Sudan's Burhan, Hemedti… a Violent End to an Old Friendshiphttps://english.aawsat.com/home/article/4276566/sudans-burhan-hemedti%E2%80%A6-violent-end-old-friendship
Sudan's Burhan, Hemedti… a Violent End to an Old Friendship
Commander of the Rapid Support Forces, Mohammad "Hemedti" Dagalo and army commander Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan. (AFP)
The armed conflict that erupted on Saturday between the Sudanese army, led by Lt. Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) headed by Lt. Gen. Mohammad "Hemedti" Dagalo, ended an old friendship and cooperation between the two men, which had started with the beginning of the conflict in the Darfur region in 2003 during the rule of ousted President Omar al-Bashir.
At that time, Hemedti formed a small army to confront armed movements in the region that were resisting the Bashir regime. Thus, he gained the president’s support. Burhan, for his part, was coordinating the army’s operations in Darfur, and started to work closely with Hemedti.
The size of Hemedti’s forces grew over time and became affiliated with the army, while maintaining a kind of independence in their leadership and operations.
This relationship strengthened in April 2019, under the pressure of the massive popular revolution that demanded the fall of Bashir’s regime. The two men agreed to overthrow the president, who was supported by the Muslim Brotherhood, and to form a military council to rule the country.
The third stage in their relationship began shortly after the coup that they orchestrated against the civilian government in October 2021, when Burhan assigned figures of the Bashir regime to key positions. Hemedti objected to the move, sparking resentment among the Islamists, who always considered him a “traitor” because he “stabbed Bashir in the back.”
The disagreement in political positions gradually developed between them, sometimes emerging in the media through indirect statements or sharp accusations.
However, the failure to form a government and the deterioration of the economic and security situation in the country, prompted the various military and civilian parties to sign a framework agreement in December 2022, which was widely accepted by civilians and important and influential parties from the international and regional communities.
Although Burhan and Hemedti signed the agreement, which provides for the transfer of power to civilians and the return of the military to their barracks, a new and stronger conflict emerged between the army and the RSF over the implementation of one of the provisions related to military reform and the integration of the Rapid Support Forces into the army.
A war of words escalated between the two sides, with the deputy head of the Rapid Support Forces, Abdel-Rahim Dagalo (Hemedti’s brother), directly addressing the army commanders who control power in the country and saying: “Our message to our brothers in the ruling authority is to hand over power to the people without further stalling.”
He added: "From now on, we will not allow the killing of young demonstrators or the arrest of politicians. We have been silent for a long time, and we don’t want to become a reason for what is happening, but we will not abandon or go back on the basic principles that unite the Sudanese people."
In response, Burhan reiterated that the integration of the RSF into the army was a necessary condition for implementing the framework agreement.
The dispute over the agreement escalated and turned into an exchange of accusations, culminating in the withdrawal of the Sudanese army and military forces from a security and military reform workshop.
Hemedti considered that the army was attempting to disrupt the implementation of the agreement and to prevent the formation of a civilian government, in order to stay in power.
The crisis reached its climax at the airport in the northern city of Merowe, near the air base of the Sudanese army, when the RSF deployed a large number of vehicles and soldiers near the base, claiming to defend their troops against any potential aircraft strikes.
Sources had told Asharq Al-Awsat that a meeting that included Burhan, Hemedti, the international forces supporting the civil transition, and the signatories to the framework agreement, decided to defuse the crisis by providing assurances to the RSF, and removing the aircraft from the air base. But the army did not abide by the agreement, prompting Hemedti to order his forces coming from the west to continue the march to both Merowe and Khartoum and deploy there.
The situation remained severely tense throughout the past week. Mediation led by multiple parties ended with an announcement that a meeting between the two men would take place over the weekend. But instead, the fighting erupted, confirming the Sudanese people’s fear of an imminent outbreak of violence.
Farouk al-Qaddoumi: We Visited Assad and He Ordered Arafat’s Release from Mezzeh Prisonhttps://english.aawsat.com/features/5053690-farouk-al-qaddoumi-we-visited-assad-and-he-ordered-arafat%E2%80%99s-release-mezzeh-prison
Yasser Arafat, Farouk al-Qaddoumi and other Palestinian officials pray at the graves of victims of a 1985 Israeli raid on the PLO headquarters in Tunis in 2001. (AFP)
Farouk al-Qaddoumi: We Visited Assad and He Ordered Arafat’s Release from Mezzeh Prison
Yasser Arafat, Farouk al-Qaddoumi and other Palestinian officials pray at the graves of victims of a 1985 Israeli raid on the PLO headquarters in Tunis in 2001. (AFP)
No history of the Arab world in the past seven decades could be written without stopping at length at the Palestinian Fatah movement. The history of the movement itself cannot be written without stopping at one of its founders, Farouk al-Qaddoumi (Abu al-Lutf), who passed away on Thursday at the age of 94.
Qaddoumi was one of the original founders of the movement in 1965, alongside Yasser Arafat, Salah Khalaf, and Khalil al-Wazir. He had moved away from the spotlight in the past 30 years over his opposition to the Oslo Accord and concern that Israel would use it against the Palestinian leadership and its people.
Before that, Qaddoumi was a prominent Palestinian figure who championed the cause as foreign minister of the Palestine Liberation Organization at international meetings. He was clear and firm in his speeches before the United Nations, Arab and Islamic summits and others.
A member of the Baath party, I asked him one day of his thoughts about Arafat (Abu Ammar) and his sole leadership of the Palestinians. He replied: “Abu Ammar is the leader of the Fatah tribe. According to our norms, the tribe leader enjoys privileges that others don't.” Whatever reservations he had about Arafat never led him to question his position as the top Palestinian leader.
I met Qaddoumi in Tunis in 1998 and will share some moments of that meeting in Asharq Al-Awsat in wake of his passing:
Early years
*How was the Fatah movement born?
Acts of resistance emerged after the occupation of Gaza in 1956. The Arab world was also being swept up in revolts from Algeria to Iraq and others. This left an impact on us. In fact, the success of the revolution in Algeria helped spur freedom fighter, “fidai”, work in our region.
Palestine’s Grand Mufti Amin al-Husseini had, during his stay in Egypt and then Lebanon, advocated for Palestinian resistance and struggle. The Higher Arab Commission existed at the time, paving the way eventually for the fidai movement. The armed struggle was also prompted by the lack of political achievements at the time.
With the dour political mood, Algeria’s independence was a beacon of hope that inspired the formation of fidai movements, and so Fatah began to take shape in Kuwait and later Qatar in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The formation of Fatah would pave the way for the formation of the PLO in 1964.
*When did you meet Arafat for the first time?
I was in Cairo in 1954. Along with Arafat, Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), and I were members of the General Union of Palestine Students. Arafat was its president. I was a student at the American university, Arafat was a student at Cairo University and Abu Iyad went to al-Azhar University.
I was a member of the Baath part, Abu Iyad of the enlightened Muslim Brotherhood and Arafat was religious but independent. We spent three years in Cairo. Arafat graduated and then headed to Kuwait where he worked as an engineer. He was followed by Abu Iyad and I worked in the health ministry. I took up positions in Libya, then Saudi Arabia and later Kuwait in 1960.
We didn’t hold meetings together. Rather, we limited our talks to bilateral contacts to maintain secrecy. I used to get in touch with Arafat, and he with Abu Iyad. Adel Abdel Karim used to coordinate our meetings. Among the Fatah founders were Abu al-Adeeb and Khaled al-Hassan.
The central committee was formed later and it began to meet as a group in 1965. For years, we made contacts with brothers throughout the region, especially Arab and Palestinian national figures, including figures in Algeria, Saudi Arabia and other countries.
Farouk al-Qaddoumi at an Organization of Islamic Cooperation conference in Malaysia in 2003. (Getty Images)
*How was the official launch of Fatah decided in 1965?
We debated whether to announce the formation of Fatah before the establishment of the PLO in 1964 or after. In the end, we decided to reinforce resistance movements and to garner Arab support for the Palestinian national identity embodied in the PLO. This facilitated the way for armed struggle and fidai operations.
The national congress was held in Jerusalem in 1964. It brought together Arafat, Khaled al-Hassan and others. It was followed by a resistance operation that called for striking water pipelines in northern Palestine. The fighters came in from the Syrian border. The operation resulted in our first prisoner Mahmoud Hijazi and first martyr Ahmed Moussa.
We later formed a “revolutionary council”, regional committees and a central committee.
*What was Arafat’s position during that time?
He was first appointed deputy to the general commander, Abu Youssef al-Najjar. He rose to general commander in 1966 and named official spokesman. I chaired the inaugural meeting of the central committee and was named its secretary.
*Where there any disputes between members during the early days of the central committee?
Fatah embodied work, ideology and organization. Meaning we enrich our thought and organization, and improve our work through operations and experiences on the ground. We used to say that carrying arms was the foundation of our work and that the purpose of carrying arms was not financial or material, but rather, it had national, moral and noble goals.
We were initially accused to roping in Egypt and Gamal Abdul Nasser in our operations. We were also accused of poorly timing our operations. We were accused of being an Arab nationalist movement. Soon, however, our armed struggle began to bear fruit and raise the morale of the people.
The Karameh battle of 1968 gave Fatah an accomplishment. With the defeat of the Arab armies in 1967, the people yearned for the formation of a revolutionary movement. People turned to Fatah and we built foundations along the River Jordan. Eventually our work became more organized and we reached out to various Palestinian groups to unite under a single banner and so, the PLO was formed with Arafat at the helm.
*How were relations with Abdel Nasser?
We always sought to establish ties with him. We tried to meet him once in late 1965 or early 1966. I was accompanied by Arafat and Mahmoud Sawda. We couldn’t manage an audience with him and instead were met with the head of intelligence. At the time, the Palestinian revolution had not yet rose to prominence and swept headlines. It was not the focus of attention in Egypt or by its president.
That changed after the 1967 defeat of Arab armies. We met with Mohammed Hassanein Haykal, who facilitated a meeting with Abdel Nasser.
Abdel Nasser loved Arafat and saw in him the spirit of Arab youths who had hope in the future. In 1969, Abdel Nasser invited Arafat to join him on a trip to the Soviet Union and so, relations between Moscow and the PLO were forged.
Syrian President Hafez al-Assad. (Getty Images)
Ties with Syria
*When did you meet Syrian President Hafez al-Assad?
We’ve known each other since the 1960s when he was defense minister. In 1966, two Fatah officers were killed during an argument in Syria. Soon after, Syrian authorities imprisoned the Fatah leadership of Arafat, Mamdouh Saidam, Walid Ahmad Nimr, al-Wazir and others. Eleven leading members were sent to jail.
Along with a colleague, I traveled to Syria to tackle the situation. We contacted Salah Jadid, Hafez al-Assad and Ahmed Sweidan. The meeting with Assad was good. The truth was that Arafat and his comrades were suspected of being members of the Muslim Brotherhood. They were surprised to learn that I was part of the Palestinian revolution and knew that I was not a member of the Brotherhood, but of the Baath party.
Arafat was jailed for some 51 days in Mezzeh prison where he came under investigation. We sought out Assad, who was defense minister. We told him that we had heard rumors that the Syrian leadership wanted to execute the detainees. “Who told you this?” he asked. We told him that they were rumors we heard in Damascus. He replied: “Please, come and receive them.” And so, we secured the release of Arafat and the others.
Later, Arafat took part in an operation from Lebanese territories and was arrested by the Lebanese army. It also arrested the Palestinian group that carried out the operation. Through Syrian mediation, we succeeded in securing Arafat’s release.
*The Syrian and Palestinian leaderships had thorny relations. What was the toughest moment that you experienced with it?
The 1976 period when the Syrian army was deployed to Lebanon was the most difficult. The “national movement” in Lebanon was opposed to the deployment. We believed that the deployment would lead to a clash with the Palestinian revolution.
*Some Palestinians accused Syria of trying to seize Palestinian decision-making.
It wasn’t about seizing this power. The Palestinian cause was the top issue for Syria and the focus of its concern, otherwise it would never have offered us what it did. Assad and Syrian officials had repeatedly said that the Palestinians control Syrian decision-making, not the other way around.
Our relations with Assad were strong and coordination was always ongoing. Assad long underscored the strategic alliance between Syria and the Palestinian revolution. He is a member of the Baath and perhaps this background allows me to understand him since we are both members of the party. At the time, more than 60 percent of Syria’s budget went to supporting the Palestinian cause.
*Did Assad have reservations about the Palestinian resistance in Lebanon?
Not until the clash happened with the Syrian army. That prompted the question: Why did the Palestinian resistance oppose the deployment of the Syrian military? Assad is a calm, patient and persevering person. He listens to everyone and can discuss several issues at length. He has the patience that is lacking in several leaders and heads of state.
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein receives Farouk al-Qaddoumi in Baghdad in 2002. (Getty Images)
Ties with Iraq
*What about your relations with Saddam Hussein?
We met Saddam in Cairo and used to travel to Baghdad, which had opened its doors to us after the Karameh battle. We even opened offices in Baghdad. Sabri al-Banna's (Abu Nidal) defection from Fatah though, created tensions between Iraq and the PLO.
*It was believed that the Iraqi leadership was influencing Banna.
Yes, we also sensed that. But Iraq acted out of a clear political vision. Iraq never hides its stances.
*What about Saddam?
He tried to understand who he was speaking with him. He was calm and focused on the person talking to him. He was never severe in dealing with us. Our requests were quickly met. He was generous with us and even more so after he became president. Iraq gave us so much. Iraq offered the PLO greater support after it was forced out of Beirut. The tensions between the PLO and Syria also helped bring us closer to Baghdad.
*Was Iraq a main backer of the PLO?
The truth is Saudi Arabia was. It provided us with so much. We must be fair in saying that Gulf countries helped the Palestinian people a lot.
