Exclusive - Lebanese Residing in Israel: Collaborators or Victims of Govt. Negligence?

Lebanese refugees, many of them relatives of fighters with the South Lebanon Army, wait to enter Israel after the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon on May 23, 2000. (Getty Images)
Lebanese refugees, many of them relatives of fighters with the South Lebanon Army, wait to enter Israel after the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon on May 23, 2000. (Getty Images)
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Exclusive - Lebanese Residing in Israel: Collaborators or Victims of Govt. Negligence?

Lebanese refugees, many of them relatives of fighters with the South Lebanon Army, wait to enter Israel after the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon on May 23, 2000. (Getty Images)
Lebanese refugees, many of them relatives of fighters with the South Lebanon Army, wait to enter Israel after the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon on May 23, 2000. (Getty Images)

Rajaa Beshara, a resident of the Deir Mimas village in Lebanon’s southern Merjeyoun province, says the South Lebanon Army (SLA) killed her brother in the early 1980s because he was active in resisting Israeli occupation of the South.

He helped men who refused mandatory military conscription in the SLA, which is why the Israelis killed him, she told Asharq Al-Awsat. They booby-trapped the area around his corpse to prevent anyone from burying it.

“They broke my mother’s heart,” she recalled. It took them three days to find a way to retrieve his body.

A native of the town of Qlayaa revealed to Asharq Al-Awsat that his aunt used to work as a servant since she was 13-years-old in order to raise money to pay for her siblings’ education. She married a military officer at 16. He was killed by Israeli strikes against Palestinians in southern Lebanon. No one but an Israeli family would take her in, so she worked for them during the 1980s, he said on condition of anonymity.

“Now she is labeled as an agent and collaborator.”

The issue of Lebanese collaborators with Israel during its occupation of the South, which started after its 1982 invasion of Lebanon, has returned to the spotlight as debate rages over an amnesty law. One of its articles calls for pardoning people who did not collaborate with Israel’s military, including families of SLA members. The article stipulates that those seeking to return to Lebanon must abandon their other (Israeli) nationality. Many Lebanese fled to Israel on the eve of the May 25, 2000 liberation out of fear of persecution.

The SLA was formed in Marjeyoun in 1976 by Saad Haddad, a Lebanese army defector. In 1984, another defector, Antoine Lahd assumed command. He killed and tortured Lebanese and Palestinians and received military and logistic support from the Israeli Defense Ministry.

No official figures exist over the number of Lebanese who fled to Israel in 2000. They are estimated at 8,000, while those still in Israel are estimated at around 3,000-3,500. The others have immigrated to other countries. Some refuse to return to Lebanon after they obtained Israeli citizenship and integrated in its society and even served in its military. Other were even born and raised in Israel and know no other home.

The Qlayaa resident spoke of a family that fled to Israel and how one of its children, a seven-year-old at the time, could not tolerate living there. He snuck back into Lebanon and lived with his relatives. When he became an adult, he was able to restore his family home where he now lives.

Rajaa said that talk of the amnesty takes her back to 1976 when Haddad formed the Free Lebanon Army, which later became the SLA, under the claim of “protecting Christians and Palestinians.”

“The Israelis at the time tried to appear as though they harbored good intentions. They even opened the border to the Lebanese, claiming to help them,” she added, criticizing leftist, nationalist and Palestinian parties for failing to realize the Israelis’ real intentions of exploiting the poor in areas that were neglected by the state.

Some of the poor saw no other way to earn a living but through working for Israel for good pay, she revealed. The SLA had imposed mandatory conscription for all youths regardless of their sect.

Francois al-Hajj, a Rmeish native who would later rise up the ranks and become a prominent Lebanese army officer, refused to enlist and collaborate with the enemy. He fled to Beirut. He would later be assassinated for his role in commanding battles in the northern Nahr al-Bared camp in 2007.

Other families were not as lucky and did not have the luxury of being able to flee to Beirut, said Rajaa. They were forced to stay in the South and their sons ended up working for Israel.

She said the label of “collaborator” should not be generalized to everyone who was forced to work for Israel. She recalled how a guard at Khiyam prison was kind to the inmates and smuggled food to them. When the South was liberated, the freed inmates even visited his house and promised that his wife would be unharmed. The guard ended up in prison for his role. The former inmates even visited him in prison to thank him for his kindness.

“I don’t know how someone who fled to an enemy country could be included in an amnesty…. The law is being used for sectarian and electoral purposes,” she charged.

The Qlayaa resident agreed with Rajaa in that the amnesty law is vague on the concept of treason, specifically towards those who chose to commit their crimes. Those people should be heavily punished. As for the poor, they were forced to join the SLA and work in Israel. They should be helped and rehabilitated, he suggested.



Is US Military Cooperation with Ethiopia Driven by Anger over Egypt-China Rapprochement?

US President Donald Trump during his meets with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on the sidelines of the 73rd session of the UN General Assembly in September 2018. (Egyptian Presidency)
US President Donald Trump during his meets with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on the sidelines of the 73rd session of the UN General Assembly in September 2018. (Egyptian Presidency)
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Is US Military Cooperation with Ethiopia Driven by Anger over Egypt-China Rapprochement?

US President Donald Trump during his meets with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on the sidelines of the 73rd session of the UN General Assembly in September 2018. (Egyptian Presidency)
US President Donald Trump during his meets with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on the sidelines of the 73rd session of the UN General Assembly in September 2018. (Egyptian Presidency)

A US defense agreement with Ethiopia was announced days before an important visit by Chinese President Xi Jinping to Cairo that saw agreements and memorandums of understanding signed in several fields and coincided with joint Egyptian-Chinese air exercises.

The timing raised questions over whether Washington’s military cooperation with Addis Ababa was driven by “US anger at Cairo” and what objectives it serves amid tensions in the Horn of Africa.

The United States and Ethiopia signed a defense agreement on Aug. 21 during an official visit by an Ethiopian military delegation to Washington. Both sides described it as a strategic framework aimed at strengthening military and security cooperation, protecting national interests and securing mutual benefits.

Raafat Mahmoud, head of the African Affairs Research Unit at the Egyptian Cabinet's Information and Decision Support Center (IDSC), told Asharq Al-Awsat that Washington was seeking to rebuild ties with Addis Ababa after years of tension, particularly over the Tigray war and US criticism of Ethiopia’s human rights record.

He argued that the agreement showed Ethiopia had become part of broader US calculations involving Red Sea security, countering Chinese and Russian influence and combating armed groups in the Horn.

Ethiopian lawmaker Mohammed Al-Arusi noted that Washington views the Horn as directly linked to Red Sea security, international trade and maritime routes, while also facing terrorist threats.

“Ethiopia lies at the heart of this geography, with its demographic, political and military weight across a broad region, and it hosts the permanent headquarters of the African Union,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat. Washington, he added, was not seeking a temporary stance but it is “rebuilding its position in a region where the balance of power is changing.”

US Republican and strategic affairs expert Adolfo Franco cautioned that the agreement lacks formally binding treaties and direct financial funding, adding that future defense exports remain subject to strict restrictions and case-by-case assessments, including human rights considerations.

Al-Arusi pointed to a US-Ethiopian dialogue launched in May covering economics, trade, investment, defense and security. The defense track advanced just three months later, a sequence he said showed Washington was approaching Ethiopia with long-term considerations.

Mahmoud said growing US support could strengthen Ethiopia’s negotiating position not only on water but also in its efforts to secure maritime access and expand its presence in the Red Sea region.

Recent media reports have portrayed the US-Ethiopian rapprochement as Washington’s response to Egypt’s growing ties with China, highlighted by Xi’s visit to Cairo this week.

Mahmoud countered that Egyptian-Chinese rapprochement was not new, although recent developments naturally raised sensitivities in Washington, particularly amid expanding economic and security cooperation.

In January 2026, Ethiopia and China elevated their relations to an “all-weather strategic partnership,” nearly two years after Egypt and China upgraded their ties to a “strategic partnership” in 2024.

Al-Arusi argued that Washington’s expanding partnership with Addis Ababa should not be viewed as replacing one partner with another, but rather as evidence of Ethiopia’s growing strategic value.

Former US diplomat Henry Ensher told Asharq Al-Awsat that Washington wants a security partner in the Horn and that Ethiopia is the best option given its capabilities.

While China and the United States compete in Africa, Egypt is the more important partner, he said, making it unlikely that Washington would use this approach to confront or punish Cairo.


Syrian Official to Asharq Al-Awsat: Integration Process Following SDF Dissolution Is Moving Toward Completion

A convoy of Syrian security forces and Special Operations Forces enters the headquarters of the “Vanguards Camp” Regiment in Hasakah (Hasakah Media)
A convoy of Syrian security forces and Special Operations Forces enters the headquarters of the “Vanguards Camp” Regiment in Hasakah (Hasakah Media)
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Syrian Official to Asharq Al-Awsat: Integration Process Following SDF Dissolution Is Moving Toward Completion

A convoy of Syrian security forces and Special Operations Forces enters the headquarters of the “Vanguards Camp” Regiment in Hasakah (Hasakah Media)
A convoy of Syrian security forces and Special Operations Forces enters the headquarters of the “Vanguards Camp” Regiment in Hasakah (Hasakah Media)

Ahmad al-Hilali, deputy governor of Hasakah, told Asharq Al-Awsat on Friday that the integration process stipulated in the “January 29, 2026 Agreement” has moved, following the dissolution of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the former Kurdish Autonomous Administration, from “the stage of understandings and negotiations to actual implementation, whether in civilian institutions or in the security and military sectors.”

He described the security situation as “much better” and said “stability is gradually strengthening,” stressing that the process “is moving toward completion, and what we want is for it to take place calmly.”

Since SDF commander Mazloum Abdi announced from the presidential palace in Damascus on August 25 the dissolution of the SDF and the Autonomous Administration, Hasakah has witnessed a series of developments and changes signaling the emergence of a new phase in the governorate. Its defining features are the restoration of state authority across all sectors, stronger security and stability, the unification of institutions, and the end of administrative duplication, in accordance with the January 29 Agreement.

In his remarks, al-Hilali said that “the integration process is not simply a matter of transferring buildings or changing names. It is about reunifying institutional authority, administrative decision-making, and security and military command under the umbrella of the Syrian state.”

He said significant steps had already been completed in this direction, while work was underway to address the remaining files in an orderly manner that would prevent any institutional or security vacuum and preserve stability in the governorate.

Before the announcement of the SDF's dissolution, most cities and areas in Hasakah had experienced security disorder involving the Revolutionary Youth. Such incidents increased after the signing of the January 29 Agreement, when members of the group prevented the handover of institutions to the government. That situation, however, has now disappeared.

Al-Hilali attributed the disappearance of the previous unrest primarily to the fact that “the phase has changed.”

“Previously, there were attempts to obstruct the process of transferring state institutions, and some activities emerged aimed at disrupting this course. But as implementation of the agreement progressed and the direction toward ending institutional and security duplication became clear, these manifestations declined significantly,” he said.

According to al-Hilali, “There is now a growing conviction among everyone that state institutions should not be a subject of conflict or confrontation, and that the integration process is moving toward completion.”

“What we want is for this process to take place calmly, away from provocation and tension, and for all residents of the governorate to feel that the return of state institutions means the return of services, the rule of law and stability, and is not directed against any component of society,” he said.

Asked when the integration of military, security and civilian institutions would be fully completed, the deputy governor said: “I do not want to set an artificial date for a process of this scale and complexity, because some files require technical, administrative and security procedures before they can be formally closed.”

He added: “But I can say that we are at a very advanced stage and that the overall direction is clearly toward completing the integration as soon as possible.”

He noted that “the bulk of the work is now in the implementation phase, while what remains consists of detailed files requiring the completion of arrangements, verification and coordination among the ministries and relevant authorities.”

Women fighters from the Women's Protection Units (YPJ) take part in military traning in Hasakah, Syria, August 22, 2026. REUTERS/Orhan Qereman

Pending Files

Al-Hilali said: “What matters most to us is that the integration be complete, genuine and sustainable, rather than merely a political announcement whose impact fades after a short period.”

Asked about the main outstanding issues preventing the completion of the integration process, al-Hilali said the remaining files could be divided into three main tracks.

“First is the military and security file, involving the completion of the restructuring of personnel and cadres and the integration of those who meet the requirements into the Ministries of Defense and Interior in accordance with the established procedures,” he said.

“The second is the administrative and civilian file, particularly the status of employees and staff, the mechanisms for confirming their positions and paying their entitlements, and the integration of institutions and departments whose transfer to the state has not yet been completed.”

“The third involves a number of service-related, technical and administrative files linked to the transfer of powers and the reunification of operating systems, databases and resources.”

Al-Hilali said these issues “do not represent an obstacle to the integration process so much as they are implementation files that need to be completed.”

“The political decision is clear and the overall direction has been settled: state institutions will be unified, authority will rest with the Syrian state, and the rights of all citizens and components of the governorate will be preserved,” he said.

The rise of the Autonomous Administration

The first foundations of the Kurdish Autonomous Administration, which sought to establish a “Kurdish project in Syria,” emerged through the formation of the Kurdish Supreme Committee. It was established by Syria's Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the Kurdish National Council following the signing of the Erbil Agreement on July 12, 2012.

A military wing was subsequently established for the committee, comprising the People's Protection Units (YPG), the Women's Protection Units (YPJ) and the Asayish security forces. The SDF was later formed in 2015, under predominantly Kurdish leadership.

The geographic footprint of the Autonomous Administration expanded from three cantons in 2014 to six in 2016 and seven by 2023. This territorial expansion was accompanied by the growth of its military and security apparatus and civilian institutions, which collectively included tens of thousands of personnel.

The SDF subsequently lost a significant portion of its territory during armed clashes that erupted between its fighters and the Syrian army in late 2025 and early 2026. The fighting lasted about two weeks and was followed by the signing of the January 29, 2026 Agreement.

The agreement between the Syrian government and the SDF called for a ceasefire and the gradual integration into Syrian state institutions of the military and civilian institutions established by the Kurds during the years of conflict. It also called for the handover of border crossings and oil and gas fields, as well as the withdrawal of foreign fighters from the region.


Lebanon's Ali Al-Taher Ridge, Strategic Hezbollah Position Israel Says It Seized

31 August 2026, Lebanon, Arnoun: Smoke billows after an Israeli detonation on Arnoun, not far from the strategic hill of Ali al-Taher ridge. (dpa)
31 August 2026, Lebanon, Arnoun: Smoke billows after an Israeli detonation on Arnoun, not far from the strategic hill of Ali al-Taher ridge. (dpa)
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Lebanon's Ali Al-Taher Ridge, Strategic Hezbollah Position Israel Says It Seized

31 August 2026, Lebanon, Arnoun: Smoke billows after an Israeli detonation on Arnoun, not far from the strategic hill of Ali al-Taher ridge. (dpa)
31 August 2026, Lebanon, Arnoun: Smoke billows after an Israeli detonation on Arnoun, not far from the strategic hill of Ali al-Taher ridge. (dpa)

Southern Lebanon's Ali al-Taher ridge, which the Israeli army on Thursday said it captured, was a strategic position for Iran-backed Hezbollah, where it was believed to have established a command center.

Hezbollah did not confirm losing the highland, which is around 10 kilometers (six miles) from the border with Israel and was targeted by several Israeli strikes in recent weeks despite a ceasefire.

The ridge, a flashpoint since Hezbollah drew Lebanon into the Middle East war in March, lies close to the major city of Nabatieh and the Litani River.

It is just a few kilometers from UNESCO-listed Beaufort castle, another strategic site that Israel captured in recent months and continues to occupy.

Ali al-Taher ridge, on the edge of the Israeli-proclaimed occupied "security zone", overlooks surrounding areas and key districts further north, and sits atop a network of tunnels.

During US-mediated negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, Washington proposed the Lebanese military take over the ridge, but Hezbollah refused, according to a source close to the talks.

Military expert Riad Kahwaji told AFP that the ridge is "in between several villages and adjacent to the city of Nabatieh" with a "web of tunnels (that) connects these villages around it".

On Friday, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said the capture "marks the completion of the phase of securing control in the security zone in southern Lebanon", meaning the Lebanese territory Israel occupied during the war.

- 'Command centers' -

The Israeli military on Thursday said that the tunnel network included "command centers (and) weapons storage rooms".

"The infrastructure is a strategic underground network that was built over two decades and funded and planned by the Iranian terror regime," it added.

Kahwaji, who heads the INEGMA military analysis institute, said the hilltops overlook Iqlim al-Tuffah, an area further from the border where Hezbollah holds sway, as well as part of the country's east.

Control of the area would therefore "give the Israelis an easy passage to move on both sides".

Speaking to journalists including AFP last month, Hezbollah spokesman Youssef al-Zein refused to say how many of the group's fighters were at the Ali al-Taher position. He denied any Iranian personnel were there, as had been reported in some media outlets.

He claimed that Israel had "exaggerated the importance of Ali al-Taher" as a military objective but also vowed that Hezbollah would "defend this position as much as it can".

The ridge is located right above the Litani. Hezbollah agreed to disarm in areas south of the river under a 2024 ceasefire that sought to end its previous war with Israel.

Two years later, Hezbollah dragged Lebanon into the broader Middle East war by attacking Israel in support of Iran.

Israel responded with airstrikes and a ground invasion that Lebanon says have killed more than 4,300 people.

The conflict has calmed since a US-Iran memorandum of understanding and a framework agreement between Lebanon and Israel agreed in June. But Israeli strikes continue and violence persisted around Ali al-Taher.

On August 15, Israel's army launched its deadliest strikes in weeks in response to what it said was a Hezbollah attack against its soldiers in the area.

In June, Israel's army published an updated map showing the parts of south Lebanon it considers within its "security zone" where its troops are operating, expanding the area to include the Ali al-Taher ridge.