Rifaat Assad: Challenged his Brother for Syria’s Presidency, Aged in Exile, Pardoned by his Nephew

Rifaat and Hafez al-Assad pictured in January 1984. (AFP)
Rifaat and Hafez al-Assad pictured in January 1984. (AFP)
TT

Rifaat Assad: Challenged his Brother for Syria’s Presidency, Aged in Exile, Pardoned by his Nephew

Rifaat and Hafez al-Assad pictured in January 1984. (AFP)
Rifaat and Hafez al-Assad pictured in January 1984. (AFP)

The Syria that Rifaat al-Assad left when he was vice president to Hafez al-Assad decades ago is not the same one that he returned to after his nephew, President Bashar al-Assad, allowed him to return to as a “citizen.” The country has changed with its foreign alliances and role in the region. Its composition has changed and it is now “home” to five armies.

Accompanied by his wives, children and grandchildren, his first glimpses of Damascus, with its streets, checkpoints, officials and his former residence, may have rekindled memories of when he was at the height of his power. He may have recalled a time back in the 1980s when he orchestrated a “coup” against his brother and surrounded the capital.

Damascus, which 21 years ago ordered his arrest should he return from exile, rose above the wounds and received him so he can avoid imprisonment in France where he was sentenced to serve for five years. Days alone will decipher the “code” that was headlined by al-Watan newspaper last week and that said that Rifaat, 84, had returned “with no political or social role”. Days will tell the extent to which this “decree” will be implemented in Damascus and Latakia.

The brothers and the Brotherhood
When he was young, Rifaat had always been overshadowed by his stronger older brother, Hafez, who was seven years his senior. In 1952, he followed in his brother’s ideological footsteps and joined the Baath party. He also followed him in joining the military and later the interior ministry.

In March 1963, the Baath military committee, which his brother was a member of, seized power. Rifaat soon joined the military academy in Homs. After graduating, he served alongside his brother, who at the time was an air force commander.

His first military “tours” took place with Salim Hatoum and the raid of President Amin al-Hafez’s residence in February 1966. The raid was aimed at toppling the first Baath government. Under President Nureddin al-Atassi, Rifaat was tasked with commanding a special unit that was formed by the military committee to “defend the regime”.

Historians say that during the late 1960s, Syria witnessed two major conflicts. The first pitted Hafez and Rifaat against Salah Jadid and his chief of intelligence Abdulkarim al-Jundi. Between February 25 and 28, 1969, the Assad brothers launched a military operation in Damascus. Tanks moved in the capital against Jundi and Jadid loyalists. The former committed suicide on March 2, 1969, to avoid arrest. On November 17, 1970, Assad carried out the “comprehensive movement”, arresting Atassi and Jadid. Rifaat was then tasked with securing Damascus.

Rifaat became commander of the Defense Companies, which boasted some 40,000 soldiers and acted almost like an independent army that was not affiliated with the official military. Rifaat rose up the ranks in the party and he expanded his activities among students, the youth and the media.

The second conflict erupted in 1979. It pitted the regime against the Muslim Brotherhood. In December 1979, Rifaat declared it was time to “respond with force” against the movement, calling on everyone to pledge their absolute loyalty. He was quoted as saying: “Stalin sacrificed 10 million people to protect the Bolshevik revolution. Syria must do the same to protect the Baath revolution.” He threatened to wage a “hundred wars, destroy a million forts and sacrifice a million lives” to preserve the state-regime. He let loose in suppressing the uprising between 1979 and 1982. The situation reached its peak when he struck Hama in February 1982.

In 1983, he sent his paratroopers to Damascus with the command to remove the hijab off women on the streets. The move was met with widespread criticism, even his brother openly condemned him.

Edge of danger
When Hafez fell ill in November 1983, it appeared that the moment Rifaat had long awaited had arrived. He began to act as though he were the “legitimate heir”, seeing himself as the only heir. He began to rally the support of his generals, drawing the extreme ire of the president.

Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam recalled the tense situation in his memoirs, which were seen by Asharq Al-Awsat. He said he met with Hafez in March 1978 to address the extreme campaign against Rifaat among the Syrians. “This campaign weakens the regime,” Khaddam told Hafez. “You must address the situation with Rifaat.”

Indeed, Rifaat was meddling in the affairs of state and ordering around Prime Minster Mohammed Ali Halabi, who did not dare speak out.

Khaddam added: “The president wanted his brother to succeed him, but Rifaat committed a major sin when he tried to revolt against him when he had fallen ill in November 1983.”

He recalled that Hafez had at one point in 1980 told him that he wanted to appoint a vice president for the sake of “continuity, because no one knows when their time will come.” Khaddam, who was foreign minister at the time, understood that he was referring to Rifaat. His attempted coup, however, made his brother change his mind.

Remembering the failed coup, Khaddam said that when Hafez fell ill in November 1983, commander of the republican guard, Adnan Makhlouf, informed him that the president wanted to see him at hospital. “I believed that he was a victim of an assassination attempt,” said Khaddam. “I asked: ‘Was he shot or targeted by a bomb?’ to which Makhlouf replied: ‘He was struck by a heart attack.’ I headed to the hospital immediately.”

The next day, Lebanese President Amin Gemayel was scheduled to visit Syria. Hafez asked Khaddam to postpone the visit and to cite “his preoccupation with internal matters”. When Hafez left the ICU, Khaddam contacted army commander Hikmat al-Shihabi and asked him to come to the hospital. “We agreed to take measures that would avert attempts to blow up the situation in Syria, because I was fearful of Rifaat.”

Khaddam recalled how at one point he was on the phone with the Syrian ambassador to London to request that a doctor be flown over immediately. He demanded that the best doctor be sent to Syria. He had made a similar request to the envoy in Washington. Rifaat walked in at that moment and asked why should doctors be brought from abroad? Syria has doctors, he declared. Should doctors be brought in from abroad whenever anyone falls ill? Khaddam replied: “Your brother is called Hafez al-Assad, not Hafez Khaddam. It is my responsibility to provide all conditions for his recovery because I know what sort of chaos will happen if he is gone.”

Later, Khaddam said the American ambassador revealed to him that an American envoy was coming to Damascus to meet with Rifaat. He responded: “We won’t allow him to come. Syria has a state. If the United States wanted to contact us, then it should do so through the state that I represent as foreign minister.”

The next day, the Defense Companies paraded through the streets of Damascus and Rifaat declared to the people: “I am coming.” Soon after, Khaddam met with the military, Shihabi and Defense Minister Mustafa Tlass. “We agreed to bring in two units from outside Damascus. They surrounded the city and the situation became tense. When senior officers who had pledged allegiance to Rifaat found out that Hafez was out of danger, they abandoned his brother. Rifaat became isolated.”

Tense meeting
At the time, the Central Command held a meeting. Everyone was shocked at the large numbers of Defense Companies members. Addressing the meeting, Rifaat said: “The Central Command must expel from the party Ali Duba (chief of military intelligence), Ibrahim Safi (commander of Syrian forces in Lebanon), Ali Haidar (commander of the special forces) and Mohammed Khawli (director of air force intelligence) because they are insulting me. I am the brother of the president. I should be treated like the president. If you don’t take a decision, then my forces will immediately occupy Damascus.”

Some of the members of the Central Command appeared hesitant. General Mustafa then addressed the gatherers: “These are your brothers. The problem can be solved if you meet together.” Khaddam then interjected, addressing Rifaat, he said: “You want to launch a coup? Go ahead. If every officer with a tank and soldiers wants to ride on our shoulders, then that is a dangerous thing. You have the tanks. Go ahead, make your move.” Rifaat was gradually becoming angrier. “I never said such a thing,” he retorted. Khaddam replied knowingly: “The discussion was recorded.”

After the meeting, Khaddam contacted Hafez to inform him of what happened. The president said he will check with Zuhair Masharqa, who was a member of the Central Command. Minutes later, Hafez told Khaddam that Masharqa had informed him that Rifaat did not make any threatening remarks. Khaddam told Hafez to check with the minister of defense and commander of the army because Masharqa was loyal to Rifaat. After around a quarter of an hour, Hafez contacted Khaddam again. “What you said was right. Zuhair is a coward and he lied to me,” said Hafez.

‘I am the regime’
In February 1984, Hafez carried out his retaliation. He ordered the arrest of Salim Barakat, Rifaat’s security aide. He also sent a message through their other brother, Jamil, to Rifaat, saying: “I am your older brother, whom you must obey. Do not forget that I am the one who made you.”

In March 1984, Hafez appointed Rifaat as vice president but with no official duties. In fact, this was not a form of promotion, but an attempt to curb Rifaat’s power through appointing him to a purely political role, one that would be under the constant watchful eye of the president. His security duties, as commander of the Defense Companies, were referred to Mohammed Ghanem.

Khaddam recalled how Rifaat’s appointment was announced. He said Hafez called the Central Command to meet in early March 1984. He informed the leadership that he had decided to appoint three vice presidents. He said he alone has the right to make such an order and name the officials, who were Rifaat Assad, Zuhair Masharqa and Abdul Halim Khaddam.

“I immediately told him that I didn’t want to be vice president or serve in any government or party position,” said Khaddam. “Hafez ended the meeting and then called me to his office. He asked me: ‘Why did you object?’ I replied: ‘How can you put Rifaat and Zuhair above me? Rifaat should be in jail, not act as first deputy to the president. I have worked tirelessly to serve my country. I will not practice any state or partisan work.’ He told: ‘Then take over the position of secretary of the Central Command.’ I rejected his offer and went home.”

“After about an hour, he called me back to his office. He welcomed me back with a laugh: ‘You are stubborn.’ He informed me that he issued a decree naming me as first vice president, followed by Rifaat and then Zuhair. I asked him what a vice president does. He replied that he is in charge of foreign policy. Soon after the decree was announced and I accepted.”

On March 30, 1984, Rifaat responded to the move. His soldiers entered Damascus with clear orders to seize power. They took over strategic positions throughout the capital and its surroundings. Rifaat’s forces clashes with Hafezloyalists, such as Ali Haidar of the special forces and Adnan Makhlouf of the republican guard.

Patrick Seale, author of Assad’s biography, “Assad: The Struggle for the Middle East,” wrote that had the two sides struck each other in the capital, the destruction would have been massive and the image of the regime would have been irreparably damaged. Hafez left the noose dangling enough for Rifaat to hang himself.

Hafez was in full military uniform, accompanied by his oldest son Bassel, who was to become his father’s right-hand man until his death in a car accident in 1994.

Hafez drove his car alone without any guards to confront Rifaat at the headquarters of his military command. Defense Minister Mustafa Tlass recalled the developments in a book, “Three months that shook Syria”. “Adnan Makhlouf, commander of the republican guard, informed me that Mr. president has headed alone to his brother’s headquarters in Mazzeh. He said the president had told him that if he was not back in an hour, then Tlass must carry out the plan (of confronting Rifaat’s forces),” wrote Tlass.

“Do you want to overthrow the regime?” Hafez asked Rifaat. “Here I am. I am the regime!” They argued and then Hafez offered Rifaat a way out, vowing to respect his dignity and interests and provide him with a safe exit to exile of his choosing. He promised that he would not arrest him.

In late April 1984, Rifaat sensed that the balance of power had started to lean in his brother’s favor to an extent that he could no longer move. He contacted his brother Jamil so that he could mediate a reconciliation and to say that he was ready to do anything the president wanted. Hafez was impatiently waiting for Rifaat to collapse and resign himself to the authority. He won the waiting game. Then the difficult negotiations began.

They agreed that the Defense Companies would come under the authority of the operations command in the armed forces. Rifaat would remain as vice president tasked with security affairs. They agreed that senior officers would travel with him to Moscow. On May 28, 1984, a plane carrying Rifaat and his senior officers flew to Moscow to cool down. They were summoned one by one back to Syria and Rifaat alone remained in exile.

‘My brother doesn’t love me’
It was said that prior to leaving Syria, Rifaat had thrown a huge banquet for his friends. “It appears as though my brother no longer loves me. When he sees me, he frowns. I am not an American agent. I did not conspire against my country,” he told them. “If I were a fool, I would have destroyed the entire city, but I love this place. My men have been here for 18 years, the people are used to us and they love us. Now the commandos want to kick us out.”

Rifaat returned to Syria in 1992 at the wishes of his mother, who died later that year. In 1994, he extended his condolences to Hafez when his son Bassel died. Later that year, he was discharged from his position in the army and kept his post as vice president before later being relieved of his duties.

In 1999, his supporters clashed in a gunfight with government forces in Latakia. He set up a satellite channel in London in September 1997. He established his own party in Europe that is headed by his son, Sumer. The party had called for political change and was met with criticism by loyalists and the opposition.

When Hafez died on June 10, 2000, he issued a statement to elegize him. He claimed to be his heir, but his calls fell on deaf ears. Khaddam ordered Rifaat’s arrest should he attempt to attend his brother’s funeral.

After the eruption of the 2011 protests in Syria, Rifaat stood against the regime. His son, Ribal, is openly involved in politics. Rifaat’s presence in the media gradually faded. He appeared during the presidential elections this year when he voted for his nephew at the Syrian consulate in Paris. He then sent a cable of congratulation to Bashar on his reelection. On Thursday, he returned to Syria.



How Have US Presidents Tapped Strategic Petroleum Reserves During War?

GILLETT, TEXAS - MARCH 11: Pump jacks operate in a field on March 11, 2026 in Gillett, Texas. Brandon Bell/Getty Images/AFP
GILLETT, TEXAS - MARCH 11: Pump jacks operate in a field on March 11, 2026 in Gillett, Texas. Brandon Bell/Getty Images/AFP
TT

How Have US Presidents Tapped Strategic Petroleum Reserves During War?

GILLETT, TEXAS - MARCH 11: Pump jacks operate in a field on March 11, 2026 in Gillett, Texas. Brandon Bell/Getty Images/AFP
GILLETT, TEXAS - MARCH 11: Pump jacks operate in a field on March 11, 2026 in Gillett, Texas. Brandon Bell/Getty Images/AFP

The US plans to release 172 million barrels of oil from its Strategic Petroleum Reserve, more than 40% of a wider release coordinated with allies, to help dampen prices spiked by supply disruptions from the US-Israeli war on Iran.

The US sale, announced late on Wednesday, is part of a 400-million-barrel release by members of the International Energy Agency. The US Department of Energy said the US drawdown would begin next week and take about four months.

The SPR currently holds about 415 million barrels, most of which is high sulfur, or sour ‌crude, that US ‌refineries are geared to process. The crude is ‌held ⁠underground in hollowed-out salt ⁠caverns on the coasts of Texas and Louisiana that can store 714 million barrels.

Here is how US presidents have tapped the SPR in times of war:

RUSSIA INVADES UKRAINE

In March 2022, the month after Russia invaded Ukraine, former President Joe Biden ordered the release of 180 million barrels over six months - the largest sale ever from the emergency stash. Biden, ⁠and later President Donald Trump, slowly bought some oil ‌to replenish the reserves, but little ‌has been added back as Congress needs to provide more money to ‌do so.

LIBYA CIVIL WAR

In ⁠June 2011, former ⁠President Barack Obama ordered the release of 30 million barrels of oil from the reserve to offset disruptions to global markets from civil war in oil producer Libya. That sale was coordinated with the Paris-based IEA, resulting in an additional 30-million-barrel release from other member countries.

OPERATION DESERT STORM

In 1990-1991, after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, former President George H. W. Bush sold about 21 million barrels in two phases. In October 1990, the US ordered a 3.9-million-barrel test sale. In January 1991, after US and allied warplanes began attacks against Baghdad and other military targets in OPEC-member Iraq as part of Operation Desert Storm, Bush ordered the sale of 34 million barrels, of which half was sold.


How Trump and his Advisers Miscalculated Iran’s Response to War

Karoline Leavitt, the White House press secretary, said the administration “had a strong game plan” before the war broke out. Doug Mills/The New York Times
Karoline Leavitt, the White House press secretary, said the administration “had a strong game plan” before the war broke out. Doug Mills/The New York Times
TT

How Trump and his Advisers Miscalculated Iran’s Response to War

Karoline Leavitt, the White House press secretary, said the administration “had a strong game plan” before the war broke out. Doug Mills/The New York Times
Karoline Leavitt, the White House press secretary, said the administration “had a strong game plan” before the war broke out. Doug Mills/The New York Times

By Mark Mazzetti, Tyler Pager, Edward Wong

On Feb. 18, as President Trump weighed whether to launch military attacks on Iran, Chris Wright, the energy secretary, told an interviewer he was not concerned that the looming war might disrupt oil supplies in the Middle East and wreak havoc in energy markets.

Even during the Israeli and US strikes against Iran last June, Wright said, there had been little disruption in the markets. “Oil prices blipped up and then went back down,” he said.

Some of Trump’s other advisers shared similar views in private, dismissing warnings that — the second time around — Iran might wage economic warfare by closing shipping lanes carrying roughly 20% of the world’s oil supply.

The extent of that miscalculation was laid bare in recent days, as Iran threatened to fire at commercial oil tankers transiting the Strait of Hormuz, the strategic choke point through which all ships must pass on their way out of the Arabian Gulf.

In response to the Iranian threats, commercial shipping has come to a standstill in the Gulf, oil prices have spiked, and the Trump administration has scrambled to find ways to tamp down an economic crisis that has triggered higher gasoline prices for Americans.

The episode is emblematic of how much Trump and his advisers misjudged how Iran would respond to a conflict that the government in Tehran sees as an existential threat.

Iran has responded far more aggressively than it did during last June’s 12-day war, firing barrages of missiles and drones at US military bases, cities in Arab nations across the Middle East, and on Israeli population centers.

US officials have had to adjust plans on the fly, from hastily ordering the evacuation of embassies to developing policy proposals to reduce gas prices.

After Trump administration officials gave a closed-door briefing to lawmakers on Tuesday, Senator Christopher S. Murphy, Democrat of Connecticut, said on social media that the administration had no plan for the Strait of Hormuz and did “not know how to get it safely back open.”

Inside the administration, some officials are growing pessimistic about the lack of a clear strategy to finish the war. But they have been careful not to express that directly to the president, who has repeatedly declared that the military operation is a complete success.

Trump has laid out maximalist goals like insisting that Iran name a leader who will submit to him, while Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth have described narrower and more tactical objectives that could provide an off-ramp in the near term.

Karoline Leavitt, the White House press secretary, said the administration “had a strong game plan” before the war broke out, and vowed that oil prices would drop after it ended.

“The purposeful disruption in the oil market by the Iranian regime is short term, and necessary for the long-term gain of wiping out these terrorists and the threat they pose to America and the world,” she said in a statement.

This article is based on interviews with a dozen US officials, who asked for anonymity to discuss private conversations.

‘Show Some Guts’

Hegseth acknowledged on Tuesday that Iran’s ferocious response against its neighbors caught the Pentagon somewhat off guard. But he insisted that Iran’s actions were backfiring.

“I can’t say that we anticipated necessarily that’s exactly how they would react, but we knew it was a possibility,” Hegseth said at a Pentagon news conference. “I think it was a demonstration of the desperation of the regime.”

Trump has displayed growing frustration over how the war is disrupting the oil supply, telling Fox News that oil tanker crews should “show some guts” and sail through the Strait of Hormuz.

Some military advisers did warn before the war that Iran could launch an aggressive campaign in response, and would view the US-Israeli attack as a threat to its existence. But other advisers remained confident that killing Iran’s senior leadership would lead to more pragmatic leaders taking over who might bring an end to the war.

When Trump was briefed about risks that oil prices could rise in the event of war, he acknowledged the possibility but downplayed it as a short-term concern that should not overshadow the mission to decapitate the Iranian regime. He directed Wright and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent to work on developing options for a potential spike in prices.

But the president did not speak publicly about these options — including political risk insurance backed by the US government, and the potential of US Navy escorts — until more than 48 hours after the conflict started. The escorts have not yet taken place.

As the conflict has roiled global markets, Republicans in Washington have grown concerned about rising oil prices damaging their efforts to sell an economic agenda to voters ahead of the midterm elections.

Trump, both publicly and privately, has been arguing that Venezuelan oil could help solve any shocks coming from the Iran war. The administration announced on Tuesday a new refinery in Texas that officials said could help increase oil supply, ensuring that Iran does not cause any long-term damage to oil markets.

A Potential Off-Ramp

Trump has said both that the war could go on for more than a month and that it was “very complete, pretty much.” He also said the United States would “go forward more determined than ever.”

Rubio and Hegseth, however, appear to have coordinated their messaging for now on three discrete goals that they began laying out in public remarks on Monday and Tuesday.

“The goals of this mission are clear,” Rubio said at a State Department event on Monday before Trump held his own news conference. “It is to destroy the ability of this regime to launch missiles, both by destroying their missiles and their launchers; destroy the factories that make these missiles; and destroy their navy.”

The State Department even laid out the three goals in bullet-point fashion, and highlighted a video clip of Rubio stating them on an official social media account.

The presentation by Rubio, who is also the White House national security adviser, appeared to be setting the stage for the president to bring an end to the war sooner rather than later. In his news conference, Trump boasted of how the US military had already destroyed Iran’s ballistic missile capability and its navy. But he also warned of even more aggressive action if Iranian leaders tried to cut off the world’s energy supply.

Matthew Pottinger, who was a deputy national security adviser in the first Trump administration, said in an interview that Mr. Trump had indicated he could decide to pursue ambitions war goals that would take weeks at least.

“In his press conference, I could hear him circling back to a rationale for fighting a bit longer given that the regime is still signaling it won’t be deterred and is still trying to control the Strait of Hormuz,” said Pottinger, now the chair of the China program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a group that advocates a close US partnership with Israel and confrontation with Iran.

“He doesn’t want to have to fight a ‘sequel’ war,” Pottinger added.

The search for pathways out of the war has gained urgency since the weekend, as global oil prices surge and as the United States burns through costly munitions.

Pentagon officials said in recent closed-door briefings on Capitol Hill that the military used up $5.6 billion of munitions in the first two days of the war alone, according to three congressional officials. That is a far larger amount and munitions burn rate than had been publicly disclosed. The Washington Post reported on the figure on Monday.

Iranian officials have remained defiant, saying they will use their leverage over the world’s oil supply to force the United States and Israel to blink.

“Strait of Hormuz will either be a Strait of peace and prosperity for all,” Ali Larijani, Iran’s top national security official, said in a social media post on Tuesday. “Or it will be a Strait of defeat and suffering for warmongers.”

The New York Times


Saudi Flag Narrative Centers on Justice, Security

Saudi flag’s profound symbolism reflects unity, justice, strength and prosperity (SPA)
Saudi flag’s profound symbolism reflects unity, justice, strength and prosperity (SPA)
TT

Saudi Flag Narrative Centers on Justice, Security

Saudi flag’s profound symbolism reflects unity, justice, strength and prosperity (SPA)
Saudi flag’s profound symbolism reflects unity, justice, strength and prosperity (SPA)

Ensuring a certain level of security is not difficult for any state, regardless of its system of governance. Security, understood here as the preservation of order, can exist under many political systems. History shows that numerous authoritarian governments have succeeded in imposing strict security on their societies.

The real question, however, lies not in the existence of security but in its nature and its source. The issue is whether the desired security is that of authority imposed by force, or that of justice arising from a system of values and a fair legal order.

Security under authoritarian systems is often superficial, enforced through mechanisms of control, surveillance and punishment. It is inherently fragile because it relies on fear rather than consent, and deterrence rather than justice. Such security remains vulnerable to disruption at the first shift in the balance of power or legitimacy, as many historical examples demonstrate.

By contrast, another form of security is more stable and enduring, the security that stems from justice. This emerges when society believes that the rule governing it is fair and that the authority enforcing it is subject to a higher reference rather than an unchecked will.

National flags often reflect a country’s identity, principles and values, as well as the orientation of its political or intellectual systems. They may also contain symbols carrying religious, historical or cultural significance.

The flag of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia stands apart not only for its color and symbols but also for its meanings and implications. It reflects the state’s deep-rooted history, embodies its identity and represents the values and principles on which it was founded.

Saudi Flag Day, observed annually on March 11, highlights the close bond between Saudis and their national banner and reflects their pride in their identity.

Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Salman bin Abdulaziz has said that celebrating Flag Day affirms pride in national identity and in the flag’s historical symbolism and deep meanings that embody the country’s constants and represent a source of pride in its history.

He has also said that the Saudi state was founded by its forefathers on the principles of monotheism, justice and unity under one banner, a foundation that brought security and prosperity.

Saudi researcher and historian Dr. Abdullah Al-Munif said the Saudi flag is not merely a sovereign symbol of the state but also an expression that carries deep significance for the state’s philosophy and vision for life and society.

“The green color, which symbolizes Islam and prosperity, reflects support for a state founded on an Islamic approach with a commitment to justice and to spreading security in its comprehensive sense,” he said.

“The phrase ‘There is no god but God, Muhammad is the Messenger of God’, inscribed in Arabic, highlights the enduring foundation upon which the state stands and affirms its commitment to an approach that does not deviate from this reference as a basic guide for governance and politics.”

He added that the sword, which symbolizes strength and the pursuit of justice, reflects the state’s effort to protect the path it believes is right, with the aim of spreading justice and establishing security across the country.

“These three elements are not merely formal components but form a precise equation linking justice and security in a cause-and-effect relationship,” he said.

“The Islamic approach represents the spiritual and social foundations of the state that seeks to achieve justice and stability, ensure security and provide an environment suitable for promoting what is right.”

In this sense, the Saudi flag becomes a symbol of the dynamic interaction among the components of the state. The state seeks to achieve security as a necessity for establishing and spreading what is right, while also pursuing justice and stability as the basis for comprehensive security and sustainable prosperity.

The Saudi flag can therefore be read historically as more than a sovereign symbol. It symbolizes the state’s vision. The three elements that compose it, the green color, the inscription and the sword, reflect a precise equation between justice and security in a cause-and-effect relationship.

Legal expert Dr. Fahd Al-Tarisi said the phrase at the center of the flag represents the system’s supreme reference.

“It is a clear declaration that the justice on which governance is based is not the product of a temporary political will but rests on a fixed religious reference,” he said.

“The presence of this phrase at the center of the flag therefore means that law and justice derive their source from a higher system of values rather than from political authority alone.”

He added that the sword placed beneath the phrase does not symbolize violence or domination but rather the authority to enforce justice.

“Every legal system needs power to protect it and ensure respect for it, otherwise it remains merely text,” he said. “The sword therefore symbolizes the power that protects the principle, not the power that replaces it.”

He said the placement of the sword beneath the phrase reflects a symbolic order in which power serves justice rather than replacing it.

The green color that fills the flag, historically associated in Islamic culture with calm, stability and reassurance, can symbolize the social security that emerges when justice prevails in political and legal systems.

In this reading, the symbolism of the Saudi flag presents a clear equation: the reference establishes justice, power protects that justice, and from this arises the security and stability of society.

This distinction highlights two types of security: the security of authority, imposed by force and often present in authoritarian systems, and the security of justice, which arises naturally when the rules governing society are fair and enjoy moral and legal legitimacy.

Within this framework, the symbolic structure of the Saudi flag presents a clear vision of the state. Security is not the starting point but the result. The cause that leads to it is justice protected by legitimate power within a stable reference.

In that sense, the flag becomes more than a national emblem. It becomes a visual expression of a philosophy of governance that sees true stability not as something built on fear but as the outcome of justice that produces security.

For Saudis, the flag reflects the needs and aspirations of the Saudi citizen, summarized in the values of justice, stability, security and prosperity.

In celebrating Flag Day, Saudis celebrate a nation that sees its strength in unity, a leadership that places service to its people among its top priorities, and a banner under which people and leadership have stood together for centuries.