Elias Atallah: Syrian Officer Jameh Jameh Pressed the Button and Killed President René Moawad

Elias Atallah (not seen) holds a photo of George Hawi and Samir Kassir during Kassir’s funeral in 2005 (AFP)
Elias Atallah (not seen) holds a photo of George Hawi and Samir Kassir during Kassir’s funeral in 2005 (AFP)
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Elias Atallah: Syrian Officer Jameh Jameh Pressed the Button and Killed President René Moawad

Elias Atallah (not seen) holds a photo of George Hawi and Samir Kassir during Kassir’s funeral in 2005 (AFP)
Elias Atallah (not seen) holds a photo of George Hawi and Samir Kassir during Kassir’s funeral in 2005 (AFP)

In this final part of an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Elias Atallah, former political bureau member of the Lebanese Communist Party and coordinator of operations for the Lebanese National Resistance Front (JNFR), recounted a turbulent chapter of Lebanon’s modern history.

Atallah revisited the blood-soaked years of the 1980s, when Lebanon was torn apart by wars with Israel, battles in Beirut, and the volatile triangle of Syrian, Palestinian and Lebanese entanglements. He said his experience had been “harsh and painful.”

Confrontation with Israel had reached its zenith; the price of war in Beirut had been high; and relations within the Lebanese-Palestinian-Syrian triangle had been dangerously booby-trapped.

He said that a long-running exchange of strikes had taken place, between the Communist Party and Elie Hobeika, who served as the security chief and later head of the Lebanese Forces.

“I met him about twenty times,” Atallah explained. “He was a man without a heart and absolutely without feeling. It would be wrong to call him pragmatic. He was Machiavellian, willing to do anything to get what he wanted. He was physically brave and would openly state his opinion. He tried to present himself as a deep intelligence man. He had no cultural formation but he was physically strong and courageous.”

Atallah recounted a hunting trip that illustrated Hobeika’s ruthlessness. “I intended to go to Syria to shoot birds,” he said. “George Hawi (the Communist Party’s secretary-general) said we would go together with Elie Hobeika. I disliked the idea but I went. In the wheat plain I noticed Hobeika sliding the rifle under his arm and firing - a method that did not hit birds but could be used against people. I told him, ‘It seems you only go hunting people.’ He replied, ‘Yes, I killed people, but they deserved to die.’ We argued. George invited us to lunch; he had bought a lamb. I pretended I would join them but I climbed into a car and returned to Beirut.”

Atallah added that Hobeika boasted of operations he had carried out, including the explosive device that struck the Communist Party office on Baalbek Street near the Arab University. “We were supposed to hold a Central Council meeting,” he said. “It seems Hobeika received information, so he put his men to plant the explosives. Chance played its role. Our comrade George Batal asked me to drive him to the meeting and I was delayed a few minutes. I was about 150 meters away when the blast shook out. There were dead and injured.”

Atallah also described kidnappings. “One day Hobeika’s group kidnapped three of our youths in the Jiyyeh area; they were transporting explosives for the resistance. I had no option but to kidnap an important person in return,” he recalled. “That was what happened. Two were released because he had killed the third. They two told us Hobeika’s fighters were testing new rifles and pistols by firing at captives they had.”

When asked whether the two men had spoken about the Iranian diplomats whose fate later became the subject of rumors - that one of them had died while his captors were testing a firearm on the bulletproof vest he had been compelled to wear - Atallah replied: “I did not know the fate of the Iranian diplomats, but Hobeika told me in a meeting that he had kidnapped them.”

The former Lebanese Communist Party official contended that Hafez al-Assad had not stopped at Hobeika’s past because he sought to push through a “tripartite agreement,” a formula Atallah described as “a plan to consume Lebanon.” He suggested that Hobeika’s relationship with General Michel Aoun (who later became president) had not begun in the mid-1980s as commonly reported; rather, Atallah believed they had “a prior relationship somewhere in Syria, a matter that required research to untangle.”

He claimed Walid Jumblatt had suffered humiliations under Hafez al-Assad, including being forced to eat lunch with military officers among them Major General Ibrahim Huweija, who had overseen the assassination of Jumblatt’s father, Kamal. While Atallah did not deny that Assad supplied Jumblatt with weapons and tanks during the Mountain War, he stressed that Assad had not given Jumblatt “the right to decide.”

The Soviet abduction

Atallah described the 1985 abduction of four Soviet embassy staff in Beirut in detail. “They called us at the Soviet embassy,” he said. “They told me that yesterday four people from the embassy apparatus were kidnapped; I did not think they were high-ranking, then they disappeared.”

Despite intense searching, day after day, they had found no trace. Walid Jumblatt mobilized everything he had; Atallah and his group did all they could, both publicly and covertly. Days passed without a hint.

Then a senior KGB general, “Yuri,” arrived as an envoy. He thanked them and, it seemed, realized they had failed to locate the missing men. “He told me, in broken Arabic: ‘Look, sheikh; today the detainees ate a breakfast that included labneh, olives and cucumbers, and they were wearing striped pajamas of a particular color. Your fate is at stake. We, the Soviet Union, do not let these matters pass without consequence, be it from the small or the big. I expect them tomorrow at 4 pm, and after that everyone will know his role.’”

General Yuri went alone to see Sayyed Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah, the cleric often portrayed in the media as the spiritual godfather of Hezbollah, a depiction Atallah said he did not necessarily accept as accurate. Fadlallah received him and, by four in the afternoon, three of the four Soviets had been released. Fadlallah’s guards explained that the fourth Soviet had resisted during the transfer, tried to seize a rifle, and was shot dead. The account appeared credible, as he had been killed only recently.

Finger-pointing fell on the Islamic Dawa Party and on an element hidden under the mantle of the Amal movement.

On assassinations and Tripoli battles

Atallah denied that the Communist Party had planned the assassination of Bashir Gemayel. “Absolutely not,” he insisted. “From the time I led these apparatuses, we decided in principle to refuse involvement in assassinations. There was one assassination attempt on General Michel Aoun in the Baabda palace courtyard, and when the Syrian army moved to remove Aoun, the perpetrator fired and we took custody of him. That attempt did not go through us.”

On the battles in Tripoli in the north, Atallah pointed to a bitter rift between Hafez al-Assad and Yasser Arafat. “One day Assad told him: ‘I will pursue an independent decision. Independent of whom?’ Arafat replied: ‘Independent of you. You do not recognize Palestine; Palestine, in turn, does not recognize Syria.’”

Arafat returned to Tripoli in 1983 and entered what Atallah described as Assad’s personal battle with the Palestinian leader. “One hundred percent, it was a mistake for us to participate,” Atallah admitted. “We should have declared ourselves unable to intervene.”

The Communist Party paid dearly: 34 dead in the first round in 1983, and 21 more in the second round during the period of Sheikh Saeed Shaaban. “We paid 55 martyrs for no justification,” he said.

A meeting with Hafez al-Assad

Atallah recalled a 1984 visit with George Hawi to Hafez al-Assad in which Hawi had pushed for immediate unity between Lebanon and Syria. The idea, Atallah said, had been alien to Lebanese sentiment and even dangerous.

In their palace meeting Assad spoke for two hours, repeating themes that were familiar from other encounters, according to Atallah. Oddly, Assad probed into where exactly Atallah lived in Ramlet, down to the house’s location on the side of the road near Saida. As they departed, Assad turned to Hawi with a warning: “Never repeat the story of immediate Lebanon-Syria unity. This talk is dangerous and forbidden. There are things to be carried out silently, without words.”

On Hariri, Hawi and Syrian-Iranian partnerships

When asked who killed Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, Atallah answered bluntly: “Three, and one leader: Bashar al-Assad.” He argued that after the departure of investigator Detlev Mehlis, the tribunal had lost its way. He named Assef Shawkat and other Syrian officers, as well as Hezbollah, as participants. He noted wryly that all Syrian intelligence officers who had overseen Lebanon were themselves later killed, including Rustom Ghazaleh, who was “torn to pieces.”

As for George Hawi’s assassination, Atallah maintained that until 2005 most assassinations in Lebanon were Syrian operations, but from that year onward there had been Syrian-Iranian partnerships in carrying out killings.

The killing of René Moawad

The climax of Atallah’s testimony came with his version of the assassination of President René Moawad, elected on November 5, 1989. Moawad had no presidential palace or guard, as Baabda Palace was still held by General Michel Aoun. He lived instead in a Hariri-owned building in West Beirut, considered secure because it lay inside the Syrian intelligence perimeter.

Atallah said Syrian intelligence had placed Major Jameh Jameh in charge of Moawad’s security, with Ghazi Kanaan and Hafez al-Assad’s blessing. Moawad, suspicious, had asked that Jameh be lodged in the adjacent Beaurivage Hotel and kept away from his entourage.

Atallah then recounted a chilling episode: A Communist soldier, recruited into Moawad’s guard at Syrian request, was later given a tiny explosive to attach to the president’s clothing during a church crowd in Ehden. Atallah said he learned of the plan and warned Moawad personally, along with George Hawi and Karim Mroueh. He remembered Moawad’s hands trembling as he heard the soldier’s name and the Syrian officer behind the plot.

The attempt failed when the soldier vanished. Ten days later, Moawad was killed. Witnesses later told Atallah they saw Jameh Jameh on the rooftop of the building, holding a device. “He pressed the button and the explosion went off,” they said. Jameh descended calmly and walked away.

Reflections on failure and lessons

Atallah ended the final part of his Asharq Al-Awsat interview with reflections on the futility of the cycle of violence. “I review this past not because I want to live in it, but because I hope no one will repeat it,” he said. His aim was twofold: “To state my criticisms of what happened, and to show the truth about the national resistance and the failure of resistances that were political projects, not national ones.”

He continued: “Hezbollah’s so-called resistance was not resistance. It was the occupation of the liberated land and turned into a profession. Resistance ceased to be a mission and became a career.”

Response from the Ibrahim Qais Family to Elias Atallah’s Testimony 

To the esteemed Editor-in-Chief and Editorial Board of Asharq Al-Awsat:  

We, the family of the late Ibrahim Qais, address you with this letter in exercise of our right of reply to what was stated in the interview titled: “Elias Atallah: Syrian Officer Jameh Jameh Pressed the Button and Killed President René Moawad”, published in your newspaper on September 20, 2025.  

We kindly request that you publish this response in full, in order to preserve the credibility of your newspaper and to clarify the facts:  

What was attributed to the late Ibrahim Qais by Mr. Elias Atallah in the interview is completely false.  

Our father was not a witness to what Atallah claims, and he never said that he saw Jameh Jameh press the detonation button in the assassination of President René Moawad.  

The truth is that on October 22, 1989, Independence Day, we - the Qais family - were gathered with the family of our friend Majed Muqalled for lunch at our home, located near the Daaboul Travel Agency building, opposite a plot of land that separated us from Beirut prison. Muqalled, like our father, was seated with us. When the presidential convoy passed by the house, Majed went out onto the balcony to watch, and the explosion occurred at that very moment.  

The violent blast came from the Flippers playroom, which was adjacent to Raml al-Zarif School, where an explosive device had been detonated remotely. We experienced that horrifying moment in which the windows shattered and the house was damaged, and several family members and neighbors were injured.  

Our father, who rushed to help our wounded mother, was not observing the buildings or following any specific individuals; he was in the midst of the destroyed house, searching for his children and aiding the injured.  

Mr. Atallah’s claim that Jameh Jameh was seen on the roof of a building across the street pressing the detonation button contradicts both logic and the facts:  

First: Jameh Jameh was part of the convoy itself, as confirmed by MP Michel Moawad in a documented testimony, and the Syrian officer’s cars were about 150 meters ahead of the vehicle carrying the martyred president. 

Second: The buildings that Atallah claims our father and Majed Muqalled witnessed the explosion from were at the very heart of the blast and were directly damaged. 

Third: There was no way anyone could have witnessed the “pressing of the button”; we were all victims of this criminal explosion, right at the scene of the crime.  

If Atallah’s statements were truly accurate, why did he not report them during his years in a position of decision-making within the Communist Party, or in the years that followed? Why did he not disclose them while serving as a member of parliament for the city of Tripoli? It would have been more appropriate for him to show the courage to confront the truth directly instead of hiding behind colleagues who have passed away and can no longer refute his fabrications.  

Mr. Atallah’s attempt to implicate our late father Ibrahim Qais as a sole witness - alive, according to his account - in one of the most serious political and security cases in Lebanese history is nothing but a baseless slander lacking any credibility.  

Our father, the well-known communist activist, never exploited bloodshed and never accepted being part of a game of defamation or falsification. 



Spanish Ambassador to Asharq Al-Awsat: Saudi Arabia and Spain Enter New Era of Strategic Partnership

Spain's Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Javier M. Carbajosa (Embassy of Spain in Riyadh)
Spain's Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Javier M. Carbajosa (Embassy of Spain in Riyadh)
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Spanish Ambassador to Asharq Al-Awsat: Saudi Arabia and Spain Enter New Era of Strategic Partnership

Spain's Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Javier M. Carbajosa (Embassy of Spain in Riyadh)
Spain's Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Javier M. Carbajosa (Embassy of Spain in Riyadh)

Saudi-Spanish relations have entered a new phase of institutional cooperation following the signing of the Strategic Partnership Agreement in Madrid last May. The agreement established a permanent framework to expand economic, investment and technological cooperation while creating a high-level mechanism to oversee joint projects.

In an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Spain's Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Javier Carbajosa, revealed that two new Memorandums of Understanding in the fields of economy and transport have been finalized, alongside additional cooperation frameworks that remain under negotiation. He stressed that bilateral relations are moving toward a comprehensive strategic partnership aligned with the objectives of Saudi Vision 2030.

Saudi Arabia and Spain signed the Strategic Partnership Agreement on May 13 in Madrid and agreed to establish a Strategic Partnership Council to elevate bilateral relations and expand cooperation, particularly in promising economic and investment sectors. They also signed an agreement on mutual visa exemption for holders of diplomatic and special passports.

On Tuesday, the Saudi Cabinet approved a Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation in the future of modern transport methods between the Kingdom's Ministry of Transport and Logistics Services and Spain's Ministry of Transport and Sustainable Mobility.

A New Framework for Bilateral Relations

Carbajosa said the agreement signed in Madrid marks a turning point in bilateral relations, establishing a new institutional framework for managing cooperation between the two countries.

"I am very pleased to share with you what I consider a milestone in our bilateral relations, and that is the signature last May in Madrid of the Strategic Partnership Agreement between our two countries, raising our diplomatic relations to its highest level.

From now onwards, both Prime Ministers will personally lead our bilateral relations."

He explained that under the new framework, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez will personally lead bilateral relations, helping accelerate the implementation of joint projects and strengthen political and economic coordination.

"Traditionally, cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Spain was driven by a Joint Commission, co-led by the Ministries of Economy from both countries and supported by various government sectors. This framework aimed to deepen bilateral ties through regular technical consultations and biennial high-level summits. Now, the new framework supersedes everything else and the Strategic Partnership will encompass all our activities in different sectors."

He added that Memorandums of Understanding in the fields of economy and transport have already been finalized, while negotiations continue on additional cooperation frameworks that will all fall under the umbrella of the new Strategic Partnership.

Growing Trade, Services Driving the Partnership

Carbajosa said bilateral trade between the two countries stands at approximately $6 billion annually, while Spanish exports to Saudi Arabia range between $2.4 billion and $2.6 billion, making Spain the fifth-largest European Union exporter to the Kingdom.

Spanish exports include industrial machinery, mechanical valves, ceramics, pharmaceuticals and agri-food products. Meanwhile, Spain imports roughly $3.5 billion annually from Saudi Arabia, mainly crude petroleum, refined oil and ethylene polymers.

He said Spanish imports from Saudi Arabia rose by 18 percent during the first quarter of this year, driven by higher crude oil prices linked to regional geopolitical tensions, while Spanish exports contracted during the same period.

"While long-term indicators point toward growth, the overall trade trajectory in 2026 remains dependent on the normalization of energy supply routes in the Gulf region."

Carbajosa noted that cooperation extends beyond trade in goods.

"While the trade in goods favors Riyadh, the exchange of services tells a different story. Driven by Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 economic diversification, Spanish engineering, infrastructure, and transport firms have secured multi-billion-dollar contracts in the Kingdom.

From the flagship Haramein High-Speed Railway to massive urban transit and renewable energy grids, Spain heavily exports 'know-how' and technical services that do not always register in traditional customs ledger balances."

From Water and Energy to Smart Transport

The ambassador said cooperation also covers desalination and water resource management, drawing on Spain's world-class expertise in the design, construction and operation of large-scale reverse osmosis desalination plants, wastewater treatment facilities and circular water networks. Spanish companies have historically led major water and desalination projects across the Kingdom.

He added that cooperation also extends to urban development, infrastructure project management and the preparation of master plans for smart and sustainable cities, alongside upgrading power grids, substations and industrial complexes to strengthen energy security and support the integration of utility-scale renewable energy.

In the transport sector, Carbajosa said Spanish companies possess globally recognized expertise in designing, managing and operating complex transport networks. He cited the landmark Haramein High-Speed Railway, led by Spanish public-private consortia, alongside major infrastructure contributions to the Riyadh Metro project.

He also highlighted Spain's role in smart mobility, noting that Spanish companies will manage the intercity transportation network for the Qiddiya City giga-project through intelligent transport systems and traffic management solutions.

The Region's First Virtual Air Traffic Control Tower

Carbajosa said Saudi Arabia and Spain signed two Memorandums of Understanding in February 2026 covering civil aviation and future transportation modes, in the presence of Saudi Minister of Transport and Logistics Services Saleh Al-Jasser and his Spanish counterpart, Óscar Puente.

"The agreements align with the Kingdom's Aviation Program goals: expanding connectivity to 250 international destinations, positioning Saudi Arabia as a global logistics hub, and reaching 330 million annual passengers by 2030. Cooperation spans seven areas, including safety standards, route expansion, regulatory alignment, sustainable aviation, and joint R&D into autonomous aircraft and smart airport design."

He added that cooperation also extends to modernizing air navigation systems and airport infrastructure. A Spanish engineering firm has been selected to update the master plans for five Saudi airports, while another Spanish company has partnered with Saudi Air Navigation Services to deploy the region's first virtual air traffic control tower.

Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan and Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs José Manuel Albares Bueno during the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding establishing the Strategic Partnership Council (X)

From Arms Procurement to Technology Transfer

Carbajosa said defense cooperation between the two countries has evolved beyond traditional arms procurement toward industrial partnerships built on technology transfer and the localization of defense industries.

He explained that the joint venture between Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI) and Spain's Navantia to outfit five Avante 2200 corvettes has helped transfer technological know-how to the Kingdom and resulted in the development of the HAZEM naval combat management system through technology transfer from Navantia. He added that a follow-on agreement includes the transfer of intellectual property rights to the General Authority for Military Industries (GAMI), paving the way for future naval vessels to be built in Saudi Arabia.

He added that other Spanish companies, including Indra and Grupo Oesía, offer advanced capabilities in radar systems, electronic warfare and counter-drone technologies. Spain currently accounts for approximately 10 percent of Saudi arms imports, ranking second only to the United States.

According to Carbajosa, Spain's expertise in cybersecurity, command-and-control systems and dual-use technologies aligns with the objectives of Saudi Vision 2030, which seeks to localize more than 50 percent of military spending by 2030 through technology transfer, research and development, and workforce training.

Space Opens New Horizons for Partnership

Carbajosa said Saudi Arabia's space economy reached $8.7 billion in 2024 and is projected to grow to $31.6 billion by 2035.

He noted that Spain has an advanced industrial base in the space sector through companies such as Airbus Defence and Space Spain, Indra, GMV, Hisdesat and Sener, which provide solutions in secure satellite communications, Earth observation and geospatial analytics.

He said these companies are natural partners for the Kingdom's sovereign space infrastructure priorities, including secure satellite communications, Earth observation and geospatial analytics.

He concluded by emphasizing that Saudi-Spanish relations have evolved from implementing projects to building long-term strategic partnerships based on co-production and technology transfer, opening new horizons for cooperation in defense, aviation and space.


Iraq PM to Asharq Al-Awsat: Corruption Crackdown Is Irreversible, Arms Must Be Under State Control

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi during his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat Editor-in-Chief in Baghdad on Sunday
Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi during his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat Editor-in-Chief in Baghdad on Sunday
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Iraq PM to Asharq Al-Awsat: Corruption Crackdown Is Irreversible, Arms Must Be Under State Control

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi during his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat Editor-in-Chief in Baghdad on Sunday
Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi during his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat Editor-in-Chief in Baghdad on Sunday

Journalists live for the unexpected, especially in Iraq, where events can overtake a carefully planned interview before it even begins.

I had requested a meeting with Iraq’s new prime minister, Ali al-Zaidi, who emerged after a prolonged political contest involving two of his predecessors, Nouri al-Maliki and Mohammed Shia al-Sudani. The interview was scheduled for June 28th, so I arrived in Baghdad the day before. As it turned out, the timing could not have been better.

When al-Zaidi took office, I wondered whether he had made the biggest mistake of his life. He had built a successful career in finance and business and amassed considerable personal wealth. Why abandon that world for the unforgiving arena of Iraqi politics, and for a job in which success has often proved elusive?

From his first day in office, he appeared to be confronting two of Iraq’s most dangerous challenges: entrenched corruption, which has drained the country’s wealth, and armed groups operating beyond state control, which have exacted a heavy price on Iraq’s economy, reputation and regional and international relations.

I woke early in the Green Zone to messages saying that armored vehicles had sealed off the area overnight and restricted access. At first, I assumed it was a routine security incident. It soon became clear that something far more significant was under way.

Acting on judicial warrants, security forces raided the homes of figures who had long believed themselves beyond reach. Within hours, influential politicians, lawmakers and provincial officials had been detained for questioning over allegedly stolen public funds. The operation extended beyond Baghdad to other provinces and remained ongoing.

Al-Zaidi launched his tenure by giving up his salary and official allowances, declaring that he would accept no gifts, “not even a necktie.” In Baghdad, there was widespread talk that a man accused of offering him $200 million to draw him into a corruption network was now himself under investigation.

Al-Zaidi speaks in firm, unambiguous terms. He says there will be no protection for the corrupt and “no retreat from the decision to fight corruption or from the decision to bring all weapons under state control. Both will be enforced through the law.”

He also rejects foreign dictates and tutelage, insisting that Iraq will not submit to pressure from any side. When I joked that those with money seek power and those with power seek money, he replied that he was already financially secure. He said he would neither contest the next parliamentary elections nor seek a second term as prime minister.
 

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi during an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat Editor-in-Chief in Baghdad on Sunday

The fatigue was visible in his eyes when we met. He said he had not slept for 24 hours, having followed what Baghdad residents were calling “the night the big fish were caught.”

A visit by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi shortened the time available for al-Zaidi’s first interview with an Arab media outlet, leaving some questions unasked.

The following is the full interview:

Is the fight against corruption an irreversible decision?

Yes. It is an irreversible decision, and it is not optional. Corruption now threatens the very existence of the Iraqi state.

Certain elements adopted the notion of entering the body of the Iraqi state for the purpose of theft rather than public service. There is no longer any place for such people.

Between 1980 and 2003, Iraq’s wealth was devoted to sustaining wars, followed by the years of sanctions. Iraqis were therefore unable to enjoy their country’s wealth for 23 years.

From 2003 until the current year, 2026, another 23 years have passed. You are well aware of what happened in Iraq during this latter period.

A deviant system of thought emerged, centered on competing to loot and steal. We are in the process of ending this system, writing a new page for Iraq and closing that chapter.

Does this mean that you have decided to close the chapter on corruption?

Yes. There will be no place for corruption and no place for arms outside the state.

At the end of this year, we will announce a “National Sovereignty Conference” that will enshrine the exclusive possession of force by the state and its institutions.

No party will be permitted to carry weapons outside the framework of the state, and Iraqis will finally enjoy their country’s wealth.

We face two paths. We can either accommodate the interests of certain individuals and lose the approval of God Almighty and of the people, or we can remove those individuals.

Today, we will instruct the minister of finance to open a special account to recover Iraq’s funds from those involved in corruption. They must return the money.

Those who refuse to return it will face a different response from us. We will pursue settlements with those who return corruption proceeds, while safeguarding the rights of the Iraqi people in accordance with the law. The proceedings will remain confidential.

I have made this intention sincerely before God. We carry a debt toward Iraq.

What is that debt?

This country, Iraq, has bestowed its blessings and wealth upon us. How could we have become what we are without Iraq?

It is now our duty to repay that debt.

That is why I announced that I would not receive a salary and would not accept a gift, even if it were a necktie. My hand will not touch public money.

Should I act otherwise, I hope I receive what I deserve. I imposed this pledge upon myself to prevent any possibility of change. The highest limit of my ambition is to earn God’s approval and bring happiness to Iraqis.

Will you continue the anti-corruption campaign, regardless of the cost?

I regard death as a meeting with God Almighty, and it is the least we can offer Iraq.

I have announced that I will not run for another term and will not establish a political party.

I am determined, however, that the whole world should come away with an image of Iraq as a true source of leaders and that Iraqis are capable of governing this ancient country.

I will not permit dictates from beyond Iraq’s borders, whether from the East or the West. Iraq’s decision belongs to its people and is expressed by parliament, and the government must implement that decision.

So your slogan is “Iraq first.” No major powers and no regional powers?

Absolutely. Iraq comes first. Nothing comes before Iraq for us.

The interests of Iraqis are my top priority. It is in our people’s interest to build distinguished relations with the international community, neighboring countries, and the Arab Gulf states. Iraq is a state, not a village.
 

Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi during the parliamentary vote on his government in the Iraqi Parliament (Government Media)

Prime Minister, during the recent war with Iran, Iraq’s relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council states became strained because some attacks on Gulf targets were launched from Iraqi territory...

Specialized committees were formed to verify this matter. We are also awaiting evidence from the relevant authorities in the Gulf states, and we will act accordingly.

We ordered an investigation and instructed all security commanders to confront any attempt to use Iraqi territory to attack neighboring countries.

I urge, however, that the present not be judged through the lens of the past. We found this situation already in place when we assumed responsibility.

You have plans to visit Washington in the middle of next month. There will certainly be other visits as well...

We have received numerous invitations to visit brotherly and friendly countries, including France, Britain, and Germany.

The visits that will take priority because of the importance of joint work will be to the Republic of Türkiye, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, following the visit to Washington.

What do you expect from the Washington visit? Are we exaggerating if we say that Iraq is passing through a suffocating financial crisis?

That description is inaccurate. State employees’ salaries are secured and are being paid regularly. We are extremely keen to ensure that.

When our government took office, total debt stood at around 208 trillion Iraqi dinars. The budget depends on oil for 93 percent of its revenues, while non-oil revenues account for 7 percent.

My view of the Iraqi economy is that it is witnessing a struggle between two different spheres: an old economy that refuses to die and a modern economy whose birth is proving difficult.

Our economic philosophy is to move forcefully toward a market economy and free ourselves from the old economic model. That is the theoretical aspect.

In practical terms, however, we face a large body of conflicting legislation. We have old resolutions dating back to the dissolved Revolutionary Command Council that were drafted according to a socialist mentality that is no longer effective.

The Iraqi constitution, by contrast, is founded on economic freedom.

We have launched a major effort to change inherited legislation. The cabinet will complete this work in the coming days and send it to parliament.

We are also moving ahead with the establishment of an Energy and Development Fund, to which the Central Bank of Iraq will contribute. It will be offered for public subscription.

We will invite Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar to participate in the fund. We will also invite US and European funds and banks.

The fund will focus on development, industry, agriculture and all the sectors needed by our people.

How did your government manage public finances during the crisis caused by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz? Did you rely on borrowing from the Central Bank and drawing down reserves?

We discounted bills of exchange and borrowed from commercial banks and the Central Bank of Iraq.

Iraq’s position toward OPEC has generated considerable controversy. It is clear that Iraq wants a larger production quota. How do you balance increasing production with preserving oil prices?

I would like to address those concerned at OPEC.

Iraq entered a war in 1980. After eight years, it emerged with debts exceeding $100 billion.

It later became involved in the occupation of Kuwait and emerged with debts exceeding $200 billion.

After 2003, terrorism took root on our territory, and we suffered from instability.

Iraqis then fought the terrorist organization ISIS, not only in defense of Iraq but on behalf of the entire region.

Had ISIS managed to seize Iraq, the national security of neighboring countries and the wider region would have been threatened.

That war caused nearly $400 billion in infrastructure losses. To this day, thousands of Iraqis have not returned to their home areas and destroyed houses. This reality must be taken into consideration.

Iraq’s population has also reached 47 million, while our quota stands at 3.4 million barrels per day.

These facts must be incorporated into the criteria used to determine and distribute OPEC quotas.

We are therefore seeking a fair mechanism of distribution that does not prejudice the rights of Iraq and the Iraqi people.

Some forecasts suggested that Iraq might enter a borrowing program with the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank. Is that possibility still under consideration?

With the resumption of navigation and exports through the Gulf and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, those financial options have been abandoned. There is no longer any need for them.

Washington withheld shipments of physical dollars to Iraq for certain reasons. Do you expect this problem to be resolved with the US president?

They were precautionary measures and were not intended as leverage in return for specific demands.

There were concerns regarding physical cash. We explained to the US side the mechanisms and channels through which these funds move.

The issue has been resolved, and the cash shipments have arrived.
 

Members of the Saraya al-Salam cheer during a ceremony marking the start of the process of handing over their weapons to Iraqi state forces in Samarra, north of Baghdad, Iraq, Thursday, June 4, 2026. (AP Photo/Anmar Khalil)

Has the government negotiated with factions that reject confining arms to the state? What if their rejection becomes final after the withdrawal? Would the government be forced to confront them?

Let us state this clearly: there is no force other than the force of the state, and we will use the force of law to impose it.

There will be no weapons other than the weapons of the state.

Some view the plan to confine arms to the state as little more than a symbolic measure adopted to accommodate political forces.

If we listen to the skeptics, we will never reach a result.

As for the factions, they are ideologically driven groups. We believe that their publicly declared acceptance of giving up their weapons is an important and significant beginning.

In reality, we have received various types of weapons from Saraya al-Salam, Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kataib Imam Ali.

More important than the handover of weapons, however, is severing the relationship between a faction and the fighters under its command.

The weapons of these factions are now effectively in the custody of the state. Only a small quantity remains.

A mechanism will soon begin for handing over the remaining weapons to the armed forces.

This file will be addressed in its entirety. Nothing is stronger than the state.

We believe that resistance is a necessity, not a profession, and the need for it has ended.

We will not accept the existence of a state within the state.
 

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi during his meeting with US envoy Tom Barrack in Baghdad on June 16, 2026 (Government Media)

What did US envoy Tom Barrack ask of you?

He made no demands.

We discussed the suspension of operations by some US companies because of bureaucratic obstacles, and we facilitated the procedures needed by those companies.

Do you believe that the United States is genuinely prepared to support your government’s plans?

I have spoken by telephone with President Donald Trump once.

Yes, we sensed a willingness to provide support. Naturally, we place Iraq’s interests first in every step we take.

Some have accepted concessions because they had financial objectives. That is not the case with us.

Prime Minister, have the political forces pledged to facilitate your mission?

Yes, certainly.

I had previously been offered the premiership twice and turned it down on both occasions.

Is there a person who had a particular influence on you?

Yes. I was deeply influenced by my late father, who always took me with him.

He detested injustice and warned me against angering the Lord, who does not accept injustice against His servants.

How would you describe your relations with Syria and President al-Sharaa?

They are moving toward becoming good relations.

The foreign minister will visit them soon, and President al-Sharaa called to congratulate me.

We are moving toward greater economic openness and cooperation for the benefit of our two brotherly peoples.
 


Turkish Transport Minister to Asharq Al-Awsat: Costs and Financing of Türkiye- Saudi Arabia Rail Corridor to Be Finalized by Year-end

Turkish Transport and Infrastructure Minister Abdulkadir Uraloglu. (Ministry)
Turkish Transport and Infrastructure Minister Abdulkadir Uraloglu. (Ministry)
TT

Turkish Transport Minister to Asharq Al-Awsat: Costs and Financing of Türkiye- Saudi Arabia Rail Corridor to Be Finalized by Year-end

Turkish Transport and Infrastructure Minister Abdulkadir Uraloglu. (Ministry)
Turkish Transport and Infrastructure Minister Abdulkadir Uraloglu. (Ministry)

Türkiye aims to finalize costs, investment needs and financing arrangements for a strategic rail corridor linking Saudi Arabia and Türkiye by the end of 2026, Turkish Transport and Infrastructure Minister Abdulkadir Uraloglu said.

Uraloglu told Asharq Al-Awsat that technical teams were completing detailed studies for the project, which he said had strong backing from Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

He said Türkiye had reached understandings with Jordan and Syria to rehabilitate about 400 km (250 miles) of damaged rail infrastructure and position the route as a secure alternative for Gulf and global supply chains amid tensions around the Strait of Hormuz.

The minister said the corridor could become a new trade link between the Gulf and Europe, supporting regional connectivity and integrating with broader transport networks. Saudi Arabia and Türkiye signed memorandums of understanding on railways and logistics earlier this month.

Facilitating border crossings and passport procedures

On the passport and border-crossing procedures between the two countries, the Minister said: “At this stage, our priority agenda is the establishment of physical infrastructure and the completion of missing links. However, since we are also considering this line in the long term not only for freight transport but also for passenger transport, border-crossing processes are also important.

"Our objective is to establish a safe, fast and effective system. In this regard, we have introduced certain new arrangements. We extended the duration of driver visas from 15 days to 1 year. We also ensured that the required documents were rearranged in a way that allows faster procedures. Therefore, we are rapidly carrying out improvements in passport and border crossings.”

Uraloglu said the project's final implementation model and participating companies would be determined once the ongoing technical studies are completed. He said Türkiye has some of the world's strongest engineering and construction capabilities in the transport sector and, if the project proceeds as planned, Turkish firms are expected to play a leading role in the transcontinental corridor.

The Jordan-Saudi Arabia and Syria-Türkiye Railways

On the Jordan-Saudi Arabia and Syria-Türkiye sections of the proposed rail corridor, Uraloglu said: “We are currently in the period during which technical studies are being carried out most intensively. Our technical teams continue their examinations. It is being determined in which sections renewal will be carried out, which parts will be rebuilt and how much investment will be needed.

“Our primary objective is to clarify the needs along the route and the works that need to be carried out. If we can advance the process as planned, a more concrete framework regarding costs, investment needs and the financing dimension will have emerged by the end of the year. Afterwards, we will work together with the countries concerned on the investment program and implementation plan.”

On the projected financing size of the project he said: “At this stage, it is too early to announce a definite cost figure. First, we need to determine precisely the investments that need to be made. Once the technical studies are completed, a clearer financial picture will emerge”.

Leadership will and flexible financing alternatives

The Minister stressed that “the most important element here, even before financing, is political will. Our President, H.E. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and His Royal Highness Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman have demonstrated a strong will to realize this project. For us, this is the most valuable element.

"Because once political will and a common vision are put forward, financing models can also be developed. Public resources, international financial institutions, different investment models and joint financing options can be considered.

"Therefore, our priority is to complete the technical studies and put forward a clear project. Afterwards, the financing model will be shaped as a result of assessments to be made among the countries concerned”.

Transport is a strategic security factor

In his geopolitical assessment, the Turkish minister said the pandemic, regional conflicts and global crises of recent years had underscored a clear and unambiguous reality, “transport corridors are not only economic instruments, but also strategic security elements. Connectivity has therefore become central to cooperation between countries.”

He noted that the sustainability of global trade, energy supply security and supply chains depends on strong transport networks.

He added: “With its strategic location at the crossroads of Europe, Asia and Africa, Türkiye stands at the center of regional and global trade networks. Saudi Arabia, for its part, stands out as one of the most important economic powers in the Gulf region. Therefore, cooperation between the two countries in the field of transport will not only strengthen relations between Ankara and Riyadh; it will also contribute to the trade and logistics structure of a wide geography extending from the Gulf to Europe and from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea.

“Relations between Türkiye and Saudi Arabia have gained significant momentum in recent years. The strong will demonstrated by our President, H.E. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, His Majesty King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud and His Royal Highness Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has placed cooperation between the two countries on a much broader and more strategic footing. At the point we have reached today, we see that a common vision has emerged not only in trade and investment, but also in areas that will shape the future, such as transport, logistics, energy and connectivity.”

Beyond the rails: A technological and digital partnership

The Minister added: “In this context, we see significant opportunities particularly in the railway sector. With the Memoranda of Understanding we signed in Riyadh, we established a common basis for cooperation in many areas, including cooperation in the railway sector, the development of logistics services, transport technologies, digitalization, maintenance and operation processes, safety and security practices, and training activities.

“We are planning not only for today's needs, but also for the transport systems of the future. For this reason, we are working on new railway connections that will link the Gulf region to Europe via Türkiye. We are carrying out technical studies on a route that will start from Saudi Arabia, reach Türkiye via Jordan and Syria, and from there be integrated into the European railway network. Once this line is realized, it will be possible to transport cargo from the Gulf region to Europe more rapidly, more safely and more sustainably.

“The Memoranda of Understanding we signed in Riyadh actually cover not only technical cooperation regarding a railway line, but also a much broader perspective. Railway technologies, logistics services, digitalization, maintenance and operation processes, safety and security practices, training activities and technical knowledge sharing are among the many areas included within the scope of this cooperation”.

Regional Agreement with Syria and Jordan

Regarding the nature of the understanding with the Syrian and Jordanian sides on the railway connection, the Minister told Asharq Al-Awsat: “By its nature, this project is a regional connectivity project that concerns not only Türkiye and Saudi Arabia, but also the other countries located along the route. Our objective is to establish an uninterrupted railway corridor starting from the Gulf region and extending to Türkiye via Jordan and Syria, and from there to Europe. In this context, we have reached an understanding with both Syria and Jordan on the development of the corridor.

“Today, there is significant railway infrastructure on the Saudi Arabian side extending as far as the Jordanian border. On the Turkish side, our railway network reaches the Gaziantep, Kilis and İslahiye region. Therefore, one of the focal points of the project is the condition of the connections in the Syrian and Jordanian sections.

“The assessments conducted indicate that renewal, rehabilitation and new investments are needed in an approximately 400-kilometer section in Syria and Jordan. In some sections, improvement of the existing lines will be sufficient, while in some other sections new infrastructure investments will need to be implemented.

“For this reason, our priority is to clearly identify the current condition of the line, its needs and investment requirements. We aim to determine by the end of the year the works that need to be carried out, the costs and the applicable models.

“We see this project not only as a transport investment, but as a strategic initiative that will connect the countries of the region more strongly with one another. Syria and Jordan are also natural and important parts of this corridor. Once the corridor is completed, it will provide significant gains not only in terms of freight transport, but also in terms of trade, logistics and regional economic mobility”.

Geopolitical alternatives

According to Uraloglu, “Developments in recent years have shown us how fragile transport systems can be. We saw this during the pandemic. We saw it during regional conflicts. Most recently, developments in the Gulf region and tensions around the Strait of Hormuz once again revealed the same reality.

“With this understanding, Türkiye has been developing major projects in recent years to strengthen international connectivity. While the Middle Corridor offers a reliable and effective alternative for trade flows extending from China to Europe, the Development Road Project aims to create a new logistics backbone that will connect the Arabian Gulf to Europe via Türkiye.

“We see the Saudi Arabia-Türkiye Railway Project as one of the complementary elements of this major vision. Starting from the Gulf region and extending to Europe via Jordan, Syria and Türkiye, this line will support existing transport networks and further strengthen regional connectivity.

“This project is not only a regional initiative. When considered together with the Middle Corridor, the Development Road and other transport networks, it has the potential to affect the trade structure of a wide geography extending from Europe to the Gulf and from the Middle East to Asia. Our aim is to contribute to making global trade safer, more uninterrupted and more resilient by creating corridors that are not alternatives to one another, but complementary to one another”.

The Turkish minister went on, highlighting his country’s readiness: “Thanks to Marmaray, the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars Railway Line and other strategic investments we have implemented in recent years, we have established a strong railway connection between Asia and Europe. In addition, our investments such as the railway line that will pass over the Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge and the Halkalı-Kapıkule High-Speed Railway Project, which is under construction, will further strengthen Türkiye's railway integration with Europe.

“On the one hand, construction of more than 4,000 kilometers of high-speed railway lines is continuing in our country; on the other hand, we are increasing the capacity of our railway corridors extending to Europe. In this way, Türkiye is becoming a much stronger hub in railway transport between Asia and Europe”.

Dimensions of integration and Europe’s gains

On expanding the network, Uraloglu said the project is taking shape in its first phase between Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Jordan and Syria, but bilateral talks and discussions have included the possibility of extending the line in future phases to incorporate other Gulf states such as Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Oman.

He stressed that the real added value of the corridor lies in its exceptional ability to connect directly to Europe’s unified railway network via Türkiye.

Regarding the geoeconomic returns for the European side, Uraloglu said Europe’s main gain lies in establishing a more direct and secure logistical and commercial link with the Gulf region, particularly as Gulf Cooperation Council states are among the most important strategic partners for the European continent in the energy, petrochemicals and diversified industrial goods sectors, in addition to the scale of major mutual investments between the two sides, making bilateral trade flows more regular and more predictable.

In addition, Europe has in recent years been seeking to make its supply chains shorter, safer and more diversified. This corridor that we are trying to develop may also be considered a new route that increases Europe's connectivity options. The issue here is not only cost; it is speed, predictability and accessibility”.

In conclusion, he told Asharq Al-Awsat that the project’s real impact on logistics costs will only be clear once the final technical design and expected traffic volumes are known. However, he expressed confidence that the project will deliver major economic and development benefits for both the region and Europe, strengthening trade, investment, and regional economic integration over the long term.