Researcher Owns 100 Rare Flags From Saudi State Eras

Saudi researcher Adnan Al-Tarif poses with two Saudi state flags (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Saudi researcher Adnan Al-Tarif poses with two Saudi state flags (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Researcher Owns 100 Rare Flags From Saudi State Eras

Saudi researcher Adnan Al-Tarif poses with two Saudi state flags (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Saudi researcher Adnan Al-Tarif poses with two Saudi state flags (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Saudi Arabia marked Flag Day on March 11 for the fourth consecutive year, following a royal order issued on March 1, 2023, designating the date as an annual celebration of the national flag, whose current form was approved in 1937 by King Abdulaziz.

Saudi researcher Adnan Al-Tarif, who owns around 100 flags, says one of the most notable pieces in his collection is the original banner of the First Saudi State, along with dozens of other flags used during later phases of the Saudi state across its three historical eras.

According to historical sources, the banner that Al-Tarif proudly owns — and keeps in a bank vault to protect it from damage, loss, or theft — was “a green banner made of khazz and ibraism (the finest types of silk), bearing the phrase ‘There is no god but Allah, Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah’ in Arabic, and attached to a simple pole.”

The banner remained in that form during the reigns of Imam Muhammad bin Saud, founder of the First Saudi State, followed by his son, Imam Abdulaziz bin Muhammad, his son, Imam Saud bin Abdulaziz, and his son, Imam Abdullah bin Saud.

A banner that was never defeated

Al-Tarif said the first Saudi banner was raised in 1727 by the founding imam Muhammad bin Saud, whose rule lasted 40 years. The banner was either carried by him or entrusted to one of his sons.

Citing the historian Ibn Bishr, Al-Tarif said that Imam Abdulaziz bin Muhammad, the second ruler of the First Saudi State, and his son, Imam Saud, would send messengers to tribal leaders specifying a date and meeting point at a particular water source. The banner would be raised there in advance, and no tribal chief would fail to attend.

Ibn Bishr also wrote that Imam Saud “was granted success in his campaigns, and no banner of his was ever defeated.”

When Ibn Bishr described the life of Imam Turki bin Abdullah, founder of the Second Saudi State, he said that, when preparing for a campaign, Turki would write to the princes of towns and tribal leaders, specifying a time and place for assembly.

Military equipment, army supplies, and horse fodder would be sent out 15 days before departure. The banner would then be raised near the palace gate a day or two before the campaign began.

Imam Turki ordered the banner to be carried ahead of him, and his son Faisal later followed the same system of presenting or raising the banner before the palace.

Three centuries of development

Al-Tarif said the Saudi flag — also referred to as the banner or bayraq — has flown in green for three centuries, passing through several stages before settling into its final form in the later years of King Abdulaziz’s reign.

He also cited accounts from travelers and Orientalists who wrote about the Saudi banner.

During the height of the British-French rivalry, Domingo Badía y Leblich, a Spanish traveler later revealed to be a spy, pretended to convert to Islam and traveled under the name Ali Bey al-Abbasi to study the Saudi state.

He arrived in Makkah in January 1807, traveling from Morocco through North Africa, and witnessed the entry of Imam Saud’s army into the city.

He recorded that 45,000 followers of Saud, dressed in the garments of pilgrimage, entered to perform the rites, led by a green flag embroidered with large white letters reading “There is no god but Allah, Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah.”

Meanwhile, Swiss traveler Johann Ludwig Burckhardt, who adopted the name Ibrahim Abdullah after converting to Islam, wrote in observations from his travels in the East around 1810 about the military affairs of Imam Saud bin Abdulaziz bin Muhammad bin Saud and his authority across the Arabian Peninsula.

He noted that each prince had his own banner, and that Saud had several.

A new form of the flag

Al-Tarif said King Abdulaziz initially used the same banner employed during the first and second Saudi states before introducing modifications.

Writer Amin Al-Rihani recorded that the banner carried by King Abdulaziz early in his reign had a white section near the pole and a green section, and was square in shape, bearing the phrase “There is no god but Allah, Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah” in Arabic, with two crossed swords above it.

Its design later changed to include one sword beneath the inscription.

In 1925, King Abdulaziz ordered the creation of a new flag design. In 1937, the Shura Council approved official dimensions of 150 centimeters in length and 100 centimeters in width.

In the same year, decisions were issued concerning official flags, including those of the king, crown prince, army, air force, internal flag, royal naval flag, and merchant naval flag.

In 1952, the Shura Council issued decisions introducing other measurements and modifications. In 1973, the Council of Ministers approved the national flag law.

Later, during the reign of King Fahd, the Basic Law of Governance issued in 1991 defined the nature of the flag: green in color, with a width equal to two-thirds of its length, bearing the phrase “There is no god but Allah, Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah” with a sword beneath it.

A unique case

Al-Tarif said the symbolism of the current flag reflects guidance, justice, strength, growth, and prosperity.

The Islamic declaration of faith symbolizes the message of peace and Islam upon which the kingdom was founded. The sword represents strength, unity, wisdom, and security. The green color reflects the banner of Islam and symbolizes peace, generosity, tolerance, and water, while white symbolizes purity associated with Saudi Arabia.

He said the Saudi flag is unique, as it is the only flag that is never lowered to half-mast during mourning or disasters, and it cannot be used for advertising or commercial trademarks.

The flag must not touch the ground or water, be taken into impure places, or be sat upon. It also does not bow to guests during honor-guard ceremonies or mourning periods, according to Article 16 of the flag law, which also sets penalties for violations.

Families who carried the banner

In the First Saudi State, the banner was carried by Ibrahim bin Tuq and Abdullah Abu Nahiyah, who was killed during the siege of Diriyah in 1818.

In the Second Saudi State, it was carried by Al-Humaidi bin Salama, Saleh bin Hadyan, and Ibrahim Al-Dhafiri.

Under King Abdulaziz, the first to carry the banner was Abdul Latif Al-Maashouq during the recapture of Riyadh in 1902. He later took part in subsequent battles and was killed in the Battle of Bukayriyah in 1904.

His son Mansour Al-Maashouq then carried the banner and was killed in the same battle.

Afterward, Abdulrahman bin Mutrif and his sons assumed the role.

To this day, the responsibility of carrying the banner has been entrusted to the Al-Mutrif family, although many individuals and families have been honored to carry the Saudi flag in various battles and locations.

Sewing and calligraphy

Regarding the making of the flag, Al-Tarif cited historian Abdulrahman Al-Ruwaished, who wrote that sewing and writing the flag were entrusted to individuals from well-known families in Riyadh, including Abdullah bin Mohammed bin Shaheen and Saad bin Saeed.

Bin Saeed handled the preparation of the materials used for the flag, though he did not personally sew it.

Some documents indicate that King Abdulaziz tasked Sheikh Abdulrahman Al-Tubaishi with purchasing and securing certain materials for the banner.

Later in his reign, flags were manufactured in several countries using fabric-on-fabric techniques in the United States, Pakistan, and some Arab countries.

Among the earliest calligraphers of the Saudi flag during King Abdulaziz’s era was Sheikh Omar Asim Al-Hasani, from Al-Jumum in Wadi Fatimah near Makkah, who had worked in Kuwait at Al-Mubarakiyah School and later became its director.

He also wrote the script for the old Kuwaiti flag bearing the word “Kuwait.”

He was asked to inscribe the Saudi flag around 1911.

When King Abdulaziz ordered the opening of the Kiswah factory for the Kaaba in 1926, one of the first workers was calligrapher Abdul Rahim Amin Abdullah Bukhari, who was tasked with writing the inscriptions on the Kaaba’s covering and designing the calligraphy for its door.

He was also asked to write the Saudi flag and its decorative elements in Arabic Thuluth script.

Rare collections

Al-Tarif said one of the most notable parts of his collection is Saudi flags.

“I thank God that among my most prominent possessions are Saudi flags. I own more than 100 old and rare flags of different sizes, shapes, materials, and historical periods, including flags from the First and Second Saudi States that were used during campaigns to establish unity and security in this blessed land,” he said.

He said he also collected flags used during events attended by King Abdulaziz, including flags used on the king’s car.

His collection includes flags from the era of King Saud, as well as flags used during King Faisal’s visit to the United States in 1945, and others from the reigns of King Khalid and King Fahd during foreign visits.

Among the most important items he owns is the flag placed between King Fahd and King Salman bin Abdulaziz during a ceremony honoring King Saud when he assumed power in 1953.

Al-Tarif said he documented the flags through photographs and examined them at major international centers to verify their authenticity. They were also verified by individuals historically tasked with carrying the banner, including members of the Al-Mutrif family, as well as through the finials placed atop flagpoles.

He said he owns more than 10 finials made of silver, copper, and other metals used during the reign of King Abdulaziz, along with a rare document stamped by King Abdulaziz seven years after entering Riyadh, related to details about the Saudi flag.

Museums and heritage

Al-Tarif said that during his research career, he also established three private museums dedicated to camels, horses, and falcons, containing rare pieces, some of which are more than 300 years old.

He has also collected postage stamps related to these subjects from countries around the world, as well as newspaper articles published since 1850, photographs dating back more than 100 years, and museum artifacts, including utensils, incense burners, coffee pots, clocks, and license plates from the reigns of King Abdulaziz, King Saud, King Faisal, and King Khalid.

His collection also includes telephones used in royal palaces from the era of the founding king through later Saudi monarchs.

Diplomatic tensions over the flag

Al-Tarif also recounts an incident involving Saudi Arabia’s refusal to lower its flag following the death of King Faisal I of Iraq, which angered the British.

He said that after Sheikh Ibrahim bin Muammar was appointed Saudi minister plenipotentiary to Iraq in 1923, shortly after the Saudi legation opened in Baghdad, the appointment reflected the Saudi king’s confidence in his abilities.

Large Saudi communities lived in Iraq at the time, and Arab tribes inhabited the border regions between the two countries. Among his duties were caring for Saudi nationals, overseeing the implementation of newly signed border agreements, and managing arrangements for pilgrims traveling to perform the Hajj.



Sheibani, an Iranian Diplomat with Intelligence Clout

 Iranian ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Reza Sheibani (Iranian media)
Iranian ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Reza Sheibani (Iranian media)
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Sheibani, an Iranian Diplomat with Intelligence Clout

 Iranian ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Reza Sheibani (Iranian media)
Iranian ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Reza Sheibani (Iranian media)

Only weeks after Iranian diplomat Mohammad Reza Sheibani returned to Beirut as ambassador, his name has become the focus of a diplomatic crisis.

Lebanon’s Foreign Ministry withdrew its approval and declared him “persona non grata”, reflecting rising tensions between Beirut and Tehran and drawing renewed attention to a career tied to some of the Middle East’s most complex issues.

The decision swiftly ended the mission of a diplomat Tehran had sent back to Beirut, relying on his long experience on Lebanon and Syria.

His return had collided with a Lebanese political climate increasingly sensitive to the limits of foreign diplomatic roles.

War experience and regional role

Sheibani is no stranger to Lebanon. He served as Iran’s ambassador to Beirut from 2005 to 2009, a period that coincided with the 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel, giving him direct experience managing ties under complex security and political conditions.

His reappointment in early 2026 reflected an Iranian preference for seasoned diplomats in areas where politics and security overlap.

He replaced former ambassador Mojtaba Amani, who was injured in a pager explosion in Beirut, at a time of regional escalation, giving his return added weight beyond routine diplomacy.

Between Beirut and Damascus

Born in 1960, Sheibani joined Iran’s Foreign Ministry in the 1980s and rose through its ranks, focusing on Middle East affairs.

He served as chargé d’affaires in Cyprus and as head of Iran’s interests section in Egypt, before being appointed ambassador to Lebanon and later to Syria from 2011 to 2016, during which he covered the early years of the war.

He later served as ambassador to Tunisia and non-resident ambassador to Libya, and as assistant foreign minister for Middle East affairs.

He also worked as a senior adviser and researcher at the Institute for Political and International Studies at the Foreign Ministry, before returning to the forefront amid rising regional tensions.

Roles during escalation

In October 2024, he was named special representative of the Iranian foreign minister for West Asia, and in January 2025, he was appointed special envoy to Syria following developments in Damascus, including the closure of Iran’s embassy.

He was also tasked with following the Lebanese file as a special envoy during a sensitive phase, reinforcing his role as a crisis diplomat.

His career reflects a distinction within Iran’s diplomatic structure, as he is linked to the Ministry of Intelligence rather than the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guard Corps, highlighting a division of roles in foreign policy.

Legal and constitutional debate

The move by Lebanon’s Foreign Ministry has also sparked legal debate over how such decisions are made and enforced.

Constitutional expert Saeed Malek said the decision is based on Article 9 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which allows a state to declare a diplomat persona non grata without a specific procedure.

He said the measure does not amount to a break in diplomatic ties but falls within the management of diplomatic representation, adding that such decisions fall within the foreign minister’s authority under Article 66 of the constitution.

Malek said the decision is binding, and once the deadline to leave Lebanon expires, the ambassador’s presence becomes unlawful.

He added that security forces are required to enforce the decision and remove him once located.

However, he said enforcement remains bound by international rules, as the ambassador’s presence inside the embassy prevents Lebanese forces from entering under diplomatic immunity, meaning his expulsion can only be carried out once he leaves the premises.


Mohammad Baqer Zolghadr: A Man with Strong Connections at the Heart of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards

Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.
Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.
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Mohammad Baqer Zolghadr: A Man with Strong Connections at the Heart of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards

Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.
Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.

Mohammad Baqer Zolghadr was not an unfamiliar figure when he was appointed on Tuesday as secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. One week after the killing of Ali Larijani, and amid a war that has thinned the ranks of Iran’s top leadership, authorities turned to a man shaped within one of the deepest layers of the “Islamic Republic’s” power structure.

Mehdi Tabatabaei, the Iranian president’s deputy communications director, said on Tuesday that General Zolghadr had been appointed to replace Larijani. He wrote on X that Iran’s new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei had approved the decision.

The Supreme National Security Council, formally headed by President Masoud Pezeshkian, coordinates security and foreign policy. It includes senior military, intelligence and government officials, as well as representatives of the Supreme Leader, who has final authority in state affairs.

Zolghadr’s appointment appears to reflect state priorities in a time of crisis. A further decree is expected to name him as the Supreme Leader’s representative on the council, allowing him to vote under the constitution.

Unlike politicians who rise through elections or public platforms, Zolghadr belongs to a different category: a figure who boasts internal networks that predate the state and later embedded themselves within it. He accumulated power within the agencies instead of confronting them. His career resembles less a sequence of administrative posts and more a continuous thread linking some of the most entrenched centers of power in Iran.

His elevation to one of the country’s top security posts is significant not only for the positions he has held, but for the role he has played within the system. A veteran of the Iran-Iraq war, he developed expertise in organization and network-based operations, consolidating his position within the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and later extending his influence through the interior ministry, judiciary and Expediency Council.

The appointment signals a broader logic within Iran’s ruling establishment: in moments of heightened pressure, figures rooted in institutional networks tend to take precedence over those with a public political profile.

Early career

Zolghadr’s career is closely tied to the political environment from which he emerged. He belongs to a generation associated with the “Mansouroun” network, an early group that later produced influential figures within the IRGC, including Mohsen Rezaei, Ali Shamkhani, Gholam Ali Rashid, and Mohammad and Ahmad Forouzandeh.

The significance of this affiliation lies not only in early organizational ties, but in the nature of the group itself: an ideologically driven pre-revolutionary network that repositioned itself within the state through the IRGC.

Zolghadr’s rise was not an individual climb through institutional ranks, but growth within a web of relationships and loyalties embedded at the core of the system. He emerged not simply as a professional military officer, but as part of a generation that viewed security and politics as intertwined domains in safeguarding the regime. This gave him the rare ability to “reposition” himself and retain power as successive government ruled Iran.

War and the ‘Ramadan’ headquarters

After the fall of the Shah, Zolghadr, like other members of Mansouroun, initially operated through revolutionary committees before joining the IRGC. His most defining wartime role was leading the “Ramadan Headquarters,” a key unit during the Iran-Iraq war.

This post was central to his political and security development. The Ramadan Headquarters served as a nucleus for external operations, coordinating cross-border activities with Iraqi Kurdish and Shiite groups opposed to Saddam Hussein and managing operations inside Iraq. It later evolved into what became the Quds Force, the IRGC’s current foreign arm.

There, Zolghadr developed a hallmark approach: operating at the intersection of military, intelligence and political spheres. The role involved not only managing battlefield operations, but also building networks, cultivating allies and leveraging conflict to generate long-term influence.

This model — combining military structure, indirect operations and proxy management — became a defining feature of Iran’s regional strategy. Within this environment, Zolghadr gained a reputation as a manager and strategist rather than a public-facing commander.

Rise within the IRGC

Following the end of the war in the late 1980s, Zolghadr spent 16 years at the top of the IRGC hierarchy: eight years as chief of the joint staff and eight years as deputy commander-in-chief.

These roles emphasized administration, coordination and institutional discipline rather than field command. His influence was rooted not in public charisma but in his position within the IRGC’s internal machinery.

Over time, he became firmly aligned with Iran’s conservative camp. His political role became more visible during the reformist presidency of Mohammad Khatami, when tensions between reformists and hardline institutions intensified.

Reform era

During the late 1990s, Zolghadr was among military figures associated with the conservative bloc within the IRGC. His name was linked to a letter sent by IRGC commanders to President Khatami, widely seen as a signal of military intervention in political affairs at a time of unrest. He was also associated with hardline opposition to the reform movement and the student protests of that period.

This phase highlighted a structural aspect of his career: his political role did not begin after leaving the military, but was embedded within the IRGC itself as it became increasingly politicized during its confrontation with reformists.

Interior Ministry under Ahmadinejad

When Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became president in 2005, Zolghadr was appointed deputy interior minister for security affairs. The position placed him at the heart of internal security, overseeing provincial governors and managing crises, protests and local tensions. It marked a transition from military service to the executive branch, while maintaining a focus on security.

His move illustrated a broader pattern: shifting from protecting the system through force to safeguarding it through security bureaucracy, expanding his network within the state apparatus.

Basij

Zolghadr left the interior ministry in 2007 amid reports of differences with Ahmadinejad, but his departure did not signal a loss of influence. In December of that year, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed him deputy chief of staff of the armed forces for Basij affairs, a newly created role.

The Basij, a paramilitary force, plays a key role in ideological mobilization and maintaining the IRGC’s presence in Iranian society. The decree emphasized strengthening and expanding the Basij’s reach, underlining the importance of Zolghadr’s assignment.

Judiciary and expanding influence

In 2010, Zolghadr moved to the judiciary, serving first as deputy for social prevention and crime reduction, and later as strategic deputy to the head of the judiciary until 2020.

The shift did not represent a departure from security work, as Iran’s judiciary operates closely under the authority of the Supreme Leader. Instead, it broadened his influence across another pillar of the state.

In September 2021, he was appointed secretary of the Expediency Council, succeeding Mohsen Rezaei. The role involves overseeing the council’s committees and acting as a link to the highest levels of decision-making.

Zolghadr also has family ties that extend his influence. He is the father-in-law of Kazem Gharibabadi, Iran’s deputy foreign minister for legal and international affairs and a prominent figure in nuclear negotiations.

Gharibabadi previously served as Iran’s ambassador to international organizations in Vienna, including the International Atomic Energy Agency.

From Larijani to Zolghadr

Larijani’s death deprived Iran of a political figure skilled in navigating between power centers. The choice of Zolghadr suggests a shift in priorities.

While Larijani represented balance and negotiation, Zolghadr embodies institutional discipline and internal cohesion. His selection follows speculation over other candidates, including former defense minister Hossein Dehghan, who was ultimately not appointed.

The decision reflects the system’s preference, in wartime conditions, for figures trusted by security networks over those known for political flexibility.

He may not be a prominent public figure, but he represents a type of official often relied upon in times of crisis: a man with internal networks, brought back to the forefront as Iran faces one of its most challenging periods.


Expulsion of Iran Ambassador Tests Diplomacy between Beirut and Tehran

Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)
Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)
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Expulsion of Iran Ambassador Tests Diplomacy between Beirut and Tehran

Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)
Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)

Diplomatic relations between Lebanon and Iran have entered a new phase with Beirut’s unprecedented withdrawal on Tuesday of its approval of the accreditation of Tehran’s new ambassador Mohammad Reza Sheibani.

The Foreign Ministry said in a statement that it had summoned the Iranian charge d'affaires in Lebanon and informed him of “the Lebanese state's decision to withdraw approval of the accreditation of the appointed Iranian ambassador, Mohammad Reza Sheibani, and declare him persona non grata, demanding that he leave Lebanese territory no later than next Sunday.”

The ministry said it had also summoned Lebanon's ambassador to Iran “in light of what the Lebanese state described as Tehran's violation of diplomatic norms and established practices between the two countries”, after Beirut accused Iran's Revolutionary Guards of commanding Hezbollah's operations in its war against Israel.

The government has accused Hezbollah of dragging Lebanon to war after it fired rockets at Israel on March 2 in wake of the killing of Iran's supreme leader Ali Khamenei at the beginning of the conflict.

Crisis

After three decades of calm, relations between Lebanon and Iran started to grow strained after the 2024 war between Hezbollah and Israel.

Iranian parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf declared at the time that Tehran was ready to negotiate with Paris about the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1701 in Lebanon, sparking condemnation from Lebanon.

Then Prime Minister Najib Mikati slammed it as flagrant meddling in Lebanon’s sovereign affairs. He informed the foreign minister at the time to summon Iran’s charge d’affaires to file a formal complaint.

Relations became more strained in 2025 after Ambassador Mojtaba Amani’s suitcases were searched at Beirut’s Rafik Hariri International Airport.

Youssef Raggi, who became Lebanon’s foreign minister in 2025, summoned the Iranian ambassador for the first time since the 1990s last year. In April, he summoned Amani after he posted that the “project to disarm Hezbollah is an obvious conspiracy.”

The Lebanese government had issued a decision on the disarmament of Iran-backed Hezbollah last year.

In December, media close to Hezbollah reported that Raggi had suspended procedures on approving the accreditation of the new Iranian ambassador.

Last week, he summoned the charge d’affaires over statements attributed to the Iranian mission in Beirut and Iranian officials over security and military developments in Lebanon.

Ties between Raggi and Iranian officials have been strained for months. Last year he declined an official invitation from his Iranian counterpart Abbas Araqhchi to visit Tehran, suggesting that they meet in a third neutral country.

The withdrawal of accreditation is rare and it effectively means that a country refuses to welcome a diplomatic representative, reflecting deep political disapproval of the concerned country’s behavior.

The withdrawal was the latest Lebanese measure against Iran.

On March 5, the government took a series of steps that reflect a hardening approach towards Tehran. It imposed visas on visiting Iranians that had been suspended since 2011 in an effort to encourage trade and tourism between Beirut and Tehran.

The government also banned any activity by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Lebanon. Dozens of Iranians have since been deported from Lebanon.

‘Correcting’ relations

Lebanon had in the early 1990s launched a phase to “correct” relations with Iran after the end of the Lebanese civil war.

Then Foreign Minister Fares Boueiz was responsible for “reorganizing diplomatic work in line with the Vienna Convection”, said Lebanese sources.

During the 1975-90 civil war, Iranian officials would move freely to Lebanon through Syria and meet with Hezbollah officials in Beirut. Lebanese authorities had opposed the behavior.

In previous statements to Asharq Al-Awsat, Boueiz said Iranian delegations would travel to Lebanon through Syria without coordinating with the state.

The situation was later addressed through official diplomatic channels, he added.

The Iranian ambassador at the time was informed of the authorities’ objection and the stance was relayed to then Iranian FM Ali Akbar Velayati, said Boueiz.

Two days later, the Lebanese Foreign Ministry received an approval to “correct relations”, leading to an exchange in official visits and the signing of agreements that “regulated” the ties.