What Role Does the Lebanese Army Play on the Border with Israel?https://english.aawsat.com/features/4680746-what-role-does-lebanese-army-play-border-israel
What Role Does the Lebanese Army Play on the Border with Israel?
Smoke rises on the Lebanese side of the border between Israel and Lebanon after an Israeli airstrike, as seen from northern Israel, November 18, 2023. (Reuters)
What Role Does the Lebanese Army Play on the Border with Israel?
Smoke rises on the Lebanese side of the border between Israel and Lebanon after an Israeli airstrike, as seen from northern Israel, November 18, 2023. (Reuters)
The Lebanese army has been playing a limited role in the southern border regions ever since Hezbollah decided to support fighters in Gaza by opening Israel’s northern front with Lebanon.
Iran-backed Hezbollah has been clashing with Israeli forces on a daily basis since Hamas launched its Al-Aqsa Flood operation against Israel on October 7. At least 75 Hezbollah fighters have been killed so far.
Along with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), the army is committed to the implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1701. The resolution helped end a 33-day war between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006.
The army has been active in preventing Palestinian groups from launching attacks against Israel from southern Lebanon. It has been dismantling rocket launchpads that have been discovered in the fields.
A security source told Asharq Al-Awsat that the army has been carrying out sweeps of border regions in search of rocket launchers.
The presence of the military and UNIFIL has been reassuring to the locals, it added, stressing that the army will remain in its positions and is prepared for “all possibilities”.
Moreover, the source explained that the army is operating with the cover of the government. Hezbollah’s operations are, meanwhile, being covered by the state and ministerial statements.
The actions of the Palestinian factions, however, are a cause for concern, amid fears that their operations could lead to the deterioration of the security situation in the South, it added.
Political and strategic affairs researcher Khalil al-Helou said: “Officially, Lebanon is committed to resolution 1701 and the army is part of this official stance. It is therefore committed to the resolution and will not violate the truce agreement.”
It was Hezbollah, not the army, that has fired missiles at Israel, so the military must not bear the brunt of Israel’s retaliation, he added. “Whoever fired the first shot must shoulder the consequences alone,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.
The residents of the South are already suffering the consequences, he noted. The army must not be placed in danger from Israel, especially given that the balance of power is clearly not in its favor. The balance is not even in Hezbollah’s favor seeing as it has already lost dozens of fighters in the clashes.
Moreover, Helou refused to describe the army as a “spectator” in the current developments in the South.
It is implementing resolution 1701 by trying as much as possible to prevent non-Lebanese groups from firing rockets at Israel from Lebanese territories, he went on to say.
This sends a clear message to Israel that the Lebanese state does not want to become involved in the conflict and that it is committed to resolution 1701, Helou explained.
Other roles played by the military include rescuing the wounded and retrieving corpses, he revealed, explaining that Hezbollah cannot do so in the open as it would leave its members exposed to Israeli fire. So, the Red Cross members or army are doing so instead.
Resolution 1701 helped end the hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah during the 2006 war. Israeli troops withdrew from Lebanon and more UNIFIL forces were deployed to the South in coordination with the military to monitor the ceasefire.
It also stipulated that only UNIFIL and the Lebanese army are allowed to be deployed in regions south of the Blue Line and Litani River, which must be free of gunmen.
The resolution has been violated on numerous occasions by both Israel and Hezbollah over the past 17 years. Israel has breached it with its repeated violations of Lebanon’s sovereignty, and it is obvious that Hezbollah has not withdrawn its weapons and fighters from areas south of the Litani.
Hezbollah’s latest round of fighting with Israel has raised several questions about the effectiveness of the resolution and whether the Security Council will issue a new amended version once the fighting in Gaza, and consequently southern Lebanon, ends.
From Israeli-Held Zones in Gaza, Foes of Hamas Seek Lasting Role https://english.aawsat.com/features/5217917-israeli-held-zones-gaza-foes-hamas-seek-lasting-role%C2%A0
A drone view shows Palestinians walking past the rubble, following Israeli forces' withdrawal from the area, amid a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, in Gaza City, October 11, 2025. (Reuters)
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From Israeli-Held Zones in Gaza, Foes of Hamas Seek Lasting Role
A drone view shows Palestinians walking past the rubble, following Israeli forces' withdrawal from the area, amid a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, in Gaza City, October 11, 2025. (Reuters)
Groups operating from Israeli-held areas of Gaza say they will continue to fight Hamas despite the killing of their most prominent commander, reporting more recruits since an October ceasefire as they eye a role in the enclave's future.
The emergence of the groups, though they remain small and localized, has added to pressures on Hamas and could complicate efforts to stabilize and unify a divided Gaza shattered by two years of war.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu acknowledged Israeli backing for anti-Hamas groups in June, saying Israel had "activated" clans, though Israel has given little detail since then.
Last week, the man seen at the heart of efforts to establish anti-Hamas forces - Yasser Abu Shabab - was killed in southern Gaza's Rafah area. His group, the Popular Forces, said he died mediating a family feud, without saying who killed him. His deputy, Ghassan al-Dahini, has taken over and vowed to continue on the same path.
Hamas, which has controlled Gaza since 2007 and has so far refused to disarm under the ceasefire plan, has branded such groups collaborators - a view that Palestinian analysts say is broadly shared by the public. It moved swiftly against Palestinians who defied its control after the US-backed ceasefire took hold, killing dozens, including some it accused of working with Israel.
Nearly all Gaza's 2 million people live in Hamas-held areas, where the group has been reestablishing its grip and where four Hamas sources said it continues to command thousands of men despite suffering heavy blows during the war.
But Israel still holds over half of Gaza - areas where Hamas' foes operate beyond its reach. With President Donald Trump's plan for Gaza moving slowly, there is no immediate prospect of further Israeli withdrawals.
Three Egyptian security and military sources said Israel-backed groups had increased their activities since the ceasefire, and estimated they now had 1,000 fighters, adding 400 since the truce.
Egypt, which borders Gaza, has been closely involved in negotiations over the conflict. The sources expected the groups to further step up their activities in the absence of a comprehensive deal on Gaza's future.
FOOTAGE SHOWS FIGHTERS ASSEMBLED
A diplomat who spoke to Reuters on condition of anonymity said the anti-Hamas groups lacked any popular constituency, but added that their emergence raised concerns for the enclave's stability, heightening risks of conflict among Palestinians.
Since Abu Shabab's death, his group and two others have posted videos showing dozens of fighters assembled, as commanders are heard praising him as a martyr and vowing to continue.
One video released on December 5 shows Dahini telling fighters Abu Shabab's death was a "grave loss" and adding that they would "continue on this path and move with the same strength and even more strength".
Reuters verified the location as Rafah Governorate - an area of Gaza where Israeli forces are still deployed - by analyzing the buildings, walls and trees in the footage which matched file and satellite imagery of the area.
On December 7, Dahini announced the execution in late November of two men he identified as Hamas fighters, saying they had killed a member of his group. A security official in a Hamas-led coalition of militant groups in Gaza said such actions did not "alter the realities on the ground".
Hussam Al-Astal, who heads another anti-Hamas faction based in the Khan Younis area, said he and Dahini had "agreed the war on terror will continue" during a visit to Abu Shabab's grave in the Rafah area. "Our project, new Gaza ... will move ahead," Al-Astal told Reuters by phone.
Al-Astal, speaking to Reuters in a separate call in late November, said his group has received arms, money and other support from international "friends" whom he declined to identify. He denied receiving Israeli military backing but acknowledged contacts with Israel over "the coordination of the entry of food and all the resources we need to survive".
He said he was speaking from inside Gaza, in the Israeli-controlled sector near the "yellow line" behind which Israel has withdrawn. Al-Astal said his group had added recruits since the truce and now had several hundred members including fighters and civilians. The Popular Forces has also grown, a source close to it said, without giving a figure.
Hamas police officers stand guard, amid a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, in Gaza City, October 11, 2025. (Reuters)
HAMAS: ABU SHABAB MET 'INEVITABLE FATE'
Israel says it aims to ensure that Hamas, which ignited the war with its October 7, 2023 attack on Israel, is disarmed and has no future role governing Gaza.
In response to a request for comment, an Israeli government official said: "There is no shortage of Palestinians wishing and actively fighting to free themselves of the Hamas repression and tyranny."
The Popular Forces didn't respond to requests for comment sent via their Facebook page. It has previously denied receiving Israeli support.
Hamas said Abu Shabab's death was the "inevitable fate of all those who betrayed their people and homeland", while claiming no role in his killing.
The security official in the Hamas-led coalition said threats by its foes were "psychological warfare" orchestrated by Israel to "undermine internal stability".
Hamas spokesperson Hazem Qassem said security forces would pursue collaborators "until this phenomenon is eradicated".
But they "are protected by the occupation army in the areas where these forces are present, which makes it difficult for the security apparatuses", he said, in comments to Reuters before Abu Shabab's death.
HOUSING COMPOUNDS PLANNED
As well as disarming Hamas, Trump's plan foresees the establishment of a transitional authority, the deployment of a multinational force, and reconstruction.
But with no clarity on next steps, there is a risk of de facto partition between an inland sector controlled by Israel where few people now remain, and a sector along the coast now crowded with displaced people, much of it wasteland.
Touring Gaza on Sunday, Israeli military chief Lieutenant General Eyal Zamir said Israel had "control over extensive parts of the Gaza Strip and we will remain on those defense lines".
"The Yellow Line is a new border line — serving as a forward defensive line for our communities and a line of operational activity," he said.
Goals cited by anti-Hamas groups include establishing secure areas for displaced Gazans.
Hamas militants sit inside a vehicle as they escort members of the Red Cross towards an area within the so-called "yellow line" to which Israeli troops withdrew under the ceasefire, in Gaza City November 20, 2025. (Reuters)
In October, US Vice President JD Vance and Trump's son-in-law Jared Kushner said reconstruction funds could flow to the Israel-controlled area without waiting for the next stage of the plan to begin, with the idea of creating model zones for Gazans to live in.
Rafah is one of the first sites US officials have identified for such housing compounds, described as "Alternative Safe Communities," though no timeline has been set, according to two Israeli officials and three Western diplomats involved in post-war Gaza planning.
A US State Department spokesperson said the US was working with partners "to provide housing and other services to Gazans as quickly as possible".
The United States has not had any official contact with the anti-Hamas groups, "nor are we providing any funding or support", a US official said. "We are not going to be picking winners or losers in Gaza," the official said, adding: "Beyond Hamas having no future role, who will govern Gaza will be up to Gazans."
DESTABILIZING HAMAS CONTROL
Some Palestinians celebrated news of Abu Shabab's death in the nearby city of Khan Younis by distributing sweets, witnesses said.
Ghassan al-Khatib, a lecturer in international studies at Birzeit University in the occupied West Bank, said that while Hamas' popularity had declined because of the costs of the Gaza war, the anti-Hamas groups had no future because they are viewed by Palestinians as collaborators.
"Israel is using them only for tactical reasons, particularly to try to destabilize Hamas control," he said.
A spokesperson for President Mahmoud Abbas' Fatah Movement, which was driven from Gaza by Hamas and runs the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, said it rejected any armed groups backed by Israel, saying they had "nothing to do with our people and their cause".
What Syria’s Military Map Looks Like One Year After Assad Ousterhttps://english.aawsat.com/features/5217836-what-syria%E2%80%99s-military-map-looks-one-year-after-assad-ouster
What Syria’s Military Map Looks Like One Year After Assad Ouster
Hama residents set fire to a large banner of Bashar al Assad after armed factions seized the city last December (AFP)
Syria’s map of control has been shaken to its core since late 2024, when the Deterrence of Aggression offensive erupted and the Assad government fell, unleashing a series of security and military shifts that continued to redraw the country’s landscape through 2025.
But this fluid map is unlikely to hold, according to a study by the Syrian research group Jusoor Center for Studies. With regional and international actors working to head off the chaos and potential partition that threaten wider stability, any near term changes in who controls what are expected to come through political and security pressure rather than a return to large scale battles.
Mahmoud Eibo, one of three researchers who worked on a report on territorial influence in Syria in 2025, told Asharq Al-Awsat that the balance of control shifted sharply after the launch of the Deterrence of Aggression battles on November 27, 2024.
In less than two weeks, the Assad government lost the areas it had held since 2020, which covered more than half of the country.
Iranian withdrawal from Syrian territory
With the government’s fall, Iran’s presence also unraveled after more than a decade of entrenchment. Iran backed militias withdrew from rural Damascus, Homs, Aleppo, the southern provinces and from Al-Bukamal and Al-Mayadin.
Eibo said the militias “withdrew completely” after supply lines linking them to Lebanon and Iraq were severed, which effectively ended Iran’s influence and that of its militias across Syria.
The military role of Hezbollah also came to an end. The group had been one of Tehran’s key proxies in Syria since 2013, when its intervention began with the capture of Al-Qusayr.
But the turning point ended in the same town, after factions in the Deterrence of Aggression campaign seized Al-Qusayr in late 2024 and Hezbollah forces pulled out entirely.
The moment marked a definitive end to Hezbollah’s long military presence in Syria, after the group lost one of its most critical geographic links to Iran through Syrian territory.
Many areas that had been under the indirect influence of Hezbollah and Iran backed factions also slipped out of their orbit and reverted to the authority of the new Syrian state and its security and military institutions in the north.
The largest shift in influence last year came at the expense of the Syrian Democratic Forces, known as the SDF, Eibo said. The Dawn of Freedom operation ended the group’s presence in strategically important areas west of the Euphrates, beginning with the fall of Tel Rifaat and surrounding villages and extending toward Manbij, which cost the SDF one of its key cities in the region.
As a result, the SDF’s influence contracted in northern and eastern Aleppo countryside and the group withdrew eastward toward Raqqa, Hasakeh and parts of Deir Ezzor.
Sweida and the south
In the south, a limited but consequential development emerged in Sweida province. Local groups linked to Sheikh Hikmat Al-Hajri seized parts of the province after government forces withdrew, taking advantage of the security vacuum.
Although the area under their control is geographically small, it created a pocket of influence outside the new government’s authority and added another layer of instability to the southern provinces.
In parallel, Israel capitalized on the collapse of the southern front. It pushed beyond the buffer zone and established a presence in select points and strategic hilltops near the disengagement line.
Although the area is small, the symbolic and intelligence value of the chosen positions gives Israel leverage through monitoring and pressure, keeping the south open to volatility.
What the new map shows
Syria’s territorial map at the end of 2025 reflects a new political landscape dominated by four actors: the Syrian government, the SDF, the National Guard forces in Sweida and Israel, each wielding varying degrees of influence.
The Syrian government remains the primary authority. Beyond its broad political and social control, it holds 69.3% of the country’s territory, covering major cities, most administrative structures and key transport routes. It does not, however, control four provincial capitals: Quneitra, Sweida, Hasakeh and Raqqa.
The SDF controls 27.8% of Syria’s territory, concentrated in the north and east. The expanse is significant but uneven in terms of internal stability. The group faces serious political pressure tied to the implementation of the March 10, 2025 agreement, which is expected to reshape its relationship with the Syrian government.
The National Guard forces in Sweida, loyal to Sheikh Hikmat Al-Hajri, control 2.8% of the country. Their influence is small in size but distinct in nature. The significance lies in their location and in the direct support they receive from Israel, which positions them within a broader framework aimed at prolonging instability in the south.
Their presence overlaps with Israel’s incursion into Syrian territory, which covers 0.1% of the country. Despite the small footprint, the choice of elevated positions and small villages with high surveillance value reflects strategic intent.
Israel is not seeking territorial control, but rather an early warning line and a tighter grip over the border zone, while supporting an environment that prevents full stability in the south. This aligns with its indirect role in reinforcing the position of the Sweida National Guard forces.
Change driven by political pressure
According to Eibo, Syria’s map of control has undergone a fundamental rupture since late 2024, ending a geopolitical phase that had been largely settled since 2020.
The country has entered a more fluid and complex period marked by the retreat of traditional actors and the emergence of new, still unsettled zones of influence.
Although limited security and military shifts continued through 2025, it is unlikely that the current map will hold. Regional and international efforts are focused on avoiding chaos and partition.
Any upcoming change in territorial control will most likely be driven by political and security pressure and by reengineering spheres of influence rather than a return to large scale military confrontations.
Assad’s ‘Trap’: A Night That Shook Tehran’s Allies in Baghdadhttps://english.aawsat.com/features/5217740-assad%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%98trap%E2%80%99-night-shook-tehran%E2%80%99s-allies-baghdad
Assad’s ‘Trap’: A Night That Shook Tehran’s Allies in Baghdad
A defaced portrait of Syria's ousted President Bashar al-Assad hangs on a wall in the capital Damascus on June 2, 2025. (AFP)
A senior Iraqi security official urged his driver to pick up speed as they raced toward Damascus airport. He needed to catch a flight back to Baghdad, while alerts kept lighting up his phone.
One message stood out: “The Syrian factions are on their way to the capital.”
It was Saturday evening, December 7, 2024, and the official had just wrapped up a routine mission in northeastern Syria to coordinate border security. But Syria itself was on the edge of a dramatic shift, its old order crumbling and a new one taking shape in the ruins.
At the outskirts of Damascus, the official’s convoy halted, waiting for “extraordinary arrangements” with the emerging authorities. A flurry of sudden, unexpected contacts unfolded between the two sides.
A former Syrian official from the Military Operations Directorate said it was “the first time that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham group communicated with an official in the Iraqi government.”
An Iraqi security officer who was present during the arrangements said that “the process went ahead with unexpected ease at the time, and we entered Damascus” alongside members of the group on the morning of December 8, 2024. Then a message arrived like a lightning strike: “Bashar al-Assad has fled.”
Damascus airport was a ghostly stage. Even the officers of the Air Transport Brigade whom the Iraqi official knew had disappeared. No one asked for a ticket or a passport. The diplomatic lane was wide open to the wind. The man boarded a special flight to Baghdad.
As the plane climbed through daylight, the Iraqi security official carried a bag full of questions about the new Syria.
On the same route, but on the ground, Iraqi militias that had been stationed in Syria since 2011 were withdrawing. Convoys moved from the Damascus countryside toward Al-Bukamal near the Iraqi border, making a final one-way journey for hundreds of fighters, leaving behind 15 years of a “Resistance Axis” now collapsing like a mountain of sand.
Exclusive testimonies gathered by Asharq Al-Awsat from Iraqi figures involved in the Syrian file before Assad’s escape reveal how militias withdrew from Syria without coordination or prior arrangements.
The accounts describe what unfolded behind the scenes, including how they viewed the events, and later showed that Tehran, Moscow and Assad had each made separate decisions not to fight in Syria, failing to share essential information with their Iraqi allies until late.
The testimonies also shed light on the reactions of Shiite groups following the collapse of the Assad regime, including calls to strengthen the influence of armed factions in Iraq’s political process and reinforce what became known as “Shiite governance” in Baghdad, in order to “absorb the shock felt by those who had been left behind in Syria.”
Damascus airport after the collapse of the Assad regime. (AFP file)
‘It was not a maneuver... we were deceived’
On November 30, 2024, three days after the launch of Operation Deterrence of Aggression to topple the Syrian regime, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani held a phone call with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.
At that time, Syrian opposition factions had seized control of the Aleppo countryside. Sudani told Assad that “Syria’s security is tied to Iraq’s national security.” The following day, the opposition encircled Hama. Sudani did not call Assad again.
In Nineveh, the northern Iraqi province that borders Syria, Shiite militia leaders attempted to send reinforcements to Syria, since “as the Syrian factions advanced, the number of Iran-aligned fighters was far smaller than in previous years.” A militia official in Nineveh said they told their fighters, “You must protect the Shiites and the shrines in Syria,” and many volunteers were eager to join.
Kadhim al-Fartousi, spokesman for Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, which had been active in Syria since 2013, said the group withdrew in late 2023. “Our mission was over,” he said.
Until 2018, Syria was crowded with more than 150,000 fighters from Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, Hezbollah and Iraqi militias, according to Iraqi and Syrian security estimates. The Syrian army under the former regime appeared smaller than the foreign forces operating on its territory. By December 2023, something had changed.
The Revolutionary Guard allowed several Shiite groups to leave after consultations with Assad. It was widely said that a “regional deal” had driven this shift.
As part of the partial withdrawal of Iranian-backed forces from Syria in 2023, Assad was attempting to regain Syria’s seat in the Arab League. It required significant time and diplomatic maneuvering to prepare for an almost impossible reintegration with the Arab world, which ultimately did not materialize.
When Operation Deterrence of Aggression began in November 2024, the number of Iranian groups in Syria had fallen to several thousand, but Assad’s return to the Arab fold was not complete.
As opposition factions advanced toward Damascus, the prevailing belief was that Shiite groups were moving to plug a gap that no one had noticed.
On December 2, 2024, dozens of fighters infiltrated Syria at night via an unofficial military road, but United States aircraft struck their convoys near Al-Bukamal. After that, it became clear that those who had been eager to enter Syria were backing off.
The next morning, Syrian opposition forces seized 14 towns in Hama and turned to the battle for Homs. That day, Iraq’s Kataib Hezbollah said “it is too early to decide on sending military support to Syria.”
A senior member of a Shiite armed group said he asked his superiors in Baghdad about the first days of Operation Deterrence of Aggression. “Do not worry... Syria may fall to the opposition, but Damascus will hold,” they told him, referring to Assad’s grip on the capital.
“A week later,” he added, “we could no longer comprehend what had happened.”
Before the opposition reached Homs, Shiite groups assumed the advance would stop there. A commander said intelligence reports reviewed by officials in Iraq’s National Security Service, the Popular Mobilization Forces leadership and militia commanders indicated that Russia and Iran would halt the opposition’s momentum and that Homs would be the decisive point.
But Russia used its air superiority sparingly. As opposition factions moved from Hama toward Homs on December 6, 2024, aircraft believed to be Russian struck the Al-Rastan bridge linking the two cities with destructive force, but not enough to prevent convoys from crossing.
Later aerial footage showed Sukhoi jets armed with missiles sitting unused at Russia’s Hmeimim airbase as opposition fighters crossed the bridge into Homs, which was fully taken by dawn on December 7.
At this point, many within the so-called Resistance Axis became convinced that the swift advance of the opposition was not a mere maneuver. The militia commander said they realized “the Iranians had given us conflicting signals... maybe they were deceived too.”
Questions about the roles of Tehran and Moscow remained unresolved. Shiite factions had no clear answers in the months following Assad’s escape.
Today, Fartousi, the Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada spokesman, believes that “the Russian and Iranian position only shifted after the Assad regime retreated, the forces holding the ground collapsed and the battle turned into a confrontation with the people.”
But sources from factions active in Syria since 2013 spoke of “a decision taken early by Iran not to wage a battle in Syria due to far more complex regional calculations.”
According to these sources, “Iran was not confident of favorable outcomes had it confronted the opposition’s advance, because it realized too late that Moscow was acting independently in Syria.”
In the end, the pillars of the alliance between Moscow, Tehran and Assad appeared to be drifting apart, taking separate battlefield decisions that enabled the opposition’s rapid advance and Assad’s even faster escape. What is certain, the Shiite commander said, is that “the Iraqi groups were not central to the discussions that led to what happened.”
By then, more than ten Iraqi factions had spent over a decade on the Syrian front, during which thousands of fighters were drawn into a sea of blood.
Assad shakes hands with Iraqi PM Mohammed Shia al-Sudani in Damascus. (File photo)
‘And the wheel turns’
At six in the morning on December 8, 2024, former Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdulmahdi posted on X about how tables turn and the “aggressor” is overtaken by events. Shock swept through Shiite political forces in Baghdad. Assad had fled and the regime had fallen.
Two days after the liberation, all factions had left Syrian territory and Assad was in Moscow. On December 12, 2024, Nouri al-Maliki, leader of the State of Law Coalition and a long-time ally of Assad, declared that “the goal of what happened in Damascus is to stir the street in Baghdad.” Public opinion erupted with questions.
Shiite political circles in Baghdad struggled to absorb the shock. Private discussions intensified around “the future of the Shiites in Iraq,” dominated by deep confusion, according to participants in closed-door meetings held in the weeks following Assad’s escape.
They said Shiite decision-makers found no answers regarding what had happened in Syria or Iran’s role, and many struggled to answer how Iraq and the region would change after Assad.
One participant in a private session held in January 2025 said the crisis in Syria was not about Assad’s escape or the collapse of the Resistance Axis, but for Iraqi Shiites it was about “redefining their role after old alliances and balances had crumbled.”
Secondary effects of this difficult debate emerged within Shiite groups. Many within the resistance environment began promoting the concept of a “Shiite federation” stretching from Iraq’s Samarra to Basra on top of vast oil reserves. The idea faded quickly, like cold ash.
Talk of “Shiite governance” intensified. A militia commander said: “Shiite forces in recent months focused on strengthening the domestic scene and consolidating their presence in political life, which explains their active participation in the elections held on November 11, 2025, and the victory of armed factions in seats in the new parliament.”
It appeared that all those who had fought in Syria won seats in the new legislature. Asaib Ahl al-Haq, led by Qais al-Khazali, secured 28 seats. The Badr Organization, led by Hadi al-Amiri, won 18. The Rights bloc, linked to Kataib Hezbollah, won six. A list affiliated with Kataib Imam Ali won three. The Services Alliance, led by Shibl al-Zaidi, won nine seats.
These groups are now proposing a transitional project built on new Shiite roles, driven by the growing ambition of leaders such as Khazali to craft an umbrella that shields Shiite groups from fragmentation by expanding their influence in both the legislative and executive branches of the state.
In March 2025, Khazali was asked about the new Syria. He said: “It is the duty and interest of the Iraqi state to engage with it, as long as those governments represent their countries.”
A Shiite leader said the moment Assad fled was not a Syrian event as much as “an earthquake in Shiite consciousness inside Iraq,” pushing everyone to reconsider the alliances that had shaped the region for years.
But beneath this transformation lie lingering questions and doubts about “the future of the Iranian doctrine itself,” now facing major disruption after four decades of uninterrupted influence across the region.
“The answer,” the commander said, “has not yet matured.”
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