The ‘Impossible’ Relationship and History of Disputes between Lebanon’s Aoun, Jumblatthttps://english.aawsat.com/home/article/2761451/%E2%80%98impossible%E2%80%99-relationship-and-history-disputes-between-lebanon%E2%80%99s-aoun-jumblatt
The ‘Impossible’ Relationship and History of Disputes between Lebanon’s Aoun, Jumblatt
President Aoun meets with PSP leader Jumblatt at the presidential palace in May 2020. (NNA)
The relationship between two of Lebanon’s most influential leaders, head of the Progressive Socialist Party Walid Jumblatt and President Michel Aoun, has always been fraught with tensions and a lack of “chemistry”.
The tensions go back to when Aoun served as army commander during the 1975-90 civil war and peaked ahead of his return to Lebanon from exile in 2005. They have continued to be strained with meetings between Aoun and Jumblatt far and few between ever since 2005.
Ties between Aoun and other Lebanese parties are not any better, but the way in which the Druze leader has chosen to wage his confrontation with the founder of the Free Patriotic Movement has set him apart from the rest. Jumblatt even went so far as to demand that Aoun be ousted as president, before retracting his statement, not for political reasons, but for practical ones, such as the sectarian Lebanese system and the cover provided by Hezbollah to the president – the Iran-backed party’s key Christian ally.
Just two days ago when commenting on Aoun and the FPM – which is now headed by the president’s son-in-law Jebran Bassil - Jumblatt openly declared “I don’t like them and they don’t like me.”
The statement sparked renewed accusations between MPs from Jumblatt and Aoun’s camp.
Impending ‘tsunami’
Going back in history, Jumblatt openly opposed Aoun’s heading of the army and a military cabinet in 1988, even deeming it a declaration of war. Aoun would soon after be exiled to France, during which he and Jumblatt witnessed a brief period of rapprochement.
That was later blown up when Jumblatt warned of an impending “tsunami” when Aoun announced that he would return to Lebanon in 2005. That would mark the beginning of a new phase of ebbs and flows in their relations.
The ties were often strained, with a few attempts at reconciliation and some brief meetings between the two leaders.
The cool relations were reflected in the very few meetings the Druze leader and Aoun have held over the years. They have been limited to official occasions and attempts at maintaining calm between Druze and Christian areas. In fact they can be listed in a short paragraph: Aoun met Jumblatt in al-Chouf in 2010 and took part in a mass service in Deir al-Qamar in 2017 to mark the 16th anniversary of the Mount Lebanon reconciliation. Jumblatt then paid a visit to Aoun at his Beiteddine summer residence and the president then repaid the visit by meeting him at his Mokhtara residence.
This last meeting was only held in wake of the 2019 Qabr Shmoun incident that witnessed clashes between Druze and Christians and threatened to ignite civil strife in the country.
Jumblatt last met Aoun at the presidential palace in May in an attempt to address “differences”, said the PSP leader at the time.
Every time they met, the two officials would talk about reconciliation and calm. But whenever Lebanon approaches a significant political development tensions would boil over again and the digging up of war acts would come up, casting doubt on the possibility that the two leaders would ever truly reconcile.
‘Policy of spite’
Each side of the divide has their own view of the dispute and each accuses the other of corruption.
The PSP believes that Aoun’s term and policies have led Lebanon to its current state of collapse, while the FPM says that Jumblatt is being so critical because he no longer enjoys the role of kingmaker at parliament.
PSP MP Hadi Abou al-Hassan told Asharq Al-Awsat that Aoun and the FPM object to criticism against their performance during the president’s term.
Calamities befell Lebanon ever since Aoun headed the military government and launched his “elimination war” and “war of liberation” in 1988-90, he charged. Both wars cost hundreds of lives and allowed Syria to tighten its grip over Lebanon.
He then returned from exile after striking a deal under the table with the Syrian regime and allied himself with Hezbollah in order to become president, reneging on all of his previous statements and stances.
“We have seen nothing but setbacks, missteps, crises and losses on all levels from him,” said Abou al-Hassan.
“Despite all of this, they (the FPM) claim to pursue reform and accuse everyone of corruption, while they are the most corrupt figures. The problem lies in the policy of spite that they adopt. They say one thing and do the other. This is what caused all attempts at reconciliation and rapprochement between the FPM and PSP to fail,” he stressed, criticizing the movement for questioning the sincerity of the Mount Lebanon reconciliation.
On the other side of the divide, FPM MP George Atallah said the PSP is attacking Aoun and the movement because of the political crisis Jumblatt is enduring.
He rejected all accusations of corruption directed at the president.
“At every turn they verbally attack and defame us because of the current political situation the PSP is going through after Jumblatt lost the influential position he had occupied for years,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.
“The parliamentary elections returned him to his natural size and he fears being prosecuted for his actions throughout those years,” he added, accusing Jumblatt of corruption.
Abou al-Hassan acknowledged that other forces besides the FPM have led Lebanon to the dire situation it is in right now, “but the movement, its allies and the president are in control and they have seized main ministries.” This includes the energy ministry that they have controlled for ten years and accounts for half of the country’s debts.
As for how long the confrontation between the PSP and FPM will end, Abou al-Hassan said: “We are not keen on pursuing futile disputes, but we cannot remain silent over what is taking place.”
“Reason demands that the president alter his course of action, otherwise be confronted with the need to change this team, starting with him,” he explained. “We realize how difficult this is due to sectarian reasons and the cover Hezbollah provides him.”
Atallah rejects such demands, saying those dreaming of the toppling of the president are “deluded”.
“Our policy will not change because it is based on the firm vision of breaking the entrenched system that the PSP is a part of,” he stated.
Iran in a Quarter Century: Clash Between the ‘Revolution’ and the Statehttps://english.aawsat.com/features/5095277-iran-quarter-century-clash-between-%E2%80%98revolution%E2%80%99-and-state
Iran in a Quarter Century: Clash Between the ‘Revolution’ and the State
An Iranian woman walks by the former US embassy in Tehran. (AFP)
For the past quarter century, Iran endured a bitter conflict between the ideological aspects of the “revolution” and the strategic view aimed at protecting the state and its interests in a changing world.
Despite hopes for radical change, attempts to achieve reform collided with resistance from the traditional centers of power, preventing real reconciliation between the contradiction in the principles of the “revolution” and the demands of national reforms, or at least achieving some form of sustainable agreement between these opposing movements.
Since 2000, Iran witnessed the election of five presidents with limited jurisdiction, and five parliamentary elections, which were dominated by either of the main reformist and conservative movements, amid the ongoing debate over the nature of rule, its agenda and priorities.
Since the 1979 revolution, the jurisdiction of the parliament and government has been fully under the control of the decision-making centers in the country, with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei at the top of the pyramid. The supreme leader enjoys almost absolute power, making him above all state institutions.
Meanwhile, the role of the military and political institutions, such as the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Guardian Council, expanded as they maintained their role in protecting the ideological principles of the ruling system. The system is based on a constitution that is in turn based on the Wilayat al-Faqih. These institutions are the main tools for preserving the identity of the “Islamic Republic” and bolstering its position that is hostile to the West.
Some 45 years after its “Islamic Revolution”, Iran has yet to reconcile the contradictions between its principles and national interests. (Getty Images)
Khatami and shift in the conflict
The beginning of the new millennium in Iran coincided with a decisive moment in reformist President Mohammed Khatami’s term (1997-2005). The period was marked with the intensification of the confrontation between the reformists and conservatives. The latter sought to obstruct reforms pursued by Khatami, especially in civil freedoms and freedom of expression.
The non-elected institutions that are under Khamenei’s direct supervision, such as the Guardian Council and judiciary, played a decisive role in obstructing reform measures, creating challenges for the reformists in achieving their political and social agendas.
Khatami’s term in office witnessed a major shift in the clash between the supporters of the ideology of the revolution and those calling for achieving strategic interests. He believed that the reforms were a strategic need to secure the continuity of the system of rule and its ability to adapt to internal and external changes. His critics, however, believed that his approach threatened the very foundations of the Wilayat al-Faqih.
Iran worked on improving its relations with the West and boosting its national identity through the Dialogue Among Civilizations, but the September 11, 2001, attacks and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 were a blow to these efforts.
Iran saw in the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime in neighboring Iraq an opportunity to expand its ideological influence through supporting groups that were affiliated with Iran or were established within its territory. The nuclear file also undermined the Dialogue Among Civilizations initiative and efforts to build trust with the West, thereby increasing Iran’s isolation and regional and international tensions.
The Iranian Revolutionary Guards played a main role in the nuclear program and regional wars. (Khamenei’s official website)
IRGC and the regional role
The IRGC played a main role in issues related to the nuclear program, internal developments and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq at the end of Khatami’s term.
In Afghanistan, the IRGC supported the United States in ousting the Taliban from power. In Iraq, the IRGC’s Quds Force led armed Iraqi factions in bolstering Iranian influence that persist to this day. Under General Qassem Soleimani’s leadership, the Quds Force also expanded its operations in Lebanon, helping establish a network that ran parallel to Iranian diplomacy in regional politics.
Iran felt threatened by the US’ bolstered military presence in the region, leading it to expand its security and strategic plans, starting with the nuclear and ballistic missiles programs.
In 2002, the discovery of secret nuclear facilities aroused suspicions among the international community about Iran’s nuclear ambitions and the possibility that it would pursue the production of a nuclear bomb. Amid the rising tensions, the West shifted its priorities towards Tehran to curbing its nuclear activities. Moreover, US officials, especially during President George W. Bush’s term, threatened on numerous occasions to use military force against Iran if it continued to pursue its nuclear ambitions.
Iran has bolstered its influence in the Middle East, stoking tensions with regional powers. (AP)
Nuclear file and internal tensions
The nuclear file has been a source of tension inside and outside Iran ever since. On the domestic level, it sparked debate about the country’s national priorities. The reformists sought to maintain Tehran’s international relations and ease tensions, while the conservatives clung on to their ideological principles.
In 2003, Tehran declared that it was voluntarily ending its uranium enrichment as part of the Amad Plan agreement reached with the European troika. In return, it received a pledge that the file would not be referred to the UN Security Council and that economic ties would be established with Europe. That same year, Iran heavily promoted Khamenei’s fatwa that barred the production, storing or use of nuclear weapons.
The US, however, remained suspicious of Iran’s intentions. It believed that agreements were not enough and it accused Iran of expanding its nuclear program, leading it to impose sanctions on its banks and energy sector. During the term of President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, it referred the program to the Security Council – a move that was welcomed by the international community. The move prompted Iran to adopt an aggressive policy against western powers.
Iran has never officially declared that it was developing nuclear weapons. In 2007, US intelligence released a report that said Tehran had stopped its nuclear weapons development in 2003, helping to soften the American position against it.
Throughout Ahmedinejad’s eight years in office, tensions rose with the West over the nuclear program. Tehran raised its level of uranium enrichment to 20 percent while the president insisted on his country’s right to the peaceful use of nuclear technology. In return, crippling sanctions were imposed on its nuclear program, oil exports and economy.
Khamenei meets with veterans from the Iraqi-Iranian war. (EPA)
Iran and the ‘Arab Spring’
On the foreign level, Iran aspired to bolster relations with Arab, African and Latin American countries. It also backed armed groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas.
With the eruption of the “Arab Spring” revolts, Iran sought to consolidate its influence in the Middle East, especially in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, stoking tensions with regional powers and Arab countries. Supporting Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria was also a top priority for Ahmedinejad before he was succeeded by Hassan Rouhani.
On the domestic level, Iran went through a huge crisis after Ahmedinejad won the 2009 elections. The wave of “Green Movement” demonstrations erupted in protest against the elections results between Ahmedinejad, and reformist candidates Mir Hossein Moussavi and Mehdi Karroubi.
After Ahmedinejad’s term ended, Iran tried to ease tensions with the West. It took part in nuclear negotiations aimed at managing tensions with the major powers. Two years of negotiations led to the 2015 nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), that suspended UN sanctions on Iran and lifted restrictions on its nuclear program.
The supreme leader played a pivotal role in the negotiations. He set red lines when it came to maintaining Iran’s right to uranium enrichment, lifting economic sanctions and refusing visits to military facilities by international inspectors.
Khamenei cautiously supported Rouhani’s negotiating team at the nuclear talks despite pressure from conservative movements. The negotiations struck a balance between ideology and strategic interests as Iran sought to maintain its “revolutionary” slogans, while adapting to international changes, confronting economic and security challenges and continuing to fund its regional activities to ensure that it remained a main player in the Middle East.
The IRGC continued to consolidate Iran’s influence in the region, especially in Syria and Iraq, and Khamenei threatened to expel American forces from the region. The tensions alarmed the American administration leading then President Donald Trump to pull Washington out of the nuclear deal in 2018.
Qassem Soleimani. (Tasnim)
Patience in handling pressure
In confronting Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign, including preventing Iran from selling oil, Tehran adopted a policy of “walking on the edge of the abyss” and of “strategic patience.” Regional tensions also spiked with the IRGC seizing oil tankers after Tehran threatened to block oil shipping lanes. Trump consequently designated the IRGC as terrorist.
Trump would also order the killing of Quds Forces commander Soleimani in Baghdad in January 2020. The move took Iranian-American tensions to a whole new level and threatened to spark a direct war between the two countries.
In a leaked 2021 recording, then foreign minister Mohammed Javad Zarif called for striking a balance between foreign policy and the policy on the field, a reference to the Quds Force that leads the IRGC’s foreign operations. The recordings exposed an internal rift between the ideological and pragmatic movements in Iran, with the latter wanting to achieve interests, such as the lifting of sanctions.
Zarif defended his conviction that diplomatic work relies on the situation on the ground and vice versa, meaning diplomacy can grant “international legitimacy” to achievements on the field.
When US President Joe Biden came to office, Khamenei used his influence to support the IRGC and showed limited leniency in managing tensions through new nuclear negotiations. Biden tried to return to the nuclear pact with Tehran, but Iran’s unprecedented nuclear measures adopted by conservative late President Ebrahim Raisi and Russia’s war on Ukraine thwarted diplomacy.
18 December 2024, Iran, Tehran: Iran's President Masoud Pezeshkian speaks during the Cabinet meeting in Tehran. (Iranian Presidency/dpa)
Raisi and the ‘revolutionary government’
Under Raisi, Tehran pursued diplomacy at the negotiating table with the West, but the talks never made it to the finish line.
His term in office was cut short by his death in a helicopter crash in May 2024. His time in power was marked by loyalty to the supreme leader’s view of forming a “revolutionary government” and limiting state power to conservatives.
Raisi effectively followed in the same footsteps as Ahmedinejad: Tehran sought rapprochement with regional forces, while hoping to circumvent sanctions and speed up its nuclear activities.
Raisi was succeeded by Masoud Pezeshkian, who was backed reformists. He pledged to maintain the policy of turning to the east and bolstering relations with China and Russia. He also sought to lift sanctions on Iran by returning to nuclear negotiations.
On the regional level, Tehran’s “shadow war” with Israel came out to the open and the two sides traded direct blows. Following Raisi’s death, Iran continued to suffer more setbacks, notably the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria and the weakening of Hezbollah and Hamas’ roles. These developments will weaken the IRGC’s regional role, but it could seek to compensate for its losses in other regions, even inside Iran itself.
Pezeshkian and internal reconciliation
Pezeshkian’s presidency is seen as an opportunity to achieve internal reconciliation in Iran at a critical time when the people are preoccupied with the issue of Khamenei’s successor. Iran is unlikely to introduce radical change to its relations with the West and Pezeshkian may be granted limited jurisdiction in the nuclear negotiations.
Soon after Trump’s re-election as president, Pezeshkian stressed the need to manage relations and the confrontation with the US. He said his government will follow the strategy of the ruling system.
Pezeshkian will likely receive the backing of the supreme leader and IRGC to reach a settlement that would ease pressure on Iran. This does not necessarily mean that Iran will be moving away from the edge of the abyss. On the contrary, it could reflect an attempt to widen the margin for maneuver amid the tensions with the West. Iran is expected to follow this approach in the near future or at least when the identity of the third supreme leader is revealed.
