Stung by Prison Battle, Kurds Say They Need Help against ISIS

Civilians return to the city after fighting subsideds in Hassakeh, Syria, Sunday, Jan. 30, 2022. (AP Photo/Baderkhan Ahmad)
Civilians return to the city after fighting subsideds in Hassakeh, Syria, Sunday, Jan. 30, 2022. (AP Photo/Baderkhan Ahmad)
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Stung by Prison Battle, Kurds Say They Need Help against ISIS

Civilians return to the city after fighting subsideds in Hassakeh, Syria, Sunday, Jan. 30, 2022. (AP Photo/Baderkhan Ahmad)
Civilians return to the city after fighting subsideds in Hassakeh, Syria, Sunday, Jan. 30, 2022. (AP Photo/Baderkhan Ahmad)

Weeks after the long, furious battle with militants from the ISIS group over a prison in northeastern Syria, the mangled wreckage of a car used by suicide bombers still sat outside its perimeter. Cranes put in place new cement blast walls to close off the entrance.

Gaping holes remained in the prison’s outer wall, an ominous reminder of the ISIS inmates who escaped during the fighting.

The battle for Gweiran Prison is over; it took 10 days, but US-backed, Syrian Kurdish-led forces finally defeated the militants who attacked the facility in the city of Hasakeh, aiming to break free their comrades jailed inside, in the group’s largest and most stunning operation in years.

But the impact continues to reverberate. Residents in neighboring districts are locked down as Kurdish fighters hunt for fugitive militants hiding among them.

“Ask everyone here, they will tell you the same: We are terrified,” said Muna Farid, a mother of five who lives in the Gweiran neighborhood, which gives the prison its name — echoing the worries of dozens of residents over hidden ISIS milutants.

The region’s Kurdish administrators say the attack shows what they have long been saying: They are not getting enough help to face ISIS as it regains strength.

The Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces say the Jan. 20 prison attack was not a surprise to them. Local intelligence sources had been showing a growing number of ISIS sleeper cells in the area. But they say they were hampered in acting because of multiple pressures, including conflicts with Turkey, insufficient international help and Syria’s economic crisis.

“The main reason that ISIS sleeper cells got enhanced and strong is because of international silence and weak support (for SDF) to stand against terrorism,” said Haval Qortay, head of the commando unit that fought ISIS at the prison, using his nom de guerre. “We are relying on resources that are not enough to fight.”

ISIS suffered a blow with the US raid Thursday in northwest Syria that killed the group’s leader, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi. But it is unlikely to derail the group’s persistent insurgency in Iraq and Syria since its command became much more decentralized after the group’s territorial defeat two years ago.

“For some time now ISIS top leadership have been providing broad, strategic guidance to the global organization, but not day-to-day command and control,” said Dareen Khalifa, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group. “ISIS’s various elements will continue implementing their local insurgencies until the new successor is named.”

Since ISIS lost its last hold on any territory in 2019, its militants have gone underground in cells that have been carrying out low-level hit-and-run attacks in Syria and Iraq, mainly targeting security forces. Those attacks have been growing, raising fears the group is gaining momentum.

In northeast Syria, governed by a Kurdish-dominated administration, the SDF has been the main force trying to suppress ISIS, with the backing of several hundred US troops.

At the same time, the SDF has to watch over some 10,000 captured ISIS militants in around two dozen detention facilities — including 2,000 foreigners whose home countries have refused to repatriate them. It also oversees some 62,000 family members of ISIS militants, mostly women and children in al-Hol camp. Many of those family members remain die-hard ISIS supporters, and the camp has seen bouts of militant violence.

Khalifa said the SDF has done a “remarkable job” in fighting ISIS and in stabilizing the areas it captured from the group during the long campaign that brought down the “caliphate.”

But she said it is also hampered on multiple fronts. Particularly, its frequent clashes with Turkey, which views the Kurdish faction running eastern Syria as a terrorist group, undermine the anti-ISIS fight. Also, many Arab residents of the region don’t trust that the SDF will remain, fearing the Americans will pull out or the Damascus government will regain control of the area — so they are reluctant to endanger themselves by providing intelligence against militants.

Gweiran Prison, the biggest of the SDF-run prisons, was set up in a school campus, underscoring how the SDF has had to cobble together detention centers for the militants.

On Jan. 20, around 200 militants attacked the prison, in coordination with a riot by inmates inside. The attackers broke in, freed some prisoners, took guards hostage, and held out against SDF fighters for days, even as aircraft from the US-led coalition struck their positions repeatedly.

At least 121 SDF fighters and prison guards and more than 380 militants were killed before the SDF finally restored full control.

The commando chief Qortay said the SDF had long been aware the prison would be an ISIS target and had been receiving intelligence of a growing number of ISIS sleeper cells in the area. Some militants seamlessly pass for civilians at checkpoints, he said. Others move into towns, rent apartments and maintain a low profile.

When the attack erupted, Qortay’s units formed a belt around the prison and the nearby residential neighborhoods. During the fighting, some ISIS members hid in civilian homes, slowing the SDF as it tried to avoid civilian casualties, Qortay said.

Now the prison is fully under SDF control, he said, but he expects more attacks. Militants remain hidden, literally, across the street. SDF troops are still conducting raids to find sleeper cells, relying on intelligence from residents.

One resident of Gweiran neighborhood told The Associated Press how he informs the local authorities whenever he sees a stranger on his street. He has told them of at least eight since the prison break, including one hiding in a water tank.

“I know everyone in this area, if I see a new face I report them directly,” he said. The AP is not identifying him for his safety.

But residents are also angered by the SDF’s clampdown on three neighborhoods near the prison. With guns slung, SDF soldiers at the districts’ entrances forbid locals from leaving until their areas are cleared of militants.

Supplies are allowed in, but residents say it’s not enough. Dozens complained of shortages in food and drinking water. Mothers said they didn’t have enough milk for their babies or food to feed their families.

Fatma al-Khodr sat on the steps outside her home on the phone, begging a neighbor for any leftover bread.

“We are the ones who are suffering the most after this attack. ... We fear ISIS, but we also need water,” she said.

The militants’ ability to carry out such a major attack even amid intelligence warnings was a stinging blow to the SDF. The force is hoping it will show world powers that it needs more support, after long complaining it is left largely on its own to prevent the group’s revival in Syria.

On a recent day, the clouds hung low at a funeral for 23 of the SDF soldiers killed in the prison battle. Thousands came to pay their respects. Among them, Ibrahim Ismail, a merchant from the area.

“Their deaths were a shock to us all,” he said.

Then the crowd fell silent in remembrance. Portraits of the dead were held high as coffins draped in the region’s Kurdish colors passed along the sea of human bodies.



Ghalibaf: Ambitious ‘Public Face’ of Post-Ali Khamenei Iran

Iran’s Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf (R) meets with Pakistan’s Army Chief Syed Asim Munir in Tehran, Iran, May 23, 2026. (AFP)
Iran’s Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf (R) meets with Pakistan’s Army Chief Syed Asim Munir in Tehran, Iran, May 23, 2026. (AFP)
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Ghalibaf: Ambitious ‘Public Face’ of Post-Ali Khamenei Iran

Iran’s Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf (R) meets with Pakistan’s Army Chief Syed Asim Munir in Tehran, Iran, May 23, 2026. (AFP)
Iran’s Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf (R) meets with Pakistan’s Army Chief Syed Asim Munir in Tehran, Iran, May 23, 2026. (AFP)

Iranian parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf has emerged as the key negotiator and one of the most high-profile figures in the epublic's leadership as it enters a new phase after the US-Israeli war.

A pillar of the Iranian establishment for some three decades and one of its most prominent non-clerical figures, Ghalibaf, 64, had spearheaded the war effort and led the high-stakes negotiating process that culminated with an agreement announced Monday to halt the hostilities.

Ghalibaf survived more than five weeks of US-Israeli attacks on Iran that killed supreme leader Ali Khamenei, top security official Ali Larijani and a host of other key figures.

He came into public view for the first time in weeks in April to lead the Iranian delegation in talks in Islamabad with the United States, meeting Vice President JD Vance, the highest-level contact between the two foes since before the 1979 revolution.

An image published on social media by Iranian embassies abroad put Ghalibaf center stage in the Iranian negotiating team, looking animated and gesturing with his hand, as Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi busied himself with teacups.

The workings of the Iranian leadership without Khamenei, who dominated it for nearly four decades, remain unclear.

Khamenei's son Mojtaba was named as his successor but has yet to appear publicly after he was reportedly wounded in an airstrike.

"Following Larijani's assassination, Ghalibaf has emerged as the new public face of the regime's war effort and diplomacy," said Farzan Sabet, a managing researcher at the Geneva Graduate Institute.

"But we shouldn't overstate the extent to which he's in the driver's seat: He still answers to higher powers in Tehran," he added.

These include Mojtaba Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guards, the ideological arm of Iran's military, where Ghalibaf was a key figure as aerospace forces commander, Sabet said.

- 'Professional bargainer' -

While the trip to Islamabad was Ghalibaf's first appearance in public since before the war, he has kept a high profile online with almost daily social media posts, mixing commentary on recent developments and the negotiations with threats of harsh retaliation should the fighting resume.

His posts on X in idiomatic American English have garnered wide attention and raised questions over who is actually writing them, given Ghalibaf is not known to be a fluent English speaker.

Referring to threats of a ground invasion, a post on Ghalibaf's X account said on April 1: "You come for our home... you're gonna meet the whole family. Locked, loaded and standing tall. Bring it on."

The IranWire news site has said the posts appeared to have been written by a former adviser based in the United States, but this has not been confirmed.

While the Islamabad talks failed, The Washington Post reported that Ghalibaf left a striking impression on the US delegation after years when Washington never dealt directly with key Iranian decision makers.

Ghalibaf "impressed the American team as a refined and professional bargainer -- and potential leader of a new Iran", said the Post.

In a sign of his expanding sway, he was appointed in May to oversee Iran's vital relationship with China, the biggest buyer of Iranian oil.

- 'Ambitious and opportunistic' -

Ghalibaf's varied experience, which spans military and civilian life, has seen him work as a commander in the Revolutionary Guards, Tehran police chief, Tehran mayor and now speaker of parliament.

It is unclear if he is fully trusted by the new hardline hierarchy of the Guards.

Known to be fiercely ambitious, he has stood for the Iranian presidency on multiple occasions but has never been successful, most notably in 2005 when ultra-conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, little-known at the time, took the job.

A qualified pilot, Ghalibaf is known for boasting that he is able to captain jumbo jets.

Human rights groups have accused Ghalibaf, in his various functions, of playing a key role in suppressing protests, from the 1999 student demonstrations to the 2009 Green movement that erupted after a disputed election, right up to the nationwide protests that peaked in January 2026, just before the latest war.

"As a politician, he's shown himself to be ambitious and opportunistic, but also cautious, a trait that has helped him advance his career to the top of the country's power structure without getting purged like so many others have been," said Sabet.


What to Know About the US-Iran Peace Deal

A US Air Force F-16 fighter jet patrols the skies above the Middle East as American forces maintain regional presence and vigilance (CENTCOM)
A US Air Force F-16 fighter jet patrols the skies above the Middle East as American forces maintain regional presence and vigilance (CENTCOM)
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What to Know About the US-Iran Peace Deal

A US Air Force F-16 fighter jet patrols the skies above the Middle East as American forces maintain regional presence and vigilance (CENTCOM)
A US Air Force F-16 fighter jet patrols the skies above the Middle East as American forces maintain regional presence and vigilance (CENTCOM)

Washington: The New York Times

The United States and Iran said they were close to reaching a deal toward ending the war that has upended the Middle East for more than three months and disrupted the global economy.

Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, has said that an agreement had “never been closer.”

US officials signaled on Friday that a potential framework deal could be signed within days.

According to two Iranian officials and one regional official briefed on the terms of the agreement, Tehran and Washington have agreed to a preliminary deal that would end the fighting, reopen the crucial Strait of Hormuz and lift the US naval blockade on Iranian ports.

Both the US and Iran have sought to frame the emerging deal as a diplomatic victory.

Yet the agreement appears to push many of the thorniest issues to a 60-day negotiation period, including Iran’s nuclear program, about which major differences remain and both sides have so far held firm to longstanding red lines.

A deal would cap a week of diplomatic talks punctuated by airstrikes and Israel’s ongoing campaign in southern Lebanon.

What’s in the deal?

The two Iranian officials and one regional official briefed on the terms of the agreement gave a broad outline of the agreement. The United States has not confirmed these details:
Iran would open the Strait of Hormuz for the passage of ships and the United States would lift the naval blockade on Iran’s ports in the Arabian Gulf.

Iran and the United States would start negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program. The negotiations would last a maximum of 60 days and the war would stop on all fronts, including Lebanon, for that period.

During the 60-day negotiation period, Iran and countries in the region would discuss the future management of the strait.

The two Iranian officials said the next phase of talks would include discussion of the lifting of American sanctions, including on Iran’s oil sales and international banking transactions, in exchange for concessions on the Iranian nuclear program.

Speaking on state television Friday, Araghchi said there would be a two-part agreement to end the war: The first would be the signing of a memorandum of understanding between Tehran and Washington, and the second would be for a lasting peace deal. “The nuclear issue has been left for the second round and a final agreement,” Araghchi said.

Araghchi added that the Strait of Hormuz would reopen as part of the initial agreement between the US and Iran, but the economically vital waterway would not return to its prewar status.

He told Iranian state television that all commercial ships would be guaranteed safe passage, but said Tehran would maintain its control of the passage and would eventually charge a “service fee” for vessels passing through, an arrangement the Trump administration had previously warned against.

Framework for Nuclear Talks

According to US officials and diplomats, there are four major points of negotiation on a nuclear agreement between the United States and Iran:

1. A lengthy suspension of uranium enrichment
The United States has demanded for months that Iran agree to conduct no uranium enrichment for at least 20 years. The Iranians have countered by offering a 10-year halt, but American officials believe Tehran would settle for 15 years.

2. Iran’s current stockpile of enriched uranium is diluted, or “downblended”
The United States would work with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN inspection body, to dilute or “downblend” Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium, according to two US officials familiar with the negotiations. American officials envision an active role in handling the nuclear material. Iranian officials say the United States would serve only as an observer.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio has said repeatedly in recent weeks that any agreement would have to cover all 11 tons of enriched uranium in Iran’s possession, not just the half-ton of near-bomb-grade fuel.

The Iranians have not talked publicly about whether they are willing to give up their entire existing stockpile. But if it was downblended, rather than shipped outside the country, Iran’s leaders could say they still have possession of the fuel.

3. Iran dismantles its nuclear sites
The United States has demanded that Iran dismantle its three major nuclear sites at Natanz, Fordo and Isfahan. The United States struck all three nearly a year ago, severely damaging them.

Iran has discussed dismantling two facilities but insists on leaving one open, in part to demonstrate it has not surrendered what it views as a “right to enrich.” That could prove problematic: Critics of the Obama-era nuclear agreement with Iran focused on its failure to close down Fordo, a deep underground site, which the Iranians later revived to produce near-bomb-grade fuel.

4. Iran agrees to “snap” inspections
The United States wants international inspectors to be able to conduct “snap” inspections, anytime and anyplace inside Iran. It is not clear if the Iranian government will agree. Many of the nuclear sites are inside Revolutionary Guards military bases, where inspectors have frequently been barred at the gates.


Growing Egypt-Russia Partnership Raises Alarm in Israel

The Egyptian prime minister visits the construction site of the El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant in July 2025. (Egyptian government)
The Egyptian prime minister visits the construction site of the El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant in July 2025. (Egyptian government)
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Growing Egypt-Russia Partnership Raises Alarm in Israel

The Egyptian prime minister visits the construction site of the El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant in July 2025. (Egyptian government)
The Egyptian prime minister visits the construction site of the El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant in July 2025. (Egyptian government)

Egypt’s El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant has yet to begin operations on the country’s Mediterranean coast, but Israeli media outlets supportive of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have intensified warnings that the project could pave the way for a major Russian nuclear presence in the Middle East.

Those concerns over Egypt’s capabilities, as well as its regional partnerships, which have grown since the outbreak of the Gaza war in 2023, are unlikely to subside, according to experts interviewed by Asharq Al-Awsat.

They said that the rhetoric is tied to Israeli domestic politics, electoral competition and efforts to create new security threats for Israeli voters, while also exerting pressure on Cairo and its partners at a time when Israel is seeking to capitalize on tensions between Washington and Moscow.

Although Egypt’s nuclear program dates back to a 1956 agreement with the Soviet Union, the country’s first nuclear power project effectively began on Nov. 19, 2015, when Egypt and Russia signed an agreement to build the El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant in the Matrouh governorate on the Mediterranean coast. The project is valued at $30 billion, including a $25 billion Russian loan that Egypt is due to begin repaying in October 2029 over a 35-year period at an annual interest rate of 3%.

The plant, which is designed to generate 4,800 megawatts of electricity, will comprise four nuclear reactors. It is expected to operate for more than 60 years and is projected to supply about 10% of Egypt’s electricity needs once its first reactor comes online, currently expected between late 2027 and mid-2028.

Israeli website Natziv.net recently claimed that El Dabaa is more than an electricity-generation project, describing it as “a potential nuclear foothold for Moscow” in the Middle East. The outlet said Russia’s financing of 85% of the project’s cost - about $25 billion - along with its responsibility for fuel supplies and nuclear waste management for 60 years, could create a “long-term strategic dependence” on Moscow.

The website also warned about plans for a Russian industrial zone near the Suez Canal, describing it as a permanent presence at a key global trade hub and a sign of Cairo’s drift away from the West toward a Russia-China axis within the BRICS group, which Egypt joined in January 2024.

Despite the project’s civilian nature, the outlet claimed that the infrastructure and expertise acquired through El Dabaa could one day provide Egypt with a shorter path toward military nuclear options or fuel enrichment capabilities.

It suggested that any radioactive leak could affect Israel’s coastline and desalination facilities, while closer Egyptian-Russian ties could narrow Israel’s strategic room for maneuver and weaken traditional US influence in the region.

Similar arguments appeared in an analysis published last week by Israel’s Yedioth Ahronoth following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s announcement that the plant’s first reactor could begin operating in 2027.

It described the notion that El Dabaa is solely an energy project as a “grave misreading,” portraying it instead as a slow-moving strategic encirclement effort in which “Israel is not incidental to the picture, but the target.”

Raouf Saad, Egypt’s former ambassador to Russia and a former assistant foreign minister, said the reports should be read within their political context. He added that Netanyahu has sought to disrupt efforts toward regional peace and has repeatedly attempted to provoke Egypt since the Gaza war, without success.

Saad dismissed the Israeli allegations as “naive and transparent” aimed at warning the United States about Russia’s return to the region, saying they reflected the weakness of Netanyahu’s position rather than any genuine security threat.

Retired Major General Samir Farag, a military and strategic analyst, said such reports are part of recurring attempts to manufacture crises and are likely to intensify as Israel approaches elections.

“Netanyahu-aligned media outlets have long tried to convince the Israeli public that Egypt seeks to acquire nuclear capabilities and pursue militarization,” Farag said, describing the claims as an effort to exploit the issue politically and divert attention from Israel’s actions in the region.

While Egypt has not officially responded to the allegations, officials and analysts continued to stress that the peaceful use of nuclear energy is a legitimate right under international law.

They noted that Egypt is fully committed to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and that the El Dabaa project, like the country’s Inshas Nuclear Center, is subject to comprehensive oversight by the International Atomic Energy Agency.