Amr Moussa to Asharq Al-Awsat: The Wound has not Healed, Political Miscalculation Led to Iraq's Fall

The former Arab League Sec-Gen, Amr Moussa (Getty Images)
The former Arab League Sec-Gen, Amr Moussa (Getty Images)
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Amr Moussa to Asharq Al-Awsat: The Wound has not Healed, Political Miscalculation Led to Iraq's Fall

The former Arab League Sec-Gen, Amr Moussa (Getty Images)
The former Arab League Sec-Gen, Amr Moussa (Getty Images)

Meeting the veteran diplomat, Amr Moussa, always clarifies historical events, especially that for decades, he was a maker and a witness to the course of Arab politics, whether as the head of Egyptian diplomacy (1991-2001) or during 2001-2011 when he was the Arab League Secretary-General.

In an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Moussa discussed the two decades that followed the US invasion of Iraq (2003), "the defining event," noting that its "wounds have not yet healed," and contemplating the path that led to the invasion and its impact on the Arab structure.

He reviewed the event, combining the skill of the politician, the diplomat's wisdom, the intellectual's rationality, and the enthusiasm and pain of the Arab citizen.

Amr Moussa bases his recapture of the US invasion of Iraq on a previous one, which he deems necessary for a correct understanding of the developments.

He reviewed the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (1990-1991), which "revealed the truth about Saddam Hussein's expansionist project" that afflicted the Arab system and spread a state of skepticism among the countries that Saddam sought to attract to form an Arab cover for his ambitions, namely Egypt.

Moussa believes the Arab and international coalition formed to liberate Kuwait established a new reality regarding the region's security and ended Saddam's ambitions.

He stressed that Saddam's aspirations "did not stop at Kuwait and that Syria was the next stop," adding that there were common assumptions among politicians and diplomats that he would move later towards all the Gulf states.

Profound transformations

Mousa reviewed the changes that followed the invasion of Kuwait, leading to the US invasion of Iraq, saying that September 11, 2001, was at the forefront of those transformations "which the Iraqi regime at the time misinterpreted," stressing that it changed the course of US policy and led to the use of force.

Asked whether the Arab countries were aware of the seriousness of the situation before the US invasion, Moussa explained there was clear information, some of which even appeared to the public.

He indicated that Washington was preparing for the invasion, coordinating with Iraqi opposition leaders, and the Arab intelligence services were active in this direction.

Saddam Hussein believed Washington would not carry out its military intervention, which was strange and risky.

Meanwhile, most Arab leaders either did not care about Saddam's fate or thought he had it coming and expected it, according to the diplomat.

The gates of hell

Asked about his position as a Secretary-General of the Arab League racing against time trying to avoid the US invasion, Moussa said he acted upon considerations stemming from the role of the League and its mission in defending Arab interests.

He recalled his famous statement warning of the invasion of Iraq, which he believed would "open the gates of hell."

The second path was 14 months before the invasion, when he met the Iraqi President in January 2002, confirming that "Iraq does not possess weapons of mass destruction or nuclear reactors." The meeting also stressed the need to resume visits by international inspectors.

Saddam told Moussa that he trusted his nationalism and Arabism, and that he would not conspire against Iraq.

Moussa told Saddam that he would report that Iraq did not possess weapons of mass destruction to the UN Secretary-General at the time, Kofi Annan, who told him he was authorized to speak on behalf of Iraq.

The third track was based on implementing several Arab and international consultations and plans to save the situation while the US was moving towards mobilizing global public opinion for the war, said Moussa.

Regarding the atmosphere within the Arab League during the invasion on the night of March 19-20, 2003, Moussa said the organization was in permanent session at his request.

He recalled that on the day of the invasion, the officials were following the news with mixed feelings, noting they were enthusiastic about reports of resistance. However, the comments of the former Information Minister, Mohammad Saeed al-Sahhaf, made them laugh.

"Kidnapping" Iraq

The former Sec-Gen touched on the "state of complete chaos" that Iraq entered after the invasion, believing the plan to "kidnap Iraq" and forcibly erase its Arab identity was done by political components and the neighboring countries, referring to Iran.

The Arab League played a pivotal role in bringing together all the Iraqi components for the first time. Moussa recalled his intervention to preserve the Arab identity in the Iraqi constitution, which was being discussed at the time.

He coordinated with Iraq's new leaders, regardless of their political and sectarian affiliations, aiming to preserve the Arab identity of Iraq, adding that they all acknowledged it was not in the country's interest to deny its reality.

Moussa asserted that after 20 years of the invasion, its wounds have not yet healed, noting that reconstruction requires time and the country is moving in a clear path towards reform.

Moussa called for presenting a new vision of Arab nationalism that fits the 21st century, based on the common interest.

Moussa called for a new vision of Arab nationalism that fits the 21st century based on the common interest, noting that the future should be based on common interest, reforming the conditions of the Arab citizen, and good governance.

The absence of good governance made the Arab world fertile for creative chaos, said Moussa.

Asharq Al-Awsat asked Moussa whether the invasion of Iraq could be repeated regionally, he explained that political miscalculation leads to the same results.

"It is inconceivable that anyone would commit the same mistakes and expect positive results."

He indicated the Israeli government and others are demanding to target Iran, noting that the lesson of the US invasion of Iraq remains valid for all: no ruler or state should overestimate their power.

Moussa stressed that Tehran's destabilizing behavior in the region is unacceptable, adding that reports claiming that Iran is running four Arab capitals are "an insult to Arabs."

The diplomat believes the world would witness a "cold war," whether a Western-Russian war or a US-Chinese one, adding that Arab countries are currently weak regarding global political weight.

"We must be part of a larger global movement, which is the Global South movement, and we will find countries like India, Brazil, and others next to us in this path," said Moussa, noting that these groups are still maturing.



Abubakr Al-Qirbi to Asharq Al-Awsat: Ali Abdullah Saleh Anticipated His Fate at the Hands of the Houthis

Saleh with Hosni Mubarak in 2003 (AFP) 
Saleh with Hosni Mubarak in 2003 (AFP) 
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Abubakr Al-Qirbi to Asharq Al-Awsat: Ali Abdullah Saleh Anticipated His Fate at the Hands of the Houthis

Saleh with Hosni Mubarak in 2003 (AFP) 
Saleh with Hosni Mubarak in 2003 (AFP) 

Former Yemeni Foreign Minister Dr. Abubakr Al-Qirbi reflected on the unraveling of Yemen’s political landscape following 2004, the year that marked the beginning of a complex and eventually fatal relationship between the late President Ali Abdullah Saleh and the Houthi movement.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat in the second and final part of an in-depth conversation, Al-Qirbi shares personal insights on the war, Iran’s influence, the Arab Spring, and how Yemen’s long-time ruler foresaw his tragic end.

According to Al-Qirbi, Saleh first began to see the Houthis as a threat around the year 2000, when they started building external alliances, including with Iran and Libya, and shifting from religious activism to overt political mobilization. This culminated in the first armed conflict between the Yemeni government and the Houthis in 2004.

Al-Qirbi believes the Houthis’ turn toward Iran was a direct consequence of the wars waged against them in Yemen. “They sought a protector, and they found one in Iran,” he said, noting that Tehran’s support came not only from the government but also from religious institutions.

He recounted that he personally visited Iran twice to address Yemen’s concerns, meeting both President Mohammad Khatami and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. “We stressed three things: Yemenis—Sunnis and Zaydis—had coexisted peacefully for centuries; regional peace depended on non-interference; and Iran needed to stop supporting the Houthis, even indirectly.” Tehran, for its part, assured him of its commitment to Yemen’s stability but, Al-Qirbi implied, offered little practical restraint.

Talk of Succession

Reflecting on the 2006 elections, Al-Qirbi described them as a turning point: “It was the first time Saleh truly earned his win, receiving 60 percent of the vote in a competitive race.” He insisted the process was largely free and fair, with credible international observers in attendance.

These elections, however, intensified internal political strife. There was growing suspicion that Saleh was preparing his son for succession, a rumor that dogged his later years and stirred discontent among Yemenis and international stakeholders alike.

The Arab Spring: Shock and Opportunity

Yemen, like much of the Arab world, was caught off-guard by the speed and ferocity of the Arab Spring. Al-Qirbi acknowledges that while the regime anticipated regional change - particularly after 9/11 and increased US civil society activity - the spark from Tunisia was unexpected.

“Saleh wasn’t surprised by the demands for reform,” Al-Qirbi noted, “but he questioned the method. His position was that change should come through democratic institutions, not by toppling governments.”

During the mass youth sit-ins and growing opposition movements, Al-Qirbi believes Saleh recognized the West’s shifting stance. “He realized that the US and others were now saying plainly: Saleh must go.” Despite this, the president insisted any transition should occur constitutionally, not through force.

One of the most poignant moments in the interview comes when Al-Qirbi addresses Saleh’s reaction to the downfall of fellow Arab leaders like Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak and Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi. “It deeply affected him,” Al-Qirbi said. “These were men he knew personally. Watching them fall, especially so brutally, had a profound impact.”

Saleh, according to Al-Qirbi, was aware of the cost of clinging to power.

“He could have crushed the protests with force. He had the means, but he chose not to, fearing the chaos it might unleash.” Ultimately, Saleh agreed to a Gulf-brokered deal to step down in 2011, ushering in Vice President Abed Rabbuh Mansour Hadi as his successor.

From Vice President to Rival: The Hadi Transition

Al-Qirbi was a strong supporter of Hadi’s elevation to the presidency, arguing that his long service as vice president and his lack of overt political ambition made him a natural and unifying choice. But the relationship between the two men quickly deteriorated.

“Saleh began to feel that Hadi was sidelining him from the General People’s Congress (GPC),” Al-Qirbi said. “He felt betrayed, especially when Hadi began appointing his own loyalists to represent the party in the National Dialogue Conference.”

This rift widened dramatically as Houthi forces advanced through northern Yemen. While some accused Saleh of allying with the Houthis to settle scores with political rivals, Al-Qirbi disputes this characterization. “He never truly allied with them. At best, there was a tactical understanding, and even that crumbled once they reached Amran.”

Al-Qirbi confirms that Saleh had urged Hadi to stop the Houthi advance before they reached Sana’a, a warning that went unheeded. “Saleh expected the government to act, but it didn’t. That was a pivotal moment.”

The Fall of Sana’a and Saleh’s Final Days

When the Houthis seized Sana’a in 2014, Al-Qirbi was in the city. He recalls the shock that swept through the capital as government forces surrendered without resistance. “Nobody expected it to happen so easily,” he said.

Despite forming a brief partnership with the Houthis, Saleh grew increasingly uneasy. Al-Qirbi recounts how Houthi supervisors effectively controlled ministries, sidelining GPC ministers and eroding Saleh’s influence.

By 2017, tensions reached a breaking point. As Saleh prepared to commemorate the anniversary of the GPC’s founding, Houthi forces viewed the event as a political threat. That same year, they killed him.

“Saleh anticipated it,” Al-Qirbi admits. “He understood the risks of engaging with the Houthis and sensed early on that they were not true partners.”

Al-Qirbi speaks of Saleh with a mix of admiration and reflection. “He was a flexible leader, willing to engage with enemies, and he preferred dialogue over violence. Had he been a man of force, he could have crushed the protests. But he chose restraint.”

Asked whether Saleh’s long rule prevented the building of a true Yemeni state, Al-Qirbi acknowledges both internal constraints and missed opportunities. “There were moments - after reunification, after the 1994 war, and especially after 2006 - where a stronger state could have been built. But like many revolutionary leaders, Saleh became too focused on power and too cautious to make drastic reforms.”

On Yemen’s famously complex tribal and political fabric, Al-Qirbi supports Saleh’s infamous quote likening governance in Yemen to “dancing on the heads of snakes.” He agrees, “It’s an accurate description. Balancing tribal, regional, political, and external interests is an impossible act.”

Hope for Unity?

Despite everything, Al-Qirbi remains cautiously optimistic about Yemen’s future. “Yemen must return to unity. Without it, there can be no long-term stability,” he insists. But he warns that foreign interference remains a significant obstacle. “The day Yemenis are left to negotiate among themselves is the day peace becomes possible.”

Asked whether the Houthis could be brought under the authority of a national government, he offers a realist’s view: “There are now three centers of power: Sana’a, Aden, and the internationally recognized government. None are truly sovereign in their decisions. But if dialogue is given a real chance - without outside manipulation - Yemenis will find a solution.”