John Simpson: The More I Covered War the More I Hated it

A BBC journalist’s journey of 52 years… worldly interviews and crossfire

John Simpson: The More I Covered War the More I Hated it
TT

John Simpson: The More I Covered War the More I Hated it

John Simpson: The More I Covered War the More I Hated it

The waitress at London’s Landmark Hotel led me to his usual table in the corner, and there he was, an English, elegant man in his seventies. He was engrossed in an article on his MacBook. He greeted me with a warm smile. And after we exchanged pleasantries, he immediately assumed the role of the interviewer, forgetting that I was the one asking the questions. He soon realised and said, “I prefer asking the questions, as people’s stories and documenting the truth is my passion”.

To John Simpson, journalism is not a career, it is a calling. When he was only 15 years old he read George Orwell’s “1984”, and decided ever since to always be on the side of those who preserve memories rather than ones trying to erase them. He devoted his life to documenting history in public records.

Simpson’s name became linked to the BBC from day one. This partnership allowed for a journey of 52 years packed with adventures in over 120 countries, and 47 wars. Death brushed him ten times, and he lost one of his crew members in Iraq, a few metres away from where he was standing. As he grew older, his hatred for war grew with him. However, he refuses to allow those bad experiences to take control of his endless memories.

He told me about the time he snuck into Afghanistan in a Shadoor (Afghani Burqa), and how he discovered the Massacre of Sabra and Shatila in Lebanon. When he told me about his mock execution in the outskirts of Beirut, I felt I was there with him.

I asked him about his interviews with world leaders so he praised Mandela, told me he was charmed by King Hussein of Jordan, and expressed his annoyance with Khomeini. He even diagnosed Gaddafi with insanity.
One cannot summarize Simpson’s career in numbers and anecdotes, but interviewing him gave me an insider’s look at the world of journalism aimed at humanizing politics.

* You have covered tens of wars, and have become regarded as one of the most important British war correspondents. How do you feel about that?
I do not regard myself as a war reporter. I am really more of a diplomatic correspondent who strays into wars. I have covered around 47 wars all together, but it is not how I see myself. I see myself as somebody who is really interested in politics. Of course, wars are a nasty form of politics, so that is really why I have strayed into that. Also, not everyone likes to cover wars, but I do not mind. Like Martin Bell and the others, whatever happens I ought to report on it, and sometimes it is a war, sometimes it is a revolution..

* Claire Hollingworth late war reporter used to take socks and a toothbrush with her in a small rucksack to war. What do you take?
I am much less organized than her. I also take much more than Claire. I always carry some form of gadget for music whatever it may be, and I always carry one big book because you can get arrested or stuck somewhere and if you do not have anything to read that is absolutely dreadful. I am very forgetful. I often forget the toothbrush or the socks, but I never forget the music or the book.

* You have categorized wars in your last book as dirty wars, proxy wars, and so one. How is the notion of war changing today?
Back where Claire Hollingworth and Martha Gellhorn started, at the time of the Spanish Civil War, big powers were fighting. I think that is true for Syria and in other parts of the world where the big countries are moving in, paying people, supplying them with weapons and fighting out their ideological, religious or just purely political battles in other people’s territory. The idea of an all-out major war between powers, that seems to have vanished, the last example of that I believe was Saddam Hussein’s attack on Iran in 1980. I do not think we have had anything as straightforward ever since.

* In your Panorama special on the BBC in 2016, you predicted an isolationist America under Trump, and this year’s Munich Security Conference has come to a conclusion that diplomacy is dead. How do you perceive the scene now?
I think that is profoundly wrong about diplomacy, as I feel that it is all what we have got. It is a lifebelt that saves us from disaster. However, there are times where diplomacy goes silent, but it can never go away. I must say having covered 47 wars in 52 years, wars make me profoundly angry and as I have got older and have become a father again quite late in life, it has made me all the more angry. I have a hatred of war, that I suppose I previously did not have.

* How many times did you have a near death experience?
I have it written out actually. In 2016, pure chance, I had kidney failure and I lay there in hospital and was lucky to survive. I had nothing else to do on my hospital bed, and so I recalled all the times.. the Kidney failure was the 10th. Death has brushed me. It was not just the bullet that is fired here and there, it is the bullet what hits the wall right beside you. It has been bombs more than bullets for me, and knives and physical attack by groups and so forth in Northern Ireland, Iran, Lebanon (three times), and others. I know very well now what it feels like to be on the point of death and I have to say, it is not that disturbing.

* Would you count losing members of your crew more upsetting them?
That is far worse. When my translator was killed in 2003 during the invasion of Iraq, I could not see any reason to be still alive while he was dead. He was standing quite close to me and he had his legs cut off by a piece of shrapnel, and I just had a piece of shrapnel in my leg. It just seemed to me to be unfair that he died and I lived.

* Do you suffer from PTSD?
No. I do not believe in it. I have got friends who had suffered from it, so I know it does actually exist. I am not denying it, but it has not affected me. I am not saying that I go through those experiences and they do not matter, and that they do not have an effect on me. However, I do not believe in letting it affect me, and it has not. I do get little flashbacks of these things, but I do not feel of damaging flashbacks, they are more like memories. I will never forget the business of the mock execution I once had just outside Beirut during the civil war in the 80s. I knew the gun was not loaded, but it felt like a near death experience. I was made to kneel down. The guy put the gun behind my neck, I remember it with the greatest clarity, looking down at the sandy earth filled with cigarette ends, feeling that it was the last scene I would see, and then he pulled the trigger with no bullet and everybody laughed. I do have these memories, and I do think it is important to, but they are not my master, they do not control me.

* Do you prefer interviewing or being interviewed?
I much prefer interviewing. I do not like being interviewed.

* Is it because you would rather hear someone’s story rather than tell yours?
Yes. I am not very keen on talking. When I am with somebody who is talkative, I prefer getting them to talk.

* You say journalism is more of a calling than a profession, why did you become a journalist?
It is. It is not organized enough to be a profession. I became a journalist for rather noble reasons in a way, although I find it quite amusing to think of nobility and journalism in the same sentence. When I was about 15, I read George Orwell’s 1985 and it was wonderful. That idea that you could destroy the reality of the past by destroying documents, newspapers and memories, was such a concept to me. So I thought, whatever I do I will be on the side of the memories, not on the side of people trying to stop them. I still think that if you can get things out on the public record that is what counts. To tell people the truth has a serious effect on the way these events are seen. An example of that, the Chinese government for decades tried to make out that there was no massacre in Tiananmen square. I was there, I saw it. Every time I talk to a government official in
China I manage to get a reference to Tiananmen, and I always use the world massacre, and it causes upset and embarrasses people. We must not allow ourselves to forget what really, really, happened.

* You mention in your book that the kindest person you interviewed was Nelson Mandela. What was it like to interview him?
It is a big cliché and I know that, but he was the greatest person I ever interviewed. What made him the greatest was simply his normality and naturalness. You really could ask him anything and he would not have been offended by it. I asked him about corruption in South Africa for instance, which is a very sensitive subject, and he just talked through it. He was so honest and accepted that some of his ministers were corrupt. That is something you do not often see.

* You also note that some of the people you interviewed were impressive, some were not at all. Can you give examples?
I have interviewed a lot of people, many we impressive and a lot were not over the years. To me, it is their relationship to truth that makes them a serious interviewee or just another politician defending him or herself. I used to interview Margaret Thatcher quite a lot and she was terribly difficult to interview because she was so sharp and well informed and if you made any slightest little mistake she would be on you and she would correct you. I did not really like her very much as a person, but I did admire her. I have interviewed various Arab leaders over the years, amongst them was Bashar Al Assad.

* What did you think of him?
This was long before the war began. It was in 2006, and at that stage he seemed to me to be more like a North London Ophthalmologist than a Syrian president. I asked him quite a lot of difficult questions and he answered them all. I remember my producer was with me and he was very worried when I asked Assad about who was in charge in Syria, was it him or his brother or his uncle, and I heard my producer gasping, and he answered honestly. Now if you interviewed Assad you would sadly be talking about the most appalling violations of the rules of war and some of the worst examples of attacks on civilians in modern history, and he is responsible. He carries the burden of guilt for that.

* Which other interviews with Arab leaders resonated with you?
I interviewed Colonel Gaddafi several times, and I thought probably he was insane, he was just a weirdo. I am never still to this day, even after talking to several people who worked for him or knew him, quite been able to understand how he managed to survive because he was really off the wall and a very nasty character, and now we know the details. To me he seemed eccentric to the point of craziness. I also interviewed the late king of Saudi Arabia, King Abdullah bin Abdel Aziz. He was very charming, and very sharp. He was absolutely delightful, and walking away from the interview I felt much better to having met this person. Not many politicians give you that feeling. He was a very thoughtful man. Another interview I remember was with King Abdullah of Jordan. Delightful. My favorite really in many ways was the late King Hussein of Jordan. He was such a charmer and his sons got those same qualities. I just think that Abdullah has done extraordinarily well.
The list also includes various prime ministers of Lebanon but they do come and go a little bit more. I have also specialized in Iran even before the revolution. Now, sadly Tehran is so terrified by the BBC Persian service they have placed a total block on anybody from the BBC going there. I would like to go back to Iran on holiday. I tried to also learn Farsi. I interviewed Ayatollah Khomeini.

*What did you think of Al Khomeini?
He was absolutely firmly lodged in the past. All his concerns were related to the Shah’s father and to the Shah himself and to the role the Western countries played in helping the Shah and all of that kind of stuff. He was also concerned about fighting Saddam Hussein, and I do not think it was anything more in his life except that. He was very withdrawn and did not want to have any kind of relationship with his interviewer. Rafsanjani who took over from him was a lot funnier and more charming. He was more interesting and far more plugged into the realities of the real world.

*What about American Presidents?
Historically, I was not very involved in reporting from America, as the BBC has a big bureau there. There was rarely a need for me to go there. I have however met and got to know many of the American Presidents like Bill Clinton and George Bush Sr. I also met Obama, and felt he was light weight even though he is intelligent. He wanted to be liked too much. I was from the start a little less enthusiastic about his presidency than a lot of people were. Decent man no question, but not very good as a president.

*You mention in your book that a scoop should be sacrificed for the sake of checking and verifying the news before broadcasting it. The BBC does not tend to break news to the public. What do you think of that?
They never did. They are uncomfortable with stories that only one of their correspondents has got. You can feel the sense of their relief when other newspapers and outlets pick the news up. An example from a long time ago is the massacre in Sabra and Shalita in 1982. It was something which together with another BBC correspondent we were the first people to come across. Even when we broadcast the pictures of the piles of bodies I could see that the BBC was uncomfortable about it. Fortunately quite soon, it got picked up by Reuters and everybody relaxed. For the BBC the most important thing is to get it right not to get it fast. I believe in that, but it is sometimes very frustrating. I did some reporting in Iraq about abnormalities in children being born, and clearly there was something very wrong in this town, the doctors all said it. It was difficult to get to because ISIS was taking hold of the town then. It was dangerous to get to, and we got lots and lots of pictures with children with dreadful abnormalities, and proof of why it might have happened and seemed to be something to do with the weapons that the Americans had used when they stormed the town, but the BBC was terribly nervous about it. We used it in the end, but the editors were scared.

* You have done things that were not very safe, like in Afghanistan. Can you tell me more about that?
I have done a lot of crazy things in Afghanistan without necessarily setting out to do that. in 1989 when the Russian troops were just withdrawing a cameraman and I were smuggled in to Kabul by one of the fighter groups. We did not realise how dangerous it was. we were betrayed to the secret police and there was a shootout. We kind of got out stepping over the bodies of secret policemen who were attacking the house where we had been hiding. I have near thought it was something to be terribly proud of, as it sparked a fight with casualties, but it was a major story at the time, and the story was how deeply the fighters had infiltrated the government structure in Kabul. It was exciting and alarming. After 9/11, the Taliban closed of Afghanistan completely, and said that any journalists found there will be dealt with. I do not like people telling i cannot do things, so i got a group of smugglers in Pakistan who smuggled goods into Afghanistan, to agree to take me and they said the only they would do it if you and your cameraman wear a Burka and we did that.

*How did you feel wearing a Burka?
Horrible. You feel so powerless. You just have that little panel with lace on it. It is amazing how quickly you start obeying other people's instructions just like Afghan women tend to do that. it was not sensible, but i am too old to be sensible.

*Did you feel that you had to fight to be sent by the BBC everywhere?
Quite often I did, In a big organization like that, there are so many competing groups. it is a very competitive environment. I had to pull out all the stops, from bullying to contacts. It does not make me popular with my colleagues, which is sad, but there are more important things than popularity.

*You were the first BBC correspondent to use the Online Service for reporting. Tell me more?
Yes I think I was. What I really was genuinely the first person in the world to do, in Afghanistan in 2001 I was able to broadcast from there live from a battle. things going off all around us.

*You are very caught up with technological advances; you have a verified twitter account. why is that so?
You have got to keep up. A fellow BBC journalist friend of mine still uses a typewriter. I think if you step out of the line as it is moving forward, you just end up being completely forgotten about. I now rather enjoy Twitter and I am still not very good at Facebook. The technology is terribly important particular in television and you have got to keep up. When you get to my age its quite easy to stop, but I feel the need to keep on pushing myself.

*What is the most essential advice you can give to young journalists?
We are living in a different kind of world, where newspapers and television and radio news are much less popular than they were. People do not want to know about things. They want to just be in their little echo chamber where they just hear the views that they like to hear which is disturbing. I just feel that young journalists in particular have to be aware of that and have to fight against it. It is the death of real journalism if we just simply write and broadcast about things that will please people. You have to challenge the other peopple’s views of things, and keep on forcing it through. It is more difficult now because institutional journalism is on the way down. We need good young journalists more than any other stage. It is not a profession that makes money. You do not get rich by being a journalist, and you should not ever want to. You absolutely have to be true to the kind of voice inside you and not be somebody else’s employee.

*What is your next project?
I have decided to turn to fiction and am currently writing a novel about Russia. More important to me is my television work. 25 years ago, I went to Brazil to the farthest reaches of the amazon and I met a tribe there that never had any contact with the outside world. They were lovely. Now I want to go back and see what has happened to them, and I am scared that they would all be wearing Manchester United t-shirts.



Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: I Left Saddam Meeting Sensing he Misread Threat

There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)
There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: I Left Saddam Meeting Sensing he Misread Threat

There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)
There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)

In the final part of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Jordanian prime minister Ahmad Obeidat, who died earlier this month, recounted in detail his meetings with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, and disclosed an alleged attempt by Rifaat al-Assad to assassinate former Jordanian prime minister Mudar Badran.

Obeidat began with his impression of Saddam following a 2001 meeting in Baghdad. He said he left convinced that the Iraqi leader “did not accurately understand the reality of the international situation, the trap that had been set for Iraq, nor the magnitude of the danger surrounding the country and what was coming.”

He also described how strong ties between the late King Hussein of Jordan and Assad deteriorated as the Iran-Iraq war intensified. “Exceptional channels of communication” opened between King Hussein and Saddam Hussein, he said, and those channels “thwarted Assad’s efforts to build an axis against Iraq.”

Obeidat further revealed that Rifaat al-Assad “sent a group to assassinate Mudar Badran” on the pretext that Jordan was harboring the Muslim Brotherhood and hosting training camps. “All of that was false,” he said, adding that the attempt was foiled and those involved were arrested.

Turning to the file of the Palestinian militant Abu Nidal, who split from Fatah, Obeidat recalled how Abu Iyad once “protected him from arrest,” before “the tables were turned,” in a reference to Abu Iyad later becoming one of Abu Nidal’s victims.

Asked about his history with Abu Nidal, Obeidat described him as “not an easy adversary.” Abu Nidal attacked Jordanian embassies and diplomats, he said, and was responsible for killing two or three ambassadors. He was also behind the assassination of the son of former prime minister Saeed al-Mufti, a diplomat at the Jordanian embassy in Bucharest, and wounded two ambassadors in separate operations.

When Obeidat served as prime minister in 1983-1984, Abu Nidal assassinated Fahd al-Qawasmi, the mayor of Hebron, during a visit to Amman.

Abu Nidal, Obeidat said, worked at different times for Syrian, Iraqi and Libyan intelligence services. “He was ready to work for the benefit of any intelligence service in any country and allowed them to control him,” he said. Syrian, Iraqi and Libyan intelligence used him more than once, and the Iraqis deployed him against Fatah in an effort to create splits and internal problems.

Abu Iyad had shielded Abu Nidal from detention when Fatah sought to arrest him, Obeidat said. “But in the end the tables were turned,” and Abu Iyad became one of his victims. It was said, he added, that Abu Iyad came to believe that Abu Nidal had begun working for “Zionist intelligence.”

As for Jordan’s response when its diplomats were targeted, Obeidat said that at the time he was prime minister and did not follow the security file closely due to the pressures of government. He was aware, however, that contacts were made to reach a deal to halt Abu Nidal’s operations in Jordan. “Their operations did indeed stop,” he said.

On coordination with major powers, Obeidat said Jordan cooperated with “any party that possessed information of interest to us,” except the Zionists. Relations with Syrian intelligence fluctuated between competition and brief periods of cooperation, after earlier periods of no contact.

He then recounted his 1979 meeting with Hafez al-Assad over accusations that Jordan was training members of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Acting on instructions from King Hussein, Obeidat, then intelligence chief, and Prime Minister Mudar Badran met Assad to address the issue.

“We made clear to Hafez al-Assad that it was impossible for us to have camps training the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood,” he said. Jordan informed Assad that such camps were in Iraq and that Syrians were traveling via Jordan to Iraq using forged passports. Without lists of those names from Damascus, Jordan could not act.

“This is a Syrian problem, not a Jordanian one,” Obeidat said he told Assad. Jordan would not allow armed activity on its soil but needed Syrian intelligence cooperation and names to intervene effectively.

He acknowledged that tensions were aggravated when Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood leader, Mohammed Abdul Rahman Khalifeh, brought Syrian cleric Saeed Hawwa to meet King Hussein without informing the royal court or intelligence services. The move surprised the palace and embarrassed the intelligence service.

After investigating, Jordan discovered that a group of Syrians had entered the country, most intending to travel onward to Iraq. To prevent escalation with Damascus, Jordan asked them to leave, allowing limited humanitarian cases time to arrange residence elsewhere.

Obeidat described Assad as “a good listener” who did not comment during their meeting but later instructed Syrian intelligence to cooperate with Jordan. His dealings with Syrian intelligence chief Ali Duba were limited but manageable.

He dismissed suggestions that Ahmed Jibril was behind operations against Jordan, saying the more serious problem involved Rifaat al-Assad. Rifaat’s alleged plot to assassinate Badran was uncovered, with suspects arrested at the border and in an apartment in Amman’s Sweileh district. They possessed weapons and explosives and were tried before Jordan’s State Security Court.

In an earlier incident, Obeidat said, members of Rifaat’s force assassinated a Syrian political refugee in Amman.

Asked about challenges upon assuming the premiership, Obeidat cited financial strain. Arab and Gulf aid declined to near zero, while Jordanian workers returned from the Gulf after losing their jobs, placing heavy pressure on living conditions.

Security challenges included Abu Nidal’s activities. At the same time, relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization improved. King Hussein allowed the Palestinian National Council to convene in Amman in 1984, triggering a political crisis with Syria.

Several attempted attacks targeting Jordan and council members were foiled, Obeidat said. Syria exerted pressure to prevent attendance, but Jordan ensured the session’s success. Supporting the PLO after its recognition as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians became, in his words, a Jordanian necessity to prevent a political vacuum.

Obeidat described a later meeting with Yasser Arafat as cordial after earlier strained ties, and said he also met Abu Iyad at the royal court during the council’s session. He met George Habash later in Beirut, outside office.

He then revisited the 1968 Battle of Karameh. Fighters from Fatah “stood firm and fought bravely,” he said, though many were killed. Some trainees were left without weapons or guidance despite warnings that battle was imminent, leading to heavy casualties.

King Hussein, he said, “was very resolute” during the battle.

On his relationship with the monarch, Obeidat said King Hussein “respected those who respected themselves.” Their relationship cooled after the 1994 Wadi Araba peace treaty, which Obeidat opposed.

Jordanian intelligence, he stressed, did not conduct operations in Beirut in response to the assassination of Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal, though he noted military intelligence operated separately.

Obeidat listed foreign leaders he met as prime minister, including Assad, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Saddam Hussein. Meetings with Britain’s queen, Austria’s president and Spain’s king were protocol visits.

He described relations between King Hussein and Assad as once “good, frank and continuous,” with almost weekly contact, before shifting during the Iran-Iraq war as close ties formed between King Hussein and Saddam.

Recalling his 2001 Baghdad visit, Obeidat said Saddam spoke at length about sanctions and support for Palestinians. He reproached Jordan over its peace treaty and alluded to Hussein Kamel’s defection. Obeidat insisted Jordan had no role in that defection or in his return.

When Iraqi officials called for cutting oil supplies to Jordan, Obeidat told Saddam that such a move would effectively besiege the Jordanian people. Saddam responded, “I will never abandon the Jordanian people under any circumstances.”

In Obeidat’s final reflection, the meeting left a lasting impression. From Saddam’s remarks that day, he said, he concluded that the Iraqi leader did not fully comprehend the scale of the international threat facing his country, a judgment he carried with him long after the encounter.


Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Tried to Assassinate King Hussein with Missile Given to Wadie Haddad

King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Tried to Assassinate King Hussein with Missile Given to Wadie Haddad

King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).

In the second installment of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Jordanian prime minister and intelligence chief Ahmad Obeidat recounts details of a missile plot to assassinate King Hussein, which he says was backed by Muammar Gaddafi and carried out through operatives linked to Wadie Haddad, head of the external operations arm of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

Obeidat, who also served as head of intelligence and as minister of interior and defense, revisits the confrontation between Israeli forces, the Jordanian army, and Palestinian guerrillas (fedayeen) in the border town of Karameh in March 1968, asserting that the Jordanian army “decided the battle,” but suffered a “moral defeat amid the fedayeen’s claims of victory.”

Obeidat died earlier this month. The interview was recorded before the “Al-Aqsa Flood,” whose aftermath delayed its publication. Below is the text of the second installment.
 

King Hussein inspects an Israeli tank left behind by occupying forces during the Battle of Karameh (Getty)

“Battle of Karameh”

Obeidat calls Karameh “a pivotal point of utmost importance,” especially for an army still reeling from the 1967 defeat and its withdrawal from the West Bank.

“The army lived the bitterness of that defeat,” he says. “It felt a moral, national, and pan-Arab responsibility.”

Karameh, he argues, offered a chance to restore the army’s fighting morale and reclaim some of its lost dignity.

“It was the army that settled the battle,” Obeidat says.

He credits Jordanian forces with thwarting Israeli attempts to build crossing bridges, destroying their vehicles on Jordanian soil and forcing, for the first time in Israel’s history, a request for a ceasefire. “The late King Hussein refused,” he adds.

Israel, he says, did not acknowledge a fifth of its casualties. Helicopters were evacuating the wounded who were “dripping with blood.”

He singles out artillery observation officers who advanced to the closest possible positions, relaying precise coordinates even as they effectively marked their own locations for shelling.

“The Jordanian soldier would identify his position near the Israeli army to be shelled,” he says, describing a willingness to die in order to restore dignity after the 1967 setback.

He says the declaration of “armed struggle” effectively erased the army’s role, presenting Palestinian fedayeen as the victors over Israel. “They monopolized the victory and ignored the army’s role entirely,” Obeidat says. “We emerged with a moral defeat in the face of their claims.”

He alleges that hundreds of millions of dollars in donations collected afterward, much of it going to Fatah, did not reach the Palestinian people but went to organizations and their leaders.

When the army entered Amman in September 1970, Obeidat says, it aimed to end what he describes as chaos: armed displays, roadblocks, arrests of soldiers on leave and interference in courts.

"When the army entered and began expelling the fedayeen from Amman, it swept through everything in its path. Even my own home, which I had recently rented after my abduction incident and which was close to the army’s command headquarters, was entered by the Jordanian army to search for fedayeen, while my family was inside the house at the time of the raid. My wife told them that her husband was an intelligence officer, but the Jordanian soldier replied, “Don’t lie.”

Obeidat says they did not leave the house until she contacted him, at which point he assigned one of his officers, the commander of an intelligence company, to speak with the army.

"Only then did they leave the house. The point is that the army swept areas without distinguishing between Jordanian and Palestinian; it wanted only to restore control over security. All of this forced me to send my family to my parents’ home in Irbid, in the north of the Kingdom."

He later describes what he calls a “state within a state,” extending from the Jordan Valley to Amman, after armed groups asserted authority over courts, roads, and civilian life.

On Syria’s intervention, Obeidat says Syrian forces entered northern Jordan flying Palestine Liberation Organization flags.

He later learned the decision was political, taken by the Baath Party, and that then-Defense Minister Hafez al-Assad complied reluctantly before Syrian tanks withdrew.

Iraq, he says, did not intervene. Obeidat affirms that he was told by Iraqi officials that neither the Iraqi state nor its forces intended to participate in any operation aimed at ending the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan.

According to one account, Iraqi leaders did not want to shoulder the political and diplomatic burden of the Palestinian issue or risk an uncalculated adventure.

He recounts another account, which he says he cannot adopt, according to which the operations command in the army was handled by a Pakistani figure. Under this account, Zia ul-Haq was receiving operational communications and sending messages that caused confusion among Iraqi and other forces, leading them to believe they would confront powerful strike units, prompting them to remain in a state of alert rather than engage.

He also recalls a meeting in which Palestinian figures, including Abu Iyad, reproached Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr. Al-Bakr replied: “We are a state with one life. If we make a fundamental mistake, we end. You are like cats with seven lives.”

As director of intelligence, Obeidat says he dealt directly with operations attributed to Haddad.

Between 1975 and 1977, he says, a missile was sent to Jordan with a group led by a Jordanian, Brik al-Hadid, affiliated with the PFLP. The target was King Hussein’s aircraft.

“The intention was to strike the plane, with Gaddafi’s knowledge and approval,” Obeidat says.

Jordanian intelligence monitored the group from the outset and later arrested its members. The king’s aircraft departed Marka military airport as scheduled but flew in the opposite direction to its planned route as a precaution, using jamming devices against any incoming missiles.

When confronted by Mudar Badran, then head of the Royal Court, Gaddafi denied knowledge. “I have no information,” Obeidat quotes him as saying.

Obeidat describes the aircraft hijackings orchestrated by Haddad as “the straw that broke the camel’s back,” contributing to the army’s intervention.

He says Jordanian intelligence had infiltrated Fatah and monitored its leaders, including Abu Iyad and Abu Yusuf al-Najjar.

In mid-1972, intelligence learned that Abu Dawood and a group were planning to enter Jordan from Baghdad to seize the Jordanian cabinet during a session and hold ministers hostage in exchange for the release of detained Fatah members.

The group crossed in three Mercedes cars, dressed in traditional Arab attire, with weapons concealed inside the seats and forged passports in hand. They were arrested at the border after a thorough search.

Obeidat rejects claims by Abu Iyad that Abu Dawood was tortured, insisting that “not a single hair on his head was touched,” and says Abu Dawood confessed only after realizing the operation had been fully uncovered.

Later, King Hussein met Abu Dawood’s parents, who pleaded for clemency. The king read the full confession and then met Abu Dawood himself. He ultimately ordered his release, honoring a promise he had made to Abu Dawood’s parents.

In Obeidat’s view, Abu Dawood was affected by the king’s treatment of his parents and “did not pose any future threat to Jordan.”

Obeidat describes a direct relationship between King Hussein and the General Intelligence Department.

The king met with officers regularly, not only to hear briefings but also to hear their personal views. 

Obeidat says he would submit reports to the prime minister and also meet with the king. When addressing the king, however, it was sometimes necessary to elaborate verbally on certain issues so that such information would not circulate among staff. 

When he was asked to present a security briefing before the king, the late King Hussein would summon Crown Prince Hassan. The king’s advisers would also attend, along with senior army commanders, the public security leadership, the head of the Royal Court, and the prime minister. The briefing of the security report would include an explanation of the security situation and any external or internal challenges.

 


Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Mystery Sniper Killed Wasfi Tal

Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Mystery Sniper Killed Wasfi Tal

Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Former Jordanian Prime Minister Ahmad Obeidat, who died earlier this month, was both a key player and a witness to sensitive chapters in his country’s history.

Obeidat began his career in the 1970s as an assistant director of intelligence, later serving as head of the General Intelligence Department until 1982. At the height of the Palestinian-Jordanian confrontation, he was abducted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine before the events of September 1970.

He also served for two years as interior minister before King Hussein appointed him prime minister in early 1984, a post he held until April 1985, concurrently serving as defense minister.

For more than 15 years, Obeidat remained at the center of decision-making. He later took on roles drawing on his legal background, from chairing the Royal Commission that drafted the National Charter in the early 1990s to serving in human rights and judicial positions, most recently as head of the board of trustees of the National Center for Human Rights until 2008.

Weeks before Oct. 7, 2023, the day of the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation, Asharq Al-Awsat met Obeidat in Amman. The interview had been scheduled for publication in October 2023, but the major developments that followed led to its postponement, particularly as Obeidat addressed contentious issues, notably Jordanian-Palestinian relations.

In the first part of the interview, Obeidat revisits his formative years, when his political and professional journey began as a law student in Baghdad on the eve of the July 14, 1958 revolution, before returning to Iraq after the fall of the monarchy amid sweeping regional transformations.

The account moves to his early professional life in Jordan, from a brief stint in legal practice to joining the Public Security Directorate, then serving in the Political Investigations Office, which formed the nucleus of organized intelligence work. It concludes with a detailed narrative of the establishment of the General Intelligence Department in 1964, its early structure and founding members, at a time when the Jordanian state was rebuilding its institutions in an intensely turbulent region.

Asked where he was when the 1958 revolution broke out in Iraq, Obeidat said he had completed his first year in law studies and returned to Jordan for the summer break.

“While I was in Irbid, news arrived of the July 14 revolution in Iraq that overthrew the monarchy. After the summer break ended, I went back to Baghdad, where a republican government under Abdul Karim Qassem had taken power,” he recalled.

The return was not easy. “We faced difficulties on the road. The border between Jordan and Iraq was nearly closed, so we had to return via Damascus and then through desert routes to Baghdad. It was an exhausting journey,” he added.

Obeidat left Baghdad in 1961 after completing his final exams. “On the last day of exams in the fourth year, I went home, packed and returned to Jordan the same day. The border between Baghdad and Amman had reopened.”

Among his contemporaries at law school was Saddam Hussein, who studied in the evening section. Obeidat said he saw him only once by chance. “He was with others, one of whom later became a governor,” he revealed.

He returned to Baghdad again in 1983 as Jordan’s interior minister to attend a conference of Arab interior ministers, more than two decades after graduating. There, he met his Iraqi counterpart, Saadoun Shaker. “It was an ordinary relationship,” Obeidat said, describing the ties as largely ceremonial.

From customs to intelligence

After returning to Jordan in 1961, Obeidat initially considered practicing law. But limited opportunities in Irbid and his family’s financial constraints led him to seek public employment.

He was appointed to the Customs Department in Amman, where he worked for several months before joining the Public Security Directorate in April 1962 as a first lieutenant following three months of training at the police academy.

At the time, there was no separate intelligence agency. Public Security included a branch handling general investigations. Soon after, the Political Investigations Office was formed, staffed by legal officers from the army and Public Security, including Mudar Badran and Adeeb Tahaoub from military justice, alongside Obeidat and Tariq Alaaeddin from Public Security.

The office handled cases referred by security and official bodies, including military intelligence and the Royal Court. After reviewing its work, the late King Hussein ordered the establishment of a legally grounded intelligence body. The General Intelligence Law was issued in 1964, formally creating the department, explained Obeidat.

Mohammad Rasoul Al-Kilani became its first director, followed by Mudar Badran, then Nadhir Rashid. Al-Kilani briefly returned before Obeidat assumed the post, succeeded later by Tariq Alaaeddin.

The shock of 1967

Recalling the 1967 war, Obeidat described it as “a defeat, not a setback. A military, political, psychological, and social defeat in every sense.”

He said there was no institutional intelligence view on Jordan’s participation. “The political opinion of a figure of Wasfi Tal’s stature was that entering the 1967 war was a mistake. He was not in office, but he remained close to the king and influential,” said Obeidat.

According to Obeidat, King Hussein believed Israel would occupy the West Bank whether Jordan participated or not.

“Participation was a gamble that might succeed or fail. The catastrophe was discovering that the Egyptian air force had been destroyed within half an hour,” he added.

Despite the bitterness, he said: “We did not fear for the regime, but we sought to contain public anger and absorb the shock.”

September and the assassination of Wasfi Tal

Obeidat first met Yasser Arafat after the events of September 1970. He confirmed that Arafat left Amman with an official Arab delegation to attend the Cairo summit and returned immediately afterward.

He recalled being informed mid-flight of the death of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. “King Hussein was deeply affected.”

On the assassination of Prime Minister Wasfi Tal in Cairo, Obeidat said the gunmen who confronted Tal at the hotel entrance were not responsible for the fatal shot. “The fatal bullet came from behind, from a sniper in another unseen location. To this day, the sniper has not been identified,” he added.

He rejected the notion that Tal had been reckless. “Wasfi was not a gambler. He had a distinct political project,” he stressed.

Obeidat said the Black September Organization accused Tal of ordering the expulsion of fedayeen from forested areas in Jerash and Ajloun. He denied that Tal was directly responsible, saying the clashes began after fedayeen attacked a police station and killed officers, prompting a spontaneous army response.

Abduction without interrogation

Before September 1970, Obeidat was abducted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine while serving as assistant intelligence director.

Armed vehicles stopped his car as he was leaving his home in Jabal Al-Taj with his family. He and his brother-in-law were taken to the Wehdat camp. “We were treated politely. We drank tea. No one asked me a single question,” he recalled.

After several hours, he was driven to another house in Amman and later returned home. The next morning, members of Fatah took him briefly to one of their offices, only to release him on foot without explanation.

“Not a single question was asked,” Obeidat said. “It was bewildering.”

He resumed his duties after ensuring his family’s safety. “At the time, intelligence, like any official institution, was threatened and targeted,” he said, reflecting on one of the most volatile periods in Jordan’s modern history.