The Consequences of ‘Normalization’ with Damascus

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad receives the UAE Foreign Minister (SANA)
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad receives the UAE Foreign Minister (SANA)
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The Consequences of ‘Normalization’ with Damascus

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad receives the UAE Foreign Minister (SANA)
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad receives the UAE Foreign Minister (SANA)

Key Arab countries are expected to take more steps towards the normalization of ties with Syria before re-admitting Damascus into the Arab League by a more significant political initiative next spring when the regional organization holds its scheduled summit in Algeria.

Attention is now directed towards the parties conducting the next steps in normalizing ties with Damascus.

This comes after the visit of UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed to Damascus and his meeting with President Bashar al-Assad last week, Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal Miqdad meeting with a number of his counterparts in New York two months ago, and the head of Syria’s main spy agency, the General Intelligence Directorate, Maj. Gen. Hossam Louka, participating at an intelligence forum in Cairo a few days ago.

In the past few days, a series of public and non-public meetings were held between Arab and foreign officials to discuss the Syrian crisis and to coordinate between the involved parties “so that normalization would not come for free.”

Several ideas were put on the table of main Arab countries.

As for these states, they have taken the “first step” with Damascus, and therefore are waiting for “reciprocal steps” on Syria’s part before the normalization train goes to its next stations.

Individual or collective Arab expectations relate to three levels:

The first level pertains to Syrian files, such as Damascus positively handling the political process and the meetings of the Constitutional Committee.

The seventh round of Committee meetings led by Special Envoy for Syria Geir Pedersen is currently under consideration by the UN to be held on December 13. Talks will tackle the return of refugees, detainees, and displaced persons, and finally the implementation of Resolution 2254.

The second level revolves around geopolitical expectations regarding the Iranian presence in Syria, the Turkish incursion into its north, and the possibilities of opening channels between Tel Aviv and Damascus.

Demands are no longer focused on removing Iran completely from Syria.

Rather, expectations revolve around mitigating, redefining, or dissolving the Iranian role, in addition to lowering Syria’s provision of logistical-military-training support to Iran in other files related to Arab countries.

As for the third level, it concerns Damascus’ cooperation in the areas of combating terrorism and crime, controlling the borders with Jordan, and stopping drug smuggling to Arab countries, whether from Jordan’s borders or from Syrian and Lebanese ports.

It also concerns not having more refugees pouring into neighboring countries.

Washington has not prevented Arab countries from normalizing ties with Damascus. Instead, the US is asking these countries to obtain internal or geopolitical “Syrian concessions” while reminding them of sanctions under the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act.

Washington, at the same time, informed European countries of the need to maintain the “three no’s”: No to financing the reconstruction of Syria, no to breaking isolation, and no to lifting sanctions before achieving progress in the political process according to UNSC resolution 2254.

Indeed, countries are still committed to their positions and have sanctioned new Syrian ministers.

However, a number of European countries began to ask questions about the future of European policies towards Syria, which are confused between three directions: the urgency of Arab countries to normalize ties with Damascus, and the great doubts, especially from France and Germany, about the feasibility of engaging with Russia, which increases pressure on Europe with the “weapon of refugees” in Belarus, and American advice about the need to commit to traditional policy with Syria.

Doses of Arab normalization renewed the call for the need of reaching an international-Arab formula for a “step-for-step” approach that defines what is required of Damascus and the incentives offered to it, but a collective understanding on this has not yet emerged.



Report: Israel Hit Syrian Bases Scoped by Türkiye, Hinting at Regional Showdown

 Debris is scattered at the site of an Israeli strike on a military airbase near Hama, Syria, Thursday, April 3, 2025. (AP)
Debris is scattered at the site of an Israeli strike on a military airbase near Hama, Syria, Thursday, April 3, 2025. (AP)
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Report: Israel Hit Syrian Bases Scoped by Türkiye, Hinting at Regional Showdown

 Debris is scattered at the site of an Israeli strike on a military airbase near Hama, Syria, Thursday, April 3, 2025. (AP)
Debris is scattered at the site of an Israeli strike on a military airbase near Hama, Syria, Thursday, April 3, 2025. (AP)

Türkiye scoped out at least three air bases in Syria where it could deploy forces as part of a planned joint defense pact before Israel hit the sites with air strikes this week, four people familiar with the matter told Reuters.

The bombardment signals the risks of a deepening rift between two powerful regional militaries over Syria, where opposition factions have installed a new government after toppling former leader Bashar al-Assad in December.

The Israeli strikes on the three sites Türkiye was assessing, including a heavy barrage on Wednesday night, came despite Ankara's efforts to reassure Washington that a deeper military presence in Syria was not intended to threaten Israel.

The factions replacing Assad have alarmed Israel, which is wary of their presence on its border and has lobbied the United States to curb Türkiye’s growing influence in the country.

Ankara, a longtime backer of opposition to Assad, is positioning to play a major role in the remade Syria, including with a possible joint defense pact that could see new Turkish bases in central Syria and use of Syria's airspace.

In preparation, Turkish military teams in recent weeks visited the T4 and Palmyra air bases in Syria's Homs province and the main airport in Hama province, according to a regional intelligence official, two Syrian military sources and another Syrian source familiar with the matter.

The sources spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss the visits, which have not been previously reported.

Turkish teams evaluated the state of the runways, hangars and other infrastructure at the bases, the regional intelligence official said.

Another planned visit to T4 and Palmyra on March 25 was cancelled after Israel struck both bases just hours beforehand, according to the regional intelligence official and the two Syrian military sources.

Strikes at T4 "destroyed the runway, tower, hangars and the planes that were grounded. It was a tough message that Israel won't accept the expanded Turkish presence," said the intelligence official, who reviewed photographs of the damage.

"T4 is totally unusable now," said a fourth Syrian source, who is close to Türkiye.

When asked about the visits, a Turkish defense ministry official said: "Reports and posts regarding developments in Syria - whether real or alleged - that do not originate from official authorities should not be taken into consideration, as they lack credibility and may be misleading."

A spokesperson for Syria's defense ministry declined to comment.

Türkiye’s foreign ministry on Thursday called Israel "the greatest threat to regional security". On Friday, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan told Reuters Türkiye wanted no confrontation with Israel in Syria.

HEAVY STRIKES

In the four months since Assad was toppled, Israel has seized ground in southwest Syria, made overtures to the Druze minority, and struck much of the Syrian military's heavy weapons and equipment. Wednesday's strikes were some of the most intense yet.

Syria's foreign ministry said Israel struck five separate areas within a 30-minute window, resulting in the near-total destruction of the Hama base and wounding dozens of civilians and soldiers.

Israel said it hit the T4 air base and other military capabilities at air bases in Hama and Homs provinces, as well as military infrastructure in the Damascus area.

Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz called the air strikes a warning that "we will not allow the security of the State of Israel to be harmed". Foreign Minister Gideon Saar accused Ankara of seeking a "Turkish protectorate" in Syria.

Noa Lazimi, a specialist in Middle East politics at Bar-Ilan University, said Israel was concerned that Türkiye could establish Russian anti-aircraft systems and drones at T4.

"The base would enable Türkiye to establish air superiority in this area, and this poses a serious concern for Israel because it undermines its operational freedom in the region," she said.

'IDEOLOGICAL COLLISION COURSE'

Türkiye has tried to reassure the US that it wants to work towards a stable Syria.

Foreign Minister Fidan told US officials in Washington last month that Syrian interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa would not pose a threat to neighbors, according to a senior regional diplomat close to Türkiye and a source in Washington briefed on the meetings.

Fidan and other Turkish officials had earlier told Sharaa that Ankara was carefully calibrating its moves towards a defense pact so as not to irk Washington, one of the Syrian military sources said.

" Türkiye, not Israel, would pay the highest price among regional states were there to be failure or destabilization in Syria, including with refugees and security," an official in Türkiye’s ruling AK Party told Reuters.

Soner Cagaptay, director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute think tank, said Türkiye and Israel were on an "ideological collision course" but could avoid military escalation through mediation with Washington.