Alliances, Conspiracies Overshadowed the Letters between Assad, Saddam

Former Syrian President Hafez Al-Assad (left) Former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein (Right)
Former Syrian President Hafez Al-Assad (left) Former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein (Right)
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Alliances, Conspiracies Overshadowed the Letters between Assad, Saddam

Former Syrian President Hafez Al-Assad (left) Former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein (Right)
Former Syrian President Hafez Al-Assad (left) Former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein (Right)

The relationship once shared between the late Syrian and Iraqi leaders, Hafez al-Assad and Saddam Hussein, can be described as both complicated and intertwining. So was the history between Damascus and Baghdad.

Many factors, such as politics, sectarianism, ideology, and geography, defined the characteristics of the ties between Iraq and Syria and the race towards leadership in the region.

The roots of the competition for regional domination can be traced back to the interlocked fate of the two countries. Baathists had arrived in power in Damascus in March 1963 but ended up losing Baghdad by the end of the same year.

However, after managing to steer governance in Syria to a new direction in 1966, the Baath party made its way back to the forefront of authority in Iraq a couple of years later. In 1970, Assad went on to end all struggles facing the movement with his Corrective Revolution.

There were several attempts to reconcile the two Baathist regimes in Iraq and Syria.

Indeed, Iraq assisted with the 1973 October War and Oil Embargo. But the relationship would soon return to falling apart. At the time, Saddam was “soaring” under the wing of former Iraqi President Aḥmad Ḥasan Bakr, while Assad was solidifying his position and influence in Damascus and Lebanon in 1976.

Breakthroughs in Egyptian-Israeli negotiations and tokens of a “revolution” in Iran meant that both Syria and Iraq would lay on a “bed of thorns.” This led to presidents Bakr and Assad signing the Charter of Joint National Action in 1978, which culminated in plans and treaties that would lead to the unification of Iraq and Syria at the start of 1979—two weeks before a “revolution” was announced in Tehran.

Hungry after more power, each of Saddam and Rifaat al-Assad, former Vice President of Syria and Assad’s younger brother, opposed the initiative.

While Assad managed to toe his brother back in line, Saddam succeeded in overthrowing Bakr and rise to power in July 1979. On the way to becoming Baghdad’s new ruler, Saddam ordered the execution of unification “enthusiasts” and accused Syria’s then Vice President of “conspiracy.”

After the signing of the Camp David Accords, Assad sought to reinforce the “southern front” against Israel. This effort was mirrored by a similar endeavor by Baghdad fortifying Iraq’s eastern gates against Iran.

Soon after the Iraq-Iran war began after the “revolution” in Tehran, Assad sided with Saddam’s enemy, and the Damascus-Baghdad track dove into yet another deep valley. Baghdad responded by severing relations with Damascus in October 1980 and supporting the “Muslim Brotherhood” in Syria.

Preoccupied with its agenda in Lebanon, Syria shut down borders with Iraq in 1982, cutting off the Iraqi oil pipeline to the Mediterranean. Iran then moved on to replace lost Iraqi oil with its own.

Secret Meetings

In the mid-80s, towards the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Jordan’s King Hussein brought Assad and Saddam together for a “stormy marathon” meeting.

Moreover, “secret” and “experimental” meetings were held between former Syrian vice presidents Farouk al-Sharaa, Abdul Halim Khaddam, and Saddam’s close aid, Tariq Aziz.

After Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, Assad decided to join the international coalition to liberate the Gulf country. While the Syrian president strengthened his internal economic status and influence in Lebanon, his Iraqi counterpart, Saddam, was drowning in a quagmire of isolation and sanctions.

In the mid-90s, the Baathist “comrades” would try to take the pulse of bilateral relations once again.

Assad was motivated to look for alliances that would protect him from the uncertainty of peace negotiations with Israel and help solve an economic crisis at home. At the same time, Saddam sought any way he could break the siege on Iraq.

Turkish pressure, the aftermath of Hussein Kamel, Saddam’s son-in-law, fleeing to Amman under the banner of changing his father-in-law’s regime, and Jordan’s talk of “federalism” would also bring Assad and Saddam closer.

The two kingpins referred to choosing two of their most trusted companions to head a secret communication backchannel.

Saddam picked his former bureau chief and ambassador in Doha, Anwar Sabri Abdul Razzaq al-Qaisi, and Assad assigned Khaddam, who had served him well during his struggle with Baathist comrades in the 60s.

Each of Qaisi and Khaddam was well aware of the need for utmost confidentiality with their task.

When comparing Khaddam’s records, which he took to Paris in 2005 and Asharq Al-Awsat had access to, and an exclusive interview with Qaisi, a difference in opinions surfaces about who jumpstarted the channel.

Khaddam says that Saddam broke the ice in August 1995, but Assad met this initiative with “doubts” in light of their shared history and Saddam’s role in thwarting the Charter of Joint National Action in 1979.

Rising above his doubts, Assad decided to hold dialogue and test Saddam before turning on a new leaf, according to Khaddam.

But Qaisi claims that Assad first launched the initiative after publicly declaring Jordan’s ambitions for federalism as a threat to Syria and Iraq. According to the former ambassador, after Assad’s declaration, he received a signal from Khaddam to open a channel between the two presidents.

Rushing in…Slowing Down

In his letters to Assad, Saddam seemed in a rush to reopen the two embassies that were closed in 1982 and to hold political meetings and open the borders.

In early 1996, Assad responded to Saddam’s request with patience and cautiousness to not drive a wedge between Damascus and Arab countries. He informed his Iraqi counterpart that he intends to “conduct contacts with a number of Arab countries in order not to complicate the Arab situation further.”

Qaisi told Asharq Al-Awsat that he secretly visited Damascus six times, four of which were made through trips transited from Sudan.

“Saddam was serious about opening a new page with Assad to restore relations,” he told the newspaper, adding that he was given the green light to show Iraqi readiness for far-reaching reconciliation.

“The president told me to tell the Syrians that if Assad took a step forward, he would match it with ten ahead,” said Qaisi.

Opening the channel, according to Qaisi, was to “convince brothers in Syria not to receive Kamel.”

“Indeed, he was not received due to the common concern about Jordan’s ambitions for proposing federalism,” noted Qaisi, adding that Saddam had proposed holding a secret summit with Assad on the border, forming a “joint political leadership,” and holding bilateral discussions on reviving the Charter of Joint National Action, as well as floating the idea of an Arab summit in Damascus for Iraqi-Arab reconciliation.

“King Hussein’s recent statements, before his visit to Washington, confirm that he is accelerating the push for the United States concluding a military agreement and forming a regional alliance with Israel and Turkey at its backbone; this is certainly directed against Iraq and Syria,” Saddam wrote to Assad in March 1996.

Corollary, the then director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service Mani Rashid revealed that Iraqi-Syrian covert security meetings were held to ensure coordination “against Jordan and Turkey placing the two countries between the claws of a pincer.”

According to Qaisi, Saddam “openheartedly” welcomed Assad’s stingy criticism of establishing federalism in the region.

“Abu Uday”

In the letter exchanges and records of the top-secret meetings, the discourse between Saddam and Assad saw a significant shift, to the extent that Khaddam would convey the latter’s greetings to “Abu Uday (father of Uday: Saddam)” – in Arabic, referring to someone by their fatherhood is considered a sign of respect and amiability.

For his part, Saddam would refer to Assad as “the brother President.” The letter exchange proceeded to be dominated by what the two can do and what they want to do.

Besides talking to Saddam, Assad carried on with contacting Arab nations and informing French President Jacques Chirac that “the situation in Iraq is worrying and has become a ticking bomb about to explode.”

Behind closed doors, Chirac surprised Assad by opening yet another issue: The Syrian presence in Lebanon. The French president made an offer regarding disarming Hezbollah vs Israel’s withdrawal from the Golan Heights, but Syria would have to guarantee its military presence in Lebanon.

By the second half of 1996, Assad’s primary goal became preventing the collapse of the regime in Iraq and reopening borders with the fellow Levantine country. This followed his initial try at overthrowing Saddam.

Even though Assad was uncomfortable with Saddam delegating Aziz to redevelop relations with Syria, he welcomed him in Damascus in November 1997. Assad also received then Iraqi Foreign Minister Muhammad Saeed Al-Sahaf in February 1998.

At the time, Assad’s conviction was that Saddam isn’t working to remove “justifications” for a military strike during a crisis with international inspectors. So he agreed with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to relay to Saddam that a strike was on the way and that it would target both his regime and country.

Once again, there was an overlap in the regional matters. After Chirac’s offer to “swap” between Iraq and Lebanon, US President Bill Clinton linked Iraq with the resumption of Syrian-Israeli peace negotiations.

On February 21, 1998, Clinton wrote to Assad that if Saddam was forced to take up arms, it is essential that Syria remains impartial, and that Iraq complies with UN resolutions. He also noted that he was not willing to go back to the starting point after all that was accomplished in previous negotiations.

Assad responded on March 13 that year, talking about “anxieties and tensions building up around the possibility of military action against Iraq.”

He stressed the desire to resume negotiations (with Israel) from the point where they had stopped, following the loss of Shimon Peres and the victory of Benjamin Netanyahu in 1996.

Afterward, Iraqi-Syrian borders were reopened, and reconciliation bureaus were set up in the two capitals. “Transition” took place in Damascus, and the “regime was brought down in Baghdad.”

As the US attack on Iraq started dawning in 2003, Assad flew to Tehran. He met with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to agree on “resisting” Americans in Iraq, which was seen as a buffer zone between Syria and Iran.

The content of the letters exchanged between Saddam and Assad was unknown. However, revealing them, while also being acknowledged by Qaisi, aims to highlight parts of the shared history between Syria and Iraq and how it affected the region.



Iraq's Political Future in Limbo as Factions Vie for Power

FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
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Iraq's Political Future in Limbo as Factions Vie for Power

FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa

Political factions in Iraq have been maneuvering since the parliamentary election more than a month ago to form alliances that will shape the next government.

The November election didn't produce a bloc with a decisive majority, opening the door to a prolonged period of negotiations, said The Associated Press.

The government that eventually emerges will be inheriting a security situation that has stabilized in recent years, but it will also face a fragmented parliament, growing political influence by armed factions, a fragile economy, and often conflicting international and regional pressures, including the future of Iran-backed armed groups.

Uncertain prospects

Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani's party took the largest number of seats in the election. Al-Sudani positioned himself in his first term as a pragmatist focused on improving public services and managed to keep Iraq on the sidelines of regional conflicts.

While his party is nominally part of the Coordination Framework, a coalition of Iran-backed Shiite parties that became the largest parliamentary bloc, observers say it’s unlikely that the Coordination Framework will support al-Sudani’s reelection bid.

“The choice for prime minister has to be someone the Framework believes they can control and doesn't have his own political ambitions,” said Sajad Jiyad, an Iraqi political analyst and fellow at The Century Foundation think tank.

Al-Sudani came to power in 2022 with the backing of the Framework, but Jiyad said that he believes now the coalition “will not give al-Sudani a second term as he has become a powerful competitor.”

The only Iraqi prime minister to serve a second term since 2003 was Nouri al-Maliki, first elected in 2006. His bid for a third term failed after being criticized for monopolizing power and alienating Sunnis and Kurds.

Jiyad said that the Coordination Framework drew a lesson from Maliki “that an ambitious prime minister will seek to consolidate power at the expense of others.”

He said that the figure selected as Iraq's prime minister must generally be seen as acceptable to Iran and the United States — two countries with huge influence over Iraq — and to Iraq’s top Shiite cleric, Grand Ali al-Sistani.

Al-Sudani in a bind

In the election, Shiite alliances and lists — dominated by the Coordination Framework parties — secured 187 seats, Sunni groups 77 seats, Kurdish groups 56 seats, in addition to nine seats reserved for members of minority groups.

The Reconstruction and Development Coalition, led by al-Sudani, dominated in Baghdad, and in several other provinces, winning 46 seats.

Al-Sudani's results, while strong, don't allow him to form a government without the support of a coalition, forcing him to align the Coordination Framework to preserve his political prospects.

Some saw this dynamic at play earlier this month when al-Sudani's government retracted a terror designation that Iraq had imposed on the Lebanese Hezbollah militant group and Yemen’s Houthis— Iran-aligned groups that are allied with Iraqi armed factions — just weeks after imposing the measure, saying it was a mistake.

The Coalition Framework saw its hand strengthened by the absence from the election of the powerful Sadrist movement led by Shiite cleric Muqtada Sadr, which has been boycotting the political system since being unable to form a government after winning the most seats in the 2021 election.

Hamed Al-Sayed, a political activist and official with the National Line Movement, an independent party that boycotted the election, said that Sadr’s absence had a “central impact.”

“It reduced participation in areas that were traditionally within his sphere of influence, such as Baghdad and the southern governorates, leaving an electoral vacuum that was exploited by rival militia groups,” he said, referring to several parties within the Coordination Framework that also have armed wings.

Groups with affiliated armed wings won more than 100 parliamentary seats, the largest showing since 2003.

Other political actors

Sunni forces, meanwhile, sought to reorganize under a new coalition called the National Political Council, aiming to regain influence lost since the 2018 and 2021 elections.

The Kurdish political scene remained dominated by the traditional split between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan parties, with ongoing negotiations between the two over the presidency.

By convention, Iraq’s president is always a Kurd, while the more powerful prime minister is Shiite and the parliamentary speaker Sunni.

Parliament is required to elect a speaker within 15 days of the Federal Supreme Court’s ratification of the election result, which occurred on Dec. 14.

The parliament should elect a president within 30 days of its first session, and the prime minister should be appointed within 15 days of the president’s election, with 30 days allotted to form the new government.

Washington steps in

The incoming government will face major economic and political challenges.

They include a high level of public debt — more than 90 trillion Iraqi dinars ($69 billion) — and a state budget that remains reliant on oil for about 90% of revenues, despite attempts to diversify, as well as entrenched corruption.

But perhaps the most delicate question will be the future of the Popular Mobilization Forces, a coalition of militias that formed to fight the ISIS group as it rampaged across Iraq more than a decade ago.

It was formally placed under the control of the Iraqi military in 2016 but in practice still operates with significant autonomy. After the Hamas-led attack in southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023 sparked the devastating war in Gaza, some armed groups within the PMF launched attacks on US bases in the region in retaliation for Washington’s backing of Israel.

The US has been pushing for Iraq to disarm Iran-backed groups — a difficult proposition, given the political power that many of them hold and Iran’s likely opposition to such a step.

Two senior Iraqi political officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity because they weren't authorized to comment publicly, said that the United States had warned against selecting any candidate for prime minister who controls an armed faction and also cautioned against letting figures associated with militias control key ministries or hold significant security posts.

“The biggest issue will be how to deal with the pro-Iran parties with armed wings, particularly those... which have been designated by the United States as terrorist entities,” Jiyad said.


What Egypt’s Red Lines Mean for Sudan’s War

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
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What Egypt’s Red Lines Mean for Sudan’s War

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)

In unusually blunt language, and following a visit by Sudan’s Sovereignty Council Chairman and army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan to Cairo, the Egyptian presidency issued a statement on the war in Sudan outlining three points it described as red lines.

It said Egypt would not allow any of them to be crossed or compromised, as they directly affect Egypt’s national security, which it said is inseparable from Sudan’s national security.

The reference to activating the joint defense agreement between the two countries was seen as a signal that Egypt could bring its military, political, and diplomatic weight to bear in support of the Sudanese army.

Joint defense agreement

In March 2021, Egypt signed a military cooperation agreement with Sudan that covers training, border security, and the confrontation of shared threats. That agreement followed a joint defense pact signed in 1976 during the presidencies of Sudan’s Gaafar Nimeiry and Egypt’s Anwar Sadat.

Articles One and Two of the pact stipulate that any attack on one party is considered an attack on the other, and require immediate consultation, including the use of armed force to repel aggression. The agreement also commits both sides to coordinating their defense and military policies on matters related to their national security.

After the fall of Nimeiry’s regime in the 1985 popular uprising, then Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi informed the Egyptian leadership of his desire to cancel the joint defense agreement. Instead, the two sides signed what became known as the Brotherhood Charter in 1987. While it did not explicitly cancel the 1976 agreement, its mechanisms have not been discussed or activated since then.

Regional and international messages

Sudanese journalist Osman Mirghani, editor-in-chief of Al-Tayar newspaper, said the Egyptian statements amounted to regional and international messages linked to recent developments and what he described as serious security threats facing Sudan.

He pointed to the expansion of the Rapid Support Forces in the Darfur and Kordofan regions in a way that threatens shared Sudanese and Egyptian national security, warning of risks of geographic fragmentation that could endanger Sudan’s unity.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Mirghani said Egypt was, for the first time, using direct and tough language and signaling the possibility of intervention under international law in Sudan’s conflict. He said this reflected the level of Egyptian concern over the situation in Sudan.

Mirghani added that the reference to red lines was a message directed at all parties, noting that there are many influential players in Sudan.

The red lines

The first red line cited by Cairo was the preservation of Sudan’s unity and territorial integrity, preventing any tampering with its resources or those of the Sudanese people, and rejecting the secession of any part of the country. Egypt reiterated its categorical refusal to the establishment or recognition of any parallel entities, saying such moves would undermine Sudan’s unity and territorial integrity.

The statement also stressed the need to preserve Sudanese state institutions and prevent any harm to them. Egypt affirmed its full right to take all necessary measures permitted under international law, including activating the joint defense agreement between the two brotherly countries, to ensure these red lines are not crossed.

Timing of the visit

Former Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Youssef noted the timing of Burhan’s visit to Cairo, stating that it occurred after his trip to Saudi Arabia earlier this week and following a visit by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to the United States.

Youssef said the trip was part of efforts to end the war in Sudan through the Quartet mechanism, which includes Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and the United States.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Youssef said Burhan briefed Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on the outcomes of his Saudi visit and the latest developments in Sudan.

He stated that the visit did not follow the usual ceremonial protocol and was a result of developments in the war, noting that Egypt’s security is linked to Sudan’s security. He added that Egypt is part of the Quartet, which seeks to end a war that is approaching its third year.

Military implications

Sudanese military expert Al-Muatasim Abdel Qader said activating the joint agreement would imply Egyptian intervention in various forms, including supplying weapons and ammunition or direct military involvement.

He said the provisions of the agreement obligate each army to defend the other, adding that the red lines outlined by the Egyptian presidency represented a significant step and carried major implications for the Sudanese state.

In remarks to Asharq Al-Awsat, Abdel Qader described mutual protection between the two countries as a historically rooted matter, dating back to wars Egypt fought in the last century in which Sudanese armed forces took part.

Rapid Support Forces response

Basha Tabiq, an adviser to the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, said in posts on X that Egypt’s position amounted to blatant interference, bias toward one party, and a colonial mindset that views Sudan as a backyard.

Another source aligned with the RSF said accusations against Egypt of backing the Sudanese army have persisted since the early days of the war. The source pointed to the presence of Egyptian forces at Merowe air base in northern Sudan at the start of the conflict, when several Egyptian soldiers and officers were captured before later being handed over to Cairo.

The source also cited accusations by RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, who said in October 2024 that the Egyptian army had carried out air strikes against his forces and supplied the Sudanese army with drones and training.

He said Hemedti renewed those accusations last June, alleging that Cairo supported the Sudanese army with aircraft flown by Egyptian pilots that bombed areas under his forces’ control, and supplied weapons and aviation fuel. Hemedti described this as a blatant aggression against the Sudanese people.

The source, who requested anonymity, said Egypt has been intervening in the war from the outset and that activating the joint defense agreement would merely formalize an existing reality.

No time to spare

Sudanese ambassador Al-Sadiq al-Maqli said Egypt is working with Saudi Arabia and the international Quartet, in coordination with the United States, to give fresh momentum to efforts on Sudan.

He said Washington is currently using soft power rather than force, which he described as an option deferred until shuttle diplomacy by US President’s senior adviser Massad Boulos is exhausted.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Maqli said the United States fully understands the influence of Saudi Arabia and Egypt and their ability to persuade and soften the stance of Sudan’s government, which has rejected the latest US initiative.

He said Burhan currently has no time to spare, as what is unfolding in Sudan represents the world’s worst humanitarian disaster, according to the international community.

Maqli noted that Egypt, represented by Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty, has been almost fully dedicated to making the Quartet mechanism succeed, given that the continuation of the current situation in Sudan poses a threat to Egypt’s national security.

He described Burhan’s visits to Riyadh and Cairo as short but necessary steps toward accepting the Quartet initiative, saying the Saudi visit marked a qualitative shift in the Sudanese government’s official position.

He added that Sudan’s foreign ministry later expressed Port Sudan’s readiness to cooperate with President Donald Trump, his secretary of state, and Boulos in efforts to achieve peace in Sudan, predicting imminent developments that could lead to a major breakthrough in the crisis.


Iraq Negotiates New Coalition Under US Pressure

Election workers count ballots as they close a polling station, during the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, Nov. 11, 2025. (AP)
Election workers count ballots as they close a polling station, during the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, Nov. 11, 2025. (AP)
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Iraq Negotiates New Coalition Under US Pressure

Election workers count ballots as they close a polling station, during the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, Nov. 11, 2025. (AP)
Election workers count ballots as they close a polling station, during the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, Nov. 11, 2025. (AP)

More than a month after Iraq's parliamentary elections, the country's top leaders remain locked in talks to form a government while facing pressure from Washington to exclude Tehran-backed armed groups.

Amid seismic changes in the Middle East, where new alliances are forming and old powers waning, Iraqi leaders face a daunting task: navigating relations with US-blacklisted pro-Iranian factions.

The US has held significant sway over Iraqi politics since leading the 2003 invasion that ousted long-time ruler Saddam Hussein.

But another specter also haunts Iraq's halls of power: Washington's arch-foe, Iran.

Iraq has long been caught between the two, with successive governments negotiating a delicate balance.

Now, after November's election, Washington has demanded the eventual government must exclude Iran-backed armed groups and instead move to dismantle them, Iraqi officials and diplomats told AFP.

A State Department spokesperson, speaking on condition of anonymity, said: "Iraqi leaders well know what is and is not compatible with a strong US-Iraq partnership".

Washington, the spokesperson said, "will continue to speak plainly to the urgency of dismantling Iran-backed militias".

But some of these groups have increased their presence in the new chamber and have joined the Coordination Framework, an alliance of Shiite parties with varying ties to Iran and which holds the majority.

For weeks, the Coordination Framework has been embroiled in talks to nominate the next prime minister.

"The US has put conditions that armed factions should not be part of the new government," a senior Iraqi official said. The factions must disarm and "sever ties with Iran's Revolutionary Guard," he added.

In recent tweets, the US special envoy to Iraq, Mark Savaya said that Iraqi leaders are at a "crossroads".

Their decision "will send a clear and unmistakable signal to the United States... that Iraq is ready to claim its rightful place as a stable and respected nation in the new Middle East.

"The alternative is equally clear: economic deterioration, political confusion, and international isolation," Savaya said.

The US has blacklisted as "terrorist organizations" several armed groups from within the pro-Iran Popular Mobilization Forces, a former paramilitary alliance now integrated into the armed forces.

They are also part of the Iran-backed so-called "Axis of Resistance" and have called for the withdrawal of US troops -- deployed in Iraq as part of an anti-ISIS coalition -- and launched attacks against them.

Most of these groups hold seats in parliament and have seen their political and financial clout increase.

The Asaib Ahl al-Haq faction, led by Qais al-Khazali, who is a key figure in the Coordination Framework, won 27 seats in the latest election, making it harder to exclude it from the government.

A potential compromise is to deny it a key portfolio, as in the current government.

"The US has turned a blind eye before, so they might after all engage with the government as a whole but not with ministries held by armed groups," a former Iraqi official said.

Other blacklisted groups are:

+ Kataeb Hezbollah, one of the most powerful armed groups, supports a parliamentary bloc (six seats).

+ Kataeb Sayyid al-Shuhada, Kataeb Imam Ali and Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya.

+ The al-Nujaba movement is the only group that has steered clear of elections.

Iraq has its economic growth to worry about.

After decades of turmoil, it has only begun to regain a sense of normalcy in recent years.

Washington has already imposed sanctions on several Iraqi entities and banks, accusing them of helping Tehran evade sanctions.

But Iraqi leaders hope for greater foreign investments and support partnerships with US companies.

The most striking endorsement came from Khazali, an opponent of the US military presence who now argues that it would be in Baghdad's interest for major US companies to invest.

Since the Israel's war with Hamas in Gaza began in October 2023, Iraq has remained relatively unscathed by the turmoil engulfing the Middle East.

Iraqi armed groups did launch attacks on US troops and largely unsuccessful ones on Israel. Washington responded with heavy strikes, and the attacks have long since halted.

Iraq remained the only close regional ally of Iran to stay out of Israel's crosshairs.

So far, the US has acted as a buffer, helping to prevent an Israeli attack, but Iraqis have been warned of strikes against the armed groups, multiple sources said.

But as the presence of American forces dwindles, fears are growing.