Question: How Should We Read What Happened Last Wednesday in the Lebanese Parliament?
Answer: It should be understood on two levels: the failure of Hezbollah and its allies to elect their candidate to the presidency of the republic, and the attack that the party and its allies have launched to devour the presidency of the republic. It is true, as its opponents claim, that Hezbollah suffered a setback. However, this setback was a part of an offensive strategy. The opponents of Hezbollah often overlook this fact. Thus, the setback will not hinder the attack, which will continue through calls for empty dialogue, the disruption of parliament, blackmailing influential regional and Western powers, and Hezbollah could perhaps do other more dangerous deeds.
Question: What is meant by an offensive strategy aimed at devouring the presidency?
Suppose, for a moment, that ours was not a sectarian political system and that we did not live in a sectarian society. In this event, it would be heretical to say: Maronites have the first say in naming the Maronite president of the republic, the Shiites have the first say in naming the Shiite speaker of parliament, and the same goes for the Sunnis and the Sunni prime minister. Indeed, the fact that the top positions in the country are split along sectarian lines would itself seem like a heresy that incites against the stability of the country, its values, and its customs.
However, in a non-sectarian political system, it would be heretical to claim that the Shiites decide whether or not there should be an armed resistance because this sect neighbors the party that the Lebanese are supposedly resisting.
Thus, neither would this sect enjoy a privileged position in deciding a question as pivotal as who to name the next president, nor would that sect decide questions regarding the resistance, which are no less critical, on its own.
Following this line of reasoning but flipping it on its head, we could say that in a sectarian political system like the one we have in Lebanon, which is supposedly governed by “consensus,” the Maronites ought to have the major say in deciding the (Maronite) president, especially since the Shiites are the only party deciding the fate of the (Shiite) resistance. However, something even worse is unfolding today. Indeed, we should recall that it is the Shiite faction objecting to the Maronites’ right to the presidency, which implies that what is demanded is recognition of the Shiites’ right to decide the fate not only of the resistance, but also the presidency.
To ensure the Shiite right to the presidency as well as the resistance, Hezbollah supporters dubbed the Maronites putting forward their preferred candidate “blackmail,” “defiance”, “playing with fire,” and a “threat to civil peace.” In fact, the extortion and defamation reached astronomical levels with the rhetoric of Lebanon’s top Shiite religious authority, who claimed that “the presidential elections will not achieve the outcome that Tel Aviv and Washington failed to impose through the Israeli invasion.” That is, he accused his “partners,” with whom a “consensus” should be developed, of treachery.
This is an attempt to corrode the Maronites’ hold on the presidency that uses all sorts of heavy weaponry to put the leadership of the resistance, which is actually the most important position in the country, the (Shiite) speakership of parliament, and the (Maronite) presidency of the republic in the same pocket; meanwhile, the (Sunni) prime minister is made into a caretaker that oversees the dissipation of the autonomous strength of the Sunnis. This is a political settler movement making incursions into centers of power or undermining them and depriving those entitled to them of control after defaming them.
Question: But why now?
Answer: The battle for the presidency of the republic (without there being much enthusiasm for either of its candidates) has taken the question to a place that makes covering things up difficult. Given the favorable regional situation and its dissipation’s grip on the levers of decision-making, Hezbollah was shocked that it failed to bring a subservient president to office. This was accompanied by the shift in the Aounists’ position, which deprived the party of the Christian cover they had been providing since 2006. Thus, taking the overt sectarian emphasis to a higher level became the demand as long as the leaves are falling. Behind this decision stand the experiences of the two Michels: “consensus” pushed Michel Suleiman, despite his quitism, to take a degree of independence that the “party” could not tolerate, and Michel Aoun reinforced the interpretation of “consensus” that the party seeks. After Aoun, a return to Suleiman is untenable. Only a return to Emile Lahoud is possible and acceptable.
Question: Is this not a sectarian assessment?
Answer: No. What is happening today is that we are behaving as though we were not a sectarian country in which the Maronites are not entitled to choosing the president of the republic. At the same time, however, we are operating under the assumption that we are a sectarian country in which the Shiites alone are allowed to decide whether there should be a resistance movement. Objecting to the Shiites’ exclusive right to decide matters related to the resistance is sectarian, and supporting the Maronite’s privileged position in choosing the president is sectarian.
Indeed, according to this line of reasoning, being non-sectarian means arguing that only the Shiites have a right to decide matters tied to the resistance, while the Maronites are not entitled to the presidency in any way.
In response to calling a spade a spade, we hear things like: this is a sectarian discourse, as we should distinguish what we live from what we say. We live sectarianly, and sectarian hegemony is imposed in practice, but we talk as though sectarianism did not exist. Something similar was seen in many Arab countries where regimes pursued sectarian policies. When their opponents argued that the regime’s behavior was sectarian, they were the ones called sectarian.
The Lebanese philosophy professor Bashar Haydar once asked: If we have a political system that discriminates on the basis of race, ethnicity, or gender, it must be exposed and confronted. However, why do we see silence and dissimulation prevail in the face of a regime of sectarian discrimination?
Before 1975, it was claimed that “Political Maronism” offered the Muslims this formula for coexistence: “What is ours is ours, and what is yours is ours and yours.” Beyond a shadow of a doubt, “political Shiism” is offering the rest of the Lebanese this formula: “What is ours is ours, and what is yours is ours.”
