The majority of local and foreign parties rule out the possibility of reaching an imminent political breakthrough in Lebanon that would end the constitutional vacuum in the two top positions (the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister). The failure of the solution so far is linked to sharp internal divisions and external differences.
In the first, the Shiite duo is facing a pact crisis with the majority of Christian political forces, even its long-time allies, due to their collective rejection of its presidential candidate, Sleiman Franjieh.
Added to this are two important internal factors: the first is the consensus of most of the opposition forces and the Change deputies that Franjieh represents the March 8 Forces, which means that he does not meet the qualities nor the external specifications, being part of the ruling system that is accused, internally and externally, of mismanagement of the state and corruption.
The second factor is the position of the Maronite Church towards the presidential election. Bkirki, which is keen not to position itself on any side of the two camps, cannot bypass the Christian political consensus and the general attitude towards the Shiite duo’s candidate for the presidency on the one hand, but did not give any clear signal that could be interpreted as a rejection of this candidate, on the other.
In his sermon during the Easter Mass in Bkirki, Maronite Patriarch Beshara Boutros Al-Rai called on the parliamentary blocs to elect a figure who enjoys local and foreign confidence, in order to remove all claims of the deputies’ failure and to avoid waiting for the ‘open sesame’ word.
Rai stressed that confidence in such a candidate “does not come overnight, and he does not gain it through promises and conditions dictated to him, nor by passing exams imposed by influential figures at the internal and external levels.”
He added that local and foreign trust is earned through actions, stances and achievements, far from the presidential elections.
Externally, the joint Saudi-Syrian statement issued last Wednesday, following Faisal Al-Miqdad’s visit to Jeddah, and his meeting with his Saudi counterpart, Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan, confirmed that the talks were limited to the Syrian file. This weakens the bets of the Shiite duo that the Saudi-Iranian agreement and the Arab openness to Damascus will strengthen its position in the presidential race.
It is clear that in the first part (the Saudi-Iranian agreement), Lebanon is not an urgent priority, especially with the presence of external political and economic factors that play a role in the file of constitutional elections. In fact, despite the French position in favor of the duo’s proposal, Arab and Western stances, especially Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Egypt - who are members of the group of five countries concerned with resolving the Lebanese crisis - in addition to the United States, are still adhering to the qualities and specifications of the presidential candidate, and refuse to discuss names as Paris does.
This was confirmed by the US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Barbara Leaf, and the Minister of State in the Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Muhammad Al-Khulaifi, during their recent visit to Beirut.
Leaf stressed that Washington was concerned with economic reforms and how the ruling political class would deal with the conditions set by the IMF. Her position, in its economic content, is a clear indication of the specifications that the future president should have and the extent of his commitment to the reform requirements and not the terms of the Lebanese political class that disrupt both the constitutional and economic programs.
The Qatari side, for its part, expressed its view more clearly. Majed Al-Ansari, the spokesperson for the Qatari Foreign Ministry, said upon the return of his country’s delegation from Beirut that it was “inappropriate to talk about an external party who has a preferred candidate in the Lebanese presidential elections.” He added Qatar and the Arab countries could only support the Lebanese to reach a consensus that would remove Lebanon out of its current crisis.
Accordingly, the regional breakthrough has its urgent priorities and does not necessarily directly affect the Lebanese file. The internal parties’ concerns are contradictory and conflicting, while the five countries have not decided on the French bargain proposal and the Arab and American specifications. Therefore, Lebanon remains hostage to waiting.
