Lebanon: Divorce between Aoun, Hezbollah Is Final

Hezbollah is accused of stabbing the FPM several times in the back.

Then FPM leader Michel Aoun and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah shake hands as they declare their understanding in February 2006. (Reuters)
Then FPM leader Michel Aoun and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah shake hands as they declare their understanding in February 2006. (Reuters)
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Lebanon: Divorce between Aoun, Hezbollah Is Final

Then FPM leader Michel Aoun and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah shake hands as they declare their understanding in February 2006. (Reuters)
Then FPM leader Michel Aoun and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah shake hands as they declare their understanding in February 2006. (Reuters)

A Lebanese official following the relations between former President Michel Aoun with Hezbollah said the “marriage” between them, which was held at a Maronite church in Beirut’s southern suburbs in 2006, is over.

All that is left is for them to announce the official divorce, marking an end to an alliance between two of the most opposite parties in Lebanon.

Many had believed that the understanding - signed at the Mar Mikhael church in February 2006 between then head of the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) Michel Aoun and Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah - was doomed to fail.

Even though it brought two parties that could not be any more different, their understanding turned out to be a solid alliance wherein the personal relations between Aoun and Nasrallah played a big role in consolidating it, leading to a major change in Lebanon’s political identity.

However, Aoun’s political successor, his son-in-law and MP Gebran Bassil played a major role in ruining the understanding, leading to its collapse and now, divorce.

The FPM and Hezbollah achieved major gains from the alliance. Hezbollah gained sizeable Christian cover for its arsenal of weapons, while the FPM gained unlimited support in internal files that allowed it at first to control Christian shares in governments and then state institutions. The alliance also allowed Aoun to be elected president after two years of vacuum in the country’s top post.

Ironically, Aoun’s election as president marked the beginning of the end of the alliance. As soon as Aoun became head of state, he found himself at great odds with influential parliament Speaker Nabi Berri, a major ally of Hezbollah.

Aoun believed that Hezbollah’s support to him in domestic affairs must be unlimited, but the party chose to take the middle ground and avoid confronting Berri out of its keenness on the “unity of Shiite ranks.” Aoun was very disappointed, openly informing his guests that Berri was the greatest obstacle to his presidential achievements and Hezbollah did not intervene to rein in its ally.

Aoun believes that Berri was the major obstacle that hindered the success of his term as president – an argument that many agree with. Hezbollah chose to take a “hands off” approach in internal files, prioritizing its regional role.

Berri, however, did not take a “hands off” approach. He confronted Aoun’s ambitions in state institutions. The speaker is a main political player and refused to turn into an “affiliate” to Aoun, said one of the figures close to him. The lack of “political chemistry” between Aoun and Berri was obvious to them and others from the start.

Aoun’s term in office ended with a vacuum in the presidency with political parties failing to elect a successor. The way Hezbollah is approaching the vacuum has dealt a strong blow to the alliance with Aoun.

The party is clear in backing the candidacy of former minister Suleiman Franjieh, but Bassil, now head of the FPM, has strongly rejected this choice. He believes that he has made a great sacrifice by refraining from nominating himself, calling on Hezbollah to reach an understanding with him over a “third choice”.

Nasrallah and Bassil met, with the former frankly telling him that Franjieh was their choice. Bassil strongly opposed the suggestion. Nasrallah told him to think about it, but Bassil was adamant in rejecting Franjieh.

Other points of contention were related to the caretaker government. The FPM argued that the government, in its caretaker capacity, could not hold meetings amid the presidential vacuum. Hezbollah disagreed and granted the needed quorum for the cabinet meetings to be held. Bassil was furious, striking below the belt by speaking of “honest parties who renege on the agreement, vow and guarantee.” The party was forced to respond openly to the accusation, the first time it had done so since the 2006 understanding.

The relationship between Hezbollah and the FPM was based partially on the latter’s support of the party's conflict with Israel. In return, the party would support the FPM in domestic political affairs, leading to a “balanced partnership”, as Bassil has told his visitors. An imbalance in this equation will break the partnership. On whether Hezbollah’s latest positions were viewed as a stab in the back, Bassil’s visitors said: “There are many knives in the back this time.”

Hezbollah and Bassil’s ties were never completely rosy. Bassil never shied away from criticizing the party every now and then. His biggest reservation was that the party prioritized its relations with Shiites over all else. According to Bassil, this “encouraged corruption and prevented the rise of state institutions.” Bassil went so far as to tell his visitors that Hezbollah fought for Aoun to be elected president and when he finally became so, it did not support him in the battle to build the state, abandoning him before his rivals.

Bassil’s visitors said he was clear with Hezbollah over the need to agree on another presidential candidate besides Franjieh. “If they believe he is maneuvering or seeking something else in return, they are wrong and it would be a big problem if the party believes so,” they added.

Bassil has said that the relationship between the FPM and Hezbollah was perfect. “We were capable of reaching understandings with foreign parties, while in return, the resistance [Hezbollah] would perform its duty in protecting the nation,” he was quoted as saying.

In short, Bassil believed that the 2006 understanding with Hezbollah changed Lebanon's identity and if the relations with the party were to collapse, then Lebanon’s identity will again be changed.

Hezbollah’s view

In return, Hezbollah appears unconvinced of Bassil’s justifications. An official close to the party said the divorce has happened with the party and they are now awaiting the official announcement. He stressed, however, that the announcement will not be made by the party, leaving it up to Bassil.

The official disagrees with the Aounist camp’s claims that the FPM’s support for Hezbollah gave the former free reign in domestic affairs. “They are giving the party support it doesn’t need. It is already a regional power and recognized as so by the world,” he remarked.

Internally, he said the “weight” of the alliance with the FPM “cost Hezbollah several of its Christian friends and strained its relations with other parties because it was always siding with Bassil.”

Moreover, he added that the formation of governments was obstructed on numerous occasions “just so Bassil could get what he wanted. The parliament was also obstructed just so Aoun could be elected president.”

The party is clear in saying that Bassil takes issues personally. It holds him responsible for the failure to form a new government before Aoun’s term ended. At the time, Berri and caretaker Prime Minister Najib Miqati agreed to Bassil’s conditions, but at the very last minute, the FPM leader said he would not support the new lineup even though he was to be granted shares other than those of the president and the greatest number of seats as he demanded.

Even in rejecting Franjieh’s nomination, Hezbollah believes that Bassil is taking issues personally. The official said the MP constantly tries to undermine Franjieh’s image and influence, even calling him by his first name, without any of his titles.

The official added, however, that he has not ruled out the possibility that Bassil could take advantage of the political upheaval and possibility of the United States lifting sanctions on him to emerge as a leading candidate for the presidency. Hezbollah does not have a Plan B to deal with such a scenario, acknowledged the official.



Who is Hashem Safieddine, Leading Candidate to Succeed Nasrallah?

Hashem Safieddine in a photo from 2015 (AFP)
Hashem Safieddine in a photo from 2015 (AFP)
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Who is Hashem Safieddine, Leading Candidate to Succeed Nasrallah?

Hashem Safieddine in a photo from 2015 (AFP)
Hashem Safieddine in a photo from 2015 (AFP)

Unconfirmed reports suggest that Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary-General of Lebanon's Hezbollah, was killed in an Israeli airstrike on Beirut on Friday, raising questions about who might succeed him after 32 years in power.

While the process for selecting leaders in groups like Hezbollah is often secretive, Hashem Safieddine emerges as a top contender if the rumors are confirmed.

A cousin of Nasrallah and the father of the son-in-law of Qassem Soleimani, the former commander of Iran’s Quds Force, Safieddine has been groomed for leadership since 1994.

Safieddine closely resembles Nasrallah in appearance and mannerisms. He moved from Qom to Beirut to lead Hezbollah’s Executive Council, which functions as the party’s governing body, with oversight from the late security chief Imad Mughniyeh.

For three decades, Safieddine has been a key player in Hezbollah, managing day-to-day operations and financial affairs while leaving strategic decisions to Nasrallah.

Safieddine, who has been on the US terrorism list since 2017, is a prominent Hezbollah official known for his close connections to both the military and executive branches of the group.

His relationships within the party have made him a significant player in its leadership.

Safieddine’s Strong Ties to Iran Enhance Leadership Chances

Safieddine has strong connections with Tehran, having spent years studying at the Qom seminary before being called to Beirut by Nasrallah to take on key roles in Hezbollah.

In 2020, his son, Rida, married Zainab Soleimani, the daughter of Soleimani, who was killed in a US airstrike in Baghdad that same year.

Sixteen years ago, an Iranian newspaper suggested Safieddine as a potential successor to Nasrallah, but sources indicate that the decision was made much earlier.

A former senior Hezbollah leader revealed that Safieddine was chosen about two years after Nasrallah became Secretary-General in 1992, following the assassination of Abbas al-Mousawi by Israel.

Safieddine was urgently summoned from Qom to Beirut in 1994 to take a position that allowed him to control the party’s financial and administrative operations.

His chances of succeeding Nasrallah are strengthened by their similar paths within the party, although Nasrallah, who is only two years older, carries a more significant political presence.

Safieddine has remained largely unknown in Lebanese politics until recently.

Due to heightened security around Nasrallah, he has stepped into the spotlight at party events, especially during funerals for members killed in Lebanon or while fighting alongside President Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria and other areas supporting Iran’s regional agenda.

Limited information is available about Safieddine. He was born in 1964 in Deir Qanun al-Nahr, a town in southern Lebanon, to a family with a strong social presence.

His family includes Mohammad Safieddine, a prominent MP in the 1960s and 1970s, as well as several well-known religious figures.