Elias Atallah: Syrian Officer Jameh Jameh Pressed the Button and Killed President René Moawad

Elias Atallah (not seen) holds a photo of George Hawi and Samir Kassir during Kassir’s funeral in 2005 (AFP)
Elias Atallah (not seen) holds a photo of George Hawi and Samir Kassir during Kassir’s funeral in 2005 (AFP)
TT

Elias Atallah: Syrian Officer Jameh Jameh Pressed the Button and Killed President René Moawad

Elias Atallah (not seen) holds a photo of George Hawi and Samir Kassir during Kassir’s funeral in 2005 (AFP)
Elias Atallah (not seen) holds a photo of George Hawi and Samir Kassir during Kassir’s funeral in 2005 (AFP)

In this final part of an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Elias Atallah, former political bureau member of the Lebanese Communist Party and coordinator of operations for the Lebanese National Resistance Front (JNFR), recounted a turbulent chapter of Lebanon’s modern history.

Atallah revisited the blood-soaked years of the 1980s, when Lebanon was torn apart by wars with Israel, battles in Beirut, and the volatile triangle of Syrian, Palestinian and Lebanese entanglements. He said his experience had been “harsh and painful.”

Confrontation with Israel had reached its zenith; the price of war in Beirut had been high; and relations within the Lebanese-Palestinian-Syrian triangle had been dangerously booby-trapped.

He said that a long-running exchange of strikes had taken place, between the Communist Party and Elie Hobeika, who served as the security chief and later head of the Lebanese Forces.

“I met him about twenty times,” Atallah explained. “He was a man without a heart and absolutely without feeling. It would be wrong to call him pragmatic. He was Machiavellian, willing to do anything to get what he wanted. He was physically brave and would openly state his opinion. He tried to present himself as a deep intelligence man. He had no cultural formation but he was physically strong and courageous.”

Atallah recounted a hunting trip that illustrated Hobeika’s ruthlessness. “I intended to go to Syria to shoot birds,” he said. “George Hawi (the Communist Party’s secretary-general) said we would go together with Elie Hobeika. I disliked the idea but I went. In the wheat plain I noticed Hobeika sliding the rifle under his arm and firing - a method that did not hit birds but could be used against people. I told him, ‘It seems you only go hunting people.’ He replied, ‘Yes, I killed people, but they deserved to die.’ We argued. George invited us to lunch; he had bought a lamb. I pretended I would join them but I climbed into a car and returned to Beirut.”

Atallah added that Hobeika boasted of operations he had carried out, including the explosive device that struck the Communist Party office on Baalbek Street near the Arab University. “We were supposed to hold a Central Council meeting,” he said. “It seems Hobeika received information, so he put his men to plant the explosives. Chance played its role. Our comrade George Batal asked me to drive him to the meeting and I was delayed a few minutes. I was about 150 meters away when the blast shook out. There were dead and injured.”

Atallah also described kidnappings. “One day Hobeika’s group kidnapped three of our youths in the Jiyyeh area; they were transporting explosives for the resistance. I had no option but to kidnap an important person in return,” he recalled. “That was what happened. Two were released because he had killed the third. They two told us Hobeika’s fighters were testing new rifles and pistols by firing at captives they had.”

When asked whether the two men had spoken about the Iranian diplomats whose fate later became the subject of rumors - that one of them had died while his captors were testing a firearm on the bulletproof vest he had been compelled to wear - Atallah replied: “I did not know the fate of the Iranian diplomats, but Hobeika told me in a meeting that he had kidnapped them.”

The former Lebanese Communist Party official contended that Hafez al-Assad had not stopped at Hobeika’s past because he sought to push through a “tripartite agreement,” a formula Atallah described as “a plan to consume Lebanon.” He suggested that Hobeika’s relationship with General Michel Aoun (who later became president) had not begun in the mid-1980s as commonly reported; rather, Atallah believed they had “a prior relationship somewhere in Syria, a matter that required research to untangle.”

He claimed Walid Jumblatt had suffered humiliations under Hafez al-Assad, including being forced to eat lunch with military officers among them Major General Ibrahim Huweija, who had overseen the assassination of Jumblatt’s father, Kamal. While Atallah did not deny that Assad supplied Jumblatt with weapons and tanks during the Mountain War, he stressed that Assad had not given Jumblatt “the right to decide.”

The Soviet abduction

Atallah described the 1985 abduction of four Soviet embassy staff in Beirut in detail. “They called us at the Soviet embassy,” he said. “They told me that yesterday four people from the embassy apparatus were kidnapped; I did not think they were high-ranking, then they disappeared.”

Despite intense searching, day after day, they had found no trace. Walid Jumblatt mobilized everything he had; Atallah and his group did all they could, both publicly and covertly. Days passed without a hint.

Then a senior KGB general, “Yuri,” arrived as an envoy. He thanked them and, it seemed, realized they had failed to locate the missing men. “He told me, in broken Arabic: ‘Look, sheikh; today the detainees ate a breakfast that included labneh, olives and cucumbers, and they were wearing striped pajamas of a particular color. Your fate is at stake. We, the Soviet Union, do not let these matters pass without consequence, be it from the small or the big. I expect them tomorrow at 4 pm, and after that everyone will know his role.’”

General Yuri went alone to see Sayyed Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah, the cleric often portrayed in the media as the spiritual godfather of Hezbollah, a depiction Atallah said he did not necessarily accept as accurate. Fadlallah received him and, by four in the afternoon, three of the four Soviets had been released. Fadlallah’s guards explained that the fourth Soviet had resisted during the transfer, tried to seize a rifle, and was shot dead. The account appeared credible, as he had been killed only recently.

Finger-pointing fell on the Islamic Dawa Party and on an element hidden under the mantle of the Amal movement.

On assassinations and Tripoli battles

Atallah denied that the Communist Party had planned the assassination of Bashir Gemayel. “Absolutely not,” he insisted. “From the time I led these apparatuses, we decided in principle to refuse involvement in assassinations. There was one assassination attempt on General Michel Aoun in the Baabda palace courtyard, and when the Syrian army moved to remove Aoun, the perpetrator fired and we took custody of him. That attempt did not go through us.”

On the battles in Tripoli in the north, Atallah pointed to a bitter rift between Hafez al-Assad and Yasser Arafat. “One day Assad told him: ‘I will pursue an independent decision. Independent of whom?’ Arafat replied: ‘Independent of you. You do not recognize Palestine; Palestine, in turn, does not recognize Syria.’”

Arafat returned to Tripoli in 1983 and entered what Atallah described as Assad’s personal battle with the Palestinian leader. “One hundred percent, it was a mistake for us to participate,” Atallah admitted. “We should have declared ourselves unable to intervene.”

The Communist Party paid dearly: 34 dead in the first round in 1983, and 21 more in the second round during the period of Sheikh Saeed Shaaban. “We paid 55 martyrs for no justification,” he said.

A meeting with Hafez al-Assad

Atallah recalled a 1984 visit with George Hawi to Hafez al-Assad in which Hawi had pushed for immediate unity between Lebanon and Syria. The idea, Atallah said, had been alien to Lebanese sentiment and even dangerous.

In their palace meeting Assad spoke for two hours, repeating themes that were familiar from other encounters, according to Atallah. Oddly, Assad probed into where exactly Atallah lived in Ramlet, down to the house’s location on the side of the road near Saida. As they departed, Assad turned to Hawi with a warning: “Never repeat the story of immediate Lebanon-Syria unity. This talk is dangerous and forbidden. There are things to be carried out silently, without words.”

On Hariri, Hawi and Syrian-Iranian partnerships

When asked who killed Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, Atallah answered bluntly: “Three, and one leader: Bashar al-Assad.” He argued that after the departure of investigator Detlev Mehlis, the tribunal had lost its way. He named Assef Shawkat and other Syrian officers, as well as Hezbollah, as participants. He noted wryly that all Syrian intelligence officers who had overseen Lebanon were themselves later killed, including Rustom Ghazaleh, who was “torn to pieces.”

As for George Hawi’s assassination, Atallah maintained that until 2005 most assassinations in Lebanon were Syrian operations, but from that year onward there had been Syrian-Iranian partnerships in carrying out killings.

The killing of René Moawad

The climax of Atallah’s testimony came with his version of the assassination of President René Moawad, elected on November 5, 1989. Moawad had no presidential palace or guard, as Baabda Palace was still held by General Michel Aoun. He lived instead in a Hariri-owned building in West Beirut, considered secure because it lay inside the Syrian intelligence perimeter.

Atallah said Syrian intelligence had placed Major Jameh Jameh in charge of Moawad’s security, with Ghazi Kanaan and Hafez al-Assad’s blessing. Moawad, suspicious, had asked that Jameh be lodged in the adjacent Beaurivage Hotel and kept away from his entourage.

Atallah then recounted a chilling episode: A Communist soldier, recruited into Moawad’s guard at Syrian request, was later given a tiny explosive to attach to the president’s clothing during a church crowd in Ehden. Atallah said he learned of the plan and warned Moawad personally, along with George Hawi and Karim Mroueh. He remembered Moawad’s hands trembling as he heard the soldier’s name and the Syrian officer behind the plot.

The attempt failed when the soldier vanished. Ten days later, Moawad was killed. Witnesses later told Atallah they saw Jameh Jameh on the rooftop of the building, holding a device. “He pressed the button and the explosion went off,” they said. Jameh descended calmly and walked away.

Reflections on failure and lessons

Atallah ended the final part of his Asharq Al-Awsat interview with reflections on the futility of the cycle of violence. “I review this past not because I want to live in it, but because I hope no one will repeat it,” he said. His aim was twofold: “To state my criticisms of what happened, and to show the truth about the national resistance and the failure of resistances that were political projects, not national ones.”

He continued: “Hezbollah’s so-called resistance was not resistance. It was the occupation of the liberated land and turned into a profession. Resistance ceased to be a mission and became a career.”

Response from the Ibrahim Qais Family to Elias Atallah’s Testimony 

To the esteemed Editor-in-Chief and Editorial Board of Asharq Al-Awsat:  

We, the family of the late Ibrahim Qais, address you with this letter in exercise of our right of reply to what was stated in the interview titled: “Elias Atallah: Syrian Officer Jameh Jameh Pressed the Button and Killed President René Moawad”, published in your newspaper on September 20, 2025.  

We kindly request that you publish this response in full, in order to preserve the credibility of your newspaper and to clarify the facts:  

What was attributed to the late Ibrahim Qais by Mr. Elias Atallah in the interview is completely false.  

Our father was not a witness to what Atallah claims, and he never said that he saw Jameh Jameh press the detonation button in the assassination of President René Moawad.  

The truth is that on October 22, 1989, Independence Day, we - the Qais family - were gathered with the family of our friend Majed Muqalled for lunch at our home, located near the Daaboul Travel Agency building, opposite a plot of land that separated us from Beirut prison. Muqalled, like our father, was seated with us. When the presidential convoy passed by the house, Majed went out onto the balcony to watch, and the explosion occurred at that very moment.  

The violent blast came from the Flippers playroom, which was adjacent to Raml al-Zarif School, where an explosive device had been detonated remotely. We experienced that horrifying moment in which the windows shattered and the house was damaged, and several family members and neighbors were injured.  

Our father, who rushed to help our wounded mother, was not observing the buildings or following any specific individuals; he was in the midst of the destroyed house, searching for his children and aiding the injured.  

Mr. Atallah’s claim that Jameh Jameh was seen on the roof of a building across the street pressing the detonation button contradicts both logic and the facts:  

First: Jameh Jameh was part of the convoy itself, as confirmed by MP Michel Moawad in a documented testimony, and the Syrian officer’s cars were about 150 meters ahead of the vehicle carrying the martyred president. 

Second: The buildings that Atallah claims our father and Majed Muqalled witnessed the explosion from were at the very heart of the blast and were directly damaged. 

Third: There was no way anyone could have witnessed the “pressing of the button”; we were all victims of this criminal explosion, right at the scene of the crime.  

If Atallah’s statements were truly accurate, why did he not report them during his years in a position of decision-making within the Communist Party, or in the years that followed? Why did he not disclose them while serving as a member of parliament for the city of Tripoli? It would have been more appropriate for him to show the courage to confront the truth directly instead of hiding behind colleagues who have passed away and can no longer refute his fabrications.  

Mr. Atallah’s attempt to implicate our late father Ibrahim Qais as a sole witness - alive, according to his account - in one of the most serious political and security cases in Lebanese history is nothing but a baseless slander lacking any credibility.  

Our father, the well-known communist activist, never exploited bloodshed and never accepted being part of a game of defamation or falsification. 



Turkish Transport Minister to Asharq Al-Awsat: Costs and Financing of Türkiye- Saudi Arabia Rail Corridor to Be Finalized by Year-end

Turkish Transport and Infrastructure Minister Abdulkadir Uraloglu. (Ministry)
Turkish Transport and Infrastructure Minister Abdulkadir Uraloglu. (Ministry)
TT

Turkish Transport Minister to Asharq Al-Awsat: Costs and Financing of Türkiye- Saudi Arabia Rail Corridor to Be Finalized by Year-end

Turkish Transport and Infrastructure Minister Abdulkadir Uraloglu. (Ministry)
Turkish Transport and Infrastructure Minister Abdulkadir Uraloglu. (Ministry)

Türkiye aims to finalize costs, investment needs and financing arrangements for a strategic rail corridor linking Saudi Arabia and Türkiye by the end of 2026, Turkish Transport and Infrastructure Minister Abdulkadir Uraloglu said.

Uraloglu told Asharq Al-Awsat that technical teams were completing detailed studies for the project, which he said had strong backing from Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

He said Türkiye had reached understandings with Jordan and Syria to rehabilitate about 400 km (250 miles) of damaged rail infrastructure and position the route as a secure alternative for Gulf and global supply chains amid tensions around the Strait of Hormuz.

The minister said the corridor could become a new trade link between the Gulf and Europe, supporting regional connectivity and integrating with broader transport networks. Saudi Arabia and Türkiye signed memorandums of understanding on railways and logistics earlier this month.

Facilitating border crossings and passport procedures

On the passport and border-crossing procedures between the two countries, the Minister said: “At this stage, our priority agenda is the establishment of physical infrastructure and the completion of missing links. However, since we are also considering this line in the long term not only for freight transport but also for passenger transport, border-crossing processes are also important.

"Our objective is to establish a safe, fast and effective system. In this regard, we have introduced certain new arrangements. We extended the duration of driver visas from 15 days to 1 year. We also ensured that the required documents were rearranged in a way that allows faster procedures. Therefore, we are rapidly carrying out improvements in passport and border crossings.”

Uraloglu said the project's final implementation model and participating companies would be determined once the ongoing technical studies are completed. He said Türkiye has some of the world's strongest engineering and construction capabilities in the transport sector and, if the project proceeds as planned, Turkish firms are expected to play a leading role in the transcontinental corridor.

The Jordan-Saudi Arabia and Syria-Türkiye Railways

On the Jordan-Saudi Arabia and Syria-Türkiye sections of the proposed rail corridor, Uraloglu said: “We are currently in the period during which technical studies are being carried out most intensively. Our technical teams continue their examinations. It is being determined in which sections renewal will be carried out, which parts will be rebuilt and how much investment will be needed.

“Our primary objective is to clarify the needs along the route and the works that need to be carried out. If we can advance the process as planned, a more concrete framework regarding costs, investment needs and the financing dimension will have emerged by the end of the year. Afterwards, we will work together with the countries concerned on the investment program and implementation plan.”

On the projected financing size of the project he said: “At this stage, it is too early to announce a definite cost figure. First, we need to determine precisely the investments that need to be made. Once the technical studies are completed, a clearer financial picture will emerge”.

Leadership will and flexible financing alternatives

The Minister stressed that “the most important element here, even before financing, is political will. Our President, H.E. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and His Royal Highness Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman have demonstrated a strong will to realize this project. For us, this is the most valuable element.

"Because once political will and a common vision are put forward, financing models can also be developed. Public resources, international financial institutions, different investment models and joint financing options can be considered.

"Therefore, our priority is to complete the technical studies and put forward a clear project. Afterwards, the financing model will be shaped as a result of assessments to be made among the countries concerned”.

Transport is a strategic security factor

In his geopolitical assessment, the Turkish minister said the pandemic, regional conflicts and global crises of recent years had underscored a clear and unambiguous reality, “transport corridors are not only economic instruments, but also strategic security elements. Connectivity has therefore become central to cooperation between countries.”

He noted that the sustainability of global trade, energy supply security and supply chains depends on strong transport networks.

He added: “With its strategic location at the crossroads of Europe, Asia and Africa, Türkiye stands at the center of regional and global trade networks. Saudi Arabia, for its part, stands out as one of the most important economic powers in the Gulf region. Therefore, cooperation between the two countries in the field of transport will not only strengthen relations between Ankara and Riyadh; it will also contribute to the trade and logistics structure of a wide geography extending from the Gulf to Europe and from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea.

“Relations between Türkiye and Saudi Arabia have gained significant momentum in recent years. The strong will demonstrated by our President, H.E. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, His Majesty King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud and His Royal Highness Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has placed cooperation between the two countries on a much broader and more strategic footing. At the point we have reached today, we see that a common vision has emerged not only in trade and investment, but also in areas that will shape the future, such as transport, logistics, energy and connectivity.”

Beyond the rails: A technological and digital partnership

The Minister added: “In this context, we see significant opportunities particularly in the railway sector. With the Memoranda of Understanding we signed in Riyadh, we established a common basis for cooperation in many areas, including cooperation in the railway sector, the development of logistics services, transport technologies, digitalization, maintenance and operation processes, safety and security practices, and training activities.

“We are planning not only for today's needs, but also for the transport systems of the future. For this reason, we are working on new railway connections that will link the Gulf region to Europe via Türkiye. We are carrying out technical studies on a route that will start from Saudi Arabia, reach Türkiye via Jordan and Syria, and from there be integrated into the European railway network. Once this line is realized, it will be possible to transport cargo from the Gulf region to Europe more rapidly, more safely and more sustainably.

“The Memoranda of Understanding we signed in Riyadh actually cover not only technical cooperation regarding a railway line, but also a much broader perspective. Railway technologies, logistics services, digitalization, maintenance and operation processes, safety and security practices, training activities and technical knowledge sharing are among the many areas included within the scope of this cooperation”.

Regional Agreement with Syria and Jordan

Regarding the nature of the understanding with the Syrian and Jordanian sides on the railway connection, the Minister told Asharq Al-Awsat: “By its nature, this project is a regional connectivity project that concerns not only Türkiye and Saudi Arabia, but also the other countries located along the route. Our objective is to establish an uninterrupted railway corridor starting from the Gulf region and extending to Türkiye via Jordan and Syria, and from there to Europe. In this context, we have reached an understanding with both Syria and Jordan on the development of the corridor.

“Today, there is significant railway infrastructure on the Saudi Arabian side extending as far as the Jordanian border. On the Turkish side, our railway network reaches the Gaziantep, Kilis and İslahiye region. Therefore, one of the focal points of the project is the condition of the connections in the Syrian and Jordanian sections.

“The assessments conducted indicate that renewal, rehabilitation and new investments are needed in an approximately 400-kilometer section in Syria and Jordan. In some sections, improvement of the existing lines will be sufficient, while in some other sections new infrastructure investments will need to be implemented.

“For this reason, our priority is to clearly identify the current condition of the line, its needs and investment requirements. We aim to determine by the end of the year the works that need to be carried out, the costs and the applicable models.

“We see this project not only as a transport investment, but as a strategic initiative that will connect the countries of the region more strongly with one another. Syria and Jordan are also natural and important parts of this corridor. Once the corridor is completed, it will provide significant gains not only in terms of freight transport, but also in terms of trade, logistics and regional economic mobility”.

Geopolitical alternatives

According to Uraloglu, “Developments in recent years have shown us how fragile transport systems can be. We saw this during the pandemic. We saw it during regional conflicts. Most recently, developments in the Gulf region and tensions around the Strait of Hormuz once again revealed the same reality.

“With this understanding, Türkiye has been developing major projects in recent years to strengthen international connectivity. While the Middle Corridor offers a reliable and effective alternative for trade flows extending from China to Europe, the Development Road Project aims to create a new logistics backbone that will connect the Arabian Gulf to Europe via Türkiye.

“We see the Saudi Arabia-Türkiye Railway Project as one of the complementary elements of this major vision. Starting from the Gulf region and extending to Europe via Jordan, Syria and Türkiye, this line will support existing transport networks and further strengthen regional connectivity.

“This project is not only a regional initiative. When considered together with the Middle Corridor, the Development Road and other transport networks, it has the potential to affect the trade structure of a wide geography extending from Europe to the Gulf and from the Middle East to Asia. Our aim is to contribute to making global trade safer, more uninterrupted and more resilient by creating corridors that are not alternatives to one another, but complementary to one another”.

The Turkish minister went on, highlighting his country’s readiness: “Thanks to Marmaray, the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars Railway Line and other strategic investments we have implemented in recent years, we have established a strong railway connection between Asia and Europe. In addition, our investments such as the railway line that will pass over the Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge and the Halkalı-Kapıkule High-Speed Railway Project, which is under construction, will further strengthen Türkiye's railway integration with Europe.

“On the one hand, construction of more than 4,000 kilometers of high-speed railway lines is continuing in our country; on the other hand, we are increasing the capacity of our railway corridors extending to Europe. In this way, Türkiye is becoming a much stronger hub in railway transport between Asia and Europe”.

Dimensions of integration and Europe’s gains

On expanding the network, Uraloglu said the project is taking shape in its first phase between Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Jordan and Syria, but bilateral talks and discussions have included the possibility of extending the line in future phases to incorporate other Gulf states such as Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Oman.

He stressed that the real added value of the corridor lies in its exceptional ability to connect directly to Europe’s unified railway network via Türkiye.

Regarding the geoeconomic returns for the European side, Uraloglu said Europe’s main gain lies in establishing a more direct and secure logistical and commercial link with the Gulf region, particularly as Gulf Cooperation Council states are among the most important strategic partners for the European continent in the energy, petrochemicals and diversified industrial goods sectors, in addition to the scale of major mutual investments between the two sides, making bilateral trade flows more regular and more predictable.

In addition, Europe has in recent years been seeking to make its supply chains shorter, safer and more diversified. This corridor that we are trying to develop may also be considered a new route that increases Europe's connectivity options. The issue here is not only cost; it is speed, predictability and accessibility”.

In conclusion, he told Asharq Al-Awsat that the project’s real impact on logistics costs will only be clear once the final technical design and expected traffic volumes are known. However, he expressed confidence that the project will deliver major economic and development benefits for both the region and Europe, strengthening trade, investment, and regional economic integration over the long term.

 


Safer CEO: Company Ready to Resume LNG Exports

Safer’s CEO said the company is ready to resume liquefied natural gas exports (Asharq Al-Awsat). 
Safer’s CEO said the company is ready to resume liquefied natural gas exports (Asharq Al-Awsat). 
TT

Safer CEO: Company Ready to Resume LNG Exports

Safer’s CEO said the company is ready to resume liquefied natural gas exports (Asharq Al-Awsat). 
Safer’s CEO said the company is ready to resume liquefied natural gas exports (Asharq Al-Awsat). 

As Yemen’s energy sector continues to grapple with the effects of war and a steep decline in foreign investment, Safer Exploration & Production Operations Company — the country’s largest oil and gas producer — has unveiled plans to expand the use of its hydrocarbon resources.

These plans include introducing compressed natural gas as a fuel for vehicles and households and studying the development of potential shale oil reserves.

In an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Safer Chief Executive Officer Salem Kaiti said the company is technically prepared to resume production and exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) whenever the government authorizes the move and security and political conditions permit.

He added that any restart would be gradual and would follow the rehabilitation and maintenance of selected wells and facilities.

According to Kaiti, Safer currently produces about 15,000 barrels of oil per day and 1.6 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, down from approximately 32,000 barrels per day and 2.2 trillion cubic feet before the war.

He attributed the decline to the suspension of development, drilling, and exploration activities, as well as the departure of several foreign companies from Yemen’s energy sector.

The executive also revealed that Safer is studying a strategic project to develop compressed natural gas (CNG) based on methane gas as a lower-cost alternative to transportation fuels and household cooking gas.

Yemen possesses substantial methane reserves, he said, but the project would require significant investment in infrastructure, transportation networks, and distribution stations.

In addition, Safer is examining opportunities in unconventional oil resources, including shale oil. Preliminary studies conducted by oilfield services company Schlumberger indicated promising signs of significant reserves, according to Kaiti.

However, confirming those estimates and developing the resource commercially would require advanced technologies and partnerships with specialized international companies.

Kaiti also expressed interest in building future cooperation with Saudi Aramco⁠, particularly in training, workforce development, and benefiting from the company’s expertise across the energy sector.

Maintaining Operations During Wartime

Kaiti stressed that Safer has operated under extraordinary conditions throughout years of conflict and economic instability. Despite security and financial challenges, the company’s workforce has managed to keep critical facilities in the oil-producing governorate of Marib running and prevent significant deterioration.

Operations have been strained by prolonged interruptions to exports, aging infrastructure, and the withdrawal of many foreign service companies. Nevertheless, Safer continued maintenance programs for wells and production facilities, preserved output levels, and maintained supplies of petroleum products and cooking gas to the domestic market.

Among the company’s most significant achievements, Kaiti cited the relocation of Safer’s headquarters and financial center from areas controlled by the Houthis to Marib in early 2017.

The company also resumed oil exports in October 2019 through truck transport to facilities operated by YCOM, with shipments eventually reaching the Port of Nushaymah on the Arabian Sea. Between 2019 and 2022, total exports reached approximately 8.6 million barrels.

Safer also succeeded in returning 17 inactive wells to production. Between 2023 and 2025, those efforts generated cumulative output of 554,000 barrels of oil and 52 billion cubic feet of gas.

In December 2024, the company restarted production from the Al-Wahda-2 well using electric submersible pump technology, which Kaiti described as the first step toward wider deployment of the technology across other wells.

The company resumed well-maintenance operations in May 2018 after a three-year halt. According to Kaiti, some wells faced serious technical risks that could have resulted in accidents or gas leaks, but engineering teams successfully addressed the problems.

Other accomplishments include launching production of improved gasoline for the local market, constructing a 55,000-barrel crude oil storage tank at the central processing facility, paving a 40-kilometer road linking Safer and Al-Ruwaik, and supporting development projects in education and healthcare across Marib.

War-Driven Production Decline

Before the conflict, Safer’s production stood at approximately 32,000 barrels of oil per day and 2.2 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Today, those figures have fallen to around 15,000 barrels per day and 1.6 trillion cubic feet, respectively.

Kaiti attributed the decline to the natural depletion of mature fields, the suspension of field-development programs, halted drilling and exploration activities, weak maintenance programs, and the departure of foreign companies because of the war.

Given current conditions, he said the company’s priority is to stabilize production and prevent further declines until circumstances allow larger development projects to resume.

Workforce and Economic Role

Kaiti described Safer as one of the pillars of Yemen’s economy, citing its role in supplying domestic markets with cooking gas, gasoline, and diesel, while contributing to government revenues and employment.

The company also provides fuel for power stations, helping maintain electricity supplies in Marib and other governorates. Approximately 99 percent of Safer’s workforce is Yemeni, with the company employing around 1,000 people, in addition to hundreds of workers employed by contractors from across the country.

Future Projects: Shale Oil and CNG

Looking ahead, Safer has developed both short- and long-term exploration and development plans aimed at increasing and sustaining production and identifying new reserves. Their implementation, however, remains dependent on security and financial conditions.

Planned initiatives include drilling new development and exploration wells, launching projects to produce and process heavy crude oil and asphalt, and expanding the use of gas-lift systems and electric submersible pumps.

The company is also studying projects to process hydrogen sulfide gas in several fields and install specialized equipment to improve the quality of oil and gas production.

Kaiti emphasized that developing shale oil resources would require partnerships with international firms possessing advanced technology and expertise, given the high costs and technical complexity involved.

LNG Exports Could Resume Gradually

On the prospect of restarting LNG exports, Kaiti said Safer has preserved upstream facilities throughout the war and remains technically ready to resume production and exports once political and security conditions improve and the government gives its approval.

Any restart would be gradual, he noted, because some wells and facilities require maintenance and rehabilitation after years of inactivity. Extended shutdowns have affected portions of the company’s equipment and surface installations.

Kaiti also voiced hope that foreign companies that left Yemen during the conflict would eventually return. While some have already resumed activities through Yemeni staff, others continue to monitor the security situation before deciding whether to re-enter the market.

 

 

 


Yemeni Interior Minister: Assassination Cells in Aden Backed by Foreign Funding, Seeking to Undermine State

Haidan stated that security coordination between Yemen and Saudi Arabia is at its highest levels (Photography: Turki Al-Oqaily)
Haidan stated that security coordination between Yemen and Saudi Arabia is at its highest levels (Photography: Turki Al-Oqaily)
TT

Yemeni Interior Minister: Assassination Cells in Aden Backed by Foreign Funding, Seeking to Undermine State

Haidan stated that security coordination between Yemen and Saudi Arabia is at its highest levels (Photography: Turki Al-Oqaily)
Haidan stated that security coordination between Yemen and Saudi Arabia is at its highest levels (Photography: Turki Al-Oqaily)

Yemen’s Interior Minister Major General Ibrahim Haidan revealed what he described as the foiling of the "largest political assassination plot" in the temporary capital Aden, saying security forces had carried out a successful pre-emptive operation against terrorist cells linked to foreign actors that were planning to target prominent political and security figures as part of what he called an “intelligence war” against the Yemeni state and its institutions.

In an extensive interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Haidan said investigations had uncovered foreign funding and logistical support for the cells behind the recent assassinations in Aden, adding that authorities found documents, maps and tools in the possession of cell members that exposed the scale of the plot and its objectives.

The minister said security coordination with Saudi Arabia was taking place "at the highest levels," describing ties between the two countries as a "shared destiny" and praising support provided by the Kingdom under the leadership of Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Salman bin Abdulaziz and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

Prince Abdulaziz bin Saud, Saudi Interior Minister, during his reception of Major General Haidan in February 2024 (SPA)

Shared destiny with Saudi Arabia

Haidan stressed that Yemen’s relationship with Saudi Arabia represented a "shared destiny."

"Given the circumstances Yemen is going through, we find our brothers in Saudi Arabia dedicating all their efforts to supporting Yemen’s legitimate government in restoring the state and achieving security, economic and political stability," he said. "Therefore, Yemen’s security is an integral part of the region’s security."

He added that this made security coordination between Yemen and Saudi Arabia "at its highest levels," while expressing appreciation for the "generous and continued support" provided by the Kingdom, including in training, rehabilitation, logistical and technical assistance.

Haidan said the support had played a major role in ensuring the resilience and continuity of Yemen’s security institutions, adding: "We consider the Kingdom our primary strategic partner in the battle against terrorism."

Haidan explained that the assassination operations were an attempt to create social unrest to undermine public trust in the state (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Security situation in Aden

The minister said the security situation in liberated areas in general, and in the temporary capital Aden in particular, was seeing continuous improvement despite what he described as a "systematic targeting" of the city’s security aimed at undermining efforts to restore the state.

He said progress could be measured through several indicators, including the effectiveness and rapid response of security agencies, declining crime rates, and public support for state institutions. He added that those factors had helped foil what he described as the largest political assassination plot, although "the price was high."

According to Haidan, the plot claimed the lives of three prominent figures over recent weeks: Major Abdul Karim Abdullah, deputy director of the Seventh Security District; Dr. Abdulrahman Al-Shaer, director of Al-Nawras Schools; and Wissam Qaed, acting executive director of the Social Fund for Development.

He said the Interior Ministry, backed by military and intelligence institutions, was working to achieve security and stability under a comprehensive security plan aimed at strengthening state institutions and enforcing the rule of law, while noting positive cooperation from citizens.

Haidan added that security forces had become "more professional, disciplined and vigilant" in confronting threats posed by militias and their regional allies.

Why assassinations have returned

Haidan said the resurgence of assassinations in Aden was intended to create social unrest and erode public confidence in the state.

"By examining the nature of the targets chosen by militias backed by regional actors, we can understand the mechanism of the plot," he said. "The assassinations recently targeted the security sector, education and development, meaning that both the state and society were being targeted simultaneously."

He said the attacks were also aimed at obstructing efforts by the Presidential Leadership Council and the government to unify decision-making and normalize conditions in the country.

Who is behind the assassinations?

Responding to a question about those responsible for the recent assassinations in Aden, Haidan said security agencies, in coordination with the public prosecution, had made significant progress in collecting evidence and tracking leads.

"Many leads indicate that the rebellious coup militias received support from foreign parties to create chaos, disrupt the project of restoring the state and obstruct development efforts in liberated areas, especially Aden," he said.

Assassination of Wissam Qaed

Regarding threats allegedly received by Wissam Qaed from the Houthis before his killing, Haidan said the group had a long history of using assassinations as a political tool.

"The preliminary evidence and threats received by the martyr before his assassination place these militias under direct suspicion," he said, adding that the perpetrators may not necessarily have been directly affiliated with the Houthis but could have cooperated with allied groups pursuing a common goal of chaos and undermining the state.

Major General Haidan with General Fahd Al-Salman, Commander of the Joint Forces, in November 2024 (SPA)

Foreign funding and support

Haidan confirmed that some of the terrorist cells behind the assassinations had foreign links and had received financial and logistical backing.

"There is an intelligence war taking place on our soil aimed at shedding the blood of our people and dismantling the social fabric in order to undermine the state and obstruct the restoration of its institutions," he said.

He added that Yemen was coordinating with regional and international partners to "dry up the sources of cross-border terrorism."

Dismantling assassination cells

Speaking about the recently dismantled assassination cells, Haidan said the arrested group had been trained to carry out assassinations and plant explosive devices and included individuals with criminal records directly linked to a command center in Houthi-controlled areas.

He described the operation as a successful pre-emptive strike, adding that authorities had found documents, maps and tools revealing a major plot targeting prominent political and security figures.

Security in liberated areas

The minister said there had been "tangible progress" in the security situation across liberated provinces, noting growing coordination and integration among security agencies nationwide, with Aden receiving particular focus because of its political and symbolic significance.

He added that official statistics showed a slight decline in crime rates while maintaining the same level of enforcement.

"Compared with the first quarter of 2025, which recorded 3,111 crimes, the first quarter of 2026 recorded 3,064 crimes, with a clearance rate reaching 90 percent," Haidan said.