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Diriyah... A Starting Point, Castle of Glories, Threat to Empires

Archive photo of Diriyah’s Al-Turaif ruins in Saudi Arabia (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Archive photo of Diriyah’s Al-Turaif ruins in Saudi Arabia (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Diriyah... A Starting Point, Castle of Glories, Threat to Empires

Archive photo of Diriyah’s Al-Turaif ruins in Saudi Arabia (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Archive photo of Diriyah’s Al-Turaif ruins in Saudi Arabia (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Strong and fortified cities in the middle of the Arabian Peninsula, such as Diriyah and Uyaynah, have withstood the test of time, transforming from small towns founded in the middle of the fifth century to significant “city-states” that would later leave an impact on history.

Nestled on the banks of the Wadi Al-Ard valley, which cuts through the Tuwaiq Mountains, Diriyah occupies one of the best sites in terms of space, soil fertility, and suitability for settlement.

Diriyah was a threat and an obsession for kingdoms and empires four centuries ago. It was mentioned in Ottoman, British, and Persian archives and the writings of countrymen and travelers. It was popularly regarded in the first Saudi state as a rising power in the Arabian Peninsula.

“If an attack is not launched against it (Diriyah), then it will be able to defeat all the kingdoms,” era leaders would say, prompting a foreign invasion that would later destroy the historical city-state.

Centuries ago, Diriyah was a vital station on the caravan route that extended from the Red Sea to the Gulf of Basra.

Diriyah was famous for its beautiful stone-built homes. Teeming with mosques and schools since ancient times, Diriyah was surrounded by sprawling fields of wheat and barley and palm, peach, and fig groves.

It was also known for raising Iraqi purebred Arabian horses, whose fame reached kingdoms and other countries.

As the first capital of Saudi Arabia, Diriyah laid the building blocks for establishing the Saudi state. From Diriyah, Imam Muhammad bin Saud launched an integration project that would transform the city-state into a comprehensive state and bring the entire Arabian Peninsula under a united and stable political umbrella.

Diriyah is one of the most ancient Najdi cities, as it was founded on the banks of Wadi Hanifa in 1446.

Mani’ al-Muraydi worked hard to build and establish Diriyah as one of the strongest independent emirates of Nejd. Diriyah played a significant role in securing pilgrimage routes and transit trade from the east of the Arabian Peninsula to the west.

Several princes successively ruled the city of Diriyah until Imam Muhammad bin Saud, the founder of the first Saudi state, came to power in 1727.

As a city-state, Diriyah relied on its capabilities and good governance policies to emerge as the most suitable place for creating a state that includes most parts of the Arabian Peninsula. Prosperity and development were critical themes for Diriyah in the middle of the eighteenth century.

After recognizing education as a conduit for impacting change, Saudi imams transformed Diriyah into a center for attracting scholars and students alike. Diriyah’s Al-Turaif and Al-Bujairi neighborhoods became a prominent hub for knowledge and scholars.

Books and teaching circles spread in mosques, scholars’ homes, and public markets. This activated a writing, scientific and cultural movement.

As a capital, Diriyah attracted delegations of countries and tribes that pledged allegiance to Saudi imams. This expanded its influence and increased its strength, status, and importance, shaping it as a center for managing the state’s political, administrative, and military affairs.

Citizen Engagement with Leadership

Imam Muhammad bin Saud’s determination to achieve change in the Arabian Peninsula after he assumed power in 1727 saw him launching a unification project for Najd.

Spanning the heart of the Arabian Peninsula, Najd suffered from political divisions and significant disintegration among the people. This made unification one of the most difficult and trying challenges that would take a long time to be achieved.

The founding imam, however, gained victories after personally supervising the building of a strong army of citizens who believed in him and his new vision.

Imam Muhammad bin Saud trained the people, financed them with money and weapons, and took over their leadership. His leadership gave great moral support to the army.

The founding imam managed to convince different segments of society to join his unity project.

Imam Muhammad bin Saud would send an invitation from Diriyah to the countries and tribes affiliated with him to participate in the unification operations, and they would, in turn, promptly send a group of cavalry and soldiers to the place of battle.

After the unification of Najd, campaigns were launched toward other regions in the Arabian Peninsula under the era of Imam Abdul Aziz bin Muhammad, who was able to prepare and deploy a solid army to annex Al-Ahsa region in 1796.

Under Imam Saud bin Abd Al-Aziz, the state could unite most of the regions of the Arabian Peninsula until the state crowned the unity project by annexing the Hijaz in 1805.

Under the first Saudi state, the Arabian Peninsula enjoyed political and security stability, and economic and scientific life flourished. They had a close relationship with their wise leadership.

The people regretted the end of the first Saudi state and the return of conditions to what they were before its establishment.

Nevertheless, after seven years, they gathered and backed Imam Turki bin Abdullah in reestablishing the Saudi state in 1824. The people would later support Imam Faisal bin Turki in the unification process once again.

In 1902, King Abdulaziz returned to Riyadh with a determination to rebuild the state and advance it to the ranks of modern, developed countries after conditions there had deteriorated greatly.

A political vacuum followed the fall of the second Saudi state. But as soon as King Abdulaziz announced Saudi rule anew in the capital, Riyadh, countries and tribes offered allegiance to him, expressing their support for the unification operations he was leading.

Saudis gave their lives and money in service of their homeland until King Abdulaziz announced the establishment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932.

The current Saudi leadership, under directives of King Salman bin Abdulaziz and the direct follow-up and supervision of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, has put forward a project to rehabilitate and develop Diriyah and preserve its historical and cultural heritage.

The project is considered the largest heritage project in the world and has gained local, regional, and international fame. Diriyah is destined to become one of Saudi Arabia’s most remarkable landmarks and tourist destinations. It will restore its former glories and tell the world the story of a promising small town that once turned into the capital of the first Saudi state.

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The End of a Forced Coexistence: Arab Tribes Turn Against the Syrian Democratic Forces in Eastern Syria

Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)
Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)
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The End of a Forced Coexistence: Arab Tribes Turn Against the Syrian Democratic Forces in Eastern Syria

Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)
Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)

In Syria’s vast northeastern areas, a brittle arrangement has for years held together an uneasy coexistence between the Arab tribes and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). But today, that arrangement appears closer than ever to unraveling, as mounting grievances and shifting regional dynamics converge to end what many tribal leaders now call a “forced coexistence.”

Over the past months, prominent Arab tribal leaders have stepped up their denunciations of the SDF, accusing it of discrimination, repression, and siphoning off the region’s natural wealth. These tensions have erupted into public declarations, including a striking statement in early July, in which elders from major tribes in Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa, and al-Hasakah demanded that the US-led international coalition end its support for the SDF.

From Tactical Alliance to Deep Estrangement

When the SDF first emerged in 2015 - formed largely by the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) but incorporating Arab and Christian militias - many Arab tribes regarded it as a necessary partner against ISIS. After all, the militant group had rampaged through tribal lands, massacring communities and imposing draconian rule. For a time, this partnership worked: from 2015 to 2017, tribes like the Shammar, Baggara, and parts of the Aqeedat fought shoulder-to-shoulder with Kurdish forces in a shared struggle against ISIS.

But as the warfronts cooled, new frictions emerged. Arab leaders began to accuse the SDF of marginalizing them politically and economically, imposing ideologically charged school curricula, conscripting young men and boys, and monopolizing oil and wheat revenues.

By 2018 and 2019, large protests against mandatory conscription and perceived ethnic bias erupted across the region. Still, the SDF retained an aura of indispensability, its American backing and battlefield record insulating it from more serious challenges.
Today, that insulation is wearing thin.

The most recent wave of anger began in June 2025, when an SDF fighter shot and killed 11-year-old Farid al-Hureish in the town of Abu Hardoub. Days later, another boy, Ali al-Awni, died after SDF forces opened fire as he gathered wheat near a checkpoint. Such incidents are far from isolated. Local monitors and human rights groups have documented kidnappings, forced recruitment of minors through the Revolutionary Youth organization, and heavy financial levies on families seeking exemptions from military service.

In a recent interview, Nasser Hammoud al-Faraj, a prominent sheikh from the Boushaban tribe, said these abuses had created a “boiling point” across the region: “The people have lived for years under repression, exclusion, and humiliation,” he said. “This is not a foreign agenda; our tribes themselves demanded this declaration.”

Indeed, the July statement signed by 14 tribal dignitaries did not mince words. It accused the SDF of “systematic oppression,” destabilization, and theft of resources. Addressed to the US government, the declaration called for an end to military and political support for the SDF and for Syria’s central government to reassert sovereignty over the entire northeast.

Though much Western coverage portrays the SDF as a unified Kurdish force, it is in fact a complex coalition. Alongside the YPG, it includes Arab formations such as the Sanadid Forces - historically loyal to the Shammar tribe - and the Deir ez-Zor Military Council, which incorporated Arab fighters from the Aqeedat and Baggara. Yet these same tribal networks are now fracturing.

A dramatic illustration came in 2023, when the SDF arrested Ahmed al-Khabil (Abu Khawla), leader of the Deir ez-Zor Military Council. That move shattered remaining loyalty among many Arab factions. “From that moment, the last shreds of trust began to disappear,” says al-Faraj.

To complicate matters further, some tribes and sub-clans remain aligned with the SDF, while others are in contact with Damascus. Even within a single tribe, families may be divided: some serving in SDF structures, others quietly supporting the Syrian government, and still others advocating autonomy or neutrality.

This tangle of loyalties is not new. For generations, tribal allegiances have shifted according to local interests, personal rivalries, and broader geopolitical currents. But according to tribal leaders, the balance is tipping decisively away from cooperation with the SDF.

While recent tribal declarations have emphasized peaceful solutions, the language has also grown more menacing. Sheikh al-Faraj said plainly that if diplomatic avenues fail, tribes may pursue military action: “We do not seek conflict for its own sake,” he said. “But we cannot accept the occupation of our lands. We will act if necessary, with our own forces and with others who share our vision.”

To that end, tribal networks have quietly reorganized self-defense groups and explored links with Damascus. While the SDF still controls the bulk of the region militarily, the Syrian government has positioned itself as a potential guarantor of tribal rights and national unity.

In the past year, official Syrian media - long restrained in its references to the SDF - has begun openly condemning it as an occupying force. Even Governor Ghassan al-Sayyed Ahmad of Deir ez-Zor, typically cautious in public remarks, confirmed that Damascus retains military options: “If negotiations fail,” he warned in late June, “we have three fully prepared divisions ready to intervene.”

Strategic Calculations: Damascus, Washington, and Ankara

For the United States, this tribal rupture represents a profound dilemma. The SDF has been Washington’s main counterterrorism partner against ISIS. US officials, including Special Envoy Thomas Barrack, have repeatedly stressed that their cooperation is based on combating extremism rather than endorsing any project of Kurdish autonomy. But tribal grievances are testing this posture.

While the Biden administration has so far avoided any direct condemnation of the SDF, it has privately urged Kurdish commanders to moderate their policies. According to multiple regional sources, US diplomats have warned that continued abuses could undermine the entire anti-ISIS coalition and trigger Turkish or Syrian intervention.

Türkiye, for its part, has consistently opposed any Kurdish-led administration along its border. Turkish leaders have threatened new incursions if the SDF attempts to formalize autonomy or establish closer ties with the PKK. Analysts believe that any large-scale tribal uprising would likely draw tacit Turkish support, especially if it further weakens Kurdish positions.

To contain the crisis, the SDF has resorted to tactical concessions. In the aftermath of the 2023 clashes, it released waves of detainees, some of whom were arrested for allegedly supporting ISIS, others simply for joining tribal protests. The releases continued sporadically into mid-2025, culminating in a large-scale exchange in April: 140 SDF captives for 100 prisoners held by Syrian government forces.

While these deals have bought time, they have not erased deep resentment. Many tribes now insist that only the full restoration of Syrian state authority can bring stability.

Beyond military options, Arab tribes have begun constructing new political frameworks. In April, tribal elites announced the creation of the “Council for Cooperation and Coordination in Jazira and the Euphrates,” aimed at unifying tribal voices against what they called SDF “hegemony.” In founding statements, council leaders vowed to reject any attempt by the SDF to claim representation of Arab communities in negotiations with Damascus or in international forums.

This reflects a broader evolution in tribal political consciousness. Where once many leaders accepted limited accommodation with the SDF, they now see prolonged Kurdish-led rule as an existential threat to Arab identity, economic rights, and local governance.

The northeastern region is a mosaic. In Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa, Arabs form overwhelming majorities, organized in centuries-old confederations like the Aqeedat, Baggara, and Jubur. In al-Hasakah, the picture is more mixed: Arabs dominate much of the countryside, while Kurds are concentrated in urban centers such as Qamishli and Ras al-Ain. Christian Assyrian and Syriac communities add further complexity, as do smaller minorities of Turkmen, Circassians, and Armenians.

Any future political arrangement - whether federal, autonomous, or unitary - will have to balance these identities. The head of the Research Unit at the London-based Abaad Center for Strategic Studies, Syrian researcher Firas Faham, said: “The region is a dormant volcano. If there is no comprehensive settlement, conflict is inevitable.”

End of the Era of Forced Coexistence

In recent weeks, this metaphorical volcano has rumbled ever louder. Syrian state media and official statements now refer openly to “the occupation” by SDF forces. Behind closed doors, discussions are underway among Damascus, Moscow, and even Ankara about a possible reconfiguration of control.

Mudar Hammoud al-Assad, chairman of the Supreme Council of Syrian Tribes and Clans, told Asharq al-Awsat that the SDF’s options are narrowing: “After the American envoy clearly stated that the only legitimate interlocutor is the Syrian government, the SDF is exposed. They may face military action with tacit American and Turkish approval.”

Even if open war does not break out, tribal consensus against the SDF has never been stronger. What once was a tactical alliance, born of necessity in the struggle against ISIS, has become a marriage of deep resentment.

Despite the historical differences among the tribes, the growing resentment over marginalization, arbitrary arrests, and other grievances appears to have unified a tribal discourse demanding the return of the Syrian Army. Options remain suspended between negotiations and military confrontation, especially in light of official Syrian statements about the readiness of government forces.

This escalation places the international coalition in a delicate balancing act between supporting its ally, the Syrian Democratic Forces - whose local legitimacy is increasingly contested - and responding to tribal pressures warning of a potential explosion of unrest, something Washington does not want and is actively trying to prevent.