Lazzarini Warns Via Asharq Al-Awsat of Imminent Famine in Gaza

Phillipe Lazzarini, the Commissioner-General of United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Photo: UN
Phillipe Lazzarini, the Commissioner-General of United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Photo: UN
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Lazzarini Warns Via Asharq Al-Awsat of Imminent Famine in Gaza

Phillipe Lazzarini, the Commissioner-General of United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Photo: UN
Phillipe Lazzarini, the Commissioner-General of United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Photo: UN

Famine in Gaza is “imminent,” warns UNRWA, if the international community does not step up its aid to more 2.2 million Palestinian civilians in the Strip.

In an exclusive interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Mr. Phillipe Lazzarini, the Commissioner-General of United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), revealed after returning from his fourth trip to Gaza since the start of the war on October 7 last year, that he is launching an “independent review” through a third party to look into Israel’s allegations that Hamas and other Palestinian factions have been using the agency’s facilities in the context of destructive war in Gaza, in addition to using the civilians as “human shields.” Mr. Lazzarini acknowledged that the population is “caught between different types of agendas.”

The Commissioner-General spoke about his trip, which lasted three days and coincided with the 100th day of the war, and the “miserable conditions” the population is enduring, warning that famine had become “imminent.” He stressed that the “tragedy” has so far cost more than 20,000 lives, including between 60 percent and two-thirds of them children and women, and about 150 employees of the UN agency. He did not rule out the commission of war crimes by Israel or Hamas, but stressed that we must now “put an end to this suffering, this misery,” stressing that humanitarian organizations are in “a race against the clock in an effort to reverse the deterioration of the humanitarian situation, and to ensure that we do not have to "deal with a state of famine." He called for a “large-scale flow” of humanitarian aid and goods to “reverse” the worsening humanitarian situation.

Here is the full interview with Mr. Lazzarini:

* I want to start from here to ask you first about targeting journalists in the war in Gaza, and in the skirmishes, I would say, between Israel and Hezbollah. What are your thoughts?

Listen, I have full admiration with journalists, many in Gaza, because they are witnessing what was going on in Gaza. I have met many of the local journalists and stranger for international media. They have done an extraordinary job under impossible circumstances. I have seen the dedication, the devotion, despite the fact that basically they are sharing the same plight as the rest of the population. They themselves are displaced, their houses are destroyed, they lost relatives. And despite that, they’ve had such loyalty, commitment, the sense of mission to report and to make sure that the rest of the world knows what is going on. At the same time, they have paid a huge price. Journalists are like, in fact, the other types of volunteer. We saw the same with doctors and nurses. We saw the same, in fact, in my organization...

* That’s exactly what I wanted to ask you about. I'm coming to this and I want you to comment on the huge loss of UNRWA in this war. Tell me what is exactly happening, how many have you lost?

Well, as of today, there are more than 150 staff have been killed since the beginning of the war. Many of them are teachers, nurses engineers, human resource officers or drivers. Many of them have been also killed in their houses, that have been killed with relatives since the beginning of the war. This has been, for the agency, a tragedy, but at the same time, we are talking about the ecosystem of Gaza which has been a hit in indiscriminate ways. That is the reason why, I would say all the aspects of the Gazan social fabric has been impacted and have paid a huge price since the beginning of the war. When we talk about more than 20,000 people having been killed, among them, we have a number of journalists, a number of doctors, a number of a UN staffers, but those who have also paid a huge price have been the children and the woman. It is estimated that among all those who have been killed that we have between the 60 percent to 2 third of woman and children...

* What is the number exactly of children and women?

Listen, the question is: Is the overall number exact? It is as of today the best estimate. We do not have a mechanism to independently review the number. But if I look at the number of people who were killed in previous conflicts, they were by large considered by anyone as being the best reliable number having been issued. Now if I look at the number of UN staff having been killed and compare it to the overall number of staff that we have, and compare the announcement of the people having been killed in Gaza with the overall population, I would have the same type of proportion. So I would say it's certainly the best estimate available as of today. Are they precise? Certainly not precise. Are they overinflated or underestimated? it's possible that in fact, it does not capture all the people who have been killed, and there are still a number of people remaining under the rubble in northern Gaza, but also in southern Gaza.

Normal War?

* I normally hear that: the war is a war, as the French traditional notion would mention. Isn't that normal in a war?

What is normal in a war? If you look at the old war which we have gone through in Afghanistan, is it a normal war? Yemen is a normal war? and the wars we have seen in Africa? So I don't know if there is a normal war, but I can say that in the context of Gaza, it’s a little bit the war of all the superlative, the number of people killed in such a short time in proportion to the overall population, the number of children killed in proportion with the overall number of people killed, the number of people who will have been injured in proportion of the overall population in such a short time, the fact that 90% of the population had to flee and move on multiple bases, the fact that 60% of the infrastructure in the Gaza Strip has been damaged or totally destroyed in such a short time, and the fact also that we are talking about a possible looming widespread hunger, you have a possible looming starvation - pockets might be looming also in such a short time, which is completely manmade. So in Gaza, the intensity, and the number that we're talking about are just staggering.

* Are you concerned that there might be war crimes or war against humanity committed by Israel or even Hamas or whoever?

You know, this will be determined later on by the international legal body of the international community. What we have seen over the last few months is that an entire population has been impacted. That certainly war crime might have been committed by the Israelis but also by Hamas. So all of these are issues hat will be determined later on all. For the time being, what is important is to try to put an end to this suffering, to this misery. I’ve just come back again, from a three-day trip in the Gaza Strip. It was my fourth trip there. I was really struck by how people are resigned, are exhausted, how they try to be on a kind of automatic survival mode. Basically, we’re in winter, they do not sleep, but they are sharing house within the family, just to ensure the minimum of the minimum, and even with this, you hear that people have to skip their meal one day every two days. It's a struggle to find water. People feel extremely filthy also. They are living in an absolutely appalling hygienic condition. These are all people who have been displaced multiple times, people who have lost and left everything behind, people who have lost a beloved and family member. So, the focus today is really to try to save life in the Gaza Strip. Our concern has always been, beyond the number of people who have been killed by the ongoing military operation and military hostility and the bombardment, that people have also started to die because of disease outbreak, because of hunger, because of weakened immunities, or because they cannot recover also from injuries in the Gaza Strip.

Inside Gaza

* Can you just elaborate more? Where did you go in Gaza? Which areas were you able to go?

This time I went to Rafah, to Khan Younes and to Deir El Balah. I visited our teams in these three locations. I visited also one shelter in Deir El Balah, one of our schools it was completely overcrowded. It felt almost claustrophobic being in this school. Basically, I was engaging with the people, to try to understand how they struggle on a day to day basis to keep going on and to survive. It is true I saw first-hand the living condition, the unsanitary condition. I heard stories about women who decided to try to eat as little as possible, drink as little as possible in order not to have to go to the toilet. Wearing the same clothes for weeks, having skin disease, with lice in their hair. Because of that, and this filthiness and because of this also exhaustion, and when you live it in this overcrowded condition, when you have to sleep on the concrete, when you do not have a proper mattress and blanket, and the winter is here, and you'll have the anxiety of a possible bombardment, you do not really sleep. And the woman who was describing to you, because of this process is more and more stigmatized, and ostracized also, and this is something that we know we will be also looking at. During the first two/three months, our approach was a global one. But now we have to look more into some individual cases, vulnerabilities of the people. All these people are going through an extraordinary tragedy.

* So in this very difficult situation, how much UNRWA has been able to help? Are there any other organizations who are able to move around and help people in need?

UNRWA is certainly the main organization operational and active in the Gaza Strip, but you have also a number of our partners. You have the World Food Program, you have UNICEF, at present you have the World Health Organization, but you have also the ICRC, you have also the Palestinian Red Crescent, which has also been important in terms of bringing in supply into the Gaza Strip. What we are capable to provide in terms of assistance is far from being in line or commensurate with the immensity of the needs. You have seen that at the beginning of the war, there was a total siege imposed on Gaza. We had at the beginning this shortage and crisis of lack of a fuel which impacted in fact all the aspects of the daily life and survival in the Gaza Strip. Then, trucks started to come in, the fuel started to come in, and today in fact, it's a race against the clock to try to reverse the worsening of the humanitarian situation, and to make sure that we do not have to deal in the weeks to come, with a situation of starvation and famine. There was an alert that has been issued by the World Food Program about this. So all the partners and the aid community is mobilized to try to address this. But we have also said more than once that aid is not enough. We need also commodities to be flown into Gaza at scale and in a meaningful way. You might remember that before October 7, and it was already a situation which was broadly described that has been under blockade. At that time, we had about 500 commercial trucks coming in, and a 100 to 200 trucks aid for the humanitarian community to support the population in Gaza. Today, we are talking about a total of 200 plus and this is following a very recent increase, but the need is at 10 times higher than they used to be before. That shows that we are far from being at scale. We are far from providing the meaningful, I would say, basic assistance that the population required.

Israel’s Allegations

* Mr. Lazzarini, I have to tell you that I always hear that UNRWA is accused of being used by Hamas, by other organizations and militants, and sometimes they're taking UNRWA and the population as human shields. How true are these accusations?

You know, that there have been quite a number of allegations of diverse nature, about tunnels, about weapons, about activities. In such an overcrowded environment, there is no doubt that the civilian population is paying the price, the civilian population is also trapped in between different types of agenda, and that operating within this overcrowded environment exposes unnecessarily the civilian. Now having said that, I have never ever received yet concrete allegation. In my office, I'm very much aware of like you about this allegation, but this is also the reason why I have taken the decision, in fact yesterday, I was informing a group of journalists that I will call for an independent review of all this allegation to find out what is behind it, what is the part which is disingenuous and aimed at undermining the agency, and what could be the part, the true, and to look at, after that, how is the agency dealing with this. I keep telling everyone, that as an agency, we are not operating in a no risk environment. It's an extraordinary emotional, divisive type of environment. But as an agency, we will be operating fully in line with UN principles and values, and we'll make sure that if a staffer by any chance would not be compliant with this value, that we would implement a zero tolerance policy. So there are allegations. I cannot confirm any of this allegation. I can tell you how we are handling this type of a situation, but it hasn't been enough because this allegation continues in a regular basis. You’re right, you keep hearing, I keep hearing. We keep saying this. So in order to go beyond this, I would say, unhealthy rhetoric of we are being accused, that and we are defending and responding. I have decided that I will commission an independent review about this allegation.

* When are you going to start with this review?

I hope to start as soon as possible. We have now finalized the terms of reference. And I'm now looking at identifying the best third party to undertake such a review.

UNRWA’s Fate

* That's good to hear. I also hear from the Israeli side, that they want UNRWA to be abolished altogether. They don't want UNRWA anymore, part of it because of these allegations and accusations. Is that something that should be done? I know you are the chief of the of UNRWA, and I'm asking you. How do you respond to that kind of idea that UNRWA should be all together abolished, and there is no need to it, and the population who relies now heavily on UNRWA should rely on some other type of organization?

To start with, UNRWA is a mandated organization by the General Assembly and its member states. So, this is up to the General Assembly and its member states to make the determination of what UNRWA should do, or should not do. As you said, these are ideas we hear from time to time, which sometimes have traction, especially when we talk about the context of the situation in Gaza, and what might unfold later on. The real question is, if not UNRWA, who will provide tomorrow the education to 300,000 children, boys and girls, who were in our schools. In an ideal solution, and we should never forget that, UNRWA was supposed to be a temporary organization. UNRWA was supposed to exist until the day there is a lasting and fair political solution. Now, unfortunately, for now nearly 75 years, there haven't been a fair and lasting political solution, and there haven't been an alternative provided on who else should step into the responsibility of an agency like ours. So the real question is, if we want to address, if we want to promote future peace and security in the region, we need also to genuinely invest into a proper peace process, and once you have the political - I would say - the solid political project and roadmap at the end of this direction of travel, it’s when UNRWA should be able to phase out, because a new state, or new authority, will take over the services the agency is providing. There have been also sometimes beliefs that if the agency is liquidated that the statue of the Palestinian refugees would be addressed and solved. This is a shortcut. This is naive, because even if the agency does not provide services, the statue of the Palestinian refugees will remain until the day you have a proper lasting and fair political solution.

* Meanwhile, what is your message for countries or organizations? What do you need from the international community in order to continue this very crucial work that you've been doing? And what is your message to the population in Gaza, to Israel, and even to Hamas and the other Palestinian fractions?

Well, I'm not sure I'm addressing to all the Palestinian fractions right now. But my message to the population in Gaza is that UNRWA will stay in Gaza, UNRWA will continue to support you, and express not only its solidarity but will continue to provide assistance. And we will also continue to be your voice within the international community. Now, to the region, it is important that the support to the agency be provided both financially - it is absolute key. We should never, ever forget that our funding base comes from voluntary contribution, while at the same time, we are providing public like services, such as education, primary healthcare, or social protection safety net. Now in Gaza, we have an unprecedented humanitarian crisis. So the focus has shifted for the agencies. But to respond to the needs of the people and their plight, we need resources, we need the region, the Arab world, to mobilize and to express its solidarity to the agency, beyond political support, but also by providing the necessary resources.

Lazzarini’s Concerns

* And with that note, I see that people are concerned, including you, by the potential mass transfer of people of Gaza outside the strip...

You know, you have right now an entire population of 2.2 million people who have been impacted by this war. The majority, the bulk of the population now, is concentrated in the south of the Gaza Strip. Already before, the Gaza Strip with its entire population, was considered as being one of the most overcrowded places in the world. It is even much more overcrowded right now. If you go to Rafah, its population has increased by four over the last few weeks. And Rafah is at the border. There are fears about a possible extension of the military operation towards Rafah, and here indeed, the question would be: what will desperate people do? Will they be tempted to cross the border or will they try to go elsewhere? There is not much more elsewhere safer in the Gaza Strip.

Are you concerned?

I am definitely concerned, but I'm also concerned that Gazans will not be able anytime soon to see what their future will look like. We keep talking about the day after, but the fear here is that the very day today is not over, and it might be a very long period in the in between day. The in between day might also be a period of misery, of despair, and distress. Because as of now we don't have on the table a proper political project. It will be difficult to invest in Gaza, and hence difficult to bring back even basic social services. I am very worried, for example, about the fate of half a million girls and boys, who are not in school today, who are deeply traumatized by this war, not only them, but also their families, and also the teachers. The more we wait, the more we're taking the risk to lose an entire generation, but also an entire generation after that, which will be brought up into resentment, into bitterness. This is certainly not what the region needs in the future.



Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Tried to Assassinate King Hussein with Missile Given to Wadie Haddad

King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Tried to Assassinate King Hussein with Missile Given to Wadie Haddad

King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).

In the second installment of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Jordanian prime minister and intelligence chief Ahmad Obeidat recounts details of a missile plot to assassinate King Hussein, which he says was backed by Muammar Gaddafi and carried out through operatives linked to Wadie Haddad, head of the external operations arm of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

Obeidat, who also served as head of intelligence and as minister of interior and defense, revisits the confrontation between Israeli forces, the Jordanian army, and Palestinian guerrillas (fedayeen) in the border town of Karameh in March 1968, asserting that the Jordanian army “decided the battle,” but suffered a “moral defeat amid the fedayeen’s claims of victory.”

Obeidat died earlier this month. The interview was recorded before the “Al-Aqsa Flood,” whose aftermath delayed its publication. Below is the text of the second installment.
 

King Hussein inspects an Israeli tank left behind by occupying forces during the Battle of Karameh (Getty)

 

“Battle of Karameh”

 

Obeidat calls Karameh “a pivotal point of utmost importance,” especially for an army still reeling from the 1967 defeat and its withdrawal from the West Bank.

 

“The army lived the bitterness of that defeat,” he says. “It felt a moral, national, and pan-Arab responsibility.”

 

Karameh, he argues, offered a chance to restore the army’s fighting morale and reclaim some of its lost dignity.

 

“It was the army that settled the battle,” Obeidat says.

 

He credits Jordanian forces with thwarting Israeli attempts to build crossing bridges, destroying their vehicles on Jordanian soil and forcing, for the first time in Israel’s history, a request for a ceasefire. “The late King Hussein refused,” he adds.

 

Israel, he says, did not acknowledge a fifth of its casualties. Helicopters were evacuating the wounded who were “dripping with blood.”

 

He singles out artillery observation officers who advanced to the closest possible positions, relaying precise coordinates even as they effectively marked their own locations for shelling.

 

“The Jordanian soldier would identify his position near the Israeli army to be shelled,” he says, describing a willingness to die in order to restore dignity after the 1967 setback.

He says the declaration of “armed struggle” effectively erased the army’s role, presenting Palestinian fedayeen as the victors over Israel. “They monopolized the victory and ignored the army’s role entirely,” Obeidat says. “We emerged with a moral defeat in the face of their claims.”

He alleges that hundreds of millions of dollars in donations collected afterward, much of it going to Fatah, did not reach the Palestinian people but went to organizations and their leaders.

When the army entered Amman in September 1970, Obeidat says, it aimed to end what he describes as chaos: armed displays, roadblocks, arrests of soldiers on leave and interference in courts.

"When the army entered and began expelling the fedayeen from Amman, it swept through everything in its path. Even my own home, which I had recently rented after my abduction incident and which was close to the army’s command headquarters, was entered by the Jordanian army to search for fedayeen, while my family was inside the house at the time of the raid. My wife told them that her husband was an intelligence officer, but the Jordanian soldier replied, “Don’t lie.”

Obeidat says they did not leave the house until she contacted him, at which point he assigned one of his officers, the commander of an intelligence company, to speak with the army.

"Only then did they leave the house. The point is that the army swept areas without distinguishing between Jordanian and Palestinian; it wanted only to restore control over security. All of this forced me to send my family to my parents’ home in Irbid, in the north of the Kingdom."

He later describes what he calls a “state within a state,” extending from the Jordan Valley to Amman, after armed groups asserted authority over courts, roads, and civilian life.

On Syria’s intervention, Obeidat says Syrian forces entered northern Jordan flying Palestine Liberation Organization flags.

He later learned the decision was political, taken by the Baath Party, and that then-Defense Minister Hafez al-Assad complied reluctantly before Syrian tanks withdrew.

Iraq, he says, did not intervene. Obeidat affirms that he was told by Iraqi officials that neither the Iraqi state nor its forces intended to participate in any operation aimed at ending the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan.

According to one account, Iraqi leaders did not want to shoulder the political and diplomatic burden of the Palestinian issue or risk an uncalculated adventure.

He recounts another account, which he says he cannot adopt, according to which the operations command in the army was handled by a Pakistani figure. Under this account, Zia ul-Haq was receiving operational communications and sending messages that caused confusion among Iraqi and other forces, leading them to believe they would confront powerful strike units, prompting them to remain in a state of alert rather than engage.

He also recalls a meeting in which Palestinian figures, including Abu Iyad, reproached Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr. Al-Bakr replied: “We are a state with one life. If we make a fundamental mistake, we end. You are like cats with seven lives.”

As director of intelligence, Obeidat says he dealt directly with operations attributed to Haddad.

Between 1975 and 1977, he says, a missile was sent to Jordan with a group led by a Jordanian, Brik al-Hadid, affiliated with the PFLP. The target was King Hussein’s aircraft.

“The intention was to strike the plane, with Gaddafi’s knowledge and approval,” Obeidat says.

Jordanian intelligence monitored the group from the outset and later arrested its members. The king’s aircraft departed Marka military airport as scheduled but flew in the opposite direction to its planned route as a precaution, using jamming devices against any incoming missiles.

When confronted by Mudar Badran, then head of the Royal Court, Gaddafi denied knowledge. “I have no information,” Obeidat quotes him as saying.

Obeidat describes the aircraft hijackings orchestrated by Haddad as “the straw that broke the camel’s back,” contributing to the army’s intervention.

He says Jordanian intelligence had infiltrated Fatah and monitored its leaders, including Abu Iyad and Abu Yusuf al-Najjar.

In mid-1972, intelligence learned that Abu Dawood and a group were planning to enter Jordan from Baghdad to seize the Jordanian cabinet during a session and hold ministers hostage in exchange for the release of detained Fatah members.

The group crossed in three Mercedes cars, dressed in traditional Arab attire, with weapons concealed inside the seats and forged passports in hand. They were arrested at the border after a thorough search.

Obeidat rejects claims by Abu Iyad that Abu Dawood was tortured, insisting that “not a single hair on his head was touched,” and says Abu Dawood confessed only after realizing the operation had been fully uncovered.

Later, King Hussein met Abu Dawood’s parents, who pleaded for clemency. The king read the full confession and then met Abu Dawood himself. He ultimately ordered his release, honoring a promise he had made to Abu Dawood’s parents.

In Obeidat’s view, Abu Dawood was affected by the king’s treatment of his parents and “did not pose any future threat to Jordan.”

Obeidat describes a direct relationship between King Hussein and the General Intelligence Department.

The king met with officers regularly, not only to hear briefings but also to hear their personal views. Security presentations would include Crown Prince Hassan, senior advisers, army commanders, the public security chief, the Royal Court chief, and the prime minister.

“Sometimes,” Obeidat says, “it was necessary to elaborate orally before the king on certain matters so they would not circulate more widely.”

Obeidat says the late King Hussein maintained a direct relationship with the General Intelligence Department, meeting regularly with senior officers and listening not only to intelligence briefings but also to their personal assessments.

When security briefings were presented before the king, Crown Prince Hassan would attend, along with royal advisers, senior army commanders, the public security chief, the head of the Royal Court, and the prime minister.

Obeidat says he would submit reports to the prime minister and also meet with the king. When addressing the king, however, it was sometimes necessary to elaborate verbally on certain issues so that such information would not circulate among staff. He met with the king regularly.

When he was asked to present a security briefing before the king, the late King Hussein would summon Crown Prince Hassan. The king’s advisers would also attend, along with senior army commanders, the public security leadership, the head of the Royal Court, and the prime minister. The briefing of the security report would include an explanation of the security situation and any external or internal challenges.

 


Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Mystery Sniper Killed Wasfi Tal

Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Mystery Sniper Killed Wasfi Tal

Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Former Jordanian Prime Minister Ahmad Obeidat, who died earlier this month, was both a key player and a witness to sensitive chapters in his country’s history.

Obeidat began his career in the 1970s as an assistant director of intelligence, later serving as head of the General Intelligence Department until 1982. At the height of the Palestinian-Jordanian confrontation, he was abducted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine before the events of September 1970.

He also served for two years as interior minister before King Hussein appointed him prime minister in early 1984, a post he held until April 1985, concurrently serving as defense minister.

For more than 15 years, Obeidat remained at the center of decision-making. He later took on roles drawing on his legal background, from chairing the Royal Commission that drafted the National Charter in the early 1990s to serving in human rights and judicial positions, most recently as head of the board of trustees of the National Center for Human Rights until 2008.

Weeks before Oct. 7, 2023, the day of the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation, Asharq Al-Awsat met Obeidat in Amman. The interview had been scheduled for publication in October 2023, but the major developments that followed led to its postponement, particularly as Obeidat addressed contentious issues, notably Jordanian-Palestinian relations.

In the first part of the interview, Obeidat revisits his formative years, when his political and professional journey began as a law student in Baghdad on the eve of the July 14, 1958 revolution, before returning to Iraq after the fall of the monarchy amid sweeping regional transformations.

The account moves to his early professional life in Jordan, from a brief stint in legal practice to joining the Public Security Directorate, then serving in the Political Investigations Office, which formed the nucleus of organized intelligence work. It concludes with a detailed narrative of the establishment of the General Intelligence Department in 1964, its early structure and founding members, at a time when the Jordanian state was rebuilding its institutions in an intensely turbulent region.

Asked where he was when the 1958 revolution broke out in Iraq, Obeidat said he had completed his first year in law studies and returned to Jordan for the summer break.

“While I was in Irbid, news arrived of the July 14 revolution in Iraq that overthrew the monarchy. After the summer break ended, I went back to Baghdad, where a republican government under Abdul Karim Qassem had taken power,” he recalled.

The return was not easy. “We faced difficulties on the road. The border between Jordan and Iraq was nearly closed, so we had to return via Damascus and then through desert routes to Baghdad. It was an exhausting journey,” he added.

Obeidat left Baghdad in 1961 after completing his final exams. “On the last day of exams in the fourth year, I went home, packed and returned to Jordan the same day. The border between Baghdad and Amman had reopened.”

Among his contemporaries at law school was Saddam Hussein, who studied in the evening section. Obeidat said he saw him only once by chance. “He was with others, one of whom later became a governor,” he revealed.

He returned to Baghdad again in 1983 as Jordan’s interior minister to attend a conference of Arab interior ministers, more than two decades after graduating. There, he met his Iraqi counterpart, Saadoun Shaker. “It was an ordinary relationship,” Obeidat said, describing the ties as largely ceremonial.

From customs to intelligence

After returning to Jordan in 1961, Obeidat initially considered practicing law. But limited opportunities in Irbid and his family’s financial constraints led him to seek public employment.

He was appointed to the Customs Department in Amman, where he worked for several months before joining the Public Security Directorate in April 1962 as a first lieutenant following three months of training at the police academy.

At the time, there was no separate intelligence agency. Public Security included a branch handling general investigations. Soon after, the Political Investigations Office was formed, staffed by legal officers from the army and Public Security, including Mudar Badran and Adeeb Tahaoub from military justice, alongside Obeidat and Tariq Alaaeddin from Public Security.

The office handled cases referred by security and official bodies, including military intelligence and the Royal Court. After reviewing its work, the late King Hussein ordered the establishment of a legally grounded intelligence body. The General Intelligence Law was issued in 1964, formally creating the department, explained Obeidat.

Mohammad Rasoul Al-Kilani became its first director, followed by Mudar Badran, then Nadhir Rashid. Al-Kilani briefly returned before Obeidat assumed the post, succeeded later by Tariq Alaaeddin.

The shock of 1967

Recalling the 1967 war, Obeidat described it as “a defeat, not a setback. A military, political, psychological, and social defeat in every sense.”

He said there was no institutional intelligence view on Jordan’s participation. “The political opinion of a figure of Wasfi Tal’s stature was that entering the 1967 war was a mistake. He was not in office, but he remained close to the king and influential,” said Obeidat.

According to Obeidat, King Hussein believed Israel would occupy the West Bank whether Jordan participated or not.

“Participation was a gamble that might succeed or fail. The catastrophe was discovering that the Egyptian air force had been destroyed within half an hour,” he added.

Despite the bitterness, he said: “We did not fear for the regime, but we sought to contain public anger and absorb the shock.”

September and the assassination of Wasfi Tal

Obeidat first met Yasser Arafat after the events of September 1970. He confirmed that Arafat left Amman with an official Arab delegation to attend the Cairo summit and returned immediately afterward.

He recalled being informed mid-flight of the death of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. “King Hussein was deeply affected.”

On the assassination of Prime Minister Wasfi Tal in Cairo, Obeidat said the gunmen who confronted Tal at the hotel entrance were not responsible for the fatal shot. “The fatal bullet came from behind, from a sniper in another unseen location. To this day, the sniper has not been identified,” he added.

He rejected the notion that Tal had been reckless. “Wasfi was not a gambler. He had a distinct political project,” he stressed.

Obeidat said the Black September Organization accused Tal of ordering the expulsion of fedayeen from forested areas in Jerash and Ajloun. He denied that Tal was directly responsible, saying the clashes began after fedayeen attacked a police station and killed officers, prompting a spontaneous army response.

Abduction without interrogation

Before September 1970, Obeidat was abducted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine while serving as assistant intelligence director.

Armed vehicles stopped his car as he was leaving his home in Jabal Al-Taj with his family. He and his brother-in-law were taken to the Wehdat camp. “We were treated politely. We drank tea. No one asked me a single question,” he recalled.

After several hours, he was driven to another house in Amman and later returned home. The next morning, members of Fatah took him briefly to one of their offices, only to release him on foot without explanation.

“Not a single question was asked,” Obeidat said. “It was bewildering.”

He resumed his duties after ensuring his family’s safety. “At the time, intelligence, like any official institution, was threatened and targeted,” he said, reflecting on one of the most volatile periods in Jordan’s modern history.


Microsoft Saudi Head Affirms Kingdom Entering AI Execution Phase

Saudi Arabia shifts from AI pilots to live deployment in key sectors (Shutterstock)
Saudi Arabia shifts from AI pilots to live deployment in key sectors (Shutterstock)
TT

Microsoft Saudi Head Affirms Kingdom Entering AI Execution Phase

Saudi Arabia shifts from AI pilots to live deployment in key sectors (Shutterstock)
Saudi Arabia shifts from AI pilots to live deployment in key sectors (Shutterstock)

Riyadh’s hosting of the Microsoft AI Tour this week delivered a headline with concrete weight: customers will be able to run cloud workloads from a local Azure data center region starting in the fourth quarter of 2026.

The announcement was more than a technical update. It marked a shift in posture. Saudi Arabia is no longer testing artificial intelligence at the margins. It is moving decisively into execution, where infrastructure, governance, skills development, and enterprise adoption align in a single direction.

For Turki Badhris, president of Microsoft Saudi Arabia, the timing reflects years of groundwork rather than a sudden push.

“Confirming that customers will be able to run cloud workloads from the Azure data center region in the fourth quarter of 2026 gives organizations clarity and confidence as they plan their digital and AI journeys,” Badhris told Asharq Al-Awsat on the sidelines of the event.

“Clarity and confidence” may sound procedural, but they are strategic variables. Government entities and large corporations do not scale AI based solely on pilot projects.

They move when they are assured that local infrastructure is available, regulatory requirements are aligned, and long-term operational continuity is secured. The announcement of the new Azure region signals that the infrastructure layer is no longer a plan, but a scheduled commitment nearing implementation.

From pilots to production

Saudi Arabia’s AI story has unfolded in phases. The first focused on expanding digital infrastructure, developing regulatory frameworks, and strengthening cloud readiness. That phase built capacity. The current phase centers on activation and use.

Badhris said the conversation has already shifted. “We are working closely across the Kingdom with government entities, enterprises, and partners to support readiness, from data modernization and governance to skills development so that customers can move from experimentation to production with confidence.”

The distinction is fundamental. Pilots test potential. Production environments reshape workflows.

Companies such as Qiddiya Investment Company and ACWA Power illustrate that transition. Rather than treating AI as isolated pilot initiatives, these organizations are embedding it into daily operations.

ACWA Power is using Azure AI services and the Intelligent Data Platform to optimize energy and water operations globally, with a strong focus on sustainability and resource efficiency through predictive maintenance and AI-driven optimization.

Qiddiya has expanded its use of Microsoft 365 Copilot to enable employees to summarize communications, analyze data, and interact with dashboards across hundreds of assets and contractors.

AI is no longer operating at the margins of the enterprise. It is becoming part of the operating core, a sign of institutional maturity. The technology is shifting from showcase tool to productivity engine.

Infrastructure as strategic signal

The Azure data center region in eastern Saudi Arabia offers advantages that go beyond lower latency. It strengthens data residency, supports compliance requirements, and reinforces digital sovereignty frameworks.

In highly regulated sectors such as finance, health care, energy, and government services, alignment with regulatory requirements is not optional; it is essential.

Badhris described the milestone as part of a long-term commitment. “This achievement represents an important milestone in our long-term commitment to enable real and scalable impact for the public and private sectors in the Kingdom,” he said.

The emphasis on scalable impact reflects a more profound understanding: infrastructure does not create value on its own, but enables the conditions for value creation. Saudi Arabia is treating AI as core economic infrastructure, comparable to energy or transport networks, and is using it to form the foundation for productivity gains.

Governance as accelerator

Globally, AI regulation is often seen as a constraint. In the Saudi case, governance appears embedded in the acceleration strategy. Adoption in sensitive sectors requires clear trust frameworks. Compliance cannot be an afterthought; it must be built into design.

Aligning cloud services with national digital sovereignty requirements reduces friction at scale. When organizations trust that compliance is integrated into the platform itself, expansion decisions move faster. In that sense, governance becomes an enabler.

The invisible constraint

While generative AI dominates headlines, the larger institutional challenge often lies in data architecture. Fragmented systems, organizational silos, and the absence of unified governance can hinder scaling.

Saudi Arabia's strategy focuses on data modernization as a foundation. A structured and integrated data environment is a prerequisite for effective AI use. Without it, AI remains superficial.

Another global challenge is the skills gap. Saudi Arabia has committed to training three million people by 2030. The focus extends beyond awareness to practical application. Transformation cannot succeed without human capital capable of integrating AI into workflows.

Badhris underscored that skills development is part of a broader readiness ecosystem. Competitiveness in the AI era, he said, is measured not only by model capability but by the workforce’s ability to deploy it.

Sector transformation as economic strategy

The Riyadh AI Tour highlighted sector use cases in energy, giga projects, and government services. These are not peripheral applications but pillars of Vision 2030. AI’s role in optimizing energy management supports sustainability. In major projects, it enhances execution efficiency. In government services, it improves the citizen experience.

AI here is not a standalone industry but a horizontal productivity driver.

Positioning in the global landscape

Global AI leadership is typically measured across four pillars: compute capacity, governance, ecosystem integration, and skills readiness. Saudi Arabia is moving to align these elements simultaneously.

The new Azure region provides computing. Regulatory frameworks strengthen trust. Partnerships support ecosystem integration. Training programs raise skills readiness.

Saudi Arabia is entering a decisive stage in its AI trajectory. Infrastructure is confirmed. Enterprise use cases are expanding. Governance is embedded. Skills are advancing.

Badhris said the announcement gives institutions “clarity and confidence” to plan their journey. That clarity may mark the difference between ambition and execution. In that sense, the Microsoft tour in Riyadh signaled that infrastructure is no longer the objective, but the platform on which transformation is built.