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Josep Borrell to Asharq Al-Awsat: Regime, Not Sanctions, Responsible for Syrian People’s Suffering

EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell. (Reuters)
EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell. (Reuters)
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Josep Borrell to Asharq Al-Awsat: Regime, Not Sanctions, Responsible for Syrian People’s Suffering

EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell. (Reuters)
EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell. (Reuters)

High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission Josep Borrell hoped that Tuesday’s donor conference on Syria will match last year’s pledge of 6 billion euros. In an extensive interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, he said the Europeans have provided some 20 billion euros to Syria since the eruption of its crisis in 2011.

“The Brussels Conference is our most effective tool to maintain the world’s attention on the need to solve this conflict and to continue mobilizing the international community around a political solution,” he said. “We will continue to do our part.”

“As in previous Brussels Conferences on Syria, we have invited neither the regime nor the opposition. This might be reconsidered only and once a political process is firmly under way, including free elections as foreseen under UN Security Council resolution 2254,” he added.

“During all these years, our vital support has reached the Syrian people. The Syrian regime bears responsibility for the humanitarian, economic and healthcare crises in Syria. Not sanctions,” Borrell stated.

What do you expect of the donor conference in Brussels on June 30? How does this one differ from the previous ones?

Syria entered its tenth year of war. In the past nine years, half of the Syrian population had to flee their homes. Over half a million people died. An entire generation of Syrian children has only known war. They all deserve a better, peaceful future. The Brussels Conference is our most effective tool to maintain the world’s attention on the need to solve this conflict and to continue mobilizing the international community around a political solution as called for in UN Security Council resolution 2254. This is the only way to bring back lasting peace and stability for Syrians.

The Conference will be 2020’s main pledging event for Syria and the region, addressing the critical needs generated by the crisis, but it goes way beyond a donor conference. It is about continuing to support, politically and financially, Syria's neighbors and their people, who have shown extraordinary solidarity towards Syrian refugees. It has also grown into a unique opportunity for Syria’s civil society to engage in direct dialogue with the donor community and refugee-hosting countries. We could not gather people physically this year but we built a week of events where Syria’s youth, women and civil society organizations could interact with the international community. This is crucial, not only because they are the voices of the Syrian people but also because they hold the key to a better future for Syria.

A few factors raise the stakes for this year’s Conference. The grave deterioration of the economic and humanitarian situation, the recent military offensive from the part of the regime and its supporters, the destruction of civilian infrastructure, as well as the ongoing coronavirus crisis all further exacerbate already dire living conditions of the Syrians. They have had enough. Together with the United Nations, who play a crucial and leading role, we are sparing no efforts to remain at their side and live up to their hope for a brighter and peaceful future.

Last year’s conference provided aid worth 6.2 billion euros. Do you think that you would get the same pledges this year? Would you be able to respond to the United Nations appeal for humanitarian aid?

It is impossible to give a figure of likely pledging ahead of this year’s Conference. Amounts also vary from year to year, depending on donors’ approaches. We remain as ambitious as we are every year in support of the Syrian people and their host communities in neighboring countries. We are all working together, not least with our co-chair the United Nations, to ensure that Syrians across the whole of Syria, as well as refugees in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, can continue receiving the support and protection of the international community over the coming year. That is the least they should expect and the least we can do.

As the European Union, we have provided over 20 billion euros since the beginning of the crisis in humanitarian, stabilization, development and economic assistance. We are the biggest donor for Syrian people. Two thirds of all the money spent to help Syrians and Syria’s neighbors came from the EU and its member states. And we will continue to do our part.

On top of the unprecedented humanitarian and economic crisis and all the suffering they have been going through, Syrians are now also enduring the consequences of the coronavirus pandemic. This year’s Conference will also address this issue. As EU, we have been adapting our current assistance in response to this new and additional challenge, working hard to ensure that life-saving equipment reaches those in need in Syria.

Why was the Syrian government not invited to the Brussels conference?

As in previous Brussels Conferences on Syria, we have invited neither the regime nor the opposition. This might be reconsidered only and once a political process is firmly under way, including free elections as foreseen under UN Security Council resolution 2254.

The resolution clearly states that “the Syrian people will decide the future of Syria”. This is not just nice words for the EU, it is our compass. Nobody should hold their future hostage. This is why we are ensuring a meaningful input and a very large involvement of Syria’s civil society, with extensive online consultations held ahead of the Conference in Syria and in the region. Days of Dialogue also took place virtually on 22 and 23 June, consisting of discussions between civil society, ministers and senior decision-makers from refugee-hosting countries, the EU, the United Nations and other international partners. These contributions will feed in the Ministerial meeting of the Conference on 30 June. Syria’s civil society, its aid workers, its women and youth organizations are the future of the country.

How would you explain Russia's participation in the conference despite its criticism of not inviting the Syrian government?

As in previous years, all those members of the international community with influence in the conflict in Syria and that have expressed a will to support diplomatic efforts, in accordance with UN Security Council relevant resolutions, have been invited. In this regard, the EU welcomes the participation of the Russian Federation.

The conference comes after the European Union renewed economic sanctions against Damascus and the start of implementing the US Caesar Act. Does it have any effect on Brussels conference?

One of the key objectives of the Conference is for the international community to come together behind the UN-facilitated and Syrian-led political process. International pressure on Damascus to fully and genuinely participate in negotiations in the framework of UN Security Council resolution 2254, which is also done through sanctions, is of course part of this effort.

Moscow and Damascus say that these sanctions will harm the flow of the humanitarian and medical aid. What’s your reply?

EU sanctions are neither new nor aimed at the civilian population. They target individuals and entities that have been supporting the repression and the regime, financing them or benefitting from the war economy. They are designed not to impede the delivery of humanitarian and medical assistance, including crucial support in the current situation of the coronavirus pandemic. They do not prohibit the export of food, medicines or medical equipment. Even for potentially dangerous dual-use goods, for example chemicals also needed for pharmaceutical use, a number of exceptions are foreseen for humanitarian purposes.

The EU has been and remains the largest humanitarian donor to the Syria crisis with over 20 billion euros mobilized since 2011. During all these years, our vital support has reached the Syrian people.

The Syrian regime bears responsibility for the humanitarian, economic and healthcare crises in Syria. Not sanctions. On the contrary, it is mostly thanks to international assistance that healthcare, food, education or protection can still be delivered to people in need inside Syria. I could also add that trade has also continued throughout the war between the EU and Syria. We have never placed Syria under any kind of embargo.

What are the conditions that the European Union can lift the sanctions against Damascus?

EU sanctions concerning Syria have been in place since 9 May 2011 in response to the Syrian regime’s violent repression against its own people, including human rights violations, the use of live ammunition against peaceful protesters and the proliferation and use of chemical weapons. These were not imposed lightly. They are the consequence of grave human rights violations and potential war crimes and crimes against humanity, which must be accounted for.

Our list now includes 273 individuals and 70 entities. The goal of these measures is to put pressure on the Syrian regime to halt repression and negotiate a lasting political settlement of the Syrian crisis in line with UN Security Council resolution 2254, under UN auspices. Without a change of behavior and a constructive and genuine commitment to the political process, sanctions will remain. They are part and parcel of the EU’s wider approach to the Syria crisis. We also review them constantly to assess, inter alia, effects and developments on the ground.

EU has linked any contribution to the reconstruction of Syria with the success of the political process in Syria. What is your position on the reconstruction of Syria now?

The EU has been very clear on this. Europeans are willing to support the future of the Syria population and help them reconstruct their country but there are parameters for the EU's engagement. The EU will only participate in Syria's reconstruction when a genuine political transition in line with UN Security Council resolution 2254 is firmly underway. If this is not the case, all efforts will be in vain. Reconstruction requires minimal conditions in terms of stability, governance, public accountability, and representativeness of the governing authorities. Syria currently fulfils none of these criteria.

The EU’s reconstruction support cannot be invested in a context that would exacerbate pre-war inequalities and grievances and would not lead to reconciliation and peace building. The focus of reconstruction is not simply to rebuild infrastructure and housing – it is about restoring Syria’s social fabric, rebuilding trust and creating conditions that will mitigate or prevent the recurrence of violence, as well as responding to the grievances that sparked the conflict. Syrians deserve to live in a country where they all feel safe and protected by an impartial judiciary and by the rule of law and where human dignity is ensured.

The Brussels conference is co-chaired by the United Nations. What is your position on the efforts of the UN Envoy to Syria Geir Pedersen?

Our position remains that only a political solution achieved in the framework of UN-brokered Geneva negotiations can guarantee a peaceful future for Syria. We fully support the work of the United Nations and of UN Special Envoy Geir Pedersen. The Brussels Conferences aim at rallying the international community behind the UN efforts to advance a political solution.

The Conference will also back the calls by UN Secretary-General António Guterres and Special Envoy Pedersen towards a nationwide ceasefire and the release of detainees, especially in light of the coronavirus pandemic.

Russia announced its willingness to negotiate with America to reach a political solution in Syria. What is your position on the American-Russian dialogue on Syria?

Any progress towards the political resolution of the Syria conflict is to be welcomed. We insist that there should be no compromise on certain principles. Both Russia and the US support UN Security Council resolution 2254 and any solution to the Syria conflict must be in line with that resolution. For us in the EU, there can be no normalization of relations with the Syrian regime, and by extension no commitment of international funding for reconstruction, until there is real engagement in a genuine, comprehensive and inclusive political process. Also, the return of refugees to Syria could only be supported by the international community only under the condition that they would be guaranteed to be safe, voluntary and dignified.

Do you think a US- Russia deal, will be enough? How does it look like for you?

Again, the future of Syria is for the Syrians to decide. This is what UN Security Council resolution 2254 says. The political negotiations on Syria's future must be Syrian-owned and Syrian-led. Both the US and Russia, as permanent members of the Security Council, have committed to support the genuine, comprehensive and inclusive political process set out in UN Security Council resolution 2254.

Currently, Syria has three spheres of influence: North East of Syria, North west, and the rest of the country. Does the European Union have the same vision for these zones?

The European Union will not waver in its commitment to the full sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of Syria. Precise governance arrangements within Syria are a matter for the Syrians to decide.

In 2021 there will be presidential election in Syria. How do you see that? How do you see Syria in one year from now?

Meaningful elections in Syria will be those held on the basis of a new Syrian Constitution, as foreseen in UN Security Council resolution 2254. They will mark the opening of a new chapter for the country and for its people.

If other elections are held before that, I encourage the Syrian regime to demonstrate its commitment to genuine political openness, for instance by making sure they are open to all Syrians, including those abroad, and that they are free and fair. However, in no way will this replace the need for real engagement in a political process and for the full implementation of UN Security Council resolution 2254.

How Syria will look a year from now will depend on the commitment of the regime to the implementation of that resolution as the only internationally accepted way forward. Not for our benefit, not for theirs or their supporters’, but for the benefit of all Syrians.

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Interviews

El-Mahboub Abdul Salam to Asharq Al-Awsat: Al-Turabi Was Shocked by Deputy’s Role in Mubarak Assassination Plot

Dr. El-Mahboub Abdul Salam speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Dr. El-Mahboub Abdul Salam speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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El-Mahboub Abdul Salam to Asharq Al-Awsat: Al-Turabi Was Shocked by Deputy’s Role in Mubarak Assassination Plot

Dr. El-Mahboub Abdul Salam speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Dr. El-Mahboub Abdul Salam speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

This happens only in thrillers. A religious leader summons an obscure army officer and meets him for the first time two days before a planned coup. He appoints him president with an unprecedented line, “You will go to the palace as president, and I will go to prison as a detainee.”

That is what happened on June 30, 1989. The officer, Omar al-Bashir, went to the presidential palace while security forces took Dr. Hassan Al-Turabi to the notorious Kober Prison along with other political leaders.

Al-Turabi’s “ruse” aimed to conceal the Islamic nature of the coup so that near and distant governments would not rush to isolate it. Intelligence agencies in neighboring states, including Egypt, fell for the deception and assumed that Bashir had seized power at the head of a group of nationalist officers. Cairo recognized the new regime and encouraged others to follow.

This happens only in stories. A young man landed at Khartoum airport carrying a passport that said his name was Abdullah Barakat. He arrived from Amman. One day he would knock on Al-Turabi’s office door, though Al-Turabi refused to see him.

Soon after, Sudanese security discovered that the visitor was a “poisoned gift,” in Al-Turabi’s words. He was the Venezuelan militant known as Carlos the Jackal, a “revolutionary” to some and a “notorious terrorist” to others.

He led the 1975 kidnapping of OPEC ministers in Vienna under instructions from Palestinian militant Dr. Wadie Haddad, an architect of aircraft hijackings. One night, and with the approval of Al-Turabi and Bashir, French intelligence agents arrived in Khartoum. Carlos awoke from sedatives aboard the plane taking him to France, where he remains imprisoned for life.

Bashir’s government was playing with explosives. In the early 1990s, it also hosted a prickly young man named Osama bin Laden, who after Afghanistan was seeking a base for training and preparation. He arrived under the banner of investment and relief work. Mounting pressure left bin Laden with no option but to leave.

This happens only in thrillers. The leadership of the National Islamic Front gathered with its top figures, Bashir, and security chiefs. The occasion was the assassination attempt against Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa.

Ali Osman Taha, Al-Turabi’s deputy, stunned attendees by admitting that Sudanese security services were linked to the attempt. Those present understood that he had been one of its sponsors. Neither the sheikh nor the president had prior knowledge.

After the attempt, some proposed killing the operatives who had returned from the Ethiopian capital to eliminate any trail that could incriminate the Sudanese regime. Al-Turabi opposed the assassinations. The impression spread that Bashir supported the killings and signs of a rift between him and Al-Turabi began to appear.

The split later became formal in what came to be known as the “separation” among Islamists. Power is a feast that cannot accommodate two guests. Bashir did not hesitate to send to prison the man who had placed him in the palace. Al-Turabi did not hesitate to back Bashir’s handover to the International Criminal Court. Al-Turabi tasted the betrayal of his own disciples. Disciples, after all, are known to betray.

This happens only in thrillers. Through Al-Turabi’s mediation, Osama bin Laden agreed to meet an intelligence officer from Saddam Hussein’s regime named Farouk Hijazi. The meeting produced no cooperation, but it became one of the early arguments George W. Bush used in 2003 to justify the invasion of Iraq.

Hijazi also met senior Sudanese security officials who later visited Baghdad and were warmly received, and it became clear that Ali Osman Taha was among Saddam’s most enthusiastic admirers.

Sudanese blood now flows like the waters of the Nile. Bodies scattered on the streets of el-Fasher are almost making the world forget the bodies buried under the rubble of Gaza. Hard men are pouring fire onto the oil of ethnic and regional hatreds. Making corpses is far easier than making a settlement, a state, or institutions.

Since independence, Sudan has been a sprawling tragedy. Because the present is the child of the recent past, searching for a witness who knows the game and the players, and journalism leads to meeting and interviewing the experienced politician and researcher Dr. El-Mahboub Abdul Salam.

For a decade he served as Al-Turabi’s office director. For another decade, he wrote some of Bashir’s speeches.

In recent years, his bold conclusions stood out, including that Sudan’s Islamic movement has exhausted its purposes, that it shares responsibility with other elites for the country’s condition, and that it erred in dealing with others just as it erred when it chose the path of coups, violence, ghost houses, and contributed to pushing the South outside Sudan’s map.

Abdul Salam does not hesitate to scrutinize Al-Turabi’s own mistakes and his passion for wielding power. I sat down for an interview with him, and this is the first installment.

Abdul Salam was a first-year university student when Al-Turabi’s ideas caught his attention. Al-Turabi then appeared different, moving outside Sudan’s traditional social divides. He also knew the West, having studied in Paris and London. In 1990, Abdul Salam became Al-Turabi’s office director until the end of that decade.

Abdul Salam recalled: “I am often asked this question, are you a disciple of Al-Turabi? I have told them more than once, yes, I am a disciple of Al-Turabi, a devoted one. But I graduated from this school and became an independent person with my own ideas and experiences, perhaps broader than those of the Islamic movement’s earlier leaders.”

Asked about when he discovered Al-Turabi’s mistakes and developed a critical sense toward his experience Abdul Salam said that it was “perhaps in 2011, with the ‘Arab Spring’, and the Egyptian revolution in particular and the change that took place in Egypt.”

A tense beginning

Abdul Salam said Al-Turabi’s relationship with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak began on polite terms when they met in 1986 during an Al-Azhar conference on the Prophet’s biography. At the time, he recalled, Cairo was hostile or deeply wary of the Sudanese government under Sadiq al-Mahdi. The meeting, in his words, “was more courtesy than substance.”

According to Abdul Salam, relations later deteriorated sharply because of the deception surrounding the 1989 coup, then worsened further after the 1995 assassination attempt against Mubarak in Addis Ababa.

The Addis Ababa shock

Abdul Salam recounted that a major political meeting was convened after the failed attempt, held at the home of Ali Osman Mohammed Taha and attended by Al-Turabi, Bashir and all senior leaders. He said that during this gathering, both Bashir and Al-Turabi learned “for the first time” that Sudanese security services and Al-Turabi’s own deputy had been involved in the operation without informing them, describing the moment as a “huge shock” to the leadership.

He said Taha admitted at the meeting that the security services were involved and that it later became clear he himself was implicated. When a proposal emerged to kill the operatives returning from Ethiopia to erase evidence, Abdul Salam said Al-Turabi “rose in fierce opposition,” calling the idea outside both politics and Sharia. He cited Dr. Ali al-Haj as saying this moment “marked the beginning of the split.”

Egyptian intelligence reassesses Sudan

Abdul Salam describes how the Sudanese and Egyptian intelligence services eventually moved toward reconciliation. He said Omar Suleiman, Egypt’s intelligence chief, sent a message through French intelligence stating that the attack had been carried out by Egyptian Islamist groups.

According to Abdul Salam, Suleiman maintained that Sudan had only provided what he described as logistical support including money, shelter and weapons, rather than planning or executing the attack. This understanding, he says, prevented Egypt from responding harshly.

The communication opened a door for “major repair” of relations, Abdul Salam added, as Sudan began presenting itself as a pragmatic government after distancing itself from Al-Turabi.

After 1999: Rapprochement with Cairo

The reconciliation with Egypt and the region, Abdul Salam noted, took shape after 1999. He recalled that Taha’s visit to Cairo came after that date, followed by a visit from intelligence chief Salah Gosh. Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman regularly traveled to Egypt and maintained a friendship with his Egyptian counterpart, further improving ties.

The memorandum that shifted power

Abdul Salam described the turning point in relations between Bashir and Al-Turabi as the “Memorandum of Ten” in October 1998. During a major Shura gathering attended by hundreds of party, state and tribal leaders, ten members presented a document calling for the removal of Al-Turabi and the installation of Bashir as both head of state and leader of the movement.

He said the memorandum included reform language, but its essence was ending dual leadership. Bashir, according to Abdul Salam, “conspired with the ten” and accepted the proposal, calling the conspiracy “clear and very public.”

Abdul Salam recounted that Bashir wanted to confine Al-Turabi to a symbolic role and that some officers close to Bashir even asked Al-Turabi to remain as a spiritual figure who would bless decisions made elsewhere. “Al-Turabi would not accept this,” he stressed.

Al-Turabi’s influence and gradual reemergence

Reflecting on the early years of the Salvation regime, Abdul Salam said Al-Turabi authored all strategic decisions while the government handled daily business independently. He avoided public appearances during the first five years, he recalls.

Abdul Salam added that Al-Turabi gradually reemerged and became speaker of the National Assembly in 1996. He said Al-Turabi’s influence “never truly faded” because of his charisma, knowledge and strong presence, and diminished only when he was imprisoned after the split.

The 2001 Memorandum and South Sudan

Abdul Salam said Al-Turabi was arrested after the signing of a memorandum of understanding with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in February 2001. He confirmed he personally signed the document.

Asked whether he felt responsible for South Sudan’s independence, Abdul Salam rejected the suggestion. He said his position was clear and aligned with Sheikh Rached Ghannouchi, who argued that unity required suspending the hudud laws introduced under President Jaafar Nimeiri. Abdul Salam told southern leaders that unity should take precedence over maintaining those laws, adding that Islamic legislation, like all legal systems, is shaped by its psychological and historical context.

Complicated relationship

Abdul Salam described the relationship between Al-Turabi and his deputy Ali Osman Taha as complex and shaped by long-standing philosophical differences. He recalled a sharp split within the Islamist movement in 1968 when Taha aligned with figures who believed Al-Turabi had grown too dominant.

He cited Taha’s personal doctrine as follows: if an individual disagrees with the organization he sides with the organization, if the organization disagrees with the state he sides with the state, and if the state disagrees with Islam he sides with Islam. Al-Turabi, Abdul Salam said, did not operate that way and pursued his own ideas regardless of circumstance.

Abdul Salam recalled that during the Salvation regime, Ahmed Osman Maki had originally been prepared to succeed Al-Turabi but later moved to the United States. He stated that Maki’s strong charisma may have made him unsuitable as number two, while Taha excelled at concealing his emotions and functioning as deputy. He said the two leaders worked in outward harmony during the early years of the regime before deep differences surfaced later.

Abdul Salam added that Taha admired Saddam Hussein’s model of governance and believed Sudanese society was not ready for liberalism or pluralism.

The Arab Spring and the Islamic movement’s decline

According to Abdul Salam, the Arab Spring was “harsh on the Islamic movement.” Although the regional wave ended around 2012, Sudan’s version of it erupted in 2019. He said the uprising struck Islamists hard and reflected the real sentiment of the Sudanese street.

He argued that during its years in power, the Islamic movement held a barely concealed hostility toward civil society, youth, women and the arts. Sudanese intellectual and cultural life, he said, naturally opposed the regime’s long authoritarian rule. The revolution’s slogans of peace, freedom and justice were not part of the movement’s vocabulary, and over time the movement evolved into a posture “contrary to Sudanese society.”

The Communist Party’s influence

Abdul Salam said the Sudanese Communist Party helped shape opposition to the Salvation regime. After the execution of its leaders in 1971, the party underwent major transformation, and after the collapse of the Soviet Union it fully embraced liberalism. He remarked that many young Sudanese seeking freedom, justice and an expanded role for women found the Communist Party closer to their aspirations than the conservative Islamist movement.

Responsibility for Sudan’s political impasse

Abdul Salam rejected the narrative that Sudan’s decades of military rule make the military solely responsible for the country’s crises. He stressed that responsibility also lies with the civilian elite. Officers were part of this elite, and civilians who supported them in government shared responsibility. Sudan’s civilian parties, he argued, lacked clear programs to address longstanding distortions inherited from the colonial era.

One of Abdul Salam’s most sensitive moments with Al-Turabi occurred on the eve of the Islamist split. He said he personally succeeded in arranging a meeting between Al-Turabi and Bashir after months of estrangement, trying to avoid complete rupture. Bashir proposed turning the party conference into a political showcase while setting aside differences. Al-Turabi agreed, but according to Abdul Salam, disagreements reappeared by the end of the day.

Writing Bashir's speeches and choosing a side

Abdul Salam described his relationship with Bashir as very good and said he wrote the president’s speeches from early 1990 until the late 1990s. The speeches reflected the movement’s overall positions.

When the split occurred, Abdul Salam aligned with Al-Turabi not on personal grounds, but because he shared his positions on democracy, public freedoms, federal governance and adherence to agreements with the South.

Abdul Salam said the relationship between Al-Turabi and Bashir resembles other regional cases involving a sheikh and a president only to a limited extent. Bashir was originally a member of the Islamist movement led by Al-Turabi and obeyed him even after becoming president.

The split emerged naturally once the visible authority of the presidency clashed with the hidden authority of the movement, “which was the one truly governing,” he said.

Interviews

UK Chancellor to Asharq Al-Awsat: Strengthening Partnership with Saudi Arabia a Top Priority

Reeves speaks during the Future Investment Initiative Conference in Riyadh (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Reeves speaks during the Future Investment Initiative Conference in Riyadh (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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UK Chancellor to Asharq Al-Awsat: Strengthening Partnership with Saudi Arabia a Top Priority

Reeves speaks during the Future Investment Initiative Conference in Riyadh (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Reeves speaks during the Future Investment Initiative Conference in Riyadh (Asharq Al-Awsat)

UK Chancellor of the Exchequer Rachel Reeves affirmed that strengthening relations and economic partnership with Saudi Arabia represents a top priority for her government, noting that under the ambitious Vision 2030, Saudi Arabia finds in the United Kingdom an ideal partner thanks to Britain’s stability, regulatory flexibility, and global expertise.

She revealed her government’s plan to support major projects that unleash growth, starting with the expansion of Heathrow Airport and extending to infrastructure spending exceeding £725 billion ($958.7 billion) over the next decade.

In an exclusive interview with Asharq Al-Awsat from Riyadh, Reeves said her participation in the Future Investment Initiative (FII) Conference stems from a key goal: deepening mutual investment and trade. She confirmed that this visit, the first by a UK Chancellor to the Gulf in six years, reflects London’s seriousness in strengthening regional relations.

“This visit marks the first time a UK Chancellor has travelled to the Gulf in six years, which reflects just how seriously this government takes our relationship with Saudi Arabia and the wider region,” Reeves said.

“I’m here with one of the largest UK business delegations to the Gulf in recent years, and our participation is driven by our number one priority: growth.”

“At a time of global uncertainty, the UK offers stability, regulatory agility and world-class expertise – qualities that make us an ideal partner for Saudi Arabia's ambitious Vision 2030 transformation,” she added.

Reeves emphasized the economic complementarity between the two nations, noting that her delegation includes UK business leaders in key sectors such as financial services, life sciences, AI, clean energy, and advanced manufacturing.

She pointed out that Britain’s expertise in these fields uniquely positions London to support Saudi Arabia’s economic diversification, while Gulf investment helps drive growth and create jobs across the UK. According to her, joint trade and investment deals exceeded £10 billion over the past 18 months alone, creating more than 4,100 jobs in the United Kingdom.

Reeves and her accompanying delegation meet with Saudi Minister of Commerce Majid Al-Qasabi at the National Competitiveness Center in Riyadh (Ministry)

Deepening Mutual Investment and Trade

The Chancellor said: “My discussions are focused on deepening the two-way investment and trade that benefits families and businesses in both our countries. The £6.4 billion ($8.4 billion) package we've announced this week demonstrates the tangible results of this approach.”

According to Reeves, the package includes £5 billion in Saudi-backed exports supporting British manufacturing, alongside major investments by Barclays, HSBC and others, strengthening their presence in Saudi Arabia.

Key Priorities

Reeves said that one of her top priorities is accelerating progress on a UK–GCC Free Trade Agreement, noting that such a deal could boost bilateral trade by 16 percent and represents the kind of forward-looking partnership that creates prosperity for both sides.

“My vision is straightforward: I want Britain and Saudi Arabia to be partners of choice for each other. We regulate for growth, not just risk. We're backing key infrastructure projects like Heathrow expansion – where the Saudi Public Investment Fund holds a 15 percent stake,” she said.

She added: “We’re creating opportunities for co-investment, particularly through our National Wealth Fund and pension reforms that will unlock tens of billions for infrastructure and innovation.”

“My message at the FII this week was clear – I'm championing the UK as a stable investment destination,” she stressed, referring to Britain’s “ironclad commitment to fiscal rules and our modern Industrial Strategy focused on the sectors of the future.”

Reeves speaks during the Future Investment Initiative Conference in Riyadh (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Saudi–British Cooperation

On the most prominent areas and nature of cooperation between Riyadh and London, Reeves said: “Our partnership – built on mutual respect and shared ambition – spans multiple high-value sectors and continues to deepen.”

“Over the past 18 months alone, we've secured over £10 billion in two-way trade and investment, creating more than 4,100 UK jobs and many others in Saudi Arabia. Over 1,600 UK companies also now have a presence in the Kingdom – this is a partnership that works to the benefit of families and businesses on both sides,” she added.

“In financial services, London remains a world-leading international financial centre. We’ve launched a new concierge service – the Office for Investment: Financial Services – to help international firms establish and expand in the UK, while banking giants like Barclays and HSBC are expanding their operations in Riyadh,” Reeves explained.

She highlighted that Riyadh Air’s first-ever flight landed in London this past weekend, powered by UK-manufactured wings and Rolls-Royce engines – showing how British engineering is integral to Gulf aviation ambitions.

According to Reeves, UK firms like Quantexa are launching new AI services in the region, while Saudi cybersecurity firm Cipher is investing $50 million to open its European headquarters in London, demonstrating a partnership at the forefront of technology and innovation.

She added: “We are also collaborating closely in areas like sustainable infrastructure, clean energy, education and the life sciences. But I feel we can and must go further – a UK–GCC Free Trade Agreement would unlock huge mutual benefits, including boosting bilateral trade by 16 percent.”

Reeves and the UK business delegation at the British Residence in Riyadh (Ministry)

A British Plan to Contain Financial Challenges

On her government’s plan to address the financial challenges facing the United Kingdom, Reeves said: “After years of decline – from austerity to Brexit to the mini-budget – we inherited significant challenges. But we've moved decisively to address them whilst investing in our future.”

“We have an ironclad commitment to robust fiscal rules. This provides the stability and certainty that investors need. The IMF now projects that, after the US, the UK will be the fastest-growing G7 economy. This didn't happen by accident – it's the result of tough choices and disciplined economic management,” she added.

Reeves emphasized that “growth is our number one priority, because it's how we overcome challenges and put more money in working people's pockets. Our modern Industrial Strategy focuses on key sectors of the future – AI, life sciences, financial services, clean energy – where Britain has genuine competitive advantages, many of which are shared by our partners in the Gulf.”

She continued: “We're catalysing private investment through our National Wealth Fund, which is driving over £70 billion in investment, and pension reforms unlocking up to £50 billion for infrastructure and innovation. This creates opportunities for co-investment with partners like Gulf sovereign wealth funds.”

Reeves confirmed that the United Kingdom offers strength in uncertain times by combining stability with ambition. She referred to her government’s plan to support major projects that unleash growth, from Heathrow Airport expansion to infrastructure spending exceeding £725 billion over the next decade.

“We're open for business, but we're being strategic about building partnerships that create good jobs, boost business and bring investment into communities across the UK – from the North East to the Oxford–Cambridge corridor. That's how we build an economy that works for, and rewards, working people in Britain,” she said.

The minister concluded by stressing that “turning inwards is the wrong response to global challenges.” She affirmed that Britain remains open for business and is taking a strategic approach to building partnerships that create jobs and benefit working people across the United Kingdom.

“After landmark deals with the US, EU and India, we're accelerating progress with the GCC,” she said.

Interviews

Yemen’s Interior Minister to Asharq Al-Awsat: Hezbollah Members Arrested in Aden

Yemeni Interior Minister Major General Ibrahim Haydan. Photo: Turky Alagili
Yemeni Interior Minister Major General Ibrahim Haydan. Photo: Turky Alagili
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Yemen’s Interior Minister to Asharq Al-Awsat: Hezbollah Members Arrested in Aden

Yemeni Interior Minister Major General Ibrahim Haydan. Photo: Turky Alagili
Yemeni Interior Minister Major General Ibrahim Haydan. Photo: Turky Alagili

Yemeni Interior Minister Major General Ibrahim Haydan said that security forces have arrested members of Lebanon’s Hezbollah, as well as Syrians and Iranians involved in drug trafficking and supporting the Houthi militias.

The detainees are connected to drug smuggling networks that moved to Yemen after the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, he told Asharq Al-Awsat in an interview.

The minister stated that security forces arrested two individuals at Aden International Airport. One is affiliated with Hezbollah and the other is a Syrian national.

The arrests took place after the Houthi-controlled Sanaa airport was bombed by Israel, disrupting flights and prompting the two to try to enter through Aden Airport as tourists. He added that “the suspects remain in custody in Aden.”

In an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, the minister also said that a Yemeni court has recently sentenced six Iranians to death for smuggling tons of narcotics, after convicting them of taking part in large-scale smuggling operations linked to regional networks that fund the Houthis.

Haydan accused Iran of sending military experts and transferring drug factories and drone production facilities to Yemen after the collapse of some of its traditional proxies in the region.

The minister believes that the Houthi group has reached its “weakest point,” saying that the latest Israeli strikes that targeted militia leaders have created divisions within the movement’s ranks.

Haydan hailed the security partnership between Yemen and Saudi Arabia, saying it has made great achievements in arresting terrorists and criminals.

He described the partnership as a “great example of productive security cooperation.”

The minister said the security cooperation between the two sides has “yielded significant successes on the ground,” most notably the joint security operation in Al-Mahra Governorate, which “resulted in the arrest of a cell affiliated with ISIS and several of its most dangerous members, thanks to direct coordination with Saudi security agencies through special units.”

The minister said that “the exchange of intelligence information between the Yemeni Interior Ministry and the relevant security authorities in the Kingdom has also been a decisive factor in the recent successes in combating drug smuggling.”

“Security forces have managed to thwart several operations and seize large quantities of illegal substances,” he told his interviewer.

He also stressed that Saudi support is not limited to field operations, but also includes training and capacity building of security personnel.

One of the most prominent forms of this support, he said, was the training programs implemented last year to qualify personnel working at land, air, and sea border crossings.

Haydan also described security ties between Yemen and the US as “excellent,” saying it is witnessing a “gradual progress toward restoring the level of partnership that existed before the Houthi coup in 2014.”

He noted that cooperation between the two sides “is gradually returning to its normal course after years of interruption.”

“We have already begun receiving training opportunities for counterterrorism personnel in a number of friendly countries under US sponsorship,” he said, pointing out that his country is “working to develop this cooperation to include equipping the Interior Ministry with advanced specialized devices for counterterrorism efforts.”