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Hemedti Says Regrets Participating in Military Coup in Sudan

Deputy head of the Sudanese Transitional Sovereign Council Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo during the press conference (Reuters)
Deputy head of the Sudanese Transitional Sovereign Council Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo during the press conference (Reuters)
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Hemedti Says Regrets Participating in Military Coup in Sudan

Deputy head of the Sudanese Transitional Sovereign Council Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo during the press conference (Reuters)
Deputy head of the Sudanese Transitional Sovereign Council Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo during the press conference (Reuters)

Deputy head of the Sudanese Transitional Sovereign Council Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo acknowledged on Sunday that he had made a mistake in participating in the October 25, 2021 coup.

Dagalo made his statement shortly after head of the Sovereign Council, army commander, Lt-Gen Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, said the army had carried out the coup for the sake of the country.

It was the first time that Burhan described the incident as a coup. He had previously referred to it as "military measures to correct the course of the revolution."

In an address to the Sudanese people, Dagalo, also known as Hemedti, said he supported the 2018 revolution that ousted longtime President Omar al-Bashir and his regime.

The coup, he said, became a gateway for the reinstatement of members of the regime.

Hemedti, who leads the Rapid Support Forces, warned members of the regime against trying to drive a wedge between the army and its forces.

It was this situation that prompted him to leave politics and to hand over power to civilians, he explained.

He said that he had made this pledge to Burhan and that he would not back down from it.

Moreover, Hemedti said he was committed to the framework agreement, aimed at forming a unified army, according to the agreed timetables and engage in security and military reform processes.

He said the Sudanese Armed Forces is a long-established institution, which will not be exploited by any party. The framework agreement has laid a solid foundation to restore the state.

The agreement is a package that must be implemented in full, asserted Hemedti, adding that it was the only way to reach a fair and just political solution that takes end the current chaos in the country.

The signatories to the agreement are trying to persuade other forces to join the political process, he added.

Hemedti said it was time to end the political process, reach a final and urgent solution to form a transitional civil authority, and return the military back to the barracks so that it can devote itself to protecting borders and national security.

He reiterated his determination that the final political agreement was an entry point to reviving the stalled Juba Peace Agreement, completing the peace process, implementing all its provisions related to the return of the displaced and refugees, and providing them with the necessary protection.

Furthermore, he stated that the solution to the economic crisis depends on political stability and the formation of a civil government. He also appealed to the international and regional community to support the new government in Sudan.

Hemedti praised the efforts of the tripartite mechanism, consisting of the African Union (AU), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and United Nations. He also lauded the Quartet mechanism and the "troika" group, comprised of Saudi Arabia, the US, the UAE, Britain, and Norway.

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How Did Iraq Survive ‘Existential Threat More Dangerous than ISIS’?

Iraqi sheikhs participate in a solidarity demonstration with Iran on a road leading to the Green Zone, where the US Embassy is located in Baghdad (AP). 
Iraqi sheikhs participate in a solidarity demonstration with Iran on a road leading to the Green Zone, where the US Embassy is located in Baghdad (AP). 
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How Did Iraq Survive ‘Existential Threat More Dangerous than ISIS’?

Iraqi sheikhs participate in a solidarity demonstration with Iran on a road leading to the Green Zone, where the US Embassy is located in Baghdad (AP). 
Iraqi sheikhs participate in a solidarity demonstration with Iran on a road leading to the Green Zone, where the US Embassy is located in Baghdad (AP). 

Diplomatic sources in Baghdad revealed to Asharq Al-Awsat that Iraqi authorities were deeply concerned about sliding into the Israeli-Iranian war, which they considered “an existential threat to Iraq even more dangerous than that posed by ISIS when it overran a third of the country’s territory.”

The sources explained that “ISIS was a foreign body that inevitably had to be expelled by the Iraqi entity, especially given the international and regional support Baghdad enjoyed in confronting it... but the war (with Israel) threatened Iraq’s unity.”

They described this “existential threat” as follows:

-When the war broke out, Baghdad received messages from Israel, conveyed via Azerbaijan and other channels, stating that Israel would carry out “harsh and painful” strikes in response to any attacks launched against it from Iraqi territory. The messages held the Iraqi authorities responsible for any such attacks originating from their soil.

-Washington shifted from the language of prior advice to direct warnings, highlighting the grave consequences that could result from any attacks carried out by Iran-aligned factions.

-Iraqi authorities feared what they described as a “disaster scenario”: that Iraqi factions would launch attacks on Israel, prompting Israel to retaliate with a wave of assassinations similar to those it conducted against Hezbollah leaders in Lebanon or Iranian generals and scientists at the start of the war.

-The sources noted that delivering painful blows to these factions would inevitably inflame the Shiite street, potentially pushing the religious authority to take a strong stance. At that point, the crisis could take on the character of a Shiite confrontation with Israel.

-This scenario raised fears that other Iraqi components would then blame the Shiite component for dragging Iraq into a war that could have been avoided. In such circumstances, the divergence in choices between the Shiite and Sunni communities could resurface, reviving the threat to Iraq’s unity.

-Another risk was the possibility that the Kurds would declare that the Iraqi government was acting as if it only represented one component, and that the country was exhausted by wars, prompting the Kurdish region to prefer distancing itself from Baghdad to avoid being drawn into unwanted conflicts.

-Mohammed Shia Al Sudani’s government acted with a mix of firmness and prudence. It informed the factions it would not tolerate any attempt to drag the country into a conflict threatening its unity, while on the other hand keeping its channels open with regional and international powers, especially the US.

-Iraqi authorities also benefited from the position of Iranian authorities, who did not encourage the factions to engage in the war but instead urged them to remain calm. Some observers believed that Iran did not want to risk its relations with Iraq after losing Syria.

-Another significant factor was the factions’ realization that the war exceeded their capabilities, especially in light of what Hezbollah faced in Lebanon and the Israeli penetrations inside Iran itself, which demonstrated that Israel possessed precise intelligence on hostile organizations and was able to reach its targets thanks to its technological superiority and these infiltrations.

-The sources indicated that despite all the pressure and efforts, “rogue groups” tried to prepare three attacks, but the authorities succeeded in thwarting them before they were carried out.

The sources estimated that Iran suffered a deep wound because Israel moved the battle onto Iranian soil and encouraged the US to target its nuclear facilities. They did not rule out another round of fighting “if Iran does not make the necessary concessions on the nuclear issue.”