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Diriyah... A Starting Point, Castle of Glories, Threat to Empires

Archive photo of Diriyah’s Al-Turaif ruins in Saudi Arabia (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Archive photo of Diriyah’s Al-Turaif ruins in Saudi Arabia (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Diriyah... A Starting Point, Castle of Glories, Threat to Empires

Archive photo of Diriyah’s Al-Turaif ruins in Saudi Arabia (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Archive photo of Diriyah’s Al-Turaif ruins in Saudi Arabia (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Strong and fortified cities in the middle of the Arabian Peninsula, such as Diriyah and Uyaynah, have withstood the test of time, transforming from small towns founded in the middle of the fifth century to significant “city-states” that would later leave an impact on history.

Nestled on the banks of the Wadi Al-Ard valley, which cuts through the Tuwaiq Mountains, Diriyah occupies one of the best sites in terms of space, soil fertility, and suitability for settlement.

Diriyah was a threat and an obsession for kingdoms and empires four centuries ago. It was mentioned in Ottoman, British, and Persian archives and the writings of countrymen and travelers. It was popularly regarded in the first Saudi state as a rising power in the Arabian Peninsula.

“If an attack is not launched against it (Diriyah), then it will be able to defeat all the kingdoms,” era leaders would say, prompting a foreign invasion that would later destroy the historical city-state.

Centuries ago, Diriyah was a vital station on the caravan route that extended from the Red Sea to the Gulf of Basra.

Diriyah was famous for its beautiful stone-built homes. Teeming with mosques and schools since ancient times, Diriyah was surrounded by sprawling fields of wheat and barley and palm, peach, and fig groves.

It was also known for raising Iraqi purebred Arabian horses, whose fame reached kingdoms and other countries.

As the first capital of Saudi Arabia, Diriyah laid the building blocks for establishing the Saudi state. From Diriyah, Imam Muhammad bin Saud launched an integration project that would transform the city-state into a comprehensive state and bring the entire Arabian Peninsula under a united and stable political umbrella.

Diriyah is one of the most ancient Najdi cities, as it was founded on the banks of Wadi Hanifa in 1446.

Mani’ al-Muraydi worked hard to build and establish Diriyah as one of the strongest independent emirates of Nejd. Diriyah played a significant role in securing pilgrimage routes and transit trade from the east of the Arabian Peninsula to the west.

Several princes successively ruled the city of Diriyah until Imam Muhammad bin Saud, the founder of the first Saudi state, came to power in 1727.

As a city-state, Diriyah relied on its capabilities and good governance policies to emerge as the most suitable place for creating a state that includes most parts of the Arabian Peninsula. Prosperity and development were critical themes for Diriyah in the middle of the eighteenth century.

After recognizing education as a conduit for impacting change, Saudi imams transformed Diriyah into a center for attracting scholars and students alike. Diriyah’s Al-Turaif and Al-Bujairi neighborhoods became a prominent hub for knowledge and scholars.

Books and teaching circles spread in mosques, scholars’ homes, and public markets. This activated a writing, scientific and cultural movement.

As a capital, Diriyah attracted delegations of countries and tribes that pledged allegiance to Saudi imams. This expanded its influence and increased its strength, status, and importance, shaping it as a center for managing the state’s political, administrative, and military affairs.

Citizen Engagement with Leadership

Imam Muhammad bin Saud’s determination to achieve change in the Arabian Peninsula after he assumed power in 1727 saw him launching a unification project for Najd.

Spanning the heart of the Arabian Peninsula, Najd suffered from political divisions and significant disintegration among the people. This made unification one of the most difficult and trying challenges that would take a long time to be achieved.

The founding imam, however, gained victories after personally supervising the building of a strong army of citizens who believed in him and his new vision.

Imam Muhammad bin Saud trained the people, financed them with money and weapons, and took over their leadership. His leadership gave great moral support to the army.

The founding imam managed to convince different segments of society to join his unity project.

Imam Muhammad bin Saud would send an invitation from Diriyah to the countries and tribes affiliated with him to participate in the unification operations, and they would, in turn, promptly send a group of cavalry and soldiers to the place of battle.

After the unification of Najd, campaigns were launched toward other regions in the Arabian Peninsula under the era of Imam Abdul Aziz bin Muhammad, who was able to prepare and deploy a solid army to annex Al-Ahsa region in 1796.

Under Imam Saud bin Abd Al-Aziz, the state could unite most of the regions of the Arabian Peninsula until the state crowned the unity project by annexing the Hijaz in 1805.

Under the first Saudi state, the Arabian Peninsula enjoyed political and security stability, and economic and scientific life flourished. They had a close relationship with their wise leadership.

The people regretted the end of the first Saudi state and the return of conditions to what they were before its establishment.

Nevertheless, after seven years, they gathered and backed Imam Turki bin Abdullah in reestablishing the Saudi state in 1824. The people would later support Imam Faisal bin Turki in the unification process once again.

In 1902, King Abdulaziz returned to Riyadh with a determination to rebuild the state and advance it to the ranks of modern, developed countries after conditions there had deteriorated greatly.

A political vacuum followed the fall of the second Saudi state. But as soon as King Abdulaziz announced Saudi rule anew in the capital, Riyadh, countries and tribes offered allegiance to him, expressing their support for the unification operations he was leading.

Saudis gave their lives and money in service of their homeland until King Abdulaziz announced the establishment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932.

The current Saudi leadership, under directives of King Salman bin Abdulaziz and the direct follow-up and supervision of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, has put forward a project to rehabilitate and develop Diriyah and preserve its historical and cultural heritage.

The project is considered the largest heritage project in the world and has gained local, regional, and international fame. Diriyah is destined to become one of Saudi Arabia’s most remarkable landmarks and tourist destinations. It will restore its former glories and tell the world the story of a promising small town that once turned into the capital of the first Saudi state.

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Gemayel to Asharq Al-Awsat: Khaddam was Assad’s Stick to Apply Pressure

Relations between Gemayel and Khaddam were highly tense (Getty)
Relations between Gemayel and Khaddam were highly tense (Getty)
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Gemayel to Asharq Al-Awsat: Khaddam was Assad’s Stick to Apply Pressure

Relations between Gemayel and Khaddam were highly tense (Getty)
Relations between Gemayel and Khaddam were highly tense (Getty)

Late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad was a masterful negotiator, fiercely protective of his image and reputation. He was known for exhausting his guests with lengthy detours into history before addressing the substance of any talks.

Assad had an exceptional ability to restrain his anger, circling around an issue before striking again — often with calculated patience.

He avoided coarse language, allowing resentments to speak for themselves, but he never forgave those he believed had tried to derail his vision. Among them, according to accounts, were Yasser Arafat, Kamal Jumblatt, Bashir Gemayel, Amine Gemayel, and Samir Geagea.

In dealing with rivals and pressuring opponents, Assad often relied on a trusted enforcer: Abdel Halim Khaddam, his long-time foreign minister and later vice president. In the second part of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Lebanese President Amine Gemayel said Khaddam was Assad’s “stick,” used to assert control.

Many Lebanese politicians believed Khaddam’s bluntness was not personal, but rather a reflection of an official mandate from his mentor.

Assad rarely issued direct threats. Instead, he preferred subtle intimidation — as when he told Gemayel that his aides had once suggested blowing up President Anwar Sadat’s plane to prevent him from reaching Jerusalem.

Khaddam, the late Syrian strongman’s long-serving envoy, was known for humiliating both allies and foes who dared defy Damascus’ directives. His tactics were often unsettling — deliberately designed to leave visitors unnerved and pliant by the time they reached Assad’s office.

In a conversation in Paris during his retirement, Khaddam defended his hardline methods, saying they were not meant to insult but to prevent potentially dangerous confrontations. “The aim was to avoid escalation that could lead to security agencies taking over, which might have resulted in worse outcomes,” he said.

In the same meeting, Khaddam accused former Lebanese President Amine Gemayel of obstructing a political solution in Lebanon, calling him “hesitant and suspicious.”

He also acknowledged Assad was caught off guard when the Tripartite Agreement collapsed. The Syrian leader, Khaddam said, had not believed anyone in Lebanon would openly defy Syria — or the other Lebanese factions who had signed the accord.

“President Assad had many cards to play. President Sarkis had none,” recalled former Lebanese Foreign Minister Fouad Boutros, reflecting on the stark imbalance between Syria and Lebanon during Elias Sarkis’s presidency.

Assad, he said, had the power to topple or paralyze the Lebanese government before Sarkis even returned to Beirut. “Sarkis had no leverage over Assad,” Boutros noted. “But while Sarkis often showed flexibility, he would stand firm when asked to compromise Lebanon’s core principles.”

Boutros, who played a key role in Lebanon’s diplomacy during the civil war, said he had to exercise utmost restraint to keep Khaddam — Syria’s often abrasive envoy — from derailing talks with personal attacks or inflammatory language.

The dynamic, he suggested, was not unique to Sarkis. It also echoed the later, uneasy relationship between Gemayel and Assad.

Gemayel recalled a cold and confrontational relationship with Khaddam, describing him as “the stick and the poison” used by Assad to pressure Beirut into submission.

“There was no warmth between us from the beginning,” Gemayel told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“Khaddam used underhanded tactics to undermine the presidency and sow division within my team. While President Assad treated me with respect and politeness, he needed someone to apply pressure — and that was Khaddam,” he added.

Gemayel said Khaddam was behind all the pressure campaigns Syria waged against him — all with Assad’s full knowledge. “Assad played the courteous statesman. Khaddam handled the dirty work. Syria wanted me to sign agreements harmful to Lebanon’s interests, and Khaddam was the one tasked with forcing my hand.”

Despite Khaddam’s harsh demeanor, Gemayel said he never allowed him to overstep.

“I kept him in check. He didn’t dare cross the line with me. We were once in a meeting with President Assad, and Khaddam had been spreading ridiculous rumors beforehand. When he spoke up, I turned to Assad and said: ‘Mr. President, we have a problem with Khaddam. Please ask him to stop acting like a spy when dealing with us.’”

Khaddam, Gemayel said, tried to intimidate many Lebanese politicians — but not him.

“He was rude, even insolent to the point of absurdity. But he knew that if he said anything out of line with me, I would respond immediately.”

Assad’s Subtle Control and the Language of Minorities

Assad understood early on the fragility of Lebanon’s sectarian makeup. To him, the country was a meeting place for minorities — one that always needed an external patron to manage its wars and truces. He allowed for limited victories, but never total defeat, ensuring that no side could do without Syria’s oversight.

Assad sought to rule Syria indefinitely, with Lebanon as a backyard extension of his regime. Yet unlike his brother Rifaat, he avoided openly sectarian rhetoric or calls for partition. Rifaat, according to Gemayel, once suggested dividing both Syria and Lebanon along sectarian lines during a conversation with Lebanese leaders Walid Jumblatt and Marwan Hamadeh.

When asked whether he ever felt his dialogue with Assad was, at its core, a conversation between an Alawite and a Maronite, Gemayel replied: “No — that was Rifaat’s language. He used to say minorities must come together and show solidarity. But that narrative was never pushed by President Assad or his inner circle. It was always tailored to serve their own agenda.”

Assad’s political strategy was built on gathering leverage — and minority groups were central to that plan. His ties with Lebanon’s Druze community, and his clash with Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt, fit squarely within this framework. Assad relied on Syria’s own Druze population, as well as the Christian minority, to tighten his grip on the country’s diverse communities and align them under the banner of his regime.

“Assad had a firm hold on the minorities,” Gemayel said, adding that “he brought them all together to make them part of the Syrian system.”

Tensions between Syria’s Alawite leadership and the country’s Sunni majority were well known, Gemayel added, particularly through the candid rhetoric of Assad’s brother, Rifaat.

“Rifaat was open about the hostility between Alawites and Sunnis,” Gemayel said. “In his conversations with us, it was clear. But with President Assad, there was no visible sign of that. What lay beneath the surface, only God knows — but in our dealings with him, we never felt it.”

Gemayel Dismisses Reports of a Syria-Lebanon Confederation Proposal

Asked about longstanding claims that former Lebanese President Camille Chamoun had once proposed a confederation between Lebanon and Syria to Hafez al-Assad, Gemayel was quick to reject the idea.

“That’s absolutely not true,” he said. “President Chamoun would never have made such a proposal. A lot of things were said at the time. There were even reports that US envoy Dean Brown had suggested relocating Lebanon’s Christians to California — all of it nonsense, poetic talk with no grounding in reality.”

Gemayel also addressed one of the most controversial moments in US diplomacy during Lebanon’s 1988 presidential crisis: the phrase reportedly used by US envoy Richard Murphy — “Mikhael Daher or chaos.”

Daher, a Christian MP close to Damascus, had been floated as the only candidate acceptable to both Syria and the United States.

But Washington later distanced itself from the deal. The episode, Gemayel said, underscored a period in which American pressure aligned more with Syrian — and by extension, Israeli — interests, leaving Lebanon’s sovereignty hanging in the balance.

Gemayel confirmed that US envoy Richard Murphy did indeed issue the stark ultimatum in 1988. The phrase, which became emblematic of foreign interference in Lebanon’s presidential crisis, reflected what Gemayel described as Washington’s unwillingness to confront Damascus — despite acknowledging its destabilizing role in Lebanon.

“Yes, Murphy said it,” Gemayel affirmed to Asharq Al-Awsat.

“The Americans had a problem — they wanted Syria, and they didn’t. They knew Syria was playing a destructive role in Lebanon, but they didn’t want to challenge it. They kept trying to find common ground with Syria, not with us.”

According to Gemayel, the US saw Daher — a respected Christian parliamentarian close to Damascus — as a palatable compromise. “They thought Daher was a respectable figure who might be acceptable to the Lebanese, so they went along with Syria’s choice,” he said.

Washington, he added, had consistently prioritized pragmatism over principle in Lebanon, often aligning with whichever side could deliver results — even if it came at Beirut’s expense.

“It was the same with the May 17 Agreement with Israel,” Gemayel said, referring to the short-lived 1983 accord.

“The US couldn't pressure Israel, so Lebanon had to pay. And they couldn’t pressure Syria either — Syria was stubborn, had resources, and they didn’t want a confrontation. So they kept trying to sell us solutions that weren’t in Lebanon’s interest.”

“The Americans were always looking for the quickest deal,” he added. “They wanted to please both Syria and Israel. With Syria, it was clear — they didn’t want to upset Assad, because they knew who held the real power in Lebanon.”

Gemayel said that while he personally held the reins in decision-making and negotiations with Syria during his time in office, several close advisers and intermediaries played essential roles in laying the groundwork for dialogue with Damascus.

“The relationship and final decisions were in my hands,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“I was the one doing the actual negotiating. But when it came to preparation, the late Jean Obeid played a very valuable role. He was intelligent, committed to Lebanon’s interests, and had close ties with the Syrians. He couldn’t get everything done, but he managed to ease certain issues,” said Gemayel.

Gemayel also credited Eli Salem, another aide, for navigating delicate talks with Syrian officials — particularly with Khaddam.

“Salem had a knack for getting through on specific points,” Gemayel said. “He had good chemistry with Khaddam, and that helped, especially since Khaddam and I didn’t get along.”

One figure who unexpectedly played a constructive role, according to Gemayel, was Brigadier General Jamil al-Sayyed, then an intelligence officer stationed in Lebanon’s eastern Bekaa Valley.

“You may be surprised,” he said, “but Jamil al-Sayyed was very helpful. Whenever I was heading to Damascus, I would stop in the Bekaa to meet him. He gave me very precise insights into what was happening at the Syrian presidential palace and the broader picture in Damascus. He was well-informed, sincere, and provided intelligence that wasn’t widely available — information that truly benefited Lebanon.”

Asked whether Syria was uneasy about the role of veteran journalist and diplomat Ghassan Tueni in his administration, Gemayel said the Syrians had little affection for him.

“There was never any warmth toward Ghassan,” he said. “He came with me to Syria just once, and it was clear there was tension. Whenever he was present, things got heated. Ghassan and Khaddam were like a ping-pong match — constantly hitting the ball back and forth.”

The friction, Gemayel explained, stemmed in large part from Tueni’s association with An-Nahar, the Beirut daily he helped lead, which often published sharp criticism of Syria.

“Syria never appreciated An-Nahar,” Gemayel said. “Even if Ghassan tried to distance himself from specific articles, the content was out there for everyone to see — and the Syrians didn’t forget it.”