Exclusive - New Secrets Revealed about Bin Laden’s Years in Sudan

Osama bin Laden is seen in a file photo taken in Afghanistan in 1998. (Reuters)
Osama bin Laden is seen in a file photo taken in Afghanistan in 1998. (Reuters)
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Exclusive - New Secrets Revealed about Bin Laden’s Years in Sudan

Osama bin Laden is seen in a file photo taken in Afghanistan in 1998. (Reuters)
Osama bin Laden is seen in a file photo taken in Afghanistan in 1998. (Reuters)

“I will leave, but you won’t solve your problems with the Americans.” These were the parting words of al-Qaeda leader, Osama bin Laden, as he boarded a military plane that flew him out of the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, to the mountains of Tora Bora in Afghanistan in 1996. Bin Laden, who was killed exactly nine years ago, never expected to be expelled by a fundamentalist regime that had adopted a hardline Islamic ideology opposed to the West and Americans. His prediction did come true, however. A year after he left Sudan, Washington imposed economic sanctions against the country.

Seven years before his expulsion, Sudan had fallen into the hands of the National Islamic Front, also known as the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1970s, after a military coup on June 30, 1989. The coup was plotted by the group’s leader, Hassan al-Turabi. Afterwards, Sudan was transformed into a safe haven for Islamic jihadist groups in other countries, especially Arab ones.

Failed assassination

The US listed Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism in 1993 after accusing its government of harboring the al-Qaeda leader and opening its territories to extremist groups from throughout the world. Bin Laden arrived in Sudan in 1991 under the guise of a businessman and investor. He was close to the Islamic group that was ruling the country and that had adopted jihadist slogans against the West. Bin Laden consequently held several open and secret meetings with the leaders of the Islamic Front, such as Omar al-Bashir and Turabi.

Sources close to the decision-making powers at the Front at the time, said Bashir, the now-ousted president, and his deputy, Ali Osman Taha, had visited Bin Laden at his house in the Riyadh neighborhood in Khartoum to inform him about plans to deport him to Afghanistan.

The same sources said Bin Laden had asked about the fate of his assets and properties in Sudan. He was informed that they will be liquidated and that his rights will be preserved. In fact, this never happened, revealed circles close to those in power. As Bin Laden was flown out of Khartoum, Bashir and his deputy, headed to Turabi’s home to inform him that the al-Qaeda leader had left the country at his own volition after acknowledging the difficult situation it was going through. This was the official version of events.

The sources, however, stated that Taha had first proposed his expulsion after the failed attempt to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, in 1995. Taha was rumored to have been involved in the plot. Bashir was convinced that he must go. Taha wanted to “get rid of” Bin Laden immediately after it soon started to emerge that he and his regime may have been in on the assassination attempt by providing the conspirators with logistic help.

Former security and intelligence chief Qutbi al-Mahdi told Asharq Al-Awsat that Taha’s role in the plot was limited to logistic support and financing the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and Jamaa al-Islamiyya groups that carried out the attack. Turabi had directly accused Taha and his deputy of being involved in the plot. He revealed that Taha had personally detailed to him the incident, asking him to eliminate two Islamists who were involved. They had just recently returned to Khartoum and were later expelled to Afghanistan.

Taha’s actions demonstrate that he was “always prepared to do anything to keep his position in power, even sacrificing his fellow members in his organization,” the sources said. This statement was confirmed by conspirators who had later plotted to remove Turabi from power. They succeeded in 1999 and the Islamist Front split between Bashir, who remained president, and Turabi, who became part of the opposition.

Necessary sacrifice

The sources dismissed the official story about Bin Laden’s “voluntary” departure from Sudan, instead saying the Sudan Brotherhood members had “sacrificed” him because they feared the consequences of the failed attempt on Mubarak’s life. The failed attack led to the ouster of then intelligence chief Nafeh Ali Nafeh and several Islamist members of his agency. The sources said Turabi had asked Bashir to keep Nafeh in his position because his dismissal would implicate Sudan. Bashir did not heed the warning and acted on his own.

Other reports suggest that Bashir had repeatedly sought to get rid of Bin Laden after his regime grew tired of al-Qaeda. His attempts all failed. He even tried to hand him over to the United States, which responded that it did not have enough evidence to put him on trial and secure a conviction. At the time, Vanity Fair magazine released a statement from the intelligence chief, Qutbi, that Sudan was ready to turn over Bin Laden, who was not yet wanted by the CIA. Washington was not interested at the time.

When Bin Laden received word that the regime was seeking to hand him over to foreign forces, he requested to leave. Sources close to the decision-making powers at the time told Asharq Al-Awsat that the expulsion was decided by the Sudanese regime, specifically Bashir and Taha.

Prior to his expulsion, the intelligence agency had detained all foreign Islamists in Sudan. They turned over the Libyans to then ruler Moammar al-Gaddafi, the Eritreans to Eritrea and the Tunisians to Tunisia. Bin Laden was about to be handed over to the US.

Beginnings

In the mid-1990s, German authorities at Frankfurt airport arrested a Syrian called Imad and known as Abou Hajar, a member of al-Qaeda. He was handed over to US intelligence. He was given save haven by the Islamist regime in Sudan and was resident in Khartoum for years. He led prayers at a mosque in the Riyadh neighborhood, the same neighborhood where Bin Laden lived and the same mosque where the al-Qaeda leader prayed.

A resident of the neighborhood told Asharq Al-Awsat that Abou Hajar had given religious lessons at the mosque, which was frequented by different foreign residents of the upscale neighborhood. Many were close to Bin Laden. Bin Laden himself said little and kept to himself except when greeting others in a low barely audible tone. His house was guarded by members of the security and intelligence services.

His rented home belonged to a Sudanese man, who was rumored to be the head of the al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory that was struck by the US with a Cruse missile in 1995 for its alleged ties with al-Qaeda and for manufacturing chemical weapons. The attack was in response to the bombing of the US embassies in Dar Es Salaam and Nairobi. Washington also carried out air raids against “mujahideen” training camps in Afghanistan. One such attack sought to kill Bin Laden.

Sources said that when Bin Laden first requested to reside in Sudan, he was welcomed by Turabi, who dreamed of having his country become a safe haven for Islamist businessmen from across the Muslim world. He allowed them to enter without visas and granted the Sudanese citizenship to whoever requested it.

Soon after his arrival, Bin Laden began investing millions of dollars in several different projects. He set up various companies, implemented road projects and bought a farm belonging to Khartoum University. He used the farm to set up a training camp for the various multinational members of al-Qaeda. The harboring of these fighters, who had already received high levels of training even before arriving in Sudan, would later drag the country into terrorism.

US relations

Turabi even had relations with the “Afghan Jihad” group. The sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that these ties probably date back to 1979 after the Soviets occupied Afghanistan when Turbai served as justice minister in Prime Minister Jaafar Nimeiry’s government. Turabi had even convinced the premier to open the first office for the Afghan Jihad in the Arab world in Khartoum. The office was secretly opened in 1980.

Bin Laden played a central role in the Afghan Jihad due to his wealth and ties with Abdullah Azzam, the Brotherhood member, whom sources say had the idea to form al-Qaeda.

Relations between the Islamic movement in Sudan with the US date back to the Cold War and the Afghanistan War when Soviet intelligence accused the Muslim Brotherhood of operating under Washington’s influence. It is often said in Sudan that generations of Islamic movement members earned their university and higher education degrees in the US. They include Ahmed Osman Makki, Amin Hassan Omar, Sayyed al-Khatib and dozens of others.

Turabi and Bin Laden first met at the former’s house in Khartoum in 1988 in wake of floods that had ravaged Sudan. Bin Laden had landed in the country as part of a relief team that included his younger brother. Sources close to Turabi told Asharq Al-Awsat that he did not hold many meetings with Bin Laden and they were often held in secret. Turabi often spoke to Bin Laden of shifting the Islamic movement towards openness, while the al-Qaeda leader stuck to his extremist views. They also discussed investment in roads, agriculture and airports.

The sources confirmed that Bashir enjoyed good relations with Bin Laden. He used to visit him at his home and they were seen together at the inauguration of several projects in Sudan. World leaders avoid discussing any ties they may have had with Bin Laden while he was living Sudan, which raises questions by over his activity, which was not limited to investment and that the Sudanese government was aware of his actions.

Mahdi told Asharq Al-Awsat that Turabi and Bashir had both agreed on the need for Bin Laden to leave Sudan as soon as possible after coming pressure from regional countries and possibly even Taha.

After the Soviet Union quit Afghanistan in the early 1990s and after fierce fighting between the Arab Afghan Mujahideen with American support, they feared that the US would turn them over to their countries, he continued. Many consequently sought refuge in Sudan, which welcomed them with open arms. Some worked in investment with Bin Laden.

9/11 Avoided

Mahdi said that the Sudanese government offered to hand over Bin Laden to the Americans, who responded that they had no charges against him. Khartoum, therefore, had no choice but to deport him to fend off any terrorism accusations against it. Mahdi stressed: “America is responsible for forming terrorism because it supported the terrorists while they were fighting the Russians. After the end of the Cold War, it exerted pressure on Sudan to expel Afghan Jihad members from the country. We had no choice but to force them to return to their countries. The security and intelligence agencies were not involved in handing them over to US intelligence.”

Mahdi denied that the Brotherhood, which is accused of plotting to assassinate Mubarak, had any relations with Bin Laden and his companion, Ayman al-Zawahiri. He said members of the Egyptian Jihad and Jamaa al-Islamiyya were attempting to implicate al-Qaeda, but they failed.

Taha, he revealed, played a role in the failed attempt on Mubarak’s life. His role was limited to providing logistic and financial support. Taha believed that Mubarak was the greatest obstacle in the development of Sudanese-Egyptian relations and relations with the Gulf and several other countries.

The sources said the idea of the assassination was first proposed by the Egyptian Jihad and they approached Taha for support. Contact between the two sides took place through Sudanese intelligence.

The plot ultimately failed. Three people were killed at the scene and Ethiopian security arrested three suspects, while three others fled to Sudan. They were reportedly killed to eliminate any traces back to their leaders.

“Bin Laden and his all jihadist groups had their own unit in the Sudanese intelligence and security agency,” a security source told Asharq Al-Awsat on condition of anonymity. “When counter-terrorism cooperation began, then agency chief Salah Abdallah Gosh handed American intelligence 300 valuable intelligence files on Bin Laden.”

The move was a stab in the back by Sudan against the Islamists, he said.

American intelligence would later say that the failure of Bill Clinton’s administration to cooperate with Sudan was a direct factor that led to the September 11, 2001 attacks. Had the administration been aware of the important information Sudanese intelligence had handed over to the US, New York would have avoided the attack that changed the world. Afghanistan ultimately became Bin Laden’s final safe haven. Its Taliban rulers refused to turn him over to Washington.



Ethiopia Builds Secret Camp to Train Sudan RSF Fighters 

Satellite imagery shows new construction and drone support infrastructure at Asosa airport in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 28, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)
Satellite imagery shows new construction and drone support infrastructure at Asosa airport in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 28, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)
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Ethiopia Builds Secret Camp to Train Sudan RSF Fighters 

Satellite imagery shows new construction and drone support infrastructure at Asosa airport in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 28, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)
Satellite imagery shows new construction and drone support infrastructure at Asosa airport in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 28, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)

Ethiopia is hosting a secret camp to train thousands of fighters for the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in neighboring Sudan, Reuters reporting has found, in the latest sign that one of the world’s deadliest conflicts is sucking in regional powers from Africa and the Middle East.

The camp is the first direct evidence of Ethiopia’s involvement in Sudan’s civil war, marking a potentially dangerous development that provides the RSF a substantial supply of fresh soldiers as fighting escalates in Sudan’s south.

Eight sources, including a senior Ethiopian government official, said the United Arab Emirates financed the camp’s construction and provided military trainers and logistical support to the site, a view also shared in an internal note by Ethiopia’s security services and in a diplomatic cable, reviewed by Reuters.

The news agency could not independently verify UAE involvement in the project or the purpose of the camp. In response to a request for comment, the UAE foreign ministry said it was not a party to the conflict or “in any way” involved in the hostilities.

Reuters spoke to 15 sources familiar with the camp's construction and operations, including Ethiopian officials and diplomats, and analyzed satellite imagery of the area. Two Ethiopian intelligence officials and the satellite images provided information that corroborated details contained in the security memo and cable.

The location and scale of the camp and the detailed allegations of the UAE’s involvement have not been previously reported. The images show the extent of the new development, as recently as in the past few weeks, along with construction for a drone ground control station at a nearby airport.

Satellite imagery shows a camp with hundreds of tents in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 22, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)

Activity picked up in October at the camp, which is located in the remote western region of Benishangul-Gumuz, near the border with Sudan, satellite images show.

Ethiopia’s government spokesperson, its army and the RSF did not respond to detailed requests for comment about the findings of this story.

On January 6, UAE and Ethiopia issued a joint statement that included a call for a ceasefire in Sudan, as well as celebrating ties they said served the defense of each other’s security.

The Sudanese Armed Forces did not respond to a request for comment.

As of early January, 4,300 RSF fighters were undergoing military training at the site and “their logistical and military supplies are being provided by the UAE,” the note by Ethiopia’s security services seen by Reuters read.

Sudan's army has previously accused the UAE of supplying the RSF with weapons, a claim UN experts and US lawmakers have found credible.

The camp’s recruits are mainly Ethiopians, but citizens from South Sudan and Sudan, including from the SPLM-N, a Sudanese rebel group that controls territory in Sudan’s neighboring Blue Nile state, are also present, six officials said.

Reuters was unable to independently establish who was at the camp or the terms or conditions of recruitment.

A senior leader of the SPLM-N, who declined to be named, denied his forces had a presence in Ethiopia.

The six officials said the recruits are expected to join the RSF battling Sudanese soldiers in Blue Nile, which has emerged as a front in the struggle for control of Sudan. Two of the officials said hundreds had already crossed in recent weeks to support the paramilitaries in Blue Nile.

The internal security note said General Getachew Gudina, the Chief of the Defense Intelligence Department of the Ethiopian National Defense Force, was responsible for setting up the camp. A senior Ethiopian government official as well as four diplomatic and security sources confirmed Getachew’s role in launching the project.

Getachew did not respond to a request for comment.

The camp was carved out of forested land in a district called Menge, about 32 km from the border and strategically located at the intersection of the two countries and South Sudan, according to the satellite imagery and the diplomatic cable.

The first sign of activity in the area began in April, with forest clearing and the construction of metal-roofed buildings in a small area to the north of what is now the area of the camp with tents, where work began in the second half of October.

Satellite imagery shows a forested area where, ten months later, a camp with hundreds of tents was built in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, December 15, 2024. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)

The diplomatic cable, dated November, described the camp as having a capacity of up to 10,000 fighters, saying activity began in October with the arrival of dozens of Land Cruisers, heavy trucks, RSF units and UAE trainers. Reuters is not revealing the country that wrote the cable, to protect the source.

Two of the officials described seeing trucks with the logo of the Emirati logistics company Gorica Group heading through the town of Asosa and towards the camp in October. Gorica did not respond to a request for comment.

The news agency was able to match elements of the timeframe specified in the diplomatic cable with satellite imagery. Images from Airbus Defense and Space show that after the initial clearing work, tents began filling the area from early November. Multiple diggers are visible in the imagery.

An image taken by US space technology firm Vantor on November 24 shows more than 640 tents at the camp, approximately four meters square. Each tent could comfortably house four people with some individual equipment, so the camp could accommodate at least 2,500 people, according to an analysis of the satellite imagery by defense intelligence company Janes.

Janes said it could not confirm the site was military based on their analysis of the imagery.

New recruits were spotted travelling to the camp in mid-November, two senior military officials said.

Satellite imagery shows an area where trucks come and go at a camp in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 22, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)

On November 17, a column of 56 trucks packed with trainees rumbled through dirt roads of the remote region, the officials, who witnessed the convoys, told Reuters, with each truck holding between 50 and 60 fighters, the officials estimated.

Two days later, both officials saw another convoy of 70 trucks carrying soldiers driving in the same direction, they said.

The November 24 image shows at least 18 large trucks at the site. The vehicles’ size, shape and design match those of models frequently used by the Ethiopian military and its allies to transport soldiers, according to Reuters analysis.

Development continued in late January, the Vantor images show, including new clearing and digging in the riverbed just north of the main camp and dozens of shipping containers lined around the camp visible in a January 22 image. A senior Ethiopian government official said construction on the camp was ongoing but did not elaborate on future building plans.

Sudan’s civil war erupted in 2023 after a power struggle between the Sudanese army and the RSF ahead of a planned transition to civilian rule.


Gaza Girls Take Up Boxing to Heal War’s Scars

Palestinian girls and young women attend a boxing training session between displacement tents in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 9, 2026. (AFP)
Palestinian girls and young women attend a boxing training session between displacement tents in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 9, 2026. (AFP)
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Gaza Girls Take Up Boxing to Heal War’s Scars

Palestinian girls and young women attend a boxing training session between displacement tents in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 9, 2026. (AFP)
Palestinian girls and young women attend a boxing training session between displacement tents in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 9, 2026. (AFP)

In a makeshift boxing ring etched into the sand between the tens of displaced Palestinians in southern Gaza, a dozen young girls warmed up before delivering fierce blows at their coach's command.

Osama Ayub once ran a boxing club in Gaza City, in the north of the Palestinian territory, until it was destroyed in a strike along with his home during the war between Israel and Hamas.

After finding shelter in the southern city of Khan Younis, he opted to put his sporting skills at the service of displaced Gazans, crammed by the tens of thousands in tents and makeshift shelters.

"We decided to work inside the camp to offer the girls some psychological relief from the war", Ayub told AFP.

Behind him, some of the young athletes faced each other in the ring surrounded by cheering gymmates, while others trained on a punching bag.

"The girls have been affected by the war and the bombardments; some have lost their families or loved ones. They feel pain and want to release it, so they have found in boxing a way to express their emotions," said Ayub.

Ayub now runs these free training sessions for 45 boxers aged between 8 and 19 three times a week, with positive feedback from his students as well as from the community.

One of the youngsters, Ghazal Radwan, aged 14, hopes to become a champion and represent her country.

"I practice boxing to develop my character, release pent-up energy and to become a champion in the future, compete against world champions in other countries, and raise the Palestinian flag around the world", she told AFP.

- Call for aid -

One after the other, the girls trained with Ayub, shifting from right to left jabs, hooks and uppercuts at his command.

In war-devastated Gaza, where construction materials are scarce, Ayub had to improvise to build his small training facility.

"We brought wood and built a square boxing ring, but there are no mats or safety measures," he said.

He called on the international community to support the boxers and help them travel abroad to train, "to strengthen their confidence and offer them psychological support".

The strict blockade that Israel imposed on the Gaza Strip makes the reconstruction of sports facilities particularly complicated, as building materials are routinely rejected by Israeli officials.

The official Palestinian news agency Wafa reported in January that a shipment of artificial turf donated by China to Gaza's youth and sports council was not allowed in by Israel.

With medicine, food and fuel all in short supply, sports equipment comes much lower on the list of items entering the Palestinian territory.

Rimas, a 16-year-old boxer, said she and her friends continued "to practice boxing despite the war, the bombardments and the destruction".

"We, the girls who box, hope for your support, that you will bring us gloves and shoes. We train on sand and need mats and punching bags," she said in comments addressed to the international community.


Is Iran Pushing Houthis Toward Military Action Against Washington?

Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 
Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 
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Is Iran Pushing Houthis Toward Military Action Against Washington?

Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 
Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 

As US military movements intensify in the Middle East and the possibility of strikes on Iran looms, Yemen’s Houthi group has continued military preparations, mobilizing fighters and establishing new weapons sites.

The Houthi mobilization comes at a time when the group is widely viewed as one of Iran’s most important regional arms for retaliation.

Although the Iran-backed group has not issued any official statement declaring its position on a potential US attack on Iran, its leaders have warned Washington against any military action and against bearing full responsibility for any escalation and its consequences.

They have hinted that any response would be handled in accordance with the group’s senior leadership's assessment, after evaluating developments and potential repercussions.

Despite these signals, some interpret the Houthis’ stance as an attempt to avoid drawing the attention of the current US administration, led by President Donald Trump, to the need for preemptive action in anticipation of a potential Houthi response.

The Trump administration previously launched a military campaign against the group in the spring of last year, inflicting heavy losses.

Islam al-Mansi, an Egyptian researcher specializing in Iranian affairs, said Iran may avoid burning all its cards unless absolutely necessary, particularly given US threats to raise the level of escalation should any Iranian military proxies intervene or take part in a confrontation.

Iran did not resort to using its military proxies during its confrontation with Israel or during a limited US strike last summer because it did not perceive an existential threat, al-Mansi said.

That calculation could change in the anticipated confrontation, potentially prompting Houthi intervention, including targeting US allies, interests, and military forces, he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Al-Mansi added that although Iran previously offered, within a negotiating framework, to abandon its regional proxies, including the Houthis, this makes it more likely that Tehran would use them in retaliation, noting that Iran created these groups to defend its territory from afar.

Many intelligence reports suggest that Iran’s Revolutionary Guard has discussed with the Houthis the activation of alternative support arenas in a potential US-Iran confrontation, including the use of cells and weapons not previously deployed.

Visible readiness

In recent days, Chinese media outlets cited an unnamed Houthi military commander as saying the group had raised its alert level and carried out inspections of missile launch platforms in several areas across Yemen, including the strategically important Red Sea region.

In this context, Yemeni political researcher Salah Ali Salah said the Houthis would participate in defending Iran against any US attacks, citing the group’s media rhetoric accompanying mass rallies, which openly supports Iran’s right to defend itself.

While this rhetoric maintains some ambiguity regarding Iran, it repeatedly invokes the war in Gaza and renews Houthi pledges to resume military escalation in defense of the besieged enclave’s population, Salah told Asharq Al-Awsat.

He noted that Iran would not have shared advanced and sophisticated military technologies with the Houthis without a high degree of trust in their ability to use them in Iran’s interest.

In recent months, following Israeli strikes on the unrecognized Houthi government and several of its leaders, hardline Houthi figures demonstrating strong loyalty to Iran have become more prominent.

On the ground, the group has established new military sites and moved equipment and weapons to new locations along and near the coast, alongside the potential use of security cells beyond Yemen’s borders.

Salah said that if the threat of a military strike on Iran escalates, the Iranian response could take a more advanced form, potentially including efforts to close strategic waterways, placing the Bab al-Mandab Strait within the Houthis’ target range.

Many observers have expressed concern that the Houthis may have transferred fighters and intelligence cells outside Yemen over recent years to target US and Western interests in the region.

Open options

After a ceasefire was declared in Gaza, the Houthis lost one of their key justifications for mobilizing fighters and collecting funds. The group has since faced growing public anger over its practices and worsening humanitarian conditions, responding with media messaging aimed at convincing audiences that the battle is not over and that further rounds lie ahead.

Alongside weekly rallies in areas under their control in support of Gaza, the Houthis have carried out attacks on front lines with Yemen’s internationally recognized government, particularly in Taiz province.

Some military experts describe these incidents as probing attacks, while others see them as attempts to divert attention from other activities.

In this context, Walid al-Abara, head of the Yemen and Gulf Studies Center, said the Houthis entered a critical phase after the Gaza war ended, having lost one of the main justifications for their attacks on Red Sea shipping.

As a result, they may seek to manufacture new pretexts, including claims of sanctions imposed against them, to maintain media momentum and their regional role.

Al-Abara told Asharq Al-Awsat that the group has two other options. The first is redirecting its activity inward to strengthen its military and economic leverage, either to impose its conditions in any future settlement or to consolidate power.

The second is yielding to international and regional pressure and entering a negotiation track, particularly if sanctions intensify or its economic and military capacity declines.

According to an assessment by the Yemen and Gulf Studies Center, widespread protests in Iran are increasingly pressuring the regime’s ability to manage its regional influence at the same pace as before, without dismantling its network of proxies.

This reality is pushing Tehran toward a more cautious approach, governed by domestic priorities and cost-benefit calculations, while maintaining a minimum level of external influence without broad escalation.

Within this framework, al-Abara said Iran is likely to maintain a controlled continuity in its relationship with the Houthis through selective support that ensures the group remains effective.

However, an expansion of protests or a direct military strike on Iran could open the door to a deeper Houthi repositioning, including broader political and security concessions in exchange for regional guarantees.