Quake Pushes Forward Normalization Efforts with Syria as Assad Heads to Oman

15 February 2023, Syria, Damascus: A photo released by the official Syrian Arab news agency (SANA) on 15 February shows Syrian President Bashar al-Assad (R) speaking with Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman al-Safadi. (SANA/dpa)
15 February 2023, Syria, Damascus: A photo released by the official Syrian Arab news agency (SANA) on 15 February shows Syrian President Bashar al-Assad (R) speaking with Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman al-Safadi. (SANA/dpa)
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Quake Pushes Forward Normalization Efforts with Syria as Assad Heads to Oman

15 February 2023, Syria, Damascus: A photo released by the official Syrian Arab news agency (SANA) on 15 February shows Syrian President Bashar al-Assad (R) speaking with Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman al-Safadi. (SANA/dpa)
15 February 2023, Syria, Damascus: A photo released by the official Syrian Arab news agency (SANA) on 15 February shows Syrian President Bashar al-Assad (R) speaking with Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman al-Safadi. (SANA/dpa)

The earthquake that struck Syria and Türkiye two weeks ago, that left tens of thousands of people dead and left devastation in its wake, has raised several questions and critical challenges in Arab and western circles over how to respond to the catastrophe. This includes the possibility of distinguishing between Syria and the its ruling regime. It has also pushed forward efforts to normalize relations between Damascus with the Arab world and West.

The first global reaction to the humanitarian disaster was sympathy with the Syrian and Turkish people. It was nearly impossible for any country to express sympathy with Ankara without sympathizing with Damascus as well. This is a humanitarian, not a political disaster. The earthquake is not a civil war.

The main predicament was that the international recognition of the Turkish government does not extend to the same extent to the Damascus government. Yes, the latter does still represent Syria and Syrian “government” is increasingly replacing “regime” in foreign political rhetoric.

This government, however, remains suspended from the Arab League and continues to be boycotted by influential Arab and western countries. It is also still weighed down by a lengthy list of economic sanctions, accusations and damning reports against state institutions and figures over their handling of the crisis since the eruption of the protests in 2011.

The regions that were most affected by the earthquake lie outside of government control. The quake did also strike some government regions in Aleppo, Hama and Latakia.

Devastated and forgotten Syria

Syria has been abandoned and forgotten since the eruption of the war in Ukraine nearly a year ago. It has dropped from international and regional priorities. The earthquake, however, has again turned attention to the country.

A series of political contacts have been held between concerned Arab and non-Arab countries. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has also received a series of telephone calls that would have been unheard of in recent years. He was contacted by Egyptian President Abdul Fattah al-Sisi and was visited in Damascus by Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman al-Safadi. It was the first visit by a Jordanian FM to Syria in years.

On the diplomatic levels, western countries demanded the adoption of a new United Nations resolution that would reopen land borders between Türkiye and opposition-held Syrian regions. Moscow had initially mulled an exchange that would include its approval of the proposal in return for increasing western funding of “early recovery” projects in Syria.

Arab and international contacts with Damascus, however, yielded a deal: another indirect exchange. Assad continues to underline “Syria’s sovereignty over all its territories” in return for his agreement to reopen two more border crossings between Türkiye and northern Syria for three months. He agreed to the delivery of aid from government-held regions to opposition-held Idlib.

Washington also agreed to suspending some sanctions related to bank transfers for six months so as to facilitate humanitarian aid.

Further official contacts and visits between Arab officials and Assad culminated in more leniency: more aid and planes loaded with relief were allowed in Syria without extensive searches. Official field visits were carried out to quake-stricken regions. Official statements were delivered from those regions. The remarks were written on a prepared document and delivered before the cameras. They spoke of condoling the Syrians. They spoke of dialogue and expressed gratitude to “Arab brothers and friends.”

Absent from the remarks were Idlib, Hama, Aleppo and Latakia that were struck by the quake. Omitted were also mentions of “allies”, meaning Iran and Russia, and “occupation”, meaning the United States and Türkiye.

Normalization

The earthquake had mobilized normalization efforts. Arab countries that have normalized ties or were seeking to have used the disaster to intensify efforts through a series of telephone calls and visits. Assad will visit Oman and then the United Arab Emirates in the coming hours.

Some Arab countries have maintained their position towards Damascus that offers humanitarian aid to the victims and ensuring that conditions for the Syrian refugees’ return home are provided. At the same time, they continue to remind the world of Tehran’s ongoing alliance with Damascus, noting Iranian Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani’s visit to Aleppo in wake of the earthquake. He was the first official on the scene, beating the Syrians.

In Europe, the quake has exposed divisions over how to approach Damascus. Countries, such as Italy, Greece, Cyprus and Austria, that used to call for accepting the “status quo” in recent years, now believe that they are in a stronger position to press this demand.

They are now demanding that Europe reconsider its “three nos” in Syria: opposition to normalization, reconstruction and lifting of sanctions before progress is made in the political process.

Other European countries and the US have held coordination meetings in recent days to counter this argument: yes, the earthquake resulted in a humanitarian disaster that demands a response in Syria and Türkiye, but this does not mean abandoning the “three nos” and the political process.

The European division was evident in the position on a conference on Syria and Türkiye’s reconstruction that was called for by the European Union to be held late next month. Countries that have normalized ties with Damascus have called for the Syrian government to be invited and for political agendas to be dropped. They have also demanded calling off a donor conference that is set for Brussels in June. These countries have also said they were prepared to carry out direct unilateral moves with Damascus away from European consensus.

Several factors will determine how Arab and western forces approach Damascus in the coming months. This in turn will determine balances of power and alliances in Syria. One critical factor is how relief aid and funds will be delivered to the devastated region and just how committed various parties are to pledges made behind closed doors. These issues will gain significance in the coming weeks as the extent of the tragedy caused by the earthquake becomes clearer.



ISIS in Syria Eyes Revival by Exploiting Jihadist Disillusionment

ISIS members in Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)
ISIS members in Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)
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ISIS in Syria Eyes Revival by Exploiting Jihadist Disillusionment

ISIS members in Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)
ISIS members in Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)

Despite losing its last stronghold in Baghouz near the Iraqi border in Syria’s Deir al-Zor province in March 2019, the ISIS group has continued to pose a serious threat to Syria’s security and stability through its mobile sleeper cells operating across the vast Syrian desert.

With the collapse of the Syrian regime in December 2024, the group is widely expected to recalibrate its strategies and adapt to the shifting security landscape.

Neither the military campaigns waged by the former government with Russian air support nor the operations carried out by the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have succeeded in fully dismantling the group or eliminating its threat. US policy, which focused on preventing the group’s resurgence in urban areas, achieved limited success—weakening ISIS militarily and eliminating many of its top and mid-tier leaders.

However, the group continues to pose a residual threat and may exploit Syria’s fragile security environment, particularly with a US withdrawal on the horizon.

ISIS issued a rare video statement on April 20, 2025, threatening Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and warning him against joining the US-led international coalition against terrorism.

The video, one of the group’s most prominent public threats in recent months, came after Washington formally requested that the newly formed Syrian government take part in efforts to combat ISIS and its affiliates.

Since the collapse of the Assad regime on December 8, 2024, ISIS has intensified its propaganda against Syria’s new leadership, with a noticeable uptick in incitement campaigns published in its weekly newsletter Al-Naba, monitored by Asharq Al-Awsat.

The militant group has launched scathing attacks on al-Sharaa and his administration, accusing the new government of betraying Syria by seeking stronger ties with Arab states and the international community.

ISIS has branded these diplomatic overtures a “betrayal of Syrian sacrifices” and a departure from the principle of “Sharia governance,” a slogan once championed by al-Sharaa himself during his leadership of the former al-Qaeda affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra.

Blow after blow

Despite the escalating rhetoric, ISIS’s military activity on the ground—particularly in the Syrian desert—has dwindled significantly in recent months, raising questions about the group’s evolving strategy.

Since December, ISIS has suffered a string of security setbacks. Just three days after the regime's fall, Syria’s new government announced the foiling of a planned attack on the Sayyida Zainab shrine near Damascus and the arrest of an ISIS cell.

On December 16, US Central Command carried out airstrikes that killed 12 ISIS fighters. Three days later, another senior ISIS leader was eliminated in Deir al-Zor, reportedly in coordination with the new authorities.

A US strike on December 23 targeted an ISIS weapons truck, while in January 2025, a joint operation with the SDF led to the capture of a key attack cell leader. On February 16, Syrian security forces arrested Abu al-Harith al-Iraqi, suspected of planning attacks inside Damascus.

Observers believe the group’s recent silence may reflect a shift in strategy—minimizing its public footprint to reduce security pressure while regrouping quietly in rural towns and urban fringes, away from government surveillance.

Tactical shift

Over the years, ISIS has refined its guerrilla tactics, relying on swift, nighttime raids carried out by small mobile units of three to five fighters who quickly retreat to avoid detection. This hit-and-run approach has allowed the group to maintain an operational presence without the need for fixed command centers—frustrating counterterrorism efforts for more than a decade.

Now, analysts say, the group appears to be focusing on stealth and survival rather than visibility, potentially laying the groundwork for a long-term resurgence amid Syria’s fragile and shifting security environment.

In areas controlled by the US-backed SDF, ISIS has adopted a different operational model—one that capitalizes on tribal tensions and local grievances.

Tribal sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that several recent attacks targeting SDF forces were carried out by local tribesmen who are not formally affiliated with ISIS, but whose actions align with the group’s tactics of stealth and evasion.

These loosely coordinated assaults have made it more difficult to identify the true perpetrators, giving isolated acts of violence a veneer of organized insurgency. Analysts say this dynamic has created fertile ground for ISIS to expand its presence, using tribal discontent with the SDF as a cover to rebuild its influence.

Idlib’s experience and a comprehensive strategy

A senior Syrian security official, speaking on condition of anonymity, told Asharq Al-Awsat that past experience dismantling ISIS cells in Idlib has bolstered the new government's confidence in confronting the group.

“We know ISIS well—we’ve dealt with them in Idlib and succeeded in dismantling their networks, even at times when the group was stronger financially and militarily, and we were far weaker than we are today,” the official said. “Now, we are more prepared and more experienced.”

The Syrian security official also said the country’s new government is implementing a “comprehensive security strategy” aimed at preventing a resurgence of ISIS, which continues to pose a threat despite its territorial defeat.

The strategy includes rebuilding and coordinating intelligence agencies to detect sleeper cells, strengthening border control in cooperation with neighboring countries, countering extremist propaganda through public awareness campaigns and online monitoring, and dismantling supportive environments by improving basic services, fighting corruption, and expanding local development programs, the official told Asharq Al-Awsat.

The official warned that ISIS may increasingly resort to targeted attacks on prominent civilian or security figures using small explosive devices or selective assassinations.

“Inside cities, the group could activate sleeper cells to carry out such attacks and may use unregulated or informal neighborhoods as temporary hideouts,” they said, adding that such tactics present added challenges for security forces.

Targeting the new administration

Orabi Orabi, a researcher at the Dimensions Center for Strategic Studies, said ISIS is currently in a phase of “exhaustion and attrition,” seeking to establish small cells capable of disrupting security without aiming to hold territory as it did in the past.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Orabi noted that the group is facing severe shortages in manpower and funding, as well as growing regional pressure due to improved security cooperation between Syria and Iraq.

“Still,” he added, “ISIS may attempt to exploit frustration among fighters from other armed factions—especially those with jihadist backgrounds—who feel alienated by the Syrian government’s rhetoric, which has shifted away from Islamist narratives.”

Additionally, ISIS is stepping up its propaganda campaign against Syria’s transitional government, accusing it of betraying the blood of Syrians and capitalizing on lingering grievances such as delays in transitional justice, political exclusion, and perceived marginalization.

“The group is relying increasingly on inciteful rhetoric to undermine the credibility of the new administration,” Orabi told Asharq Al-Awsat, noting that ISIS disseminates its messaging through Telegram channels and covert media networks.

Social media campaigns—circulated by anonymous accounts and sympathetic groups—have also taken aim at al-Sharaa on a personal level. These include attacks on his public image, attire, and the polished persona he seeks to project as the face of Syria’s new era. Particular focus has been placed on his recent appearance with his wife during a diplomatic visit to Antalya.

Fragile transition amid internal and regional tensions

The interim government faces steep challenges in stabilizing the country both economically and in terms of security. Syria remains fractured, with tensions rising in the northeast with Kurdish-led SDF forces, lingering influence from remnants of the former regime in coastal areas, and a strained relationship with parts of the Druze community.

At the same time, the government is seeking to build international and Arab legitimacy. The United States has yet to formally recognize the new leadership, and most international sanctions remain in place. President al-Sharaa’s invitation to the upcoming Arab League summit in Baghdad reportedly came only after prolonged diplomatic negotiations.

In this environment, analysts warn that ISIS is poised to exploit the prevailing instability and security vacuum—particularly in remote desert regions where the government lacks the manpower to maintain control.

Persistent sectarian violence and unresolved local rivalries continue to offer fertile ground for extremist recruitment. Delays in transitional justice—especially in holding accountable those responsible for atrocities under the Assad regime—have further deepened public frustration.

ISIS, in turn, is attempting to present itself as an alternative force for retribution. In recent weeks, the group’s affiliated websites and propaganda outlets have increasingly framed its mission as one of justice for the victims of past abuses—seeking to fill the void left by the state’s slow-moving reforms.

Concerns are mounting that ISIS could attempt to rebuild its ranks not only through recruitment, but also by orchestrating the release of thousands of its imprisoned fighters and leaders—many of whom remain in detention under the Kurdish-led SDF, amid ongoing disputes over their fate.

This threat underscores one of the most pressing and complex challenges facing Syria’s new transitional government: the need to confront ISIS while managing competing demands of state-building, national unity, and economic recovery.

Analysts say the government must strike a delicate balance between asserting control over all Syrian territory, easing societal divisions, and weakening the ideological influence that allows ISIS to survive. That includes cutting off its financial lifelines, curbing recruitment, and deradicalizing communities that once served as the group’s support base—an effort that mirrors the transformation seen in groups like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.

Experts warn this cannot be achieved in isolation. It requires close coordination with regional and international partners to enhance intelligence sharing, freeze the group’s assets, and support stabilization efforts across the country. Without that, the resurgence of ISIS could become a defining test of Syria’s fragile transition.