Iraq after the Al-Aqsa Flood: Iran’s Plan for the Rapid Collapse

How did the ‘Islamic Resistance in Iraq’ emerge?

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani chairs a meeting with top-ranking officials of the Iraqi armed forces and of the US-led coalition during the first round of talks on the future of American and other foreign troops in the country, in Baghdad on January 27, 2024. (AFP)
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani chairs a meeting with top-ranking officials of the Iraqi armed forces and of the US-led coalition during the first round of talks on the future of American and other foreign troops in the country, in Baghdad on January 27, 2024. (AFP)
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Iraq after the Al-Aqsa Flood: Iran’s Plan for the Rapid Collapse

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani chairs a meeting with top-ranking officials of the Iraqi armed forces and of the US-led coalition during the first round of talks on the future of American and other foreign troops in the country, in Baghdad on January 27, 2024. (AFP)
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani chairs a meeting with top-ranking officials of the Iraqi armed forces and of the US-led coalition during the first round of talks on the future of American and other foreign troops in the country, in Baghdad on January 27, 2024. (AFP)

On the 27th day of the war on Gaza, something started to happen in Baghdad. The Popular Mobilization Forces began to show footage of an “emergency” meeting that was held in wake of the battles between the Israelis and Palestinian Hamas movement.

The meeting was attended by the majority of the main leaders of the Iraqi armed factions. Chief of Staff Abdulaziz al-Mohammedawi, known as Abou Fadak, warned of an impending war in the region.

The position of chief of staff is a senior post in the Iraqi military, but the PMF borrowed the title after 2016 to oversee military operations. As a result, Abou Fadak now boasts privileges superior to those of the PMF leader, Faleh al-Fayyad.

Abou Fadak is a former leader of the Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq and he plays a central role in the armed factions. Many members of the factions believe that he is the successor of the PMF deputy leader, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, who along with Iranian Quds Force leader Qassem Soleimani, were killed in a US strike near Baghdad airport in January 2020.

Abou Fadak’s warning appeared routine given the tensions in the region, but he then uttered a statement that sounded coded: “The situation in the region is sensitive and what will take place will hinge on how committed we are to what we agreed upon.”

So what had they agreed upon? And who are “they”?

The details of this agreement and the parties to it started to emerge on the 28th day of the war when Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah delivered his first televised speech since Hamas carried out its Al-Aqsa Flood operation on October 7. Without outlining what that “Lebanese resistance” will do next, Nasrallah praised the Iraqi factions for attacking American troops deployed in their country.

At that moment, it appeared as though the pro-Iran factions in Iraq had shifted to the forefront of the so-called Resistance Axis and that a new front to Gaza had been opened in Baghdad, which is ruled by a politically powerful government sitting on a $450 billion budget.

Ain al-Asad: The first attack

Days later, a group calling itself the “Islamic Resistance in Iraq” emerged, declaring that it will start carrying out revenge attacks against American forces in Iraq and Syria after they confirmed that “they were providing support to the Israeli troops in Gaza”, they said in a statement on Telegram.

On November 17, the group announced that they had attacked the Ain al-Asad base west of Baghdad using two drones. This was the first attack carried out by the “Islamic Resistance in Iraq” and the strings connecting the Al-Aqsa Flood operation and Abou Fadak’s “coded” message began to appear.

Soon after the attack, Abou Fadak would disappear from the scene, even though he had declared the state of emergency himself. More attacks would follow, reaching more than 150 against American bases in Iraq and Syria as of January 29, when this report was completed.

The attacks targeted the Ain al-Asad base, the second largest air base in Iraq after the Balad base, and Harir, which is used by the Americans as a landing site for their fighter jets when they were fighting ISIS in 2015.

The attacks also targeted American bases in Syria: Al-Tanf, al-Shadadi, al-Malikiya, al-Rukban, Abou Hajar, Tal Abdo, Rmeilan, Green Village and Al-Omar oil field.

Data from the Islamic Resistance in Iraq showed that a third of the attacks targeted the Ain al-Asad and Harir.

Since declaring a state of emergency, the PMF, which says it is affiliated with the government, was never tied to any of the attacks against the American forces. All the attacks were claimed by the Islamic Resistance.

It is said that the Resistance is formed by the several factions, such as the al-Nujaba movement, Kataib Hezbollah, and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, and that they joined it after rejecting negotiations to stop the escalation, according to media leaks quoting sources close the ruling Coordination Framework coalition.

It is difficult to differentiate between this coalition, which succeeded in forming a government headed by Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani in November 2022, and armed Shiite factions.

The factions are playing a very complicated role. They hold a lot of power in the PMF, which operates under government cover, and they also enjoy “ideological immunity.” They, however, are not outwardly present in government institutions to appear as though they have “nothing to lose.”

Iraq’s Shiite to liberate Jerusalem

Two weeks before Abou Fadak declared the “state of emergency”, a medium rank Iraqi officer working for the PMF was on his way back from Syria to southern Iraq. He received a telephone call from another officer who briefed him on the “latest situation.”

Speaking on condition of anonymity to Asharq Al-Awsat, the officer said the Iraqi factions were on a state of alert without even being ordered to do so. It is as if they were “thirsting for some war.” At the time, “all we did was create incitement through the media. It was necessary to consolidate the role of the Shiites of Iraq in liberating Jerusalem,” he went on to say.

It may have been coincidence that Iranian officials visited Baghdad in the coming days. They were delivering “urgent messages” that reflected the mood that prevailed among the factions.

In the first week since the Al-Aqsa operations, the Iranians held a series of meetings with politicians who are members of the Coordination Framework and field leaders of the armed Shiite factions.

The officer said: “They informed us that we are a part of Iran and its strength in the region. You are the hand that strikes to protect Shiism. It is time to not only liberate Jerusalem, but to rule the entire region (...) it is your golden age.”

The Iranians lamented that had Tehran been located in closer positions, such as al-Anbar in western Iraq, “we would have liberated Jerusalem in a handful of days,” the officer quoted them as saying. He revealed that Iraqi officials were “enraged” by these comments.

The Anbar province borders Syria. It boasts a vast desert and for years, was the arena for al-Qaeda and ISIS activity. After the liberation of Iraq from ISIS in 2017, the PMF units redeployed in those regions under the pretext of securing them and preventing the return of the “terrorists”.

However, an aide in the Sunni Taqadum party, led by former parliament Speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi, refuted the claims. He said these armed formations “serve a political agenda aimed at preventing the representatives of the province from playing central roles that may irritate the Shiite forces.”

He added that the continued deployment of these units in areas close to the Syrian border is “very important” to Iraq to ensure that resistance groups in the region remain connected geographically.

Before the Iranian officials left Baghdad, they tasked an “Arab” figure to remain there, work closely with the Iraqi groups and follow up on the developments in Gaza. Despite various information, it remains difficult to verify who this person was and from which country he comes from.

All that this report could verify was that the factions call him “Al-Hajj” and he has effectively assumed the position of leader of the command centers of the “resistance”, revealed leaderships of local Shiite factions.

“Al-Hajj” is a title that is commonly used by members of the Lebanese Hezbollah instead of the adoption of military ranks. Media close to the party often uses the title to describe prominent Hezbollah military official Mohammed al-Kawtharani and other leaders.

It is likely that Kawtharani has been running the field operations of the pro-Iran Iraqi factions since mid-2021. A former government official said: “The Lebanese Hezbollah has effectively replaced Qassem Soleimani in Iraq.”

This ex-official used to hold a senior position in the governments of former PMs Haidar al-Abadi and Adel Abdul Mahdi. He left his post when Mustafa al-Kadhimi became prime minister in 2019.

Before the PMF declared their state of emergency, “Al-Hajj” met with leaders of the Coordination Framework and armed factions in a “safe place” south of Baghdad. They agreed to “pester the American forces with calculated strikes in several regions.” In all likelihood, these officials were party to the “coded” statement that Abou Fadak made days later.

Field leaders in Iraqi factions that were recently active in al-Anbar and Kirkuk said the groups that have upped their activity since November are one bloc inside a single system. In remarks to Asharq Al-Awsat in December, they said that the tactic relies on groups that can move flexibly in setting up rockets and launching them in a short period of time.

The changes that took place in the past two months of 2023 called for their deployment in new locations to make sure their attacks can reach bases in Erbil and Syria.

So, the factions adopted an “agile” method in carrying out the attacks, said the leader of a small group in an armed faction that has been deployed north of Baghdad in for the past three months.

The groups effectively need four or six members who can launch a rocket or fire a drone while other members of the faction would secure their route and choose the location from where to fire them. Such operations generally need a large truck and one or two smaller vehicles used for surveillance and cases of emergency.

So far, it appears as though the factions have only used three types of rockets in the attacks that they carried out since November 17. All the rockets have been developed by Iran since 2022.

The rockets don’t have the capacity to cause major damage, which is in line with the current agreement, revealed the leader of the local group.

Syrian lesson

The Iraqi factions have gone through various stages of formation and restructuring. The conflict in Syria was a prime location for many of these groups to be formed. There, the Iranians needed a more organized structure so that they could firmly control the ground with the Syrian army.

The al-Nujaba movement and the Kataib Hezbollah may have been set up in Iraq, but other factions actually were formed and took shape in Syria. They grew in power after the eruption of the war in Ukraine because the Iranians feared that the Russians would be distracted by that conflict and neglect Syria.

Who came first Sudani or the ‘Framework’?

Before becoming prime minister in November 2022, Sudani seemed to be an ambitious “second class” Shiite politician.

In December 2019, he resigned from the Islamic Dawa and State of Law coalition, both of which are headed by former PM Nouri al-Maliki, two months after the eruption of popular protests against the ruling Shiite-dominated political class and against Iran’s influence over Iran.

Sudani came to power after a strained period between the factions and PM Kadhimi’s government. The Coordination Framework was supposed to restore political and government influence in Iraq after its rival, cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, quit political life in June 2022.

The Framework was formed on October 11, 2021 to coordinate political work. It later transformed into a coalition that worked on preventing Sadr from forming a government with his Sunni and Kurdish allies.

The Framework did not take part in that alliance, while still vying for state positions, such as the national security agency and intelligence agency. The Framework leaders were very ambitious. They not only sought to end the 2019 protest movement, overcome Sadr and reclaim the state, but they also wanted to be the sole rulers, said a Sunni leader who was part of government formation efforts in 2022.

In other words, the government that Sudani would come to lead was not designed to serve his agenda, but to empower the Framework, with the Iranians being at the heart of this process.

Sudani tried to find room to maneuver in a wider space that was effectively controlled by the Framework.

Three MPs described Sudani as an organized administrative figure. He represented Shiites who separate their ideology from state work. Ultimately, he is viewed as a politician who is running a house that he doesn’t really own.

‘Special Iranian operation’

A former government official, who was in office between 2016 and 2019, said the formation of the cabinet was complicated despite the Framework’s optimism. Iran had set many goals: It wanted many positions and sought the withdrawal of American forces in a way that would not harm Shiite control over Iraq. It wanted to end the protest movement, seize complete control of institutions and change the rules of the game with the Kurds.

Effectively, “we were at an advanced stage of Iran’s influence in Iraq. Iran’s plans in Iraq were being discussed in the open. I later learned that the Iranians were demanding a ‘special operation’ that was launched when Sudani came to power,” he added.

Months after taking office, Sudani started to learn up close how delicate balances of power were maintained.

In January 2015, US national security coordinator Brett McGurk was in Baghdad for routine talks with the PM as part of the strategic agreement between the countries.

Less than a week later, media affiliated with Shiite parties reported that Iranian Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani was in Baghdad and that he too had met with Sudani.

At the time, leading members of the Framework, such as Hadi al-Ameri, head of the Badr organization, was leading a campaign to pressure the government to press for the withdrawal of American troops.

Shiite forces revealed at the time that the government had reached a settlement with its allies on the need to reach a truce with the factions if they wanted to negotiate the withdrawal.

The truce itself was reached with the approval of the Coordination Framework and Iran, revealed a member of the State Administration coalition, which in turn showed the contradictions within the Shiite parties which were rooted in the struggle for power.

The bulletproof vest

On November 5, the 30th day of the Gaza war, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited Baghdad at night. The lasting image of that visit was the bulletproof vest that he wore and how he flew from Baghdad airport to the US embassy onboard a combat helicopter.

At the Iraqi government, state media officials said the US State Department designed this “scene” to increase pressure on Baghdad. The Americans showed that Iraq was no longer trustworthy, said a source who attended government discussions that night.

In contrast, when Shiite threats reached their peak, American officials used to move around Iraq in a completely different manner. US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin visited the country in March 2023. He landed in broad daylight, dressed in civilian attire and shook the hands of the welcoming officers.

Sudani tried to explain to Blinken the situation on the ground: Baghdad could not tolerate the pressure. It could not appease both the Americans and the Iranians because it will be the loser in the end, said three MPs close to the PM.

According to government sources, Blinken interpreted the Iraqi tone as “desperate” and that officials were incapable of taking greater steps to deter the factions.

Sudani played the usual role adopted by governments that came to power after 2003: “He kept the door open to Washington, while Tehran continued to consolidate its position at home,” said the government official.

However, the developments in Gaza demonstrated the difficulty in maintaining this tricky balance.

Exchanging roles towards the abyss

The government official said: “The Iranian plan put in place after October 7 called for the armed factions to freely carry out attacks against the American forces. Meanwhile, the powers that formed the government would ease the pressure piled on the Americans as a result of these strikes for as long as possible.”

This approach did not defuse the divisions between the Shiite factions, which have shown a fierceness on the ground and brusque political approach aimed at gaining Iran’s favor, while also attempting to reap gains from the Iraqi government.

MP Sajjad Salem stressed that the majority of the “resistance” operations have nothing to do with the developments in Gaza. He explained that the factions are “extorting the Shiite partners and government for political gains.”

Take for instance, the Asaib Ahl al-Haq, whose leader Qais Khazali is carrying out political roles to protect the government by getting rid of the “armed militia” label.

Khazali oversees the “media of the resistance”, said trusted sources that have known him since 2015. They revealed that the majority of the leaks that claim to uncover the behind-the-scenes details of the armed factions are actually being released by him to test the political waters.

He has also played a role in silencing opponents of Iran’s influence.

The Iranians view him as very politically ambitious and that he quickly learned how to maneuver and manipulate the public opinion. They believe that it is useful to have someone like him to “modernize the Shiite house and make it more dynamic,” said the former government official.

Khazali is the “only cornerstone” in the strategy of “changing roles” that Iran has adopted. He suspected that the factions on the ground are “irritated by the political favor he enjoys.”

Iran has set a long-term plan for Iraq, but it is stumbling at the details, such as the disputes among the factions, said the official.

Direct confrontation

On the 39th day of the Gaza war, the US carried out a missile strike against the al-Nujaba movement headquarters in Baghdad. It killed a leading member of the group who was running field operations in Syria.

That day, the Americans opened a direct confrontation with the factions, dropping the delicate rules of engagement that placed weight on the partnership with the Sudani government.

On the ground, the armed factions soon changed their positions as a precaution from more American attacks.

The government was meanwhile losing the initiative with all parties. It could not take the initiative from them, and it could not withstand the pressure from the Americans.

The former government official said the heads of Shiite factions and the Iranians discussed the possibility of coming up with a scapegoat to rein in the Americans. The suggestion was rejected and raised fear among Shiite leaders about their political future and future of the government.

The former government official said the Iranians are determined to continue to put pressure on the Americans. Perhaps they want to hold negotiations with them but under certain conditions.

New deal or another collapse

The “changing of roles” is an approach that Shiite factions cannot adopt or excel at, said Akeel Abbas, an Iraqi academic. Such a position cannot be adopted in such strained times, he added, noting that the Al-Aqsa Flood exposed the fragility of the Coordination Framework.

The Sudani government did not have the means to control the conflict between the Americans and the armed factions. Now, it is at a loss and has to deal with parties that have stood back and remained silent and militias that have sought escalation.

Some see an opportunity in the escalation. Selin Uysal, a former Iraq desk officer at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said it was now possible for the US to ease the pressure and introduce new rules to the game because the current active dynamism could lead to unintentional results.

The Americans are taking a risk by quickly using up the room they have to maneuver, while the regional tensions are expected to remain high for several weeks, if not months, to come, she added.

Having a government that is close to Iran – like the one in Baghdad - may be a favorable element during this escalation because this gives Washington a channel of communication to defuse the tensions on the ground, she explained.

An innovative solution is necessary to preserve all parties’ security interests, such as an organized transitional negotiated process over the future of the international coalition. This would give the government and the factions greater room to rein in the more extreme militias, which are not only acting at Iran’s orders but also seeking political gain, she said.

Something of the scapegoat scenario can be implemented here, she suggested.



Floods, Drought Raise Questions over Türkiye’s Tigris, Euphrates Leverage

The Ataturk Dam on the Euphrates River sparked a Türkiye -Syria crisis in the 1990s. (Turkish State Hydraulic Works website)
The Ataturk Dam on the Euphrates River sparked a Türkiye -Syria crisis in the 1990s. (Turkish State Hydraulic Works website)
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Floods, Drought Raise Questions over Türkiye’s Tigris, Euphrates Leverage

The Ataturk Dam on the Euphrates River sparked a Türkiye -Syria crisis in the 1990s. (Turkish State Hydraulic Works website)
The Ataturk Dam on the Euphrates River sparked a Türkiye -Syria crisis in the 1990s. (Turkish State Hydraulic Works website)

Floods that swept northern and eastern Syria in early June, along with a rise in the Euphrates River after heavy rain and increased flows from Türkiye, have revived questions about the water crisis in Syria and Iraq, and whether Türkiye is using the Tigris and Euphrates as a political and security pressure card.

The crisis between Türkiye, Iraq and Syria centers on how to share the waters of the two rivers. Türkiye, the upstream state, controls the main tributaries. Its water policies and expanding dam network have sharply reduced flows, worsened drought and pushed water levels to near-catastrophic lows, especially in Iraq, which has faced its worst drought in more than 80 years.

Türkiye says the Tigris and Euphrates are transboundary rivers and that it has the right to manage them under its territorial sovereignty. Iraq and Syria want them classified as international rivers, with fair-sharing rules and international law applied under historic agreements, including the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne and joint cooperation protocols.

Mismanagement or resource depletion?

Türkiye has been accused of using water as leverage against Iraq and Syria for security reasons, mainly linked to the Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK, and its extensions inside both countries. Those tensions later widened into Turkish air and ground operations in the two neighboring states, leaving a Turkish military presence that has long caused friction, especially between Ankara and Baghdad.

Several issues drive the crisis. The most important is Türkiye’s Southeastern Anatolia Project, designed to develop eastern and southeastern Türkiye. Under the project, Türkiye built major dams and reservoirs, including the Ataturk, Keban and Ilisu dams, to regulate irrigation and generate power. That sharply reduced the water reaching Syria and Iraq, the transit and downstream states.

The impact has been especially severe in Iraq. Water scarcity has battered agriculture, shrunk farmland, damaged the southern marshes listed as a World Heritage site and triggered repeated social and environmental crises.

Lower flows have also hit hydroelectric power generation and drinking water supplies for millions of people. In Syria, drought periods have raised the risks of pollution and disease.

Diplomatic efforts have surfaced from time to time. The countries have reached understandings, joint agreements and bilateral, and sometimes trilateral, memorandums of understanding to secure the minimum vital needs of each state. During severe droughts, Iraq and Syria have also tried to persuade Türkiye to increase flows. Türkiye insists it is a water-poor country and says Iraq’s crisis stems from local mismanagement and poor resource use, not from Turkish dams.

In Mesopotamia, water has rarely been just a natural resource. It has been a foundation of civilization, a source of conflict and, at times, a key to reconstruction and joint development. That was reflected in the Iraq-Türkiye framework agreement on water and development signed in November 2025.

What the Tigris brings together, the Euphrates drives apart

Turkish writer and water affairs researcher Bilgay Duman said the agreement, whose full terms have not been disclosed, marked an important development not only in Ankara-Baghdad relations, but also in redefining how shared resources are managed in the Middle East.

Duman said that after Türkiye, Iraq and Syria emerged as states, regulating the use of resources became a political and legal necessity. It also became a permanent source of dispute. The Euphrates turned into a three-way issue, while the Tigris became central to Turkish-Iraqi relations.

Early attempts were made to agree on water shares. The 1921 Ankara Agreement and the 1946 agreement between Türkiye and Iraq laid technical foundations for cooperation, including data sharing and flood control.

Later came the 1987 Syrian-Turkish agreement, a temporary deal to share Euphrates waters during the five-year filling of the Ataturk Dam reservoir.

Signed on July 17, 1987, the agreement committed Türkiye to provide an annual average of more than 500 cubic meters per second at the Turkish-Syrian border until a final arrangement was reached among the three Euphrates states.

On April 17, 1989, Syria and Iraq signed an agreement setting Iraq’s share at 9.106 billion cubic meters a year through the Syrian border, Syria’s share at 6.627 billion cubic meters and Türkiye’s at 15.700 billion cubic meters.

Syria registered its agreement with Türkiye at the United Nations in 1994 to secure its minimum share, and Iraq’s, of Euphrates waters. But that did not solve the problem.

Water for the PKK

As accusations grew that Türkiye was using water to pressure its neighbors, squeeze Kurds in Syria and push Iraq to act against the PKK and classify it as a terrorist organization, the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses set out the principles of no harm and equitable distribution.

It also required states to consider the water, economic and social needs of all riparian countries, as well as the needs of populations dependent on the watercourse and its direct and possible effects.

The convention strengthened Iraq and Syria’s legal position against Türkiye because both countries have large areas along the Tigris and Euphrates. Syria was among the first states to ratify it. Türkiye did not join, saying it harmed its interests and water rights, and voted against its adoption.

Syria, where the Euphrates irrigates more than 640,000 hectares, did not turn to international arbitration to secure its water rights from Türkiye. International law remains inconclusive in such cases, and arbitration requires both sides to agree.

Syrian support for the PKK, and its decision to allow the group’s fighters to use northern Syria as a rear base, pushed Türkiye into a harder position and led Ankara to link that support to the water dispute.

In 1993, Turkish-Syrian talks were held in Ankara to reach a final agreement on water shares. They produced nothing beyond the temporary 1987 arrangement, which was tied only to the filling of Lake Ataturk.

The same period saw Syria and Türkiye sign a joint development agreement on the Orontes River, which rises in Lebanon’s upper Bekaa Valley. Türkiye had been excluded from sharing the river with Syria and Lebanon in 1994. Giving up its share was a small price for greater benefit from the Euphrates.

Only 10% of the Orontes reached Türkiye’s Hatay province, and by then it was polluted and unusable. For decades, residents of the province bordering Syria, historically known as the Sanjak of Alexandretta, saw central government policies as unfair and blamed them for marginalizing the area and depriving it of a natural resource for political, ethnic and religious reasons.

Syrian revolution, Turkish opportunity

After the Syrian uprising against Bashar al-Assad began, Türkiye moved quickly to complete the Sanliurfa water canals project in 2012. The canals allowed water held at the Ataturk Dam to irrigate the border plains with Syria in Harran, Mardin and Ceylanpinar. The Silvan Dam was also filled in 2011. Syria took no countermeasure because Assad’s authorities were busy suppressing the uprising.

Syria’s approach to the water file showed that its main strategy against Türkiye had been to exploit internal security and the PKK threat, a strategy that ended with the Adana Agreement. Other options seemed impossible because of Türkiye’s military strength, external alliances and control of the Euphrates source.

Iraq: Drought and unrest

Iraq, which gets 60% of its water needs from Türkiye, has been the hardest hit by shortages. It faced successive severe crises across its territory, especially after the Ilisu Dam, built on the upper Tigris in Türkiye, began operating in 2020. Other dams on smaller tributaries added to the pressure. Tensions with Türkiye over water reached their peak.

Other environmental issues, including tree-cutting in northern Iraq during a Turkish military campaign against PKK militants, deepened tensions with Ankara. Pressure on the Turkish government produced little beyond a slight delay in filling Ilisu, postponing the problem rather than solving it.

In the summer of 2018, dwindling water resources and pollution caused fish to die in the Euphrates. Water shortages then became a major cause of social unrest across Iraq in the following years, culminating in the worst drought in 80 years in 2025.

The Ilisu Dam reduced Iraq’s share of Tigris waters to nearly 60% because of power generation.

In June 2025, Iraq called for water not to be used as a political pressure card and urged a joint regional vision based on fair distribution of transboundary waters. At the same time, it noted progress in negotiations and in the work of joint committees with Türkiye and Iran.

Despite this, Iraq and Türkiye kept positive relations, which expanded under Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani. The two sides reached understandings on security, the economy, trade, water and energy, while focusing on cooperation over the Development Road project.

Water disputes, also tied to security as in the Syrian case, became a route to cooperation after Iraq’s National Security Council declared the PKK a banned group in 2024.

Development Road runs through politics

On Nov. 2, 2025, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein signed a document establishing a mechanism to finance projects under a framework agreement for water cooperation. The mechanism implements the water cooperation framework agreement signed in 2024 during Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to Iraq.

The agreement set a framework for water projects worth billions of dollars. Turkish companies will build new infrastructure to improve water-use efficiency and storage in Iraq. The projects will be financed from Iraqi oil revenues, in an attempt to turn crude exports into water security.

According to details that have emerged but have not been formally announced by either side, the first projects include water-collection dams and land-reclamation initiatives.

Ankara described the initiative as mutually beneficial for regional stability and economic cooperation.

“We in Türkiye are keen to support Iraq’s security, development and safety, and our support in this regard is absolute,” Fidan said at the signing ceremony.

Hussein said the agreement was needed to protect water security, food production and economic stability. He said Baghdad had long suffered from a weak position because of the absence of formal treaties regulating the use of Tigris and Euphrates waters.

Securing Erdogan’s presidency in 2028?

The agreement stirred doubts and fears among some Iraqi politicians and water experts. Some said it serves Türkiye more than Iraq and supports Erdogan’s effort to remain president after 2028.

Some Iraqi political forces reject the agreements with Türkiye, including those linked to the Development Road project and water cooperation. They say the deals could make Iraq dependent on Türkiye.

Allocating oil revenues to contracts with Turkish companies also raises legal and constitutional questions, along with concerns about corruption, weak transparency and possible obstacles caused by relying on one funding source, oil, which is exposed to global price swings.

Some opponents point to the absence of a final, binding legal framework agreed by both sides that defines the water share Türkiye must release to Iraq from the Tigris and Euphrates.

Although Türkiye and the PKK have begun a process to end the group’s activity, the PKK file and the presence of its members in northern Iraq, in areas beyond Baghdad’s control, could still obstruct implementation of the agreement.

The issue is not limited to Iraq’s domestic situation. It also touches the regional balance, with some parties seeing stronger Iraq-Türkiye ties as a source of pressure. That could turn Iraq into an arena for regional competition and influence struggles.

The Ottoman legacy

Duman said the agreement serves the interests of both Türkiye and Iraq. He said the water problem between the two countries did not emerge in recent decades, but dates back to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, when the Tigris and Euphrates changed from internal rivers inside one political entity into transboundary rivers between independent states.

What marks the current phase in Turkish-Iraqi relations, he said, is the gradual shift from conflict over water shares to managing mutual benefit, and a broader rethinking of transboundary resources as a driver of integration, not a permanent source of tension.

He said the agreement’s most important new feature is the direct link between water and energy. Revenues from oil Türkiye imports from Iraq will finance water projects inside Iraq.

Turkish companies specializing in dams, modern irrigation networks, water treatment and waste reduction will carry them out. That bypasses one of Iraq’s biggest development obstacles, lack of funding, without turning to foreign loans or the conditions of international financial institutions.

In an article on the Turkish platform Fikir Turu, Duman said the model gives Türkiye a new role, not just as a state that controls water sources but as a partner in rebuilding Iraq’s infrastructure. That strengthens Türkiye’s regional influence through economic and development tools rather than hard-power tools.

The model could also expand regionally and become a practical reference for future cooperation with Syria, especially on Euphrates water management, if the right political conditions emerge.

Water diplomacy in the Levant could then shift from a source of fragility and chronic conflict into a platform for trust-building and regional integration, by linking natural resources to economic development rather than reducing them to sovereignty and conflict.

Prominent Turkish transboundary water researcher Dr. Tugba Evrim Maden told Asharq Al-Awsat that shared water resources need joint management based on technological solutions, not conflict or legal disputes.

She said the problems of downstream countries mostly stem from political instability, destroyed infrastructure, poor resource use and waste.

Türkiye is not rich in water

Contrary to common belief, Türkiye is not rich in water resources. It is not water-abundant compared with its region. It lies in a semi-arid climate zone and has less annual water per person than its neighbors, North America and water-rich northern Europe.

In water-rich countries, the annual per capita share of usable water exceeds 10,000 cubic meters. In Türkiye, it is about 1,350 cubic meters, according to Turkish Foreign Ministry data.

If the population reaches 100 million in 2030, Türkiye’s per capita water share is expected to fall to about 1,000 cubic meters. Because Türkiye’s water resources vary by region and season, they cannot meet current and expected needs everywhere. Some areas have abundant water that is not suitable for use, while densely populated industrial areas lack enough water.

Türkiye’s arid and semi-arid regions receive rain for only four or five months a year. That makes water development projects, including dams and reservoirs that store rainwater for year-round use, vital to sustainable social and economic development.

At the same time, Türkiye’s energy consumption is rising because of rapid urbanization and industrialization. Its per capita energy use is only one-sixth of the European Union average. Türkiye has no major oil or natural gas resources, so it is pursuing domestic resources to meet rising energy needs, including renewable, cheap and environmentally friendly hydropower.

The UN Convention to Combat Desertification’s report, “Global Drought Hotspots 2023-2025,” placed Türkiye among critical areas in the drought belt stretching from southern Europe to the Middle East.

The report warned that current trends could push Türkiye into severe water scarcity by 2030, with nearly 80% of its farmland potentially exposed to repeated and severe drought waves over the next decade.

As climate change intensifies, Türkiye is nearing a crisis that threatens its water security. Turkish and international experts say it is approaching the critical threshold of water poverty and could be officially classified as water-poor by 2030 if current conditions continue.

Türkiye’s per capita share of renewable water has fallen from about 1,650 cubic meters at the start of the millennium to below 1,300 cubic meters now, nearing the UN red line of 1,000 cubic meters a year.

The 19% decline in two decades reflects not only a resource crisis, but also an unsustainable consumption pattern and a water management system facing a serious structural challenge, water experts say.

Türkiye suffered severe drought in 2025, marked by scarce rain, record temperatures and dried-up lakes and water bodies. It recorded its hottest December in more than half a century, with rainfall more than 50% below seasonal averages, according to the Turkish State Meteorological Service.

Lack of response

Experts say that despite growing warnings about water poverty, the authorities’ response remains below the scale of the challenge.

Mustafa Chashmaz, a climate professor at Karadeniz Technical University, warned that evaporation caused by rising temperatures has become one of the main drivers of water loss. He said that storing water in broad-surface dams without accounting for climate conditions makes reservoirs more vulnerable to evaporation as heat waves intensify.

He called for urgent technical solutions, including deeper reservoirs less exposed to sunlight, covered basins in sensitive areas, and a ban on the use of freshwater in private swimming pools at coastal resorts, replacing it with treated saltwater.

He also said state institutions are part of the problem because public facilities consume large amounts of water without effective conservation systems or modern saving technologies.

Türkiye faces one of the most complex environmental challenges in its modern history: widening desertification, worsening drought and rising environmental stress. Recent years have brought repeated severe heat waves and forest fires, including about 3,000 fires in the summer of 2025.

Türkiye’s water crisis extends beyond its borders and affects regional water security, especially in Syria and Iraq. Türkiye controls about 90% of Euphrates waters and a large share of Tigris waters.

At the opening of water projects in October 2025, Erdogan said Türkiye was not water-rich, as some believe. Annual average rainfall does not exceed 574 millimeters, he said, far below the global average.

Experts say agriculture consumes 70% to 75% of total water withdrawals, while cities lose 20% to 35% through leaking networks. Dam efficiency is also weakened by evaporation and sediment buildup.

The Turkish government recently announced a program to restore shrinking or dried-up lakes, including Lake Marmara in western Türkiye. It also plans to invest in wastewater recycling plants for irrigation, agriculture and industry, and to build new desalination plants in areas with chronic freshwater shortages, especially western Anatolia and the Mediterranean coast.

Urgent priorities include cutting urban water losses to below 15%, expanding high-efficiency irrigation systems to save up to 30% of agricultural consumption, reducing evaporation by improving reservoir design and expanding underground storage, raising treated-water reuse to 20% of urban demand, adjusting water tariffs, shifting to less water-intensive crops and adopting mandatory drought management plans.


Sudan’s Muslim Brotherhood at a Crossroads

Ali Ahmed Karti, Secretary General of the Sudanese Islamic Movement. (Facebook)
Ali Ahmed Karti, Secretary General of the Sudanese Islamic Movement. (Facebook)
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Sudan’s Muslim Brotherhood at a Crossroads

Ali Ahmed Karti, Secretary General of the Sudanese Islamic Movement. (Facebook)
Ali Ahmed Karti, Secretary General of the Sudanese Islamic Movement. (Facebook)

Sudan is passing through an exceptionally complex phase as the war enters its fourth year and military and political alliances continue to shift at a rapid pace. With factions that have defected from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) joining the Sudanese Armed Forces, alongside the Joint Forces of Darfur’s armed movements, the Sudan Shield Forces, and formations linked to the Islamist movement, a new balance of power is gradually emerging within the anti-RSF camp.

This evolving landscape reflects a temporary convergence of interests among actors that differ sharply in their backgrounds, objectives, and visions for Sudan’s future. While confronting the RSF remains the primary factor uniting these forces, underlying political and military differences raise serious questions about the durability of their alliance.

Sudan’s history suggests that wartime coalitions do not necessarily evolve into stable partnerships in peacetime. Instead, they often become arenas for new struggles over influence, power, and postwar arrangements. Understanding the emerging balance of forces is therefore crucial to assessing whether cooperation or confrontation will define the next phase.

In recent months, the Sudanese army has become the principal military umbrella under which a range of disparate groups operate.

The Joint Forces drawn from Darfur’s armed movements bring battlefield experience and significant combat capability. The Sudan Shield Forces have emerged as a growing tribal and military force, while former RSF members are seeking to secure a place within the new order.

Necessary alliance

This configuration has created what amounts to an “alliance of necessity.” Its members are united by a common objective — defeating the RSF — but not by a shared political project. Each faction has its own calculations regarding future power-sharing arrangements and influence.

Within this context, a central question concerns the place of Sudan’s Islamist movement in the postwar landscape.

For decades, Islamists constituted one of the most influential forces within the Sudanese state through their political, organizational, and security networks. Today, however, they no longer monopolize the instruments of power.

Many of the groups that have risen during the conflict do not subscribe to the Islamist project. Some also carry a long history of political rivalry with Islamists dating back to the era of the National Salvation regime led by ousted former President Omar al-Bashir.

This has produced a striking paradox: the broader the coalition supporting the army becomes, the smaller the Islamists’ relative weight within it. They are no longer the sole source of political backing, military support, or social mobilization. Instead, they have become one actor among several competing centers of influence, each pursuing its own interests.

Sudanese army soldiers parade in the streets of eastern Sudan's city of Gedaref on August 14, 2025 to mark the 71st anniversary of the formation of the Sudanese army. (AFP)

Mounting pressure

Signs are growing that the Islamist movement is facing increasing political pressure, both domestically and internationally.

Retired Maj. Gen. Abdel-Hadi Abdel-Basit, a strategic analyst close to Islamist circles, said the movement is confronting unprecedented challenges.

Calls have intensified for Islamists to be excluded from post-war arrangements and even held accountable for their role during decades of rule and the allegations associated with that period.

In recent months, several prominent Islamist figures were detained and later released, while National Congress Party leader Al-Numan Abdel Halim remains in custody.

These developments coincided with what many Islamists believe were externally driven pressures, including the US State Department’s designation of Sudan’s Islamist movement, the National Congress Party, and the Al-Baraa ibn Malik Battalion as terrorist organizations.

Regional and international actors have likewise called for Islamists to be excluded from any future political process.

Such positions have surfaced in consultations involving both the Quad mechanism — comprising Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and United States — and the Quintet mechanism, which includes the United Nations, the European Union, the African Union, the Arab League, and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

Civilian political forces, however, view the decline of Islamist influence primarily as a consequence of Sudan’s democratic transition rather than the war itself.

Bakri Eljack, spokesman for the democratic civilian coalition Somoud (Resilience), argued that army commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan may be able to distance himself from the Islamists, but their influence within state institutions remains significant.

Any effort to remove them would require a broad political alliance capable of managing the next phase, he explained.

Sharif Mohamed Osman, of the Sudanese Congress Party, said the Islamist project and National Congress Party rule were rejected by the people will during the December 2018 revolution.

He noted that efforts associated with prolonging the conflict have further weakened the movement, while international pressure and sanctions have deepened its political isolation.

Yet, predictions of the Islamists’ complete demise may be premature. The movement still possesses extensive organizational networks, decades of political experience, and influence within parts of the state and society.

Even so, current trends suggest that regaining the dominant position it enjoyed during the Bashir era may be more difficult than ever before.


Can Iran Maintain its Influence in Iraq?

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi meets Iranian Ambassador Mohammad Kazem Al Sadeq in Baghdad. (Government media)
Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi meets Iranian Ambassador Mohammad Kazem Al Sadeq in Baghdad. (Government media)
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Can Iran Maintain its Influence in Iraq?

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi meets Iranian Ambassador Mohammad Kazem Al Sadeq in Baghdad. (Government media)
Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi meets Iranian Ambassador Mohammad Kazem Al Sadeq in Baghdad. (Government media)

Iraqi politicians are closely watching what they describe as the potential “side effects” of any future US-Iran agreement and how it could reshape the balance of power inside Iraq.

Some observers argue that a deal would likely strengthen Washington’s influence while diminishing Tehran’s leverage. Others contend that Iran could emerge from the process with a renewed and possibly more durable form of dominance in Iraq over the coming months and years.

With significant ambiguity still surrounding the US-Iran memorandum of understanding - particularly regarding Tehran’s regional proxies and allied armed groups - signals from both capitals have done little to clarify Iraq’s future position within the competing spheres of influence of the two longtime adversaries.

The US Position

Despite repeated American warnings to Baghdad against bringing factions designated on the US terrorism list into government, Washington’s broader position remains unclear.

Asked by Alhurra, the US-funded Arabic-language broadcaster, whether a US-Iran agreement would affect Iraq and whether it might weaken or strengthen armed factions, Joshua Harris, the chargé d’affaires at the US Embassy in Baghdad, declined to speculate on the outcome.
Instead, he said the priority should be an Iraqi government that places the interests of its citizens first, noting that the United States approaches foreign policy by prioritizing its own national interests.

Harris added that the foundation of a mutually beneficial partnership between Washington and Baghdad depends on the Iraqi state confronting the challenge posed by militias and ensuring that weapons remain exclusively under state control. He described this as the essential benchmark that Iraq must meet in order to deepen its partnership with the United States.

A handout photo made available by the Iraqi Prime Minister's Media Office on 17 June 2026 shows Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi (L) meeting with US Special Presidential Envoy for Syria and Iraq Tom Barrack (R) in Baghdad, Iraq, 15 June 2026. EPA/IRAQI PRIME MINISTER'S MEDIA OFFICE

Iran Regains Momentum

At the same time, the Iranian role appears to be returning to the level seen before the war that erupted at the end of February.

Media outlets close to Tehran report that Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi plans to visit Baghdad soon to discuss the talks held in Switzerland and preparations for the funeral procession of Iran’s former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

Earlier, Tehran Mayor Alireza Zakani announced that Khamenei’s body would be transferred in early July as part of the funeral arrangements preceding burial ceremonies.

Even amid uncertainty surrounding those plans, some observers argue that the announcement itself underscores the extent of Iran’s influence in Iraq.

The Militias Question

Although Iran-aligned factions created security challenges through their involvement in the war on Tehran’s side, Iran’s ambassador to Iraq, Mohammad Kazem Al Sadeq, recently insisted that Iran “has not asked any party to intervene because it did not need such intervention.”

The remark suggested that Iraqi armed factions volunteered to support Iran rather than acting at Tehran’s request.

On the issue of restricting weapons to state control - a matter on which Washington has adopted a notably firm position - the Iranian ambassador said it was an internal Iraqi matter and that Tehran would respect any decision taken by the Iraqi government.

At the same time, he stressed the need to understand why armed factions wish to retain their weapons and to address what he described as their concerns and fears.

The source argued that Iran has demonstrated over the past two decades that it knows precisely what it wants from Iraq, unlike what he characterized as inconsistent American policy. He predicted that this situation would continue even after any US-Iran agreement is signed.

According to the source, who requested anonymity, Iran is likely to adopt a less visible approach after an agreement, one that avoids provoking Washington while preserving its traditional influence through allied political parties and figures.

Mourners attend the funeral of members of the Iraqi armed group Kataib Hezbollah who were killed in an airstrike that targeted a PMF headquarters near the western al‑Qaim district on the Syrian border, amid the US-Israel conflict with Iran, in Baghdad, Iraq, March 2, 2026. REUTERS/Thaier Al-Suda

The Oil Card

Opponents of Iranian influence take a different view. They believe the administration of President Donald Trump is both willing and able to curb Tehran’s reach through mounting pressure on Iran and sustained influence over decision-making in Baghdad.

These groups argue that the threat of economic sanctions alone could prompt Iraqi leaders - particularly Shiite political parties - to reconsider the risks associated with continued Iranian influence.

A key factor is Iraq’s dependence on the US-controlled financial system. Revenues from Iraqi oil sales are deposited with the US Federal Reserve before being transferred back to Iraqi banks, giving Washington a powerful source of leverage over Baghdad.