Three questions are raised by the decision of French President Emmanuel Macron to adopt the Moroccan approach to the Sahara issue, which is included in the Rabat Plan proposed in 2007: the first is the timing, the second is the reasons and motivations, and the third is the consequences and results.
Macron, along with French diplomacy, are aware of how sensitive the Sahara issue is to Algeria, and they know that the Algerian side will not be able to absorb the radical change in the French position.
French political sources said that the French president wanted to achieve two goals: the first is to take advantage of the occasion of Morocco’s celebration of the ascension of King Mohammed VI to the throne “to offer him a diplomatic and political gift in a file that the latter had made a compass for his country’s foreign policy.” Macron went further than Spain when it largely adopted the Moroccan solution plan in 2022.
The second reason for the timing of Macron’s initiative is linked, according to the political sources, to the internal political situation in France, where the government has resigned, parliament is on vacation and the country is busy with the Olympics.
It is likely that Macron wanted to benefit from the current institutional “vacuum” before forming a new government, which may have a different approach to the Sahara issue, despite the fact that the French Constitution entrusts the President of the Republic with drawing up the country’s foreign and defense policy.
Press reports revealed that French diplomats began working on the new approach in the spring of 2023, and that many meetings were held between diplomatic officials from the two sides.
These reports also referred to the pressure exerted by Moroccan diplomacy on France, and one of the arguments, according to French “L’Opinion”, was to remind Paris that former President Jacques Chirac, who was a great friend of Morocco, was the one who called on Rabat, since 2003, to present its autonomy plan, in order to bypass a Sahrawi referendum that would decide on the fate of the Sahara.
L'Opinion pointed to another factor: the departure of Bernard Emie, the former ambassador to Algeria and director of French foreign intelligence, from the scene last spring. Emie was one of the strongest advocates for the establishment of a special relationship between Paris and Algeria, and his absence left the door open for those who continued to assert that Algeria did not respond to the initiatives of Macron, who during the past three years made major efforts to close the controversial files with Algiers.
Another French political source added that Paris saw today that Algeria’s ability to influence its immediate surroundings, especially in the Sahel region, has declined significantly after its dispute with two neighboring countries, Mali and Niger. On the other hand, Morocco’s return to the African Union could constitute a “platform” for joint French-Moroccan action at the political, economic, and investment levels.
Politics cannot be separated from economic, trade and investment interests. France has major interests in Morocco, which may have played some role in pushing the French authorities to change their approach, and causing a “heavy” crisis with Algeria.
In response to Algeria’s decision to immediately withdraw its ambassador to Paris, Said Makousi, a French diplomatic source said that France “took note of Algeria’s decision, which is a sovereign decision.”
He added: “We are determined to strengthen our bilateral relations with Algeria; we look to the future, and our great ambition is to work for the benefit of our two peoples.”
