UN Envoy Says Syria at ‘Critical Time,’ Needs to Act

The United Nations Special Envoy for Syria Geir Pedersen. AFP
The United Nations Special Envoy for Syria Geir Pedersen. AFP
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UN Envoy Says Syria at ‘Critical Time,’ Needs to Act

The United Nations Special Envoy for Syria Geir Pedersen. AFP
The United Nations Special Envoy for Syria Geir Pedersen. AFP

The United Nations Special Envoy for Syria Geir Pedersen has lauded the Arab initiative on Damascus, stressing the importance of taking it into consideration along with the Moscow track and the American and European stances to move forward in finding a political solution in Syria.

In an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Pedersen said that we are “at a very critical time,” adding that Damascus should use this opportunity to move towards a settlement.

 

Here is the full text of the interview:

 

The Arab summit will be held in Jeddah with President Bashar Assad attending for the first time since the Arab Summit in Libya in 2010. What does it mean to the UN Special Envoy to see this?

Let me start by reminding that we have now been searching for a political solution to the crisis in Syria for 12 years. We know the problems are extremely deep and that there is no easy solution, but at the same time we also know that there is a sort of an agreed international consensus that Security Council resolution 2254 should serve as a basis for finding a political solution to the crisis.

We also know that despite the fact that we have had this agreement on 2254, the political process has not really been able to deliver, let’s be frank and honest about this. We know there is obviously no short cut for a political solution to this crisis but at the same time we should welcome renewed diplomatic attention to Syria and we are seeing when it comes to the Arabs, there has been important initiatives. We saw the meeting between the four Arab foreign ministers and (Syrian) Foreign Minister (Faisal) Mikdad in Amman on May 1 and then we are seeing lots of different meetings in Moscow and the last meeting was at the foreign ministers level between the Russians, the Iranians, the Turks and the Syrian foreign ministers. Prior to that we saw meetings on Ministers of Defense levels. There are things happening, but of course what is important to remember is that after 12 years of war and conflict, we had an additional dimension with the tragedy of the earthquakes and the reality is that the situation on the ground in Syria has not changed. We are seeing a lot of important diplomatic symbolic moves but this has so far not led to any real changes for the Syrian people on the ground. And this I believe is the chance that we all need to address together.

Let me just emphasize that obviously and I said from day one that if we are to find a solution to this crisis, we need the cooperation of all actors. We need the Syrian parties, the Astana players, the Arabs and the US and Europe also to be part of this. But now the reality is that a comprehensive solution to this crisis is not possible for now. That of course should not prevent us from trying and more time. What I see increasingly is that despite this fact, status quo is not acceptable so we need to find a way to move forward. I do believe that what we see among our Arab friends and from the meetings in Moscow is indeed that there is an agreement that status quo is not acceptable. The good news here is that the Americans and the Europeans I am talking to also agree on that, so we have the consensus. Then the question becomes what does this actually mean?

All these diplomatic moves as you said in Moscow, between the Syrians and the Iranians, between the Arabs and Damascus, do they make your mandate to achieve 2254 easier?

My hope is indeed it will lead to build some confidence and build on that confidence to be able to see concrete steps being taken in Syria that can be the beginning of implementing 2254. As you know, I have suggested what I call ‘step-for-step’ approach. Based on the understanding I just explained, I have been engaging my Arab friends, the Astana players but most importantly of course the government of Damascus on this. What we are trying to do is to agree on what we call concrete mutual and reciprocal steps that could be taken to try to unlock progress and to move the political process forward. These steps, and this is extremely important, must be very viable and implemented in parallel. Obviously, the reason we want to do this is to try to build confidence and see if we can change the realities on the ground. I highlighted few issues that should be part of such process.

Give us some examples.

Obviously we all know that the file of abductees and missing persons is extremely important and then the file of building conditions for safe dignified return of refugees is of course very important and if we are discussing that, overall we need to address protection issue, to discuss conscription, housing, land and property issues and what I call signal documentation. We also need to put on the table how we can restore socio-economic conditions and this issue became even more important after the earthquakes and part of this means addressing the issue of sanctions. Obviously, what it takes to deliver is all parties participate and put the issues on the table. Here frankly speaking from the dialogues we had so far, I see there are some overlap between the different initiatives, there are complimentary things that we could be doing and there are of course also some differences which should be no surprise to anyone.

I do believe that what we have seen in Moscow and with the Arab initiative that all of this could be a ‘circuit breaker’, the beginning of a possible development and I also said that it is extremely important that the government in Damascus uses this opportunity to engage and that is of course if what we need to see this process move forward.

As you mentioned, ‘step for step’ is sort of a part of the political and diplomatic initiative and this approach has been mentioned in Amman statement, do you think that those initiatives are really willing to engage seriously with this ‘step for step’ approach or just a lip service?

I have a good dialogue with the Arab foreign ministers, I also have with foreign minister Mikdad. I think they all understand very clearly what the key challenges are when it comes to solving the Syrian conflict. The reality on the ground is still there, it is a deeply divided country, there are different entities still controlling different parts of Syria, we have an economic and humanitarian crisis and there are still the challenges of terrorism. I know of course from our friends the issue of the Captagon, all these issues are complex and it need proper understanding and proper engagements. We can work together on this, and I am hearing very positive messages from the Arab foreign ministers about their intentions to work closely with me and the UN to address these issues and after the Arab summit I am looking forward to how to develop this further.

The same of course goes for the Astana players. I am still in close contact with Russia, Iran and Türkiye and there are also overlaps between what they are discussing, what the Arabs are discussing and what we are discussing. It is important that we continue to coordinate, we share information and based on this and the understanding that no one actor can solve the crisis alone. We need all actors to be part of this, to participate. This goes for the Arabs, for the Turks, Iranians, Russians, Americans and Europeans. I see my role as being able to contribute in one way or another to bring different parties to share, to put on the table something that can move the process forward and help change the reality on the ground in Syria.

Is it true that there is a timetable that some Arab countries are expecting Damascus to take certain steps on certain issues?

Let me not talk on behalf of my Arab friends, you have to ask them about how precisely they want to move forward. We had very good discussions so far and hope to continue to deepen the dialogue and have a follow up that would enhance and strengthen the different initiatives launched.

None of us are to have any illusions that this is easy. It will take a lot of hard work but hopefully the reality on the ground, the enormous needs in Syria that have been there for a long time now but even bigger after the earthquake, that it is more important than ever that we come together and see if there is a serious interest in moving forward in a manner that is reciprocal and is very viable and can have in parallel.

There is a gap at least for now, we see Arab normalization with Damascus and the Syrian government and at the same time the western countries, the Americans and specially the Congress are moving in a different direction, trying to impose and tighten the sanctions on Syria. As UN special envoy for Syria, does this make your mission easier or more difficult?

You are absolutely right, there is still a deep division in the international community when it comes to Syria. There is no doubt about it. You are right that we are seeing lately a renewed debate brought in Washington and European capitals on how to continue engaging in this process. My impression is that they all understand and all support the concept of the ‘step for step’ process. If we can see that Damascus now really engages in this process, this will give us a renewed opportunity to move this process. A ‘step for step’ process means that all parties deliver something concrete so that we can move forward.

A source mentioned that the approach is that we offer Damascus incentives and Damascus has to offer something in return, in terms of Captagon, the return of refugees, political process and we need to see concrete steps in the upcoming four to six months. If there is no response, then the western countries will be even tougher on Damascus than now.

The western countries should answer you directly. For me, the situation is we have now had 12 years of war and conflict, things need to change and we are seeing an initiative from the Arabs, the Turks, the Astana format, this creates a real opportunity to move the process forward. We now need to see Damascus respond positively to this. If this is not happening, the reality is that the economic and social situation in Syria will continue to deteriorate and the call for political solution will be further diminished and it will be a disaster for all of us. We are indeed at a very critical time.

I notice that I am hearing positive statements from the Arabs when it comes to have new meetings for the Constitution Committee. In Amman they stated that it is important for the Constitution Committee to meet as soon as possible. I am hearing the same from the Astana players. One easy first step should be to reconvene the Constitution Committee in Geneva. That is really one first small step that should be taken. Then it will be possible for me to follow along with the follow up committee from the Arab League and discuss precisely how to move forward, in the same manner as I am having concrete discussions with Türkiye, Iran and Russia and indeed with Americans and Europeans.

This is the unique role of the United Nations, I can talk to everyone and I can bring something to the table that no one else can bring.

Some people are saying that actually the Moscow quadruple track - Iran, Russia, Syria, Türkiye - is a substitute for Astana process and that the Arab track with Damascus is a substitute for Geneva process. Some people are saying that the big victim out of these processes is the UN sponsored process, whether it is the Constitution Committee or 2254. What is your response to this?

These processes have a potential: The Arab initiative, the Moscow track. If it starts delivering, then nothing will be better and I could see that as a support to what we are trying to achieve which is to move the situation in Syria forward in a manner that we can start to see what I call a safe home and neutral environment emerging that will enable us to move forward also on the political process. As I said, all of these initiatives are important but if we really want to see a move forward, we need to have a comprehensive view both on what it requires to change when it comes to Syria, what it requires of international engagement to move forward in Syria and none of this will be easy, but there is now an opening, a possibility but this possibility must be grasped by the government in Damascus.

For you as UN special envoy what are the next steps that you are going to work on?

We are now studying very carefully what is happening on the Moscow track, the Arab initiative, the situation after the earthquake, UN coordination, and based on all this, I have been active lately in my engagement with different key interlocutors. We will try to make sure that we develop this in a manner that can enhance the possibilities of success with the Syrian parties, with the Arabs, with Moscow, with Washington and with the Europeans. It is a huge challenge but without all being interactive together the process will stall. My job is to try to prevent that of happening. So far, the messages I am receiving in particular from my Arab friends are promising.

Until now we have not seen big progress, big change on the ground, what will you tell the Syrian citizens whether they are in Damascus, Idlib, Qamishli, in Lebanon, Jordan, Frankfurt, Paris, London... How can you convince them that actually what we are seeing now will contribute to improving their situation?

After 12 years of war and conflict, the political process so far has not delivered. I understand there is a lot of skepticism and cynicism towards the possibility of seeing a real change. What we are seeing now are important symbolic political moves, but nothing has changed when it comes to the situation on the ground in Syria. What my team and I revert together with all the UN colleagues to try to achieve is that we will see a beginning of a change to this. We will see that reality on the ground is changing and if that is not happening, we are risking continued years of war and conflict, a deterioration of the economic and social foundations in Syria. People are deprived of even hope to see these necessary changes that we need to see if Syria is to return to a situation where people can live in a situation that is safe and calm, and those refugees who want to return can return to their homes and those who are displaced can return to their homes. There needs to be a healing in the Syrian society and I notice from the Arab friends that there is talk about the need for a national reconciliation. Let us hope that this can be the beginning of something new. Are we guaranteed success? Absolutely not. But we should welcome that people are trying to do something. As I said, status quo should not be acceptable.

Some of the political opposition feel that they are abandoned, are they right in this feeling?

The reality is of course that we are seeing a lot of diplomatic moves. If these moves lead to changes on the ground in a manner that will move the process forward, I am sure then it will be welcomed by everyone and this is what we need to see. As I said, I understand the skepticism and even the cynicism to whether this is possible or not. How the opposition sees this, I think you should ask them directly.

In January 2014 there was Montreux conference sponsored by the UN to implement Geneva communique, in December 2015 there was another conference in Vienna which led to 2254. Now in 2023 are we going to see something similar like a big conference in your presence to discuss a political solution in Syria?

How practical what will happen it is too early to say, but your point is a good point and it is what I have tried to reinforce through my discussion with you today and that it is for this to move forward one way or the other. All these different initiatives need to come together. I need to make sure that I have all the key actors on board, obviously the Syrian parties, the Astana players, the Arabs, the Americans and the Europeans. I can reassure you that I will do my utmost so that we will be able to move along those lines.



Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Tried to Assassinate King Hussein with Missile Given to Wadie Haddad

King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Tried to Assassinate King Hussein with Missile Given to Wadie Haddad

King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).

In the second installment of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Jordanian prime minister and intelligence chief Ahmad Obeidat recounts details of a missile plot to assassinate King Hussein, which he says was backed by Muammar Gaddafi and carried out through operatives linked to Wadie Haddad, head of the external operations arm of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

Obeidat, who also served as head of intelligence and as minister of interior and defense, revisits the confrontation between Israeli forces, the Jordanian army, and Palestinian guerrillas (fedayeen) in the border town of Karameh in March 1968, asserting that the Jordanian army “decided the battle,” but suffered a “moral defeat amid the fedayeen’s claims of victory.”

Obeidat died earlier this month. The interview was recorded before the “Al-Aqsa Flood,” whose aftermath delayed its publication. Below is the text of the second installment.
 

King Hussein inspects an Israeli tank left behind by occupying forces during the Battle of Karameh (Getty)

“Battle of Karameh”

Obeidat calls Karameh “a pivotal point of utmost importance,” especially for an army still reeling from the 1967 defeat and its withdrawal from the West Bank.

“The army lived the bitterness of that defeat,” he says. “It felt a moral, national, and pan-Arab responsibility.”

Karameh, he argues, offered a chance to restore the army’s fighting morale and reclaim some of its lost dignity.

“It was the army that settled the battle,” Obeidat says.

He credits Jordanian forces with thwarting Israeli attempts to build crossing bridges, destroying their vehicles on Jordanian soil and forcing, for the first time in Israel’s history, a request for a ceasefire. “The late King Hussein refused,” he adds.

Israel, he says, did not acknowledge a fifth of its casualties. Helicopters were evacuating the wounded who were “dripping with blood.”

He singles out artillery observation officers who advanced to the closest possible positions, relaying precise coordinates even as they effectively marked their own locations for shelling.

“The Jordanian soldier would identify his position near the Israeli army to be shelled,” he says, describing a willingness to die in order to restore dignity after the 1967 setback.

He says the declaration of “armed struggle” effectively erased the army’s role, presenting Palestinian fedayeen as the victors over Israel. “They monopolized the victory and ignored the army’s role entirely,” Obeidat says. “We emerged with a moral defeat in the face of their claims.”

He alleges that hundreds of millions of dollars in donations collected afterward, much of it going to Fatah, did not reach the Palestinian people but went to organizations and their leaders.

When the army entered Amman in September 1970, Obeidat says, it aimed to end what he describes as chaos: armed displays, roadblocks, arrests of soldiers on leave and interference in courts.

"When the army entered and began expelling the fedayeen from Amman, it swept through everything in its path. Even my own home, which I had recently rented after my abduction incident and which was close to the army’s command headquarters, was entered by the Jordanian army to search for fedayeen, while my family was inside the house at the time of the raid. My wife told them that her husband was an intelligence officer, but the Jordanian soldier replied, “Don’t lie.”

Obeidat says they did not leave the house until she contacted him, at which point he assigned one of his officers, the commander of an intelligence company, to speak with the army.

"Only then did they leave the house. The point is that the army swept areas without distinguishing between Jordanian and Palestinian; it wanted only to restore control over security. All of this forced me to send my family to my parents’ home in Irbid, in the north of the Kingdom."

He later describes what he calls a “state within a state,” extending from the Jordan Valley to Amman, after armed groups asserted authority over courts, roads, and civilian life.

On Syria’s intervention, Obeidat says Syrian forces entered northern Jordan flying Palestine Liberation Organization flags.

He later learned the decision was political, taken by the Baath Party, and that then-Defense Minister Hafez al-Assad complied reluctantly before Syrian tanks withdrew.

Iraq, he says, did not intervene. Obeidat affirms that he was told by Iraqi officials that neither the Iraqi state nor its forces intended to participate in any operation aimed at ending the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan.

According to one account, Iraqi leaders did not want to shoulder the political and diplomatic burden of the Palestinian issue or risk an uncalculated adventure.

He recounts another account, which he says he cannot adopt, according to which the operations command in the army was handled by a Pakistani figure. Under this account, Zia ul-Haq was receiving operational communications and sending messages that caused confusion among Iraqi and other forces, leading them to believe they would confront powerful strike units, prompting them to remain in a state of alert rather than engage.

He also recalls a meeting in which Palestinian figures, including Abu Iyad, reproached Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr. Al-Bakr replied: “We are a state with one life. If we make a fundamental mistake, we end. You are like cats with seven lives.”

As director of intelligence, Obeidat says he dealt directly with operations attributed to Haddad.

Between 1975 and 1977, he says, a missile was sent to Jordan with a group led by a Jordanian, Brik al-Hadid, affiliated with the PFLP. The target was King Hussein’s aircraft.

“The intention was to strike the plane, with Gaddafi’s knowledge and approval,” Obeidat says.

Jordanian intelligence monitored the group from the outset and later arrested its members. The king’s aircraft departed Marka military airport as scheduled but flew in the opposite direction to its planned route as a precaution, using jamming devices against any incoming missiles.

When confronted by Mudar Badran, then head of the Royal Court, Gaddafi denied knowledge. “I have no information,” Obeidat quotes him as saying.

Obeidat describes the aircraft hijackings orchestrated by Haddad as “the straw that broke the camel’s back,” contributing to the army’s intervention.

He says Jordanian intelligence had infiltrated Fatah and monitored its leaders, including Abu Iyad and Abu Yusuf al-Najjar.

In mid-1972, intelligence learned that Abu Dawood and a group were planning to enter Jordan from Baghdad to seize the Jordanian cabinet during a session and hold ministers hostage in exchange for the release of detained Fatah members.

The group crossed in three Mercedes cars, dressed in traditional Arab attire, with weapons concealed inside the seats and forged passports in hand. They were arrested at the border after a thorough search.

Obeidat rejects claims by Abu Iyad that Abu Dawood was tortured, insisting that “not a single hair on his head was touched,” and says Abu Dawood confessed only after realizing the operation had been fully uncovered.

Later, King Hussein met Abu Dawood’s parents, who pleaded for clemency. The king read the full confession and then met Abu Dawood himself. He ultimately ordered his release, honoring a promise he had made to Abu Dawood’s parents.

In Obeidat’s view, Abu Dawood was affected by the king’s treatment of his parents and “did not pose any future threat to Jordan.”

Obeidat describes a direct relationship between King Hussein and the General Intelligence Department.

The king met with officers regularly, not only to hear briefings but also to hear their personal views. 

Obeidat says he would submit reports to the prime minister and also meet with the king. When addressing the king, however, it was sometimes necessary to elaborate verbally on certain issues so that such information would not circulate among staff. 

When he was asked to present a security briefing before the king, the late King Hussein would summon Crown Prince Hassan. The king’s advisers would also attend, along with senior army commanders, the public security leadership, the head of the Royal Court, and the prime minister. The briefing of the security report would include an explanation of the security situation and any external or internal challenges.

 


Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Mystery Sniper Killed Wasfi Tal

Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Mystery Sniper Killed Wasfi Tal

Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Former Jordanian Prime Minister Ahmad Obeidat, who died earlier this month, was both a key player and a witness to sensitive chapters in his country’s history.

Obeidat began his career in the 1970s as an assistant director of intelligence, later serving as head of the General Intelligence Department until 1982. At the height of the Palestinian-Jordanian confrontation, he was abducted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine before the events of September 1970.

He also served for two years as interior minister before King Hussein appointed him prime minister in early 1984, a post he held until April 1985, concurrently serving as defense minister.

For more than 15 years, Obeidat remained at the center of decision-making. He later took on roles drawing on his legal background, from chairing the Royal Commission that drafted the National Charter in the early 1990s to serving in human rights and judicial positions, most recently as head of the board of trustees of the National Center for Human Rights until 2008.

Weeks before Oct. 7, 2023, the day of the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation, Asharq Al-Awsat met Obeidat in Amman. The interview had been scheduled for publication in October 2023, but the major developments that followed led to its postponement, particularly as Obeidat addressed contentious issues, notably Jordanian-Palestinian relations.

In the first part of the interview, Obeidat revisits his formative years, when his political and professional journey began as a law student in Baghdad on the eve of the July 14, 1958 revolution, before returning to Iraq after the fall of the monarchy amid sweeping regional transformations.

The account moves to his early professional life in Jordan, from a brief stint in legal practice to joining the Public Security Directorate, then serving in the Political Investigations Office, which formed the nucleus of organized intelligence work. It concludes with a detailed narrative of the establishment of the General Intelligence Department in 1964, its early structure and founding members, at a time when the Jordanian state was rebuilding its institutions in an intensely turbulent region.

Asked where he was when the 1958 revolution broke out in Iraq, Obeidat said he had completed his first year in law studies and returned to Jordan for the summer break.

“While I was in Irbid, news arrived of the July 14 revolution in Iraq that overthrew the monarchy. After the summer break ended, I went back to Baghdad, where a republican government under Abdul Karim Qassem had taken power,” he recalled.

The return was not easy. “We faced difficulties on the road. The border between Jordan and Iraq was nearly closed, so we had to return via Damascus and then through desert routes to Baghdad. It was an exhausting journey,” he added.

Obeidat left Baghdad in 1961 after completing his final exams. “On the last day of exams in the fourth year, I went home, packed and returned to Jordan the same day. The border between Baghdad and Amman had reopened.”

Among his contemporaries at law school was Saddam Hussein, who studied in the evening section. Obeidat said he saw him only once by chance. “He was with others, one of whom later became a governor,” he revealed.

He returned to Baghdad again in 1983 as Jordan’s interior minister to attend a conference of Arab interior ministers, more than two decades after graduating. There, he met his Iraqi counterpart, Saadoun Shaker. “It was an ordinary relationship,” Obeidat said, describing the ties as largely ceremonial.

From customs to intelligence

After returning to Jordan in 1961, Obeidat initially considered practicing law. But limited opportunities in Irbid and his family’s financial constraints led him to seek public employment.

He was appointed to the Customs Department in Amman, where he worked for several months before joining the Public Security Directorate in April 1962 as a first lieutenant following three months of training at the police academy.

At the time, there was no separate intelligence agency. Public Security included a branch handling general investigations. Soon after, the Political Investigations Office was formed, staffed by legal officers from the army and Public Security, including Mudar Badran and Adeeb Tahaoub from military justice, alongside Obeidat and Tariq Alaaeddin from Public Security.

The office handled cases referred by security and official bodies, including military intelligence and the Royal Court. After reviewing its work, the late King Hussein ordered the establishment of a legally grounded intelligence body. The General Intelligence Law was issued in 1964, formally creating the department, explained Obeidat.

Mohammad Rasoul Al-Kilani became its first director, followed by Mudar Badran, then Nadhir Rashid. Al-Kilani briefly returned before Obeidat assumed the post, succeeded later by Tariq Alaaeddin.

The shock of 1967

Recalling the 1967 war, Obeidat described it as “a defeat, not a setback. A military, political, psychological, and social defeat in every sense.”

He said there was no institutional intelligence view on Jordan’s participation. “The political opinion of a figure of Wasfi Tal’s stature was that entering the 1967 war was a mistake. He was not in office, but he remained close to the king and influential,” said Obeidat.

According to Obeidat, King Hussein believed Israel would occupy the West Bank whether Jordan participated or not.

“Participation was a gamble that might succeed or fail. The catastrophe was discovering that the Egyptian air force had been destroyed within half an hour,” he added.

Despite the bitterness, he said: “We did not fear for the regime, but we sought to contain public anger and absorb the shock.”

September and the assassination of Wasfi Tal

Obeidat first met Yasser Arafat after the events of September 1970. He confirmed that Arafat left Amman with an official Arab delegation to attend the Cairo summit and returned immediately afterward.

He recalled being informed mid-flight of the death of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. “King Hussein was deeply affected.”

On the assassination of Prime Minister Wasfi Tal in Cairo, Obeidat said the gunmen who confronted Tal at the hotel entrance were not responsible for the fatal shot. “The fatal bullet came from behind, from a sniper in another unseen location. To this day, the sniper has not been identified,” he added.

He rejected the notion that Tal had been reckless. “Wasfi was not a gambler. He had a distinct political project,” he stressed.

Obeidat said the Black September Organization accused Tal of ordering the expulsion of fedayeen from forested areas in Jerash and Ajloun. He denied that Tal was directly responsible, saying the clashes began after fedayeen attacked a police station and killed officers, prompting a spontaneous army response.

Abduction without interrogation

Before September 1970, Obeidat was abducted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine while serving as assistant intelligence director.

Armed vehicles stopped his car as he was leaving his home in Jabal Al-Taj with his family. He and his brother-in-law were taken to the Wehdat camp. “We were treated politely. We drank tea. No one asked me a single question,” he recalled.

After several hours, he was driven to another house in Amman and later returned home. The next morning, members of Fatah took him briefly to one of their offices, only to release him on foot without explanation.

“Not a single question was asked,” Obeidat said. “It was bewildering.”

He resumed his duties after ensuring his family’s safety. “At the time, intelligence, like any official institution, was threatened and targeted,” he said, reflecting on one of the most volatile periods in Jordan’s modern history.


Microsoft Saudi Head Affirms Kingdom Entering AI Execution Phase

Saudi Arabia shifts from AI pilots to live deployment in key sectors (Shutterstock)
Saudi Arabia shifts from AI pilots to live deployment in key sectors (Shutterstock)
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Microsoft Saudi Head Affirms Kingdom Entering AI Execution Phase

Saudi Arabia shifts from AI pilots to live deployment in key sectors (Shutterstock)
Saudi Arabia shifts from AI pilots to live deployment in key sectors (Shutterstock)

Riyadh’s hosting of the Microsoft AI Tour this week delivered a headline with concrete weight: customers will be able to run cloud workloads from a local Azure data center region starting in the fourth quarter of 2026.

The announcement was more than a technical update. It marked a shift in posture. Saudi Arabia is no longer testing artificial intelligence at the margins. It is moving decisively into execution, where infrastructure, governance, skills development, and enterprise adoption align in a single direction.

For Turki Badhris, president of Microsoft Saudi Arabia, the timing reflects years of groundwork rather than a sudden push.

“Confirming that customers will be able to run cloud workloads from the Azure data center region in the fourth quarter of 2026 gives organizations clarity and confidence as they plan their digital and AI journeys,” Badhris told Asharq Al-Awsat on the sidelines of the event.

“Clarity and confidence” may sound procedural, but they are strategic variables. Government entities and large corporations do not scale AI based solely on pilot projects.

They move when they are assured that local infrastructure is available, regulatory requirements are aligned, and long-term operational continuity is secured. The announcement of the new Azure region signals that the infrastructure layer is no longer a plan, but a scheduled commitment nearing implementation.

From pilots to production

Saudi Arabia’s AI story has unfolded in phases. The first focused on expanding digital infrastructure, developing regulatory frameworks, and strengthening cloud readiness. That phase built capacity. The current phase centers on activation and use.

Badhris said the conversation has already shifted. “We are working closely across the Kingdom with government entities, enterprises, and partners to support readiness, from data modernization and governance to skills development so that customers can move from experimentation to production with confidence.”

The distinction is fundamental. Pilots test potential. Production environments reshape workflows.

Companies such as Qiddiya Investment Company and ACWA Power illustrate that transition. Rather than treating AI as isolated pilot initiatives, these organizations are embedding it into daily operations.

ACWA Power is using Azure AI services and the Intelligent Data Platform to optimize energy and water operations globally, with a strong focus on sustainability and resource efficiency through predictive maintenance and AI-driven optimization.

Qiddiya has expanded its use of Microsoft 365 Copilot to enable employees to summarize communications, analyze data, and interact with dashboards across hundreds of assets and contractors.

AI is no longer operating at the margins of the enterprise. It is becoming part of the operating core, a sign of institutional maturity. The technology is shifting from showcase tool to productivity engine.

Infrastructure as strategic signal

The Azure data center region in eastern Saudi Arabia offers advantages that go beyond lower latency. It strengthens data residency, supports compliance requirements, and reinforces digital sovereignty frameworks.

In highly regulated sectors such as finance, health care, energy, and government services, alignment with regulatory requirements is not optional; it is essential.

Badhris described the milestone as part of a long-term commitment. “This achievement represents an important milestone in our long-term commitment to enable real and scalable impact for the public and private sectors in the Kingdom,” he said.

The emphasis on scalable impact reflects a more profound understanding: infrastructure does not create value on its own, but enables the conditions for value creation. Saudi Arabia is treating AI as core economic infrastructure, comparable to energy or transport networks, and is using it to form the foundation for productivity gains.

Governance as accelerator

Globally, AI regulation is often seen as a constraint. In the Saudi case, governance appears embedded in the acceleration strategy. Adoption in sensitive sectors requires clear trust frameworks. Compliance cannot be an afterthought; it must be built into design.

Aligning cloud services with national digital sovereignty requirements reduces friction at scale. When organizations trust that compliance is integrated into the platform itself, expansion decisions move faster. In that sense, governance becomes an enabler.

The invisible constraint

While generative AI dominates headlines, the larger institutional challenge often lies in data architecture. Fragmented systems, organizational silos, and the absence of unified governance can hinder scaling.

Saudi Arabia's strategy focuses on data modernization as a foundation. A structured and integrated data environment is a prerequisite for effective AI use. Without it, AI remains superficial.

Another global challenge is the skills gap. Saudi Arabia has committed to training three million people by 2030. The focus extends beyond awareness to practical application. Transformation cannot succeed without human capital capable of integrating AI into workflows.

Badhris underscored that skills development is part of a broader readiness ecosystem. Competitiveness in the AI era, he said, is measured not only by model capability but by the workforce’s ability to deploy it.

Sector transformation as economic strategy

The Riyadh AI Tour highlighted sector use cases in energy, giga projects, and government services. These are not peripheral applications but pillars of Vision 2030. AI’s role in optimizing energy management supports sustainability. In major projects, it enhances execution efficiency. In government services, it improves the citizen experience.

AI here is not a standalone industry but a horizontal productivity driver.

Positioning in the global landscape

Global AI leadership is typically measured across four pillars: compute capacity, governance, ecosystem integration, and skills readiness. Saudi Arabia is moving to align these elements simultaneously.

The new Azure region provides computing. Regulatory frameworks strengthen trust. Partnerships support ecosystem integration. Training programs raise skills readiness.

Saudi Arabia is entering a decisive stage in its AI trajectory. Infrastructure is confirmed. Enterprise use cases are expanding. Governance is embedded. Skills are advancing.

Badhris said the announcement gives institutions “clarity and confidence” to plan their journey. That clarity may mark the difference between ambition and execution. In that sense, the Microsoft tour in Riyadh signaled that infrastructure is no longer the objective, but the platform on which transformation is built.