I don’t think it is difficult to predict the response to the paper submitted by Kuwaiti Foreign Minister, Sheikh Ahmed Nasser Al-Mohammed Al Sabah, to the Lebanese officials, regarding confidence-building measures to end the crisis with the Gulf.
Whoever deals with the intra-Lebanese crisis can anticipate the answer and the method in which it will be formulated, especially when it comes to the file of terrorist Hezbollah and its weapons, as well as the implementation of the “disassociation” policy.
According to information, the document presented by the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister to the Lebanese includes, for example, setting a time frame for the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions, including UNSCR 1559, which calls for the disarmament of the outlawed factions, i.e., Hezbollah.
Here, we are already aware of the Lebanese response, as Reuters quoted Lebanon’s Foreign Minister Abdallah Bouhabib as saying: “I am not going to end Hezbollah’s existence, it is out of the question in Lebanon. We are going for dialogue.”
In fact, we don’t need sources to know the response. The Lebanese minister had previously said in an audio tape broadcast by Okaz newspaper that the Americans were “pressing hard during the Trump era, with Secretary of State Pompeo, and asking us to get rid of (Hezbollah).”
He continued: “How can we get that done? I told them once. If you send us 100,000 Marines, rid us of Hezbollah and want to celebrate, then the champagne is on us.”
Therefore, it is clear that Lebanon is unable to disarm Hezbollah, and is not even willing to engage in the battle to enclose the party politically. In fact, some of Lebanon’s politicians, no matter how distressed they may seem, contributed to empowering Hezbollah at the political level.
Regarding the implementation of the “disassociation” policy, Reuters quoted sources familiar with the draft response that Lebanon would not be “a launchpad for activities that violate Arab countries”, and that it was committed “verbally and actually” to a policy of dissociation from regional conflicts.
This is not feasible because of the hegemony of Hezbollah’s weapons. Who among the Lebanese can stop the terrorist party from interfering in the Syrian crisis? Or prevent it from meddling with Yemeni affairs? Who will prevent the party from smuggling drugs while it controls the Lebanese ports?
The truth is that the Lebanese response will be a continuation of the “circumvention” approach that has taken the country to this major crisis. No Lebanese government will be able to confront the terrorist Hezbollah as long as it sticks to this prevailing method.
This analysis does not mean that the Gulf States are wasting their time. Instead, with all wisdom, they are building a Gulf, Arab and international stance against the terrorist Hezbollah, and proving that Lebanese politicians are not serious about resolving their crisis.
Even if it takes a long time to shape a real position against those who caused the crisis in Lebanon, the moment of truth is coming, especially as we are witnessing sharp political turning points in the region, represented by the Vienna negotiations, the serious developments on the ground in Yemen, and more.
As for the Lebanese politicians, they will inevitably become victims of their own policies, just as Lebanon has fallen as their prey.
