Rifaat Assad: Challenged his Brother for Syria’s Presidency, Aged in Exile, Pardoned by his Nephew

Rifaat and Hafez al-Assad pictured in January 1984. (AFP)
Rifaat and Hafez al-Assad pictured in January 1984. (AFP)
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Rifaat Assad: Challenged his Brother for Syria’s Presidency, Aged in Exile, Pardoned by his Nephew

Rifaat and Hafez al-Assad pictured in January 1984. (AFP)
Rifaat and Hafez al-Assad pictured in January 1984. (AFP)

The Syria that Rifaat al-Assad left when he was vice president to Hafez al-Assad decades ago is not the same one that he returned to after his nephew, President Bashar al-Assad, allowed him to return to as a “citizen.” The country has changed with its foreign alliances and role in the region. Its composition has changed and it is now “home” to five armies.

Accompanied by his wives, children and grandchildren, his first glimpses of Damascus, with its streets, checkpoints, officials and his former residence, may have rekindled memories of when he was at the height of his power. He may have recalled a time back in the 1980s when he orchestrated a “coup” against his brother and surrounded the capital.

Damascus, which 21 years ago ordered his arrest should he return from exile, rose above the wounds and received him so he can avoid imprisonment in France where he was sentenced to serve for five years. Days alone will decipher the “code” that was headlined by al-Watan newspaper last week and that said that Rifaat, 84, had returned “with no political or social role”. Days will tell the extent to which this “decree” will be implemented in Damascus and Latakia.

The brothers and the Brotherhood
When he was young, Rifaat had always been overshadowed by his stronger older brother, Hafez, who was seven years his senior. In 1952, he followed in his brother’s ideological footsteps and joined the Baath party. He also followed him in joining the military and later the interior ministry.

In March 1963, the Baath military committee, which his brother was a member of, seized power. Rifaat soon joined the military academy in Homs. After graduating, he served alongside his brother, who at the time was an air force commander.

His first military “tours” took place with Salim Hatoum and the raid of President Amin al-Hafez’s residence in February 1966. The raid was aimed at toppling the first Baath government. Under President Nureddin al-Atassi, Rifaat was tasked with commanding a special unit that was formed by the military committee to “defend the regime”.

Historians say that during the late 1960s, Syria witnessed two major conflicts. The first pitted Hafez and Rifaat against Salah Jadid and his chief of intelligence Abdulkarim al-Jundi. Between February 25 and 28, 1969, the Assad brothers launched a military operation in Damascus. Tanks moved in the capital against Jundi and Jadid loyalists. The former committed suicide on March 2, 1969, to avoid arrest. On November 17, 1970, Assad carried out the “comprehensive movement”, arresting Atassi and Jadid. Rifaat was then tasked with securing Damascus.

Rifaat became commander of the Defense Companies, which boasted some 40,000 soldiers and acted almost like an independent army that was not affiliated with the official military. Rifaat rose up the ranks in the party and he expanded his activities among students, the youth and the media.

The second conflict erupted in 1979. It pitted the regime against the Muslim Brotherhood. In December 1979, Rifaat declared it was time to “respond with force” against the movement, calling on everyone to pledge their absolute loyalty. He was quoted as saying: “Stalin sacrificed 10 million people to protect the Bolshevik revolution. Syria must do the same to protect the Baath revolution.” He threatened to wage a “hundred wars, destroy a million forts and sacrifice a million lives” to preserve the state-regime. He let loose in suppressing the uprising between 1979 and 1982. The situation reached its peak when he struck Hama in February 1982.

In 1983, he sent his paratroopers to Damascus with the command to remove the hijab off women on the streets. The move was met with widespread criticism, even his brother openly condemned him.

Edge of danger
When Hafez fell ill in November 1983, it appeared that the moment Rifaat had long awaited had arrived. He began to act as though he were the “legitimate heir”, seeing himself as the only heir. He began to rally the support of his generals, drawing the extreme ire of the president.

Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam recalled the tense situation in his memoirs, which were seen by Asharq Al-Awsat. He said he met with Hafez in March 1978 to address the extreme campaign against Rifaat among the Syrians. “This campaign weakens the regime,” Khaddam told Hafez. “You must address the situation with Rifaat.”

Indeed, Rifaat was meddling in the affairs of state and ordering around Prime Minster Mohammed Ali Halabi, who did not dare speak out.

Khaddam added: “The president wanted his brother to succeed him, but Rifaat committed a major sin when he tried to revolt against him when he had fallen ill in November 1983.”

He recalled that Hafez had at one point in 1980 told him that he wanted to appoint a vice president for the sake of “continuity, because no one knows when their time will come.” Khaddam, who was foreign minister at the time, understood that he was referring to Rifaat. His attempted coup, however, made his brother change his mind.

Remembering the failed coup, Khaddam said that when Hafez fell ill in November 1983, commander of the republican guard, Adnan Makhlouf, informed him that the president wanted to see him at hospital. “I believed that he was a victim of an assassination attempt,” said Khaddam. “I asked: ‘Was he shot or targeted by a bomb?’ to which Makhlouf replied: ‘He was struck by a heart attack.’ I headed to the hospital immediately.”

The next day, Lebanese President Amin Gemayel was scheduled to visit Syria. Hafez asked Khaddam to postpone the visit and to cite “his preoccupation with internal matters”. When Hafez left the ICU, Khaddam contacted army commander Hikmat al-Shihabi and asked him to come to the hospital. “We agreed to take measures that would avert attempts to blow up the situation in Syria, because I was fearful of Rifaat.”

Khaddam recalled how at one point he was on the phone with the Syrian ambassador to London to request that a doctor be flown over immediately. He demanded that the best doctor be sent to Syria. He had made a similar request to the envoy in Washington. Rifaat walked in at that moment and asked why should doctors be brought from abroad? Syria has doctors, he declared. Should doctors be brought in from abroad whenever anyone falls ill? Khaddam replied: “Your brother is called Hafez al-Assad, not Hafez Khaddam. It is my responsibility to provide all conditions for his recovery because I know what sort of chaos will happen if he is gone.”

Later, Khaddam said the American ambassador revealed to him that an American envoy was coming to Damascus to meet with Rifaat. He responded: “We won’t allow him to come. Syria has a state. If the United States wanted to contact us, then it should do so through the state that I represent as foreign minister.”

The next day, the Defense Companies paraded through the streets of Damascus and Rifaat declared to the people: “I am coming.” Soon after, Khaddam met with the military, Shihabi and Defense Minister Mustafa Tlass. “We agreed to bring in two units from outside Damascus. They surrounded the city and the situation became tense. When senior officers who had pledged allegiance to Rifaat found out that Hafez was out of danger, they abandoned his brother. Rifaat became isolated.”

Tense meeting
At the time, the Central Command held a meeting. Everyone was shocked at the large numbers of Defense Companies members. Addressing the meeting, Rifaat said: “The Central Command must expel from the party Ali Duba (chief of military intelligence), Ibrahim Safi (commander of Syrian forces in Lebanon), Ali Haidar (commander of the special forces) and Mohammed Khawli (director of air force intelligence) because they are insulting me. I am the brother of the president. I should be treated like the president. If you don’t take a decision, then my forces will immediately occupy Damascus.”

Some of the members of the Central Command appeared hesitant. General Mustafa then addressed the gatherers: “These are your brothers. The problem can be solved if you meet together.” Khaddam then interjected, addressing Rifaat, he said: “You want to launch a coup? Go ahead. If every officer with a tank and soldiers wants to ride on our shoulders, then that is a dangerous thing. You have the tanks. Go ahead, make your move.” Rifaat was gradually becoming angrier. “I never said such a thing,” he retorted. Khaddam replied knowingly: “The discussion was recorded.”

After the meeting, Khaddam contacted Hafez to inform him of what happened. The president said he will check with Zuhair Masharqa, who was a member of the Central Command. Minutes later, Hafez told Khaddam that Masharqa had informed him that Rifaat did not make any threatening remarks. Khaddam told Hafez to check with the minister of defense and commander of the army because Masharqa was loyal to Rifaat. After around a quarter of an hour, Hafez contacted Khaddam again. “What you said was right. Zuhair is a coward and he lied to me,” said Hafez.

‘I am the regime’
In February 1984, Hafez carried out his retaliation. He ordered the arrest of Salim Barakat, Rifaat’s security aide. He also sent a message through their other brother, Jamil, to Rifaat, saying: “I am your older brother, whom you must obey. Do not forget that I am the one who made you.”

In March 1984, Hafez appointed Rifaat as vice president but with no official duties. In fact, this was not a form of promotion, but an attempt to curb Rifaat’s power through appointing him to a purely political role, one that would be under the constant watchful eye of the president. His security duties, as commander of the Defense Companies, were referred to Mohammed Ghanem.

Khaddam recalled how Rifaat’s appointment was announced. He said Hafez called the Central Command to meet in early March 1984. He informed the leadership that he had decided to appoint three vice presidents. He said he alone has the right to make such an order and name the officials, who were Rifaat Assad, Zuhair Masharqa and Abdul Halim Khaddam.

“I immediately told him that I didn’t want to be vice president or serve in any government or party position,” said Khaddam. “Hafez ended the meeting and then called me to his office. He asked me: ‘Why did you object?’ I replied: ‘How can you put Rifaat and Zuhair above me? Rifaat should be in jail, not act as first deputy to the president. I have worked tirelessly to serve my country. I will not practice any state or partisan work.’ He told: ‘Then take over the position of secretary of the Central Command.’ I rejected his offer and went home.”

“After about an hour, he called me back to his office. He welcomed me back with a laugh: ‘You are stubborn.’ He informed me that he issued a decree naming me as first vice president, followed by Rifaat and then Zuhair. I asked him what a vice president does. He replied that he is in charge of foreign policy. Soon after the decree was announced and I accepted.”

On March 30, 1984, Rifaat responded to the move. His soldiers entered Damascus with clear orders to seize power. They took over strategic positions throughout the capital and its surroundings. Rifaat’s forces clashes with Hafezloyalists, such as Ali Haidar of the special forces and Adnan Makhlouf of the republican guard.

Patrick Seale, author of Assad’s biography, “Assad: The Struggle for the Middle East,” wrote that had the two sides struck each other in the capital, the destruction would have been massive and the image of the regime would have been irreparably damaged. Hafez left the noose dangling enough for Rifaat to hang himself.

Hafez was in full military uniform, accompanied by his oldest son Bassel, who was to become his father’s right-hand man until his death in a car accident in 1994.

Hafez drove his car alone without any guards to confront Rifaat at the headquarters of his military command. Defense Minister Mustafa Tlass recalled the developments in a book, “Three months that shook Syria”. “Adnan Makhlouf, commander of the republican guard, informed me that Mr. president has headed alone to his brother’s headquarters in Mazzeh. He said the president had told him that if he was not back in an hour, then Tlass must carry out the plan (of confronting Rifaat’s forces),” wrote Tlass.

“Do you want to overthrow the regime?” Hafez asked Rifaat. “Here I am. I am the regime!” They argued and then Hafez offered Rifaat a way out, vowing to respect his dignity and interests and provide him with a safe exit to exile of his choosing. He promised that he would not arrest him.

In late April 1984, Rifaat sensed that the balance of power had started to lean in his brother’s favor to an extent that he could no longer move. He contacted his brother Jamil so that he could mediate a reconciliation and to say that he was ready to do anything the president wanted. Hafez was impatiently waiting for Rifaat to collapse and resign himself to the authority. He won the waiting game. Then the difficult negotiations began.

They agreed that the Defense Companies would come under the authority of the operations command in the armed forces. Rifaat would remain as vice president tasked with security affairs. They agreed that senior officers would travel with him to Moscow. On May 28, 1984, a plane carrying Rifaat and his senior officers flew to Moscow to cool down. They were summoned one by one back to Syria and Rifaat alone remained in exile.

‘My brother doesn’t love me’
It was said that prior to leaving Syria, Rifaat had thrown a huge banquet for his friends. “It appears as though my brother no longer loves me. When he sees me, he frowns. I am not an American agent. I did not conspire against my country,” he told them. “If I were a fool, I would have destroyed the entire city, but I love this place. My men have been here for 18 years, the people are used to us and they love us. Now the commandos want to kick us out.”

Rifaat returned to Syria in 1992 at the wishes of his mother, who died later that year. In 1994, he extended his condolences to Hafez when his son Bassel died. Later that year, he was discharged from his position in the army and kept his post as vice president before later being relieved of his duties.

In 1999, his supporters clashed in a gunfight with government forces in Latakia. He set up a satellite channel in London in September 1997. He established his own party in Europe that is headed by his son, Sumer. The party had called for political change and was met with criticism by loyalists and the opposition.

When Hafez died on June 10, 2000, he issued a statement to elegize him. He claimed to be his heir, but his calls fell on deaf ears. Khaddam ordered Rifaat’s arrest should he attempt to attend his brother’s funeral.

After the eruption of the 2011 protests in Syria, Rifaat stood against the regime. His son, Ribal, is openly involved in politics. Rifaat’s presence in the media gradually faded. He appeared during the presidential elections this year when he voted for his nephew at the Syrian consulate in Paris. He then sent a cable of congratulation to Bashar on his reelection. On Thursday, he returned to Syria.



Report: Europe’s Options in the Strait of Hormuz Are Few and Risky

A cargo ship in the Gulf, near the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from northern Ras al-Khaimah, near the border with Oman’s Musandam, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in United Arab Emirates, March 11, 2026. (Reuters file)
A cargo ship in the Gulf, near the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from northern Ras al-Khaimah, near the border with Oman’s Musandam, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in United Arab Emirates, March 11, 2026. (Reuters file)
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Report: Europe’s Options in the Strait of Hormuz Are Few and Risky

A cargo ship in the Gulf, near the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from northern Ras al-Khaimah, near the border with Oman’s Musandam, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in United Arab Emirates, March 11, 2026. (Reuters file)
A cargo ship in the Gulf, near the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from northern Ras al-Khaimah, near the border with Oman’s Musandam, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in United Arab Emirates, March 11, 2026. (Reuters file)

When senior officials from 40 countries met virtually this week to discuss how to bring shipping traffic back to the Strait of Hormuz, Italy’s foreign minister had a proposal. He urged them to establish a “humanitarian corridor” allowing safe passage for fertilizer and other crucial goods headed to impoverished nations.

The plan, described after the meeting by Italian officials, was one of several competing proposals from Europe and beyond that were meant to prevent the Iran war from causing widespread hunger. But it was not endorsed by the envoys on the call, and the meeting ended with no concrete plan to reopen the strait, militarily or otherwise, reported the New York Times.

European leaders are under pressure from US President Donald Trump to commit military assets, immediately, to end Iran’s blockage of the strait and tame a growing global energy and economic crisis. They have refused to meet his demands by sending warships now. Instead, they are hotly debating what to do to help unclog the vital shipping lane once the war ends.

But they are struggling to rally around a plan of action.

That partly reflects the slow gears of diplomacy in Europe and the sheer number of nations, including Gulf states, that are invested in safeguarding the strait once the war ends. Many nations involved in the talks, including Italy and Germany, have insisted that any international effort be blessed by the United Nations, which could slow action further. Military leaders will take up the issue in discussions next week.

More than anything, the struggle reflects how difficult it could be to actually secure the strait under a fragile peace — for Europe or for anyone else. None of the options available to Europe, the Gulf states and other countries look foolproof, even under the assumption that the major fighting will have stopped.

Naval escorts

French officials, including President Emmanuel Macron, have repeatedly raised the possibility that French naval vessels could help escort merchant ships through the strait after the war ends.

American officials have pushed for Europeans and other allies, like Japan, to escort ships sailing under their own countries’ flags.

Naval escorts are expensive. Also, their air defense systems alone might not be sufficient to stop some types of attacks, like drone strikes, should Iran choose to start firing again.

“What does the world expect, what does Donald Trump expect, from let’s say a handful or two handfuls of European frigates there in the Strait of Hormuz,” Defense Minister Boris Pistorius of Germany said last month, “to achieve what the powerful American Navy cannot manage there alone?”

Sweep for mines

German and Belgian officials, among others, say they are prepared to send minesweepers to clear the strait of explosives after the war.

Western military leaders aren’t convinced that Iran has actually mined the strait, in part because some Iranian ships still pass through it. So while minesweepers might be deployed as part of a naval escort, they might not have much to do.

Help from above

Another option is sending fighter jets and drones to intercept any Iranian air assaults on ships. American officials have pushed Europe to do this.

It is quite expensive and still not guaranteed to work. Iran can attack ships with a single soldier in a speedboat, and if just a few attempts succeed, that could be enough to spook insurers and shipowners out of attempting passage.

Diplomacy

Another option are negotiations and economic leverage to pressure Iran to refrain from future attacks, and deploy a variety of military means to enforce that. This effort would go beyond Europe. On Thursday, the German foreign ministry called on China to use its influence with Iran “constructively” to help end the hostilities.

This option is expensive and still not guaranteed. Negotiations seem to have done little to stop the fighting. But this may be Europe’s best bet, for lack of a better one.

What if none of that works?

Iranian officials said this week that they would continue to control traffic through the strait after the war. They have already made plans to make ships pay tolls for passing through the strait, which is supposed to be an unfettered waterway under international law.

A continued blockage risks global economic disaster. Countries around the world rely on shipments through the strait for fuel and fertilizer, among other necessities.

In some regions, shortages loom. In others, like Europe, high oil, gas and fertilizer prices have raised the specter of spiking inflation and cratering economic growth.

“The big threat right now is stagflation,” said Hanns Koenig, a managing director at Aurora Energy Research, a Berlin consultancy. “You’ve got higher prices, and they strangle the tiny growth we would have seen this year.”

*Jim Tankersley for the New York Times


US Military Jets Hit in Iran War Are the First Shot Down by Enemy Fire in Over 20 Years

An F-15E Strike Eagle turns toward the Panamint range over Death Valley National Park, Calif., on Feb. 27, 2017. (AP)
An F-15E Strike Eagle turns toward the Panamint range over Death Valley National Park, Calif., on Feb. 27, 2017. (AP)
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US Military Jets Hit in Iran War Are the First Shot Down by Enemy Fire in Over 20 Years

An F-15E Strike Eagle turns toward the Panamint range over Death Valley National Park, Calif., on Feb. 27, 2017. (AP)
An F-15E Strike Eagle turns toward the Panamint range over Death Valley National Park, Calif., on Feb. 27, 2017. (AP)

Iran shooting down two American military jets marks an exceedingly rare assault for the US that has not happened in more than 20 years and shows Iran’s continued ability to hit back despite President Donald Trump asserting it has been “completely decimated.”

The attacks came five weeks after US and Israeli strikes first pounded Iran, with Trump saying earlier this week that Tehran's “ability to launch missiles and drones is dramatically curtailed."

Iran shot down a US F15-E Strike Eagle fighter jet Friday, with one service member getting rescued and the search still underway for a second, US officials say. Iranian state media also said a US A-10 attack aircraft crashed after being hit by Iranian defense forces.

The last time a US warplane was shot down by enemy fire in combat was an A-10 Thunderbolt II during the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, said retired Air Force Brig. Gen. Houston Cantwell, a former F-16 fighter pilot.

But, he said, that’s because the US had largely been fighting insurgents who didn’t have the same anti-aircraft capabilities. The fact that there have not been more fighter jets lost in Iran, Cantwell said, is a testament to the capabilities of US forces.

"The fact that this hasn’t happened until now is an absolute miracle,” said Cantwell, who served four combat tours and is now a senior resident fellow at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. “We’re flying combat missions here, they are being shot at every day.”

Shoulder-fired missile likely used, experts say

US Central Command said in a statement Wednesday that American forces have flown more than 13,000 missions in the Iran war while striking more than 12,300 targets.

After more than a month of punishing US-Israeli airstrikes, a degraded Iranian military nonetheless remains a stubborn foe. Its steady stream of strikes against Israel and Gulf Arab neighbors have been causing regional upheaval and global economic shock.

When it comes to American dominance over Iran's airspace, there’s still a distinction between air superiority and air supremacy, said Behnam Ben Taleblu, Iran program senior director at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a hawkish Washington think tank.

“A disabled air defense system is not a destroyed air defense system,” he said. “We shouldn’t be shocked that they’re still fighting.”

American planes have been flying missions at lower altitudes, which makes them more vulnerable to Iran's missiles, Taleblu said. It’s possible that Iran fired at the F-15 with a surface-to-air missile, but it's more likely that a portable, shoulder-fired missile was used, he said. Those are much harder to detect and reflect how Iran is “weak but still lethal.”

“This is a regime that is fighting for its life,” he said.

Mark Cancian, a retired Marine colonel and a senior defense adviser with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, agreed that a shoulder-fired missile was likely used against the fighter jet.

Nonetheless, the American air war against Iran has been a “tremendous success” so far, he said.

To put things in perspective, he said the loss rate for American warplanes flying over Germany during World War II was 3% at one point, which would equal about 350 warplanes in the US war against Iran.

“But then there’s the political side — you have an American public that is accustomed to fighting bloodless wars,” Cancian said. “Then a large part of the country doesn’t support the war. So to them, any loss is unacceptable.”

Pilots are trained on what to do if their plane is hit

The last US jet shot down in combat was struck by an Iraqi surface-to-air missile over Baghdad on April 8, 2003. The pilot safely ejected and was rescued, according to the Air Force.

In high-threat environments like missions over Iran, Cantwell, the retired general, said an aviator's blood pressure goes up and they become highly alert to incoming missiles. Those are typically either infrared- or radar-guided missiles, he said, requiring different evasive tactics.

If they are hit and need to eject from their aircraft, they are trained on what to do next, he said.

Pilots learn to check for wounds after a violent ejection and the shock of a missile explosion and, most crucially, how they are going to communicate their location so rescuers can find them.

At the same time, he said, the enemy is likely working to intercept the communications or even spoof the location.

Helicopters are more at risk than other aircraft

The planes that went down Friday were not the first crewed American aircraft to be lost overall in Iran.

A military helicopter and airplane exploded in 1980 during an aborted mission to rescue several dozen American hostages at the US embassy in Tehran, according to the Air Force Historical Support Division.

After a series of setbacks, including severe dust storms and mechanical failures, the mission was called off. As the aircraft took off, the rotor blades of one of the RH-53 helicopters collided with an EC-130 aircraft full of fuel and both exploded, killing eight.

More US helicopters have been shot down in recent decades, including a MH-47 Army Chinook helicopter that was struck by a rocket-propelled grenade in Afghanistan in 2005, killing 16. Helicopters are more dangerous because “the lower and the slower, the more susceptible you are,” Cantwell said.

That’s why those who went out on this week's rescue missions, likely in helicopters, he said, did “such a brave and honorable act.”


Iran Leaders Join Crowds on Tehran’s Streets to Project Control in Wartime

An Iranian flag is seen on a residential building that was damaged by recent strikes at Vahdat town in Karaj, southwest of Tehran on April 3, 2026. (AFP)
An Iranian flag is seen on a residential building that was damaged by recent strikes at Vahdat town in Karaj, southwest of Tehran on April 3, 2026. (AFP)
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Iran Leaders Join Crowds on Tehran’s Streets to Project Control in Wartime

An Iranian flag is seen on a residential building that was damaged by recent strikes at Vahdat town in Karaj, southwest of Tehran on April 3, 2026. (AFP)
An Iranian flag is seen on a residential building that was damaged by recent strikes at Vahdat town in Karaj, southwest of Tehran on April 3, 2026. (AFP)

After more than a month of being stalked by targeted assassinations, Iran's leadership has adopted a new tactic to show it is still in control - with senior officials walking openly in the streets among small crowds who have gathered in support of the regime.

In recent days, Iran's president and foreign minister have separately mixed with groups of several hundred people in central Tehran. On Tuesday, state television aired footage of the two posing for selfies, talking to members of the public and shaking hands with supporters who had gathered in public areas.

According to insiders and analysts, the appearances are part of a calculated effort by Iran's theocratic leadership to project resilience and authority — not only over the vital Strait of Hormuz but also over the population — despite a sustained US-Israeli campaign aimed at "obliterating" it.

One insider close to the hardline establishment said such public outings are intended to show that the regime is "unshaken by strikes and that it remains in control and vigilant" as the war grinds on.

The US-Israeli war ‌on Iran began on ‌February 28 with the killing of veteran Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and several senior military ‌commanders ⁠in waves of ⁠strikes that have since continued to target top officials.

Iran's new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, has not been seen in public since taking over on March 8 from his father. Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi, meanwhile, was removed from Israel's hit list amid mediation efforts last month, including by Pakistan, to bring Tehran and Washington together for talks to end the war.

Talks aimed at ending the war have since appeared to have petered out, as Tehran brands US peace proposals "unrealistic". Against that backdrop, recent public appearances by President Masoud Pezeshkian and Araqchi appear designed to project defiance, if not a convincing display of public support.

A senior Iranian source said officials' public presence demonstrates that "the establishment is not intimidated by Israel's targeted killing of top Iranian ⁠figures".

Asked whether Iran's foreign minister or president were on any sort of kill list, an Israeli ‌military spokesperson, Nadav Shoshani, said on Friday he would not "speak about specific personnel."

NIGHTLY RALLIES TO ‌SHOW RESILIENCE

Despite widespread destruction, Tehran appears emboldened by surviving weeks of intense US-Israeli attacks, firing on Gulf countries hosting US troops and demonstrating its ability ‌to effectively block the Strait of Hormuz.

On Wednesday, US President Donald Trump vowed more aggressive strikes on Iran, without offering a timeline ‌for ending hostilities. Tehran responded by warning the United States and Israel that "more crushing, broader and more destructive" attacks were in store.

Encouraged by clerical rulers, supporters of the regime take to the streets each night, filling public squares to show loyalty even as bombs rain down across the country.

Analysts say the establishment is also seeking to raise the "political and reputational" cost of the strikes at a time when civilian casualties are deeply disturbing for Iranians.

Omid Memarian, ‌a senior Iran analyst at DAWN, a Washington-based think tank, said the decision to send officials into gatherings reflects a layered strategy, including an effort to sustain the morale of core supporters ⁠at a moment of acute pressure.

"The system ⁠relies heavily on this base; if its supporters withdraw from public space, its ability to project control and authority weakens significantly," Memarian said.

Speaking to state television, some in the crowds voice unwavering loyalty to Iran's leadership; others oppose the bombing of their country regardless of politics; and some have a stake in the system, including government employees, students and others whose livelihoods are tied to it.

Hadi Ghaemi, head of the New York-based Center for Human Rights in Iran, said the establishment is using such loyal crowds as human shields to raise the cost of any assassination attempts.

"By being in the middle of large crowds they have protections that would make Israeli-American attacks against them very bloody and generate sympathy worldwide," he said.

POTENTIAL PROTESTERS STAY OFF STREETS AT NIGHT

The Islamic republic emerged from a 1979 revolution backed by millions of Iranians. But decades of rule marked by corruption, repression and mismanagement have thinned that support, alienating many ordinary people.

While there has been little sign so far of anti-government protests that erupted in January and abated after a deadly crackdown, the establishment has adopted harsh measures, such as arrests, executions and large-scale deployment of security forces, to prevent any sparks of dissent.

Rights groups have warned about "rushed executions" during wartime after Iran hanged at least seven political prisoners during the war.

"Many potential protesters are frightened by the continuing presence of armed men and violent crowds in the streets and largely stay at home once darkness falls," Ghaemi said.