Three weeks into the war between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces, it is clear that Sudan is the only loser, as there are no real signs of an imminent political solution to resolve this crisis, in which five armistice agreements have already been broken.
Despite the scale of the crisis in Sudan, it offers an array of lessons for the region, its states, parties, and factions, as well as the international community. We must reflect deeply on these lessons, some of which are patently evident and others that we must constantly reiterate, though they are fundamental and obvious.
One lesson is that wherever there are armed groups who are not controlled by the state, they gravely undermine the state. Indeed, the Arab countries in which such non-state actors operate will inevitably see new conflicts erupt so long as armed groups operate outside the purview of the state or even in parallel to it.
This is what happened in Yemen, and now we see the same thing unfolding in Sudan. Other Arab states could well have to contend with this threat soon. Unfortunately, the list includes Lebanon, Iraq and Syria, if we can really call them states at all. The scenes from Sudan, which we had previously seen in Yemen, suggest that this fate is inevitable so long as non-state actors are active in a given country.
The other lesson is that what has falsely been dubbed the Arab Spring (Syria is an exception in terms of the circumstances) demonstrates that none of those who had cheered for this so-called “Spring” succeeded. Nonetheless, not everyone who had been enthusiastic about them at the time has understood the lessons it taught us.
Here, I am addressing the forces who expected the winds of democracy to blow as soon as the leader of their country’s regime was changed. Some of them were genuine, but they were dreamers. Others were well aware that this would not happen but had ulterior motives. The most prominent of these motives was a pure drive for power, as was the case for the Muslim Brotherhood.
Some expected the mere fact of protesters taking to the streets to generate enough momentum to compel the military to return to their barracks, and this did not happen. Others bet on the support of neighboring countries, as was the case for many of the Syrian opposition groups that put their hopes on Turkey, specifically those tied to the Muslim Brotherhood. This also failed.
One lesson that should be noted by the international community, both its states and its institutions, is that it has failed to grasp the extent of the imbalance in our region. Here, war is easier than peace, rivalry is the foundation of the relationships, and rifts are always seen as the solution. Indeed, our region has not learned from all of its experiences with war and crisis.
Indeed, it is not only the region but also the West that is to blame. In fact, the West has no real vision for the region; here, I am talking about strategy. I am not talking about tactics and maneuvers embarked upon to further electoral interests, but a vision that accounts for the fragility of peace and stability in this part of the world.
The mistake that the international community made is that it continues to address crises, like that currently raging in Sudan and the one that preceded it in Syria, with extreme naivete. Its approach is far removed from reality. I do not see, for example, how the West or the United Nations could possibly manage to bring the army and Rapid Support Forces back to the negotiating table through statements at this point.
I do not see how these statements could bring the belligerents in Sudan an inch closer to returning to their barracks or push them to hand power over to civil society. It is difficult to understand how anyone could expect to see such a scenario unfolding. Sudanese civil society is equally puzzling; it has yet to understand that the soldiers in battle know they will end up in either a palace or a grave!
In conclusion, there is a real threat to the Sudanese state that demands unequivocal positions.
