Lebanon: Divorce between Aoun, Hezbollah Is Final

Hezbollah is accused of stabbing the FPM several times in the back.

Then FPM leader Michel Aoun and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah shake hands as they declare their understanding in February 2006. (Reuters)
Then FPM leader Michel Aoun and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah shake hands as they declare their understanding in February 2006. (Reuters)
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Lebanon: Divorce between Aoun, Hezbollah Is Final

Then FPM leader Michel Aoun and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah shake hands as they declare their understanding in February 2006. (Reuters)
Then FPM leader Michel Aoun and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah shake hands as they declare their understanding in February 2006. (Reuters)

A Lebanese official following the relations between former President Michel Aoun with Hezbollah said the “marriage” between them, which was held at a Maronite church in Beirut’s southern suburbs in 2006, is over.

All that is left is for them to announce the official divorce, marking an end to an alliance between two of the most opposite parties in Lebanon.

Many had believed that the understanding - signed at the Mar Mikhael church in February 2006 between then head of the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) Michel Aoun and Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah - was doomed to fail.

Even though it brought two parties that could not be any more different, their understanding turned out to be a solid alliance wherein the personal relations between Aoun and Nasrallah played a big role in consolidating it, leading to a major change in Lebanon’s political identity.

However, Aoun’s political successor, his son-in-law and MP Gebran Bassil played a major role in ruining the understanding, leading to its collapse and now, divorce.

The FPM and Hezbollah achieved major gains from the alliance. Hezbollah gained sizeable Christian cover for its arsenal of weapons, while the FPM gained unlimited support in internal files that allowed it at first to control Christian shares in governments and then state institutions. The alliance also allowed Aoun to be elected president after two years of vacuum in the country’s top post.

Ironically, Aoun’s election as president marked the beginning of the end of the alliance. As soon as Aoun became head of state, he found himself at great odds with influential parliament Speaker Nabi Berri, a major ally of Hezbollah.

Aoun believed that Hezbollah’s support to him in domestic affairs must be unlimited, but the party chose to take the middle ground and avoid confronting Berri out of its keenness on the “unity of Shiite ranks.” Aoun was very disappointed, openly informing his guests that Berri was the greatest obstacle to his presidential achievements and Hezbollah did not intervene to rein in its ally.

Aoun believes that Berri was the major obstacle that hindered the success of his term as president – an argument that many agree with. Hezbollah chose to take a “hands off” approach in internal files, prioritizing its regional role.

Berri, however, did not take a “hands off” approach. He confronted Aoun’s ambitions in state institutions. The speaker is a main political player and refused to turn into an “affiliate” to Aoun, said one of the figures close to him. The lack of “political chemistry” between Aoun and Berri was obvious to them and others from the start.

Aoun’s term in office ended with a vacuum in the presidency with political parties failing to elect a successor. The way Hezbollah is approaching the vacuum has dealt a strong blow to the alliance with Aoun.

The party is clear in backing the candidacy of former minister Suleiman Franjieh, but Bassil, now head of the FPM, has strongly rejected this choice. He believes that he has made a great sacrifice by refraining from nominating himself, calling on Hezbollah to reach an understanding with him over a “third choice”.

Nasrallah and Bassil met, with the former frankly telling him that Franjieh was their choice. Bassil strongly opposed the suggestion. Nasrallah told him to think about it, but Bassil was adamant in rejecting Franjieh.

Other points of contention were related to the caretaker government. The FPM argued that the government, in its caretaker capacity, could not hold meetings amid the presidential vacuum. Hezbollah disagreed and granted the needed quorum for the cabinet meetings to be held. Bassil was furious, striking below the belt by speaking of “honest parties who renege on the agreement, vow and guarantee.” The party was forced to respond openly to the accusation, the first time it had done so since the 2006 understanding.

The relationship between Hezbollah and the FPM was based partially on the latter’s support of the party's conflict with Israel. In return, the party would support the FPM in domestic political affairs, leading to a “balanced partnership”, as Bassil has told his visitors. An imbalance in this equation will break the partnership. On whether Hezbollah’s latest positions were viewed as a stab in the back, Bassil’s visitors said: “There are many knives in the back this time.”

Hezbollah and Bassil’s ties were never completely rosy. Bassil never shied away from criticizing the party every now and then. His biggest reservation was that the party prioritized its relations with Shiites over all else. According to Bassil, this “encouraged corruption and prevented the rise of state institutions.” Bassil went so far as to tell his visitors that Hezbollah fought for Aoun to be elected president and when he finally became so, it did not support him in the battle to build the state, abandoning him before his rivals.

Bassil’s visitors said he was clear with Hezbollah over the need to agree on another presidential candidate besides Franjieh. “If they believe he is maneuvering or seeking something else in return, they are wrong and it would be a big problem if the party believes so,” they added.

Bassil has said that the relationship between the FPM and Hezbollah was perfect. “We were capable of reaching understandings with foreign parties, while in return, the resistance [Hezbollah] would perform its duty in protecting the nation,” he was quoted as saying.

In short, Bassil believed that the 2006 understanding with Hezbollah changed Lebanon's identity and if the relations with the party were to collapse, then Lebanon’s identity will again be changed.

Hezbollah’s view

In return, Hezbollah appears unconvinced of Bassil’s justifications. An official close to the party said the divorce has happened with the party and they are now awaiting the official announcement. He stressed, however, that the announcement will not be made by the party, leaving it up to Bassil.

The official disagrees with the Aounist camp’s claims that the FPM’s support for Hezbollah gave the former free reign in domestic affairs. “They are giving the party support it doesn’t need. It is already a regional power and recognized as so by the world,” he remarked.

Internally, he said the “weight” of the alliance with the FPM “cost Hezbollah several of its Christian friends and strained its relations with other parties because it was always siding with Bassil.”

Moreover, he added that the formation of governments was obstructed on numerous occasions “just so Bassil could get what he wanted. The parliament was also obstructed just so Aoun could be elected president.”

The party is clear in saying that Bassil takes issues personally. It holds him responsible for the failure to form a new government before Aoun’s term ended. At the time, Berri and caretaker Prime Minister Najib Miqati agreed to Bassil’s conditions, but at the very last minute, the FPM leader said he would not support the new lineup even though he was to be granted shares other than those of the president and the greatest number of seats as he demanded.

Even in rejecting Franjieh’s nomination, Hezbollah believes that Bassil is taking issues personally. The official said the MP constantly tries to undermine Franjieh’s image and influence, even calling him by his first name, without any of his titles.

The official added, however, that he has not ruled out the possibility that Bassil could take advantage of the political upheaval and possibility of the United States lifting sanctions on him to emerge as a leading candidate for the presidency. Hezbollah does not have a Plan B to deal with such a scenario, acknowledged the official.



Proposal of Merging Hezbollah Fighters with Lebanese Army Collides with Reality

Hezbollah fighters carry the coffin of former Secretary-General Hashem Safieddine during his funeral on February 24, 2025. (AP)
Hezbollah fighters carry the coffin of former Secretary-General Hashem Safieddine during his funeral on February 24, 2025. (AP)
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Proposal of Merging Hezbollah Fighters with Lebanese Army Collides with Reality

Hezbollah fighters carry the coffin of former Secretary-General Hashem Safieddine during his funeral on February 24, 2025. (AP)
Hezbollah fighters carry the coffin of former Secretary-General Hashem Safieddine during his funeral on February 24, 2025. (AP)

Lebanese President Joseph Aoun’s proposal for Hezbollah fighters to be merged with the army has been met with skepticism and provided fodder for political debate.

Aoun had suggested that the members be merged into the military the same way militia members, who were active during the 1975-90 civil war, were merged into the army.

The proposal has not been widely welcomed given the army’s inability to accommodate so many new members for various reasons. Experts who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat dismissed the proposal as a “consolation prize for Hezbollah in exchange for it to lay down its weapons to the state.”

They stressed that it would be impossible for members of an ideological group, who have received ideological training, to be part of the army.

Aoun, the former commander of the army, said it wouldn’t be possible to form a new military unit for the Hezbollah members, so they should instead join the army and sit for training, similar to the training former militants sat for at the end of the civil war.

Member of the Lebanese Forces’ parliamentary bloc MP Ghayath Yazbeck said the army simply cannot accommodate 100,000 Hezbollah fighters.

“Even if Hezbollah had 25,000 fighters, it would be impossible to merge them into the army, whose wages are being paid through foreign assistance,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Moreover, Lebanon needs a national defense strategy that should be drafted by the military with the president and government, he went on to say. The strategy does not stipulate how many members of the army and security forces are needed to protect Lebanon.

“Once the borders are demarcated and the reasons for the war are removed, we can embark on a political solution in Lebanon and ultimately, the current number of officers and soldiers will be enough,” Yazbeck said.

Former Lebanese officer and expert in security and military affairs Khaled Hamadeh said Aoun is trying to appease Hezbollah with his proposal and persuade it to lay down its arms in line with the ceasefire agreement.

The agreement was negotiated with Hezbollah ally parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, so it has the party’s approval.

There are several obstacles to Hezbollah members being merged into the army, Hamadeh said.

“Yes, the Lebanese state had succeeded in stopping the civil war and making hundreds of militia fighters join the army and security forces. But we cannot compare that situation to the one we now have with Hezbollah,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

At the end of the civil war, militias leaders signed and recognized the national pact and announced the dissolution of the militias. They then voluntarily handed over their arms to the state and became part of the political process, he explained.

Today, Iran-backed Hezbollah does not acknowledge the ceasefire agreement and has not agreed to turn over its weapons, he noted. The party does not even recognize that it is part of the political process and that its military wing has been destroyed by Israel, so the idea of merging with the army is “out of place.”

Yazbeck also noted Hezbollah’s ideology, saying it was the “greatest obstacle to its fighters’ merging with the army.”

“The party views Lebanon as a geographic extension of Iran. This ideology still stands, and was demonstrated with Hezbollah Secretary-General Sheikh Naim Qassem’s declaration that the party will not disarm and that it is not concerned with talk about the state’s monopoly over arms,” he added.

Hamadeh echoed these remarks, saying that the civil war militias were Lebanese and took their orders from their Lebanese leaders. They chose to lay down their weapons and abide by Lebanese laws and the country's constitution.

As for Hezbollah, its takes orders from Iran and “has played dangerous military or security roles inside Lebanon and beyond,” he continued.

“Hezbollah has not declared its disengagement from Tehran. It has not declared that it will transform itself into a local political party and that it will dissolve its military wing. Once it does so, then we can talk about accommodating its fighters in the military,” stressed Hamadeh.

“How can we reconcile between a military group that follows the Wilayet al-Faqih ideology (...) and another that works under the constitution and according to democratic mechanisms?” he wondered.

Moreover, he asked: “Was the experience of merging the militias into the state’s civil and security agencies so successful that we should even be repeating it?”

Yazbeck noted that civil war militants were not really merged with the army as some would like to claim.

He explained that those who joined the security and military institutions were in a fact close to the Syrian regime, which was controlling Lebanon at the time.

“The fighters who were fighting for state sovereignty and who confronted Syrian occupation were persecuted and thrown in jail, so many were forced to flee Lebanon,” he revealed.

Furthermore, the level of discipline showed by the army does not apply to Hezbollah fighters. “Militias simply do not gel with army and the army does not gel with them either,” he stated.

Ultimately, said Hamadeh, whatever happens, Hezbollah must first hand over its weapons to the state. “Only then can its members choose to sit for assessments to enter state administrations – placing them on equal footing as other Lebanese citizens,” he added.

Hezbollah members are not isolated from society, and they must be merged, however, proposing their merger in an attempt to persuade them to lay down their arms will ultimately fail, he said.

Above all else, the party must first recognize the state and its right to monopoly over arms and decisions of war and peace, he urged.