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The Last Episode: Hafez al-Assad was Much Influenced by his Family Members, Our Relationship Sometimes Reached Rupture

Memoirs of Abdel-Halim Khaddam

Then-Defense Minister Hafez Al-Assad between President Noureddine Al-Atassi (left) and leader Salah Jadid (Asharq Al-Awsat).
Then-Defense Minister Hafez Al-Assad between President Noureddine Al-Atassi (left) and leader Salah Jadid (Asharq Al-Awsat).
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The Last Episode: Hafez al-Assad was Much Influenced by his Family Members, Our Relationship Sometimes Reached Rupture

Then-Defense Minister Hafez Al-Assad between President Noureddine Al-Atassi (left) and leader Salah Jadid (Asharq Al-Awsat).
Then-Defense Minister Hafez Al-Assad between President Noureddine Al-Atassi (left) and leader Salah Jadid (Asharq Al-Awsat).

In the eleventh and final episode of the memoirs published by Asharq Al-Awsat, former Syrian Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam talks about the struggle for power in Syria between then-Defense Minister Hafez Al-Assad and Assistant Secretary-General of the Baath Salah Jadid from 1966 till 1970.

He also presents his view of the changes in Assad’s attitudes, saying: “Al-Assad believed that his words are correct, and what he says must be implemented. He was sensitive to his family members... and he always believed that he was on the right path, and if he brought up an issue, he would not back down from it…”

Khaddam recounts: “As the regional leadership of the ruling Baath party settled its struggle with the national authority on February 23, 1966, it tightened control over the country, adopted an extremist Stalinist approach, and abandoned the party’s basic principles that called for freedom and democracy.

“This approach caused hostility of the majority of Syrians towards the party and the decline of the national economy, so the regime resorted to repression and detention to control the country. At that time, small groups of leading Baathists were formed from the various provinces, and I was among them, while contacts were taking place directly between them so that the matter would not leak out to the leadership.

“In 1968, a national conference for the party was held in Yaafour, near Damascus. During a meeting of the military committee, Defense Minister Hafez Al-Assad proposed a project to establish a military front consisting of Syria, Jordan and Iraq. The leadership rejected the proposal, stating that it was not right to deal with Jordan because it is a US agent. It also refused to cooperate with Iraq due to the existing tensions between the two countries. Before the end of the conference, Assad announced positions that contradicted the stances expressed by the regime, including that the conflict with Israel “is not Syrian, but between all Arabs and Israel; therefore differences with Arab countries must be overcome.” Assad and the military representatives withdrew from the meetings and the conference was halted.”

Khaddam continues: “Ibrahim Makhous intervened, and tried to persuade President Noureddine Al-Atassi, Salah Jadid, and the minister of Defense to change their positions, provided that Assad would take over the premiership and abandon the ministry. But Assad rejected this proposal, and campaigns escalated between the two sides. At that stage, we communicated with Assad and agreed to convey to the people our confidence in power-sharing and changing the approach of oppression.

“In late 1968, an exceptional national conference was held in the military theater in Damascus…I gave a lengthy address, strongly criticizing the national leadership, and demanding a return to the party’s basic principles and the guarantee of freedom with the people’s participation…"

“Following my speech, I was targeted by a campaign by the supporters of the national leadership, and the conference did not result in a solution to the crisis. Contacts took place between Atassi and Assad, which resulted in an agreement to form a new government in which members of the national leadership would participate to help cool the tension and search for solutions. Consequently, Atassi formed the government that brought together members from the two sides, and in which I assumed the ministry of Economy and Foreign Trade.”

According to Khaddam, the new government was unable to solve internal crises and the situation in the country deteriorated. The national leadership decided to use its last card, calling for a conference in mid-November to distance Assad from both the party and the authority.

“Assad called me and asked me for a meeting to discuss the situation. I went to his office, and he said: “I don’t want to stage a military coup. I want to reform the party and the country.” We agreed that I would go to Atassi to assure him that Assad had no intention of military action.

“I went to Atassi’s residence, where I also saw Dr. Mustafa Haddad. I explained to him the Defense minister’s view, and I said: “You are the Secretary-General of the party, and what is required of you is to work to end the crisis.”

He furiously replied: “The crisis does not end unless Assad and his officers leave the country.” I said: “The search for a solution is better than pushing things towards a military action.” Dr. Haddad supported me, but Atassi insisted (…) The atmosphere was very tense."

“I went back to the army command and informed Assad of the meeting. He showed great resentment, and asked me: “What shall we do?” So I suggested that he send the secretaries of the party’s military branches to Atassi to explain the situation… After they arrived and met with Assad, they went to the secretary-general’s house and began to talk about the crisis. But he interrupted them, saying: “As the Secretary-General of the party, I expel you.” On that day, members of the national leadership were arrested, including Jadid and Atassi. A page was turned and a new chapter began.”

Khaddam says that during that evening, he gathered with Assad and a group of leading Baathists. The participants agreed to name Ahmad Al-Khatib as head of state and Assad as prime minister.

On the way the new regime dealt with the country’s affairs, Khaddam says: “The new constitution gave the president absolute powers that were not exercised by any democratic or dictatorial president… Article 91 stipulates that the President of the Republic shall not be responsible for the actions he carries out in the exercise of his duties, except in the case of high treason, and the request for his indictment shall be based on the proposal of at least one-third of the members of the People's Assembly…

“The problem with the state and the party was that Assad believed that his words were always correct and that what he says must be implemented. His speech was full of ideals and values at a time when the reality was otherwise. He was much influenced by his family. He transformed the democratic republic stipulated in the constitution into a dictatorship, thus dropping the role of the people and the party.”

Khaddam presents some of the aspects of his relationship with Assad and says: “My relation with Assad was good at times and tense at others. At some stages, we reached a permanent rupture… That took place after the nomination of Rafik Hariri as the head of the Lebanese government in 1992, which came upon a decision by Assad…

“After he was assigned to form the Lebanese government, Hariri came to Damascus to discuss our candidates...I presented the issue to Assad, so he asked me to form a committee with Hikmat Al-Shehabi, Chief of Staff, and Brigadier General Ghazi Kanaan, head of the Military Security Branch in Lebanon, so that we would meet with Hariri to agree on the names. And indeed, we organized the meeting in my house and put together a list of a large number of names…

“Whenever we agreed on a name, I would go to the phone and report it to President Hafez, and he would ask me about the person’s specifications… Mr. Rafik Hariri took the approved names to Beirut and showed them to Mr. Nabih Berri, who gave his consent and informed the President of the Republic…"

“The next day, President Hafez called me and spoke in an angry tone, saying: “You are not working for the interest of the state, but for your interest.” I was much annoyed and responded: “I am not working for myself… I was keen to protect your reputation and that of the state.”

“The conversation ended, and we didn't speak to one another for over a month. After that period, he called me, saying: “You don’t miss anyone?” I answered: “You are the president and you set the appointments.” He replied: “I am waiting for you at 8.00 p.m.”

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Israel Is Tightening Its Grip on East Jerusalem with Evictions of Palestinians, Demolitions

This picture shows a view of the minaret of a mosque in the Arab neighborhood of Silwan in Israeli-annexed east Jerusalem, on June 6, 2026. (AFP)
This picture shows a view of the minaret of a mosque in the Arab neighborhood of Silwan in Israeli-annexed east Jerusalem, on June 6, 2026. (AFP)
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Israel Is Tightening Its Grip on East Jerusalem with Evictions of Palestinians, Demolitions

This picture shows a view of the minaret of a mosque in the Arab neighborhood of Silwan in Israeli-annexed east Jerusalem, on June 6, 2026. (AFP)
This picture shows a view of the minaret of a mosque in the Arab neighborhood of Silwan in Israeli-annexed east Jerusalem, on June 6, 2026. (AFP)

Fakhri Abu Diab fought for decades to save his home. But when Israeli authorities arrived with bulldozers two years ago, he was powerless to stop them.

He and his wife now live among shards of memory: a bicycle where his bedroom stood; the garden where he planted tomatoes as a boy; a portrait of his late mother painted on a wall, based on a photograph lost in the demolition. Their mobile home, set up amid the rubble, is also marked for removal.

They are “trying to erase my memories, my childhood, my history,” he said, wiping away tears.

For decades, Israel has worked to expand the Jewish presence in annexed east Jerusalem — the heart of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and home to major Jewish, Christian and Muslim sites. Settlers have exploited discriminatory policies and archaeological claims to evict Palestinians far from the region's war zones.

Activists say those efforts have gone into overdrive in recent years, as Israel is no longer constrained by US pressure and attention has shifted to Gaza, Lebanon and Iran.

Over 260 homes and other structures were demolished in 2025, a 70% increase from three years earlier, with some neighborhoods seeing the most evictions in decades, according to Ir Amim, an Israeli anti-settlement group that closely tracks such policies. There have been at least 116 demolitions so far this year, it said.

It’s “an intensity and scope that we have never seen,” said Aviv Tatarsky, a researcher at Ir Amim. “Israel can decide, yes, this neighborhood, we want to erase it ... No one is going to stop us.”

People look from a rooftop at the rubble of a Palestinian building demolished by Israeli military in the town of Jabaa in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, near Jerusalem June 3, 2026. (Reuters)

Israeli government supports settlement growth

Israel captured east Jerusalem, along with the West Bank and Gaza, in the 1967 Mideast war. The Palestinians want all three territories for their future state, and the UN and much of the international community consider them to be illegally occupied.

Israel considers all of Jerusalem to be its unified capital and says residents are treated equally by law.

Palestinians in annexed east Jerusalem are eligible for Israeli citizenship, but unlike Jews, they must apply for it — a long, uncertain process. Most choose not to because it would recognize Israel’s claims to the city. That leaves them with few ways to challenge housing policy, largely set by Israel’s Parliament.

Rights activists say that in addition to supporting the development of major Jewish settlements, which many Israelis view as ordinary neighborhoods, authorities have severely limited the growth of Palestinian neighborhoods, making it virtually impossible to obtain housing permits.

Last year, nearly 9,000 permits were approved for Jerusalem’s Jewish residents and fewer than 700 for Palestinians, according to Bimkom, an Israeli rights group. Palestinians make up some 40% of Jerusalem's population and are concentrated in the east.

Israeli officials say the discrepancy exists because Palestinians rarely apply for permits. Many Palestinians say it’s futile.

When Palestinians build without permits, they face the threat of demolition. Settler groups meanwhile exploit an array of laws to purchase or take over Palestinian properties.

Previous US administrations have pressed Israel to slow or suspend settlement projects, viewing them as an obstacle to resolving the conflict. US President Donald Trump broke with that tradition in his first term, recognizing Jerusalem as Israel's capital.

The US State Department said in a statement that it's up to Israeli authorities to set policy in Jerusalem, and that it expects them to respect due process and the rule of law.

The neighborhood is near major religious sites

Abu Diab's neighborhood, al-Bustan, extends through a valley just outside the Old City, with the dome of the Al-Aqsa Mosque visible above the towering walls. Named for the orchards that once grew there, the neighborhood is now a crowded jumble of low concrete blocks and demolition sites.

It's part of the larger district of Silwan, home to some 20,000 Palestinians and coveted by settlers because it is near major religious and archaeological sites. The mosque is the third holiest in Islam, and the hilltop where it stands is the holiest site for Jews, who refer to it as the Temple Mount because it was where the two Jewish temples stood in antiquity.

The Jerusalem municipality said the homes in al-Bustan are being demolished because they were built without permits in areas not zoned for housing. A park and public parking lot will be established there for the benefit of all residents, it said in a statement.

The municipality said it put forward plans for alternative housing in the neighborhood but that residents did not show “serious intentions” to reach an agreement.

Abu Diab has been battling demolition orders in court since 2004. Part of his home was built before 1967, but his growing family expanded it without permits because it was impossible to get them, he said.

In February 2024, police gave him and his wife minutes to pack before demolishing their home. Since then, they have lived in the mobile home, their suitcases packed.

They are among some 1,500 Palestinians in al-Bustan whose homes could be demolished at any time.

People walk past the rubble of a Palestinian building demolished by Israeli military in the town of Jabaa in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, near Jerusalem June 3, 2026. (Reuters)

Settlers move in as Palestinians are evicted

A short distance away, in the congested Batan al-Hawah neighborhood, settlers are moving in as Palestinians are evicted.

Zuhair al-Rajabi and dozens of his extended family were ordered out in January, when Israel's Supreme Court ruled against them after more than a decade of legal action.

Thumbing through papers in his living room, he pulled out a document from 1966 saying the property is his. He says he has to leave by July but has nowhere to go, as rents are high in Jerusalem. “The problem, in short, is that they don’t want us here,” he said.

March marked the highest rate of state-led evictions in the neighborhood in decades, with 15 families forced out and hundreds more people at risk, according to B'Tselem, an Israeli rights group.

Israeli laws allow settlers to reclaim properties that were owned by other Jews before the 1948 war surrounding Israel's creation. Palestinians who fled or were driven from their homes in what is now Israel during that conflict are barred from returning. Authorities have also transferred state-held land to settler groups.

The Batan al-Hawah evictions show “the cooperation between settler organizations and state institutions, based on discriminatory laws, toward a shared goal — the Judaization of east Jerusalem and the replacement of Palestinian residents with Israeli settlers,” said Yair Dvir, a spokesperson for B’Tselem.

The Israeli judiciary, in a statement, said courts rule on the merits of each case based on the circumstances, applicable law and established precedent, and denied colluding with private organizations.

Daniel Luria, the executive director of Ateret Cohanim, one of the main settler organizations in east Jerusalem, said it was working to correct a “monumental historical injustice” by helping Jews to return to what had been a Yemenite and Sephardic Jewish neighborhood up until the early 20th century, when he says they were expelled by Arabs and then again by the British.

Since 2004, around 50 Jewish families have moved into the neighborhood and more are eager to join them, he said. “There's never going to be a Palestinian state,” he added.

An Israeli flag waves above the home where Khalil Basbous was evicted in January. The 68-year-old moved into a relative's house around the corner but walks past his former home every day.

“It’s mine,” he said, wiping tears from his face and softly touching an olive tree he had planted by the door. “I have no doubt that I will return.”

Features

Why Iran Risked an Attack on Israel

Smoke rises from the site of an Israeli airstrike that targeted a neighborhood in the southern Lebanese coastal city of Tyre on June 7, 2026. (AFP)
Smoke rises from the site of an Israeli airstrike that targeted a neighborhood in the southern Lebanese coastal city of Tyre on June 7, 2026. (AFP)
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Why Iran Risked an Attack on Israel

Smoke rises from the site of an Israeli airstrike that targeted a neighborhood in the southern Lebanese coastal city of Tyre on June 7, 2026. (AFP)
Smoke rises from the site of an Israeli airstrike that targeted a neighborhood in the southern Lebanese coastal city of Tyre on June 7, 2026. (AFP)

At first glance, Tehran’s retaliation for Israeli attacks in Lebanon might seem like a reckless act that risks rekindling a devastating regional war.

For Iran, those strikes were necessary — part of a more aggressive posturing that marks a strategic shift by its new rulers. For them, the lesson of the war has been that forceful retaliation has allowed them to survive, and even emerge with leverage against their more powerful enemies, reported the New York Times on Monday.

“Iran wants to project strength, and that they have the power to escalate,” said Omid Memarian, an Iran expert at DAWN, a Washington-based foreign policy think tank. “They are sending the message that they are ready to resume war if necessary.”

For the past decade under Iran’s previous supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, Tehran had been more cautious about striking Israel and the United States. In 2020, Tehran pursued only limited retaliatory strikes against Washington after the United States assassinated one of its most powerful military leaders, Qassem Soleimani. And it limited its entire retaliation to strikes on a single US base in Qatar during the 12-day war last June.

In recent weeks, Iranian officials largely tolerated Israeli strikes on its most important ally, the Lebanese armed group Hezbollah. It criticized those attacks, warning that the group should be included in the regional ceasefire it agreed upon with Washington in April. Yet as long as Israel’s strikes were contained to southern Lebanon, Iran did not respond.

Iran warned that calculus would change if Israel expanded those strikes to the southern outskirts of Lebanon’s capital, Beirut, where Hezbollah is dominant. On Sunday, Israel did just that.

“Iran’s attack in defense of Lebanon was not merely a military response; it was the formal declaration of a strategic doctrine,” said Sadegh Larijani, the chairman of Iran’s powerful Expediency Council, which advises Iran’s supreme leader.

“If any component of the Axis of Resistance is attacked, the response will extend beyond geographical borders and will alter the regional balance of power,” he said, using Iran’s term for the network of allied armed groups in the region that includes Hezbollah.

With its actions, Iran wants to show it is serious about defending its regional armed allies. That position had been undermined by its former leaders when they refrained from retaliating against Israeli attacks in 2024 that badly degraded Hezbollah and killed its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, reported the New York Times.

Since the US-Israeli war began in February and killed much of Iran’s top former leadership, including Khamenei, Iran’s new rulers believe their willingness to act more aggressively — from blockading the vital Strait of Hormuz to attacking its Gulf neighbors — has been a major success, continued the report.

To them, analysts say, being more aggressive allowed them to not only survive Washington and Israel’s attacks, but to inflict economic pain and emerge with strategic leverage through control of the strait, a crucial global shipping route for oil and gas.

Iran’s new leaders have also found US President Donald Trump more responsive to their more aggressive strategy. Last week, he convinced Israel not to strike Beirut. On Monday, after Israel’s strikes on Beirut’s outskirts and Iran’s retaliation, he called for both sides to step back.

After his comments, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps quickly announced that it would halt its attacks but said it may attack again if Israel pursues strikes in southern Lebanon, a near certainty.

Such strikes may also offer Iran the opportunity to test the relationship between Trump and Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, said Memarian, the analyst.

“They understand there’s a gap between Israeli and US objectives,” he said, “and they want to put pressure on Trump to contain Israel.”

But the defense of Hezbollah is not only about testing or posturing. Iran assessed the group’s ability to continue attacking northern Israel during the recent war as critical to giving Iran room to focus its attacks on its Gulf neighbors, said Hamidreza Azizi, an Iranian security expert at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.

Allowing Israel to weaken Hezbollah further, he said, would therefore be militarily costly for Iran in a future conflict, which it deems inevitable.

Iran also saw its retaliation as necessary, he said, because it views Israel’s attacks as part of an apparent US-Israeli strategy to try to quietly erode its strategic gains in the recent conflict even as it tries to negotiate a deal to end the war with Washington.

For weeks, US forces have been quietly escorting vessels through the Strait of Hormuz. Many analysts describe this as a US attempt to alleviate pressure on the global economy while it tries to increase the economic pressure on Iran by reinforcing its own blockade of Iranian vessels. Iran worries that Israel’s efforts to weaken Hezbollah are another facet of that strategy.

The Iranians believe the United States and Israel “are using the ceasefire to shape the realities on the ground in a way that would erode the leverage Iran has achieved during this war,” Azizi said.

Tehran’s willingness to retaliate forcefully also shows how unlikely Iran thinks it is Trump, who is about to host the World Cup games, and faces a deepening global economic crisis ahead of midterm elections this fall, to rejoin the fray.

“They don’t think Trump is going to go to war,” said Farzan Sabet, an Iran analyst at the Geneva Graduate Institute in Switzerland. “But even if he does, they’re fairly confident they can manage it.”

*Erika Solomon for the New York Times

Features

Drones vs. Airstrikes: How the Deterrence Equation Between Israel and Hezbollah Changed

A fireball rises from a building in the southern Lebanese city of Tyre following an Israeli airstrike (AFP). 
A fireball rises from a building in the southern Lebanese city of Tyre following an Israeli airstrike (AFP). 
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Drones vs. Airstrikes: How the Deterrence Equation Between Israel and Hezbollah Changed

A fireball rises from a building in the southern Lebanese city of Tyre following an Israeli airstrike (AFP). 
A fireball rises from a building in the southern Lebanese city of Tyre following an Israeli airstrike (AFP). 

Israel is pressing forward with firepower, evacuation warnings, and limited ground incursions, while Hezbollah is responding with drones and direct engagements along advanced positions north of the Litani River.

Yet behind this reciprocal escalation, the deterrence equation that governed the border throughout the years following the 2006 war appears to be facing an unprecedented test, as military operations expand and reach areas that until recently were considered beyond the immediate danger zone.

Airstrikes that now reach as far as Zahrani, clashes around Zawtar al-Sharqiya, and Israel’s gradual advance toward the outskirts of Nabatieh all indicate, according to Lebanese military assessments, that the confrontation has entered a different phase.

In this new stage, drones alone are no longer capable of maintaining a deterrent balance, while Israel is pursuing a policy of mounting military pressure aimed at reshaping realities on the ground ahead of any potential settlement or negotiations.

Drones Do Not Create Deterrence

Retired Brig. Gen. Dr. Hisham Jaber, head of the Middle East Center for Studies argued that the drones used by Hezbollah do not achieve genuine deterrence against the continued expansion of Israeli air and ground operations.

He maintained that Israel’s ongoing airstrikes and ground incursions demonstrate that the deterrence equation is no longer functioning.

Jaber also linked battlefield developments to the erosion of the deterrence that had existed after the 2006 war, arguing that “the deterrence that lasted from 2006 to 2023 was real and effective.” However, he said Hezbollah’s entry into a war of attrition after opening its support front for Gaza led to the collapse of that equation.

He further warned that Israel’s objectives may not be limited to Zawtar and its surroundings but could expand farther north.

A Policy of Depopulation and Prolonged Attrition

Jaber said Israel’s policy of warnings and evacuations is designed to empty areas of their civilian populations.

“Once Israel evacuates an area of its residents, it becomes able to strike any movement within it,” he explained. “At that point, anyone traveling by car or motorcycle becomes a potential target.”

He added: “My greatest concern is that southern Lebanon may already have entered a prolonged war of attrition, because current battlefield indicators do not suggest a quick path toward ending this escalation or returning to the previous rules of engagement.”

Assessing both the military and political landscape, he argued that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu “will not stop the war in Lebanon at this stage, regardless of the losses incurred,” noting that Israel “has not yet achieved any of its declared military or political objectives.”

He added that “Tel Aviv has failed to disarm Hezbollah and has also been unable to impose the conditions it seeks on Lebanon.”

According to his assessment, current developments indicate that “things will not return to the way they were,” arguing that the conflict has entered a new phase that will have lasting consequences for southern Lebanon and the balance of power there.

As for Hezbollah, Jaber said the group also “cannot simply halt the war midway through, given the complexities of the battlefield and the interwoven regional and international calculations.”

No Deterrent Balance Exists

For his part, retired Brig. Gen. Khalil Helou argued that “the drones used by Hezbollah have failed to establish a deterrent balance against Israel’s intensive air campaign,” stressing that “Israel is inflicting far greater damage and losses than it is receiving.”

He explained that fiber-optic-guided FPV (First-Person View) drones suffer from technical limitations related to both range and payload capacity.

“In practical terms, the range of these drones is between three and 15 kilometers and may reach around 20 kilometers as a reasonable upper limit,” he said. “The cable connecting the drone adds weight and affects its operational capabilities.”

Helou argued that claims of their use at distances of up to 60 kilometers are “militarily unrealistic.”

He added that “Hezbollah is attempting to achieve battlefield effects and inflict casualties through drones, but developments on the ground show that Israel is imposing far greater damage on both Hezbollah and Lebanon.”