Alliances, Conspiracies Overshadowed the Letters between Assad, Saddam

Former Syrian President Hafez Al-Assad (left) Former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein (Right)
Former Syrian President Hafez Al-Assad (left) Former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein (Right)
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Alliances, Conspiracies Overshadowed the Letters between Assad, Saddam

Former Syrian President Hafez Al-Assad (left) Former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein (Right)
Former Syrian President Hafez Al-Assad (left) Former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein (Right)

The relationship once shared between the late Syrian and Iraqi leaders, Hafez al-Assad and Saddam Hussein, can be described as both complicated and intertwining. So was the history between Damascus and Baghdad.

Many factors, such as politics, sectarianism, ideology, and geography, defined the characteristics of the ties between Iraq and Syria and the race towards leadership in the region.

The roots of the competition for regional domination can be traced back to the interlocked fate of the two countries. Baathists had arrived in power in Damascus in March 1963 but ended up losing Baghdad by the end of the same year.

However, after managing to steer governance in Syria to a new direction in 1966, the Baath party made its way back to the forefront of authority in Iraq a couple of years later. In 1970, Assad went on to end all struggles facing the movement with his Corrective Revolution.

There were several attempts to reconcile the two Baathist regimes in Iraq and Syria.

Indeed, Iraq assisted with the 1973 October War and Oil Embargo. But the relationship would soon return to falling apart. At the time, Saddam was “soaring” under the wing of former Iraqi President Aḥmad Ḥasan Bakr, while Assad was solidifying his position and influence in Damascus and Lebanon in 1976.

Breakthroughs in Egyptian-Israeli negotiations and tokens of a “revolution” in Iran meant that both Syria and Iraq would lay on a “bed of thorns.” This led to presidents Bakr and Assad signing the Charter of Joint National Action in 1978, which culminated in plans and treaties that would lead to the unification of Iraq and Syria at the start of 1979—two weeks before a “revolution” was announced in Tehran.

Hungry after more power, each of Saddam and Rifaat al-Assad, former Vice President of Syria and Assad’s younger brother, opposed the initiative.

While Assad managed to toe his brother back in line, Saddam succeeded in overthrowing Bakr and rise to power in July 1979. On the way to becoming Baghdad’s new ruler, Saddam ordered the execution of unification “enthusiasts” and accused Syria’s then Vice President of “conspiracy.”

After the signing of the Camp David Accords, Assad sought to reinforce the “southern front” against Israel. This effort was mirrored by a similar endeavor by Baghdad fortifying Iraq’s eastern gates against Iran.

Soon after the Iraq-Iran war began after the “revolution” in Tehran, Assad sided with Saddam’s enemy, and the Damascus-Baghdad track dove into yet another deep valley. Baghdad responded by severing relations with Damascus in October 1980 and supporting the “Muslim Brotherhood” in Syria.

Preoccupied with its agenda in Lebanon, Syria shut down borders with Iraq in 1982, cutting off the Iraqi oil pipeline to the Mediterranean. Iran then moved on to replace lost Iraqi oil with its own.

Secret Meetings

In the mid-80s, towards the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Jordan’s King Hussein brought Assad and Saddam together for a “stormy marathon” meeting.

Moreover, “secret” and “experimental” meetings were held between former Syrian vice presidents Farouk al-Sharaa, Abdul Halim Khaddam, and Saddam’s close aid, Tariq Aziz.

After Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, Assad decided to join the international coalition to liberate the Gulf country. While the Syrian president strengthened his internal economic status and influence in Lebanon, his Iraqi counterpart, Saddam, was drowning in a quagmire of isolation and sanctions.

In the mid-90s, the Baathist “comrades” would try to take the pulse of bilateral relations once again.

Assad was motivated to look for alliances that would protect him from the uncertainty of peace negotiations with Israel and help solve an economic crisis at home. At the same time, Saddam sought any way he could break the siege on Iraq.

Turkish pressure, the aftermath of Hussein Kamel, Saddam’s son-in-law, fleeing to Amman under the banner of changing his father-in-law’s regime, and Jordan’s talk of “federalism” would also bring Assad and Saddam closer.

The two kingpins referred to choosing two of their most trusted companions to head a secret communication backchannel.

Saddam picked his former bureau chief and ambassador in Doha, Anwar Sabri Abdul Razzaq al-Qaisi, and Assad assigned Khaddam, who had served him well during his struggle with Baathist comrades in the 60s.

Each of Qaisi and Khaddam was well aware of the need for utmost confidentiality with their task.

When comparing Khaddam’s records, which he took to Paris in 2005 and Asharq Al-Awsat had access to, and an exclusive interview with Qaisi, a difference in opinions surfaces about who jumpstarted the channel.

Khaddam says that Saddam broke the ice in August 1995, but Assad met this initiative with “doubts” in light of their shared history and Saddam’s role in thwarting the Charter of Joint National Action in 1979.

Rising above his doubts, Assad decided to hold dialogue and test Saddam before turning on a new leaf, according to Khaddam.

But Qaisi claims that Assad first launched the initiative after publicly declaring Jordan’s ambitions for federalism as a threat to Syria and Iraq. According to the former ambassador, after Assad’s declaration, he received a signal from Khaddam to open a channel between the two presidents.

Rushing in…Slowing Down

In his letters to Assad, Saddam seemed in a rush to reopen the two embassies that were closed in 1982 and to hold political meetings and open the borders.

In early 1996, Assad responded to Saddam’s request with patience and cautiousness to not drive a wedge between Damascus and Arab countries. He informed his Iraqi counterpart that he intends to “conduct contacts with a number of Arab countries in order not to complicate the Arab situation further.”

Qaisi told Asharq Al-Awsat that he secretly visited Damascus six times, four of which were made through trips transited from Sudan.

“Saddam was serious about opening a new page with Assad to restore relations,” he told the newspaper, adding that he was given the green light to show Iraqi readiness for far-reaching reconciliation.

“The president told me to tell the Syrians that if Assad took a step forward, he would match it with ten ahead,” said Qaisi.

Opening the channel, according to Qaisi, was to “convince brothers in Syria not to receive Kamel.”

“Indeed, he was not received due to the common concern about Jordan’s ambitions for proposing federalism,” noted Qaisi, adding that Saddam had proposed holding a secret summit with Assad on the border, forming a “joint political leadership,” and holding bilateral discussions on reviving the Charter of Joint National Action, as well as floating the idea of an Arab summit in Damascus for Iraqi-Arab reconciliation.

“King Hussein’s recent statements, before his visit to Washington, confirm that he is accelerating the push for the United States concluding a military agreement and forming a regional alliance with Israel and Turkey at its backbone; this is certainly directed against Iraq and Syria,” Saddam wrote to Assad in March 1996.

Corollary, the then director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service Mani Rashid revealed that Iraqi-Syrian covert security meetings were held to ensure coordination “against Jordan and Turkey placing the two countries between the claws of a pincer.”

According to Qaisi, Saddam “openheartedly” welcomed Assad’s stingy criticism of establishing federalism in the region.

“Abu Uday”

In the letter exchanges and records of the top-secret meetings, the discourse between Saddam and Assad saw a significant shift, to the extent that Khaddam would convey the latter’s greetings to “Abu Uday (father of Uday: Saddam)” – in Arabic, referring to someone by their fatherhood is considered a sign of respect and amiability.

For his part, Saddam would refer to Assad as “the brother President.” The letter exchange proceeded to be dominated by what the two can do and what they want to do.

Besides talking to Saddam, Assad carried on with contacting Arab nations and informing French President Jacques Chirac that “the situation in Iraq is worrying and has become a ticking bomb about to explode.”

Behind closed doors, Chirac surprised Assad by opening yet another issue: The Syrian presence in Lebanon. The French president made an offer regarding disarming Hezbollah vs Israel’s withdrawal from the Golan Heights, but Syria would have to guarantee its military presence in Lebanon.

By the second half of 1996, Assad’s primary goal became preventing the collapse of the regime in Iraq and reopening borders with the fellow Levantine country. This followed his initial try at overthrowing Saddam.

Even though Assad was uncomfortable with Saddam delegating Aziz to redevelop relations with Syria, he welcomed him in Damascus in November 1997. Assad also received then Iraqi Foreign Minister Muhammad Saeed Al-Sahaf in February 1998.

At the time, Assad’s conviction was that Saddam isn’t working to remove “justifications” for a military strike during a crisis with international inspectors. So he agreed with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to relay to Saddam that a strike was on the way and that it would target both his regime and country.

Once again, there was an overlap in the regional matters. After Chirac’s offer to “swap” between Iraq and Lebanon, US President Bill Clinton linked Iraq with the resumption of Syrian-Israeli peace negotiations.

On February 21, 1998, Clinton wrote to Assad that if Saddam was forced to take up arms, it is essential that Syria remains impartial, and that Iraq complies with UN resolutions. He also noted that he was not willing to go back to the starting point after all that was accomplished in previous negotiations.

Assad responded on March 13 that year, talking about “anxieties and tensions building up around the possibility of military action against Iraq.”

He stressed the desire to resume negotiations (with Israel) from the point where they had stopped, following the loss of Shimon Peres and the victory of Benjamin Netanyahu in 1996.

Afterward, Iraqi-Syrian borders were reopened, and reconciliation bureaus were set up in the two capitals. “Transition” took place in Damascus, and the “regime was brought down in Baghdad.”

As the US attack on Iraq started dawning in 2003, Assad flew to Tehran. He met with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to agree on “resisting” Americans in Iraq, which was seen as a buffer zone between Syria and Iran.

The content of the letters exchanged between Saddam and Assad was unknown. However, revealing them, while also being acknowledged by Qaisi, aims to highlight parts of the shared history between Syria and Iraq and how it affected the region.



Is Iran Pushing Houthis Toward Military Action Against Washington?

Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 
Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 
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Is Iran Pushing Houthis Toward Military Action Against Washington?

Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 
Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 

As US military movements intensify in the Middle East and the possibility of strikes on Iran looms, Yemen’s Houthi group has continued military preparations, mobilizing fighters and establishing new weapons sites.

The Houthi mobilization comes at a time when the group is widely viewed as one of Iran’s most important regional arms for retaliation.

Although the Iran-backed group has not issued any official statement declaring its position on a potential US attack on Iran, its leaders have warned Washington against any military action and against bearing full responsibility for any escalation and its consequences.

They have hinted that any response would be handled in accordance with the group’s senior leadership's assessment, after evaluating developments and potential repercussions.

Despite these signals, some interpret the Houthis’ stance as an attempt to avoid drawing the attention of the current US administration, led by President Donald Trump, to the need for preemptive action in anticipation of a potential Houthi response.

The Trump administration previously launched a military campaign against the group in the spring of last year, inflicting heavy losses.

Islam al-Mansi, an Egyptian researcher specializing in Iranian affairs, said Iran may avoid burning all its cards unless absolutely necessary, particularly given US threats to raise the level of escalation should any Iranian military proxies intervene or take part in a confrontation.

Iran did not resort to using its military proxies during its confrontation with Israel or during a limited US strike last summer because it did not perceive an existential threat, al-Mansi said.

That calculation could change in the anticipated confrontation, potentially prompting Houthi intervention, including targeting US allies, interests, and military forces, he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Al-Mansi added that although Iran previously offered, within a negotiating framework, to abandon its regional proxies, including the Houthis, this makes it more likely that Tehran would use them in retaliation, noting that Iran created these groups to defend its territory from afar.

Many intelligence reports suggest that Iran’s Revolutionary Guard has discussed with the Houthis the activation of alternative support arenas in a potential US-Iran confrontation, including the use of cells and weapons not previously deployed.

Visible readiness

In recent days, Chinese media outlets cited an unnamed Houthi military commander as saying the group had raised its alert level and carried out inspections of missile launch platforms in several areas across Yemen, including the strategically important Red Sea region.

In this context, Yemeni political researcher Salah Ali Salah said the Houthis would participate in defending Iran against any US attacks, citing the group’s media rhetoric accompanying mass rallies, which openly supports Iran’s right to defend itself.

While this rhetoric maintains some ambiguity regarding Iran, it repeatedly invokes the war in Gaza and renews Houthi pledges to resume military escalation in defense of the besieged enclave’s population, Salah told Asharq Al-Awsat.

He noted that Iran would not have shared advanced and sophisticated military technologies with the Houthis without a high degree of trust in their ability to use them in Iran’s interest.

In recent months, following Israeli strikes on the unrecognized Houthi government and several of its leaders, hardline Houthi figures demonstrating strong loyalty to Iran have become more prominent.

On the ground, the group has established new military sites and moved equipment and weapons to new locations along and near the coast, alongside the potential use of security cells beyond Yemen’s borders.

Salah said that if the threat of a military strike on Iran escalates, the Iranian response could take a more advanced form, potentially including efforts to close strategic waterways, placing the Bab al-Mandab Strait within the Houthis’ target range.

Many observers have expressed concern that the Houthis may have transferred fighters and intelligence cells outside Yemen over recent years to target US and Western interests in the region.

Open options

After a ceasefire was declared in Gaza, the Houthis lost one of their key justifications for mobilizing fighters and collecting funds. The group has since faced growing public anger over its practices and worsening humanitarian conditions, responding with media messaging aimed at convincing audiences that the battle is not over and that further rounds lie ahead.

Alongside weekly rallies in areas under their control in support of Gaza, the Houthis have carried out attacks on front lines with Yemen’s internationally recognized government, particularly in Taiz province.

Some military experts describe these incidents as probing attacks, while others see them as attempts to divert attention from other activities.

In this context, Walid al-Abara, head of the Yemen and Gulf Studies Center, said the Houthis entered a critical phase after the Gaza war ended, having lost one of the main justifications for their attacks on Red Sea shipping.

As a result, they may seek to manufacture new pretexts, including claims of sanctions imposed against them, to maintain media momentum and their regional role.

Al-Abara told Asharq Al-Awsat that the group has two other options. The first is redirecting its activity inward to strengthen its military and economic leverage, either to impose its conditions in any future settlement or to consolidate power.

The second is yielding to international and regional pressure and entering a negotiation track, particularly if sanctions intensify or its economic and military capacity declines.

According to an assessment by the Yemen and Gulf Studies Center, widespread protests in Iran are increasingly pressuring the regime’s ability to manage its regional influence at the same pace as before, without dismantling its network of proxies.

This reality is pushing Tehran toward a more cautious approach, governed by domestic priorities and cost-benefit calculations, while maintaining a minimum level of external influence without broad escalation.

Within this framework, al-Abara said Iran is likely to maintain a controlled continuity in its relationship with the Houthis through selective support that ensures the group remains effective.

However, an expansion of protests or a direct military strike on Iran could open the door to a deeper Houthi repositioning, including broader political and security concessions in exchange for regional guarantees.


The Gaza Ceasefire Began Months Ago. Here’s Why the Fighting Persists

Israeli soldiers and tanks stand in Gaza, as seen from the Israeli side of the Israel-Gaza border, in Israel, February 4, 2026. REUTERS/Amir Cohen
Israeli soldiers and tanks stand in Gaza, as seen from the Israeli side of the Israel-Gaza border, in Israel, February 4, 2026. REUTERS/Amir Cohen
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The Gaza Ceasefire Began Months Ago. Here’s Why the Fighting Persists

Israeli soldiers and tanks stand in Gaza, as seen from the Israeli side of the Israel-Gaza border, in Israel, February 4, 2026. REUTERS/Amir Cohen
Israeli soldiers and tanks stand in Gaza, as seen from the Israeli side of the Israel-Gaza border, in Israel, February 4, 2026. REUTERS/Amir Cohen

As the bodies of two dozen Palestinians killed in Israeli strikes arrived at hospitals in Gaza on Wednesday, the director of one asked a question that has echoed across the war-ravaged territory for months.

“Where is the ceasefire? Where are the mediators?” Shifa Hospital's Mohamed Abu Selmiya wrote on Facebook.

At least 556 Palestinians have been killed in Israeli strikes since a US-brokered truce came into effect in October, including 24 on Wednesday and 30 on Saturday, according to Gaza's Health Ministry. Four Israeli soldiers have been killed in Gaza in the same period, with more injured, including a soldier whom the military said was severely wounded when militants opened fire near the ceasefire line in northern Gaza overnight.

Other aspects of the agreement have stalled, including the deployment of an international security force, Hamas' disarmament and the start of Gaza's reconstruction. The opening of the Rafah border crossing between Gaza and Egypt raised hope of further progress, but fewer than 50 people were allowed to cross on Monday, The Associated Press said.

Hostages freed as other issues languish In October, after months of stalled negotiations, Israel and Hamas accepted a 20-point plan proposed by US President Donald Trump aimed at ending the war unleashed by Hamas' Oct. 7, 2023, attack into Israel.

At the time, Trump said it would lead to a “Strong, Durable, and Everlasting Peace."

Hamas freed all the living hostages it still held at the outset of the deal in exchange for thousands of Palestinian prisoners held by Israel and the remains of others.

But the larger issues the agreement sought to address, including the future governance of the strip, were met with reservations, and the US offered no firm timeline.

The return of the remains of hostages meanwhile stretched far beyond the 72-hour timeline outlined in the agreement. Israel recovered the body of the last hostage only last week, after accusing Hamas and other militant groups of violating the ceasefire by failing to return all of the bodies. The militants said they were unable to immediately locate all the remains because of the massive destruction caused by the war — a claim Israel rejected.

The ceasefire also called for an immediate influx of humanitarian aid, including equipment to clear rubble and rehabilitate infrastructure. The United Nations and humanitarian groups say aid deliveries to Gaza's 2 million Palestinians have fallen short due to customs clearance problems and other delays. COGAT, the Israeli military body overseeing aid to Gaza, has called the UN's claims “simply a lie.”

Ceasefire holds despite accusations

Violence has sharply declined since the ceasefire paused a war in which more than 71,800 Palestinians have been killed, according to the Gaza Health Ministry. The ministry is part of the Hamas-led government and maintains detailed records seen as generally reliable by UN agencies and independent experts.

Hamas-led militants killed some 1,200 people in the initial October 2023 attack and took around 250 hostage.

Both sides say the agreement is still in effect and use the word “ceasefire” in their communications. But Israel accuses Hamas fighters of operating beyond the truce line splitting Gaza in half, threatening its troops and occasionally opening fire, while Hamas accuses Israeli forces of gunfire and strikes on residential areas far from the line.

Palestinians have called on US and Arab mediators to get Israel to stop carrying out deadly strikes, which often kill civilians. Among those killed on Wednesday were five children, including two babies. Hamas, which accuses Israel of hundreds of violations, called it a “grave circumvention of the ceasefire agreement.”

In a joint statement on Sunday, eight Arab and Muslim countries condemned Israel’s actions since the agreement took effect and urged restraint from all sides “to preserve and sustain the ceasefire.”

Israel says it is responding to daily violations committed by Hamas and acting to protect its troops. “While Hamas’ actions undermine the ceasefire, Israel remains fully committed to upholding it,” the military said in a statement on Wednesday.

“One of the scenarios the (military) has to be ready for is Hamas is using a deception tactic like they did before October 7 and rearming and preparing for an attack when it’s comfortable for them,” said Lt. Col. Nadav Shoshani, a military spokesperson.

Some signs of progress

The return of the remains of the last hostage, the limited opening of the Rafah crossing, and the naming of a Palestinian committee to govern Gaza and oversee its reconstruction showed a willingness to advance the agreement despite the violence.

Last month, US envoy Steve Witkoff, who played a key role in brokering the truce, said it was time for “transitioning from ceasefire to demilitarization, technocratic governance, and reconstruction.”

That will require Israel and Hamas to grapple with major issues on which they have been sharply divided, including whether Israel will fully withdraw from Gaza and Hamas will lay down its arms.

Though political leaders are holding onto the term “ceasefire” and have yet to withdraw from the process, there is growing despair in Gaza.

On Saturday, Atallah Abu Hadaiyed heard explosions in Gaza City during his morning prayers and ran outside to find his cousins lying on the ground as flames curled around them.

“We don’t know if we’re at war or at peace,” he said from a displacement camp, as tarpaulin strips blew off the tent behind him.


What to Know as Iran and US Set for Nuclear Talks in Oman

The flags of USA and Iran are displayed in Muscat, Oman, 25 April 2025. EPA/ALI HAIDER
The flags of USA and Iran are displayed in Muscat, Oman, 25 April 2025. EPA/ALI HAIDER
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What to Know as Iran and US Set for Nuclear Talks in Oman

The flags of USA and Iran are displayed in Muscat, Oman, 25 April 2025. EPA/ALI HAIDER
The flags of USA and Iran are displayed in Muscat, Oman, 25 April 2025. EPA/ALI HAIDER

Iran and the United States will hold talks Friday in Oman, their latest over Tehran's nuclear program after Israel launched a 12-day war on the country in June and Iran launched a bloody crackdown on nationwide protests.

US President Donald Trump has kept up pressure on Iran, suggesting America could attack Iran over the killing of peaceful demonstrators or if Tehran launches mass executions over the protests. Meanwhile, Trump has pushed Iran's nuclear program back into the frame as well after the June war disrupted five rounds of talks held in Rome and Muscat, Oman, last year.

Trump began the diplomacy initially by writing a letter last year to Iran’s 86-year-old Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to jump start these talks. Khamenei has warned Iran would respond to any attack with an attack of its own, particularly as the theocracy he commands reels following the protests.

Here’s what to know about Iran’s nuclear program and the tensions that have stalked relations between Tehran and Washington since the 1979 Iranian Revolution.

Trump writes letter to Khamenei Trump dispatched the letter to Khamenei on March 5, 2025, then gave a television interview the next day in which he acknowledged sending it. He said: “I’ve written them a letter saying, ‘I hope you’re going to negotiate because if we have to go in militarily, it’s going to be a terrible thing.’”

Since returning to the White House, the president has been pushing for talks while ratcheting up sanctions and suggesting a military strike by Israel or the US could target Iranian nuclear sites.

A previous letter from Trump during his first term drew an angry retort from the supreme leader.

But Trump’s letters to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in his first term led to face-to-face meetings, though no deals to limit Pyongyang’s atomic bombs and a missile program capable of reaching the continental US.

Oman mediated previous talks

Oman, a sultanate on the eastern edge of the Arabian Peninsula, has mediated talks between Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and US Mideast envoy Steve Witkoff. The two men have met face to face after indirect talks, a rare occurrence due to the decades of tensions between the countries.

It hasn't been all smooth, however. Witkoff at one point made a television appearance in which he suggested 3.67% enrichment for Iran could be something the countries could agree on. But that’s exactly the terms set by the 2015 nuclear deal struck under former President Barack Obama, from which Trump unilaterally withdrew America. Witkoff, Trump and other American officials in the time since have maintained Iran can have no enrichment under any deal, something to which Tehran insists it won't agree.

Those negotiations ended, however, with Israel launching the war in June on Iran.

The 12-day war and nationwide protests Israel launched what became a 12-day war on Iran in June that included the US bombing Iranian nuclear sites. Iran later acknowledged in November that the attacks saw it halt all uranium enrichment in the country, though inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency have been unable to visit the bombed sites.

Iran soon experienced protests that began in late December over the collapse of the country's rial currency. Those demonstrations soon became nationwide, sparking Tehran to launch a bloody crackdown that killed thousands and saw tens of thousands detained by authorities.

Iran’s nuclear program worries the West Iran has insisted for decades that its nuclear program is peaceful. However, its officials increasingly threaten to pursue a nuclear weapon. Iran now enriches uranium to near weapons-grade levels of 60%, the only country in the world without a nuclear weapons program to do so.

Under the original 2015 nuclear deal, Iran was allowed to enrich uranium up to 3.67% purity and to maintain a uranium stockpile of 300 kilograms (661 pounds). The last report by the International Atomic Energy Agency on Iran’s program put its stockpile at some 9,870 kilograms (21,760 pounds), with a fraction of it enriched to 60%.

US intelligence agencies assess that Iran has yet to begin a weapons program, but has “undertaken activities that better position it to produce a nuclear device, if it chooses to do so.” Iranian officials have threatened to pursue the bomb.

Decades of tense relations between Iran and the US Iran was once one of the US’s top allies in the Mideast under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who purchased American military weapons and allowed CIA technicians to run secret listening posts monitoring the neighboring Soviet Union. The CIA had fomented a 1953 coup that cemented the shah’s rule.

But in January 1979, the shah, fatally ill with cancer, fled Iran as mass demonstrations swelled against his rule. The Iranian Revolution followed, led by Grand Khomeini, and created Iran’s theocratic government.

Later that year, university students overran the US Embassy in Tehran, seeking the shah’s extradition and sparking the 444-day hostage crisis that saw diplomatic relations between Iran and the US severed.

The Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s saw the US back Saddam Hussein. The “Tanker War” during that conflict saw the US launch a one-day assault that crippled Iran at sea, while the US later shot down an Iranian commercial airliner that the US military said it mistook for a warplane.

Iran and the US have seesawed between enmity and grudging diplomacy in the years since, with relations peaking when Tehran made the 2015 nuclear deal with world powers. But Trump unilaterally withdrew America from the accord in 2018, sparking tensions in the Mideast that persist today.