Yahya al-Sinwar: Hamas’ Top Leader as Recalled by Former Fellow Inmates

Sinwar arrives for a Quds Day commemoration in Gaza on April 14, 2023. (Getty Images)
Sinwar arrives for a Quds Day commemoration in Gaza on April 14, 2023. (Getty Images)
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Yahya al-Sinwar: Hamas’ Top Leader as Recalled by Former Fellow Inmates

Sinwar arrives for a Quds Day commemoration in Gaza on April 14, 2023. (Getty Images)
Sinwar arrives for a Quds Day commemoration in Gaza on April 14, 2023. (Getty Images)

The Palestinian group Hamas’ unprecedented attack against Israel on October 7 turned the spotlight on the movement’s prominent official Yahya al-Sinwar, who is the mastermind of the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation.

Sinwar was named on Tuesday as Hamas’ new leader, succeeding Ismail Haniyeh, who was killed in a presumed Israeli strike in Tehran last week.

Sinwar grew up in Gaza after his family was displaced there from the city of Majdal Aqab following the 1948 Nakba. His endured a difficult childhood and witnessed the 1967 setback, deepening his hatred towards Israel that was only compounded by the harsh and miserable life in Gaza and its camps.

The experience ingrained in him the “pressing need for revenge” that would shape the man he is today. His view of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was always marked by his recalling of the Nakba and the suffering endured by his parents and the Palestinians. He often spoke of his need to “create a shock and change the balances of power,” recalled those who know him.

Sinwar earned his education at schools in the Khan Younis camp. He later graduated with a degree in Arabic Studies from the Islamic University. He joined the “Islamic bloc” and eventually rose in prominence to form the “Al-Majd” agency – Hamas' internal security agency – that played a major role in pursuing agents linked to the Israeli security forces.

His security role drew the attention of Israeli forces and he was arrested in the late 1980s. Israel accused him of killing four “collaborators” and sentenced him to four life terms. He was held in various Israeli prisons and spent long periods in solitary confinement.

His imprisonment did not impact his work in Hamas. He led the movement from behind bars, while becoming increasingly paranoid. He learned Hebrew and led prisoner strikes and negotiations, winning some rounds and losing others.

He spent over two decades behind bars as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict witnessed intifadas, wars and periods of peace. It wasn’t until his brother kidnapped an Israeli soldier and Hamas exchanged him for a thousand Palestinian detainees, including Sinwar, that he gained his freedom and started carving the shape of a new phase in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Asharq Al-Awsat spoke to his colleagues, former inmates and other acquaintances who met Sinwar over the years to learn more about the mastermind of the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation that has changed the conflict forever.

Sinwar speaks to the media in Gaza on October 28, 2019. (Reuters)

First meetings

Ismat Mansour, a former prisoner and member of the Democratic Front, spent years in prison where he met Sinwar in the late 1990s. “When you first meet him, you see a normal, simple and religious man,” he said. “But he also has a harsh streak and can be severe in demeanor.”

“He is religious, but not preachy. His religious background helps shape his relations,” he added.

Mansour said Sinwar’s difficult childhood helped shape his grudge and spite against Israel that has shaped his policies. “He is not one for compromise.”

Abdel Fattah al-Dawla, a former prisoner and Fatah member, spent years held in Israeli jails. He met Sinwar once in 2006. By that point, Sinwar’s reputation had already preceded him and Dawla had the impression of a severe and unpromising man.

This impression was confirmed when they met in the Bir al-Saba prison. Dawla remarked that the “social Sinwar is different than the Hamas leader. The Sinwar with whom you can discuss various general affairs is different than the Sinwar with whom you can discuss issues related to Palestinian factions.”

He may be sociable when discussing general issues, and firm and unyielding when discussing conflict. “It is as if he were two different people,” he added.

Salaheddine Taleb, a former prisoner and Hamas member, spent years in jail with Sinwar. He was released along with Sinwar in the exchange for Gilad Shalit in 2011.

Recalling his first meeting with Sinwar, he said: “You are struck by his humility and jovial relations with others.” However, his security background and role set him apart from other Hamas leaders. “He isn’t a preacher, but the founder of the al-Majd security apparatus. This greatly impacts who he is as a person,” he went on to say. “Despite his strong social relations, when it came to security affairs, he was very strict and uncompromising.”

Security paranoia

Sinwar remained Hamas’ number one security official inside and outside prison. In the mid-90s, Israel dealt Hamas and its cells in the West Bank and Gaza a series of painful blows, including the assassination of top figures, such as Yahya Ayyash and Imad Aqel, and the arrest of numerous members.

These developments shook Hamas to the core and created a sense of paranoia among its members. Sinwar was the mover and shaker of this period. Taleb recalled this “difficult” phase during which he joined Sinwar in running security affairs from prison.

The paranoia led to investigations and interrogations within Hamas ranks. There were security breaches, assassinations and arrests. Hamas was not prepared or experienced enough to handle such challenges, said Taleb. Accusations of collaboration with Israel were thrown at several members. Some of these accusations turned out to be true, while others fell victim to the paranoia.

“It was a difficult phase and no one came out of it unscathed,” said Taleb.

Dawla revealed that investigations were carried out with anyone even remotely suspected of having ties with Israel, leading to tragic consequences. Sinwar oversaw several of these internal investigations. “Some members were killed under torture and we later learned that they were among the movement’s finest members,” he lamented.

Sinwar and al-Qassam

Sinwar was still in prison when the al-Qassam Brigade, Hamas’ military wing, was established in the early 90s and began carrying out operations against the Israeli army and settlers. Sinwar began to develop his ties with the Qassam from behind bars with the arrest of several of the Brigades’ members.

Mansour said: “Sinwar has a security-oriented mind. His security paranoia never leaves him.” The ties Sinwar that would forge with the Qassam would lead to the Shalit deal and his release from prison in 2011.

Sinwar’s younger brother, Mohammed, was a prominent member of the Qassam. He took part in the operation that led to Shalit’s kidnapping in 2006 and release years later.

Yahya’s release would consolidate his position in Hamas and elevate him among his members. He would take on a leading role in Hamas’ security and military operations, said Mansour.

Qassam Brigades members greet Sinwar in Gaza on April 30, 2022. (AFP)

Shalit and the exchange

Shalit’s kidnapping changed the equation and negotiations over the prisoner swap. Sinwar was at the top of the list of detainees it wanted to be released. In prison, the kidnapping changed Sinwar’s standing and he started to play a greater role in the negotiations.

Sinwar became a major figure after the kidnapping and after Hamas took control of Gaza. The movement was now in control of an entire territory and had an Israeli prisoner, who was being held by Sinwar’s brother, said Mansour.

The kidnapping gave Sinwar “unprecedented power inside prison that no other Hamas official had ever enjoyed safe for Ahmed Yassin and Salah Shehade, who were the first generation of prisoners,” he continued.

Sinwar became the key figure in the prisoner exchange and he used his new power to consolidate his position and influence in making decisions inside and outside prison.

Brain tumor

As the negotiations gained traction, Sinwar suffered a life-threatening brain tumor. The discovery left the Israelis at a loss because Sinwar was the main official in charge of the negotiations. Should they treat him or leave him to die? His death in the middle of the negotiations would prompt accusations that Israel had killed him and abort the prisoner swap. No one was going to believe that he had died from a tumor, regardless of the evidence.

Sinwar, meanwhile, was very adamant about rejecting treatment by the prison administration, said Dawla. Eventually his situation deteriorated, losing consciousness at one point, so he had to receive treatment at the prison. The administration declared an emergency at the prison and a helicopter was flown in to take Sinwar to hospital where he was soon operated on, recalled Dawla.

“It was a very complex and dangerous operation. He could have died,” he added.

In wake of the October 7 attack, Israelis lament that Sinwar was ever operated on, revealed Mansour. Then head of prison intelligence has recently repeatedly said she regrets saving Sinwar’s life.

2011 release

After his release in the 2011 swap, Sinwar went about consolidating his position in Hamas, especially in its military wing. He was elected member of the movement’s politburo in 2012 and immediately focused his attention on the military wing, deepening his ties with its officials.

Sinwar made it his mission to become the number one figure in Hamas as soon as he was released from prison, said Mansour.

His influence kept growing and he defeated Ismail Haniyeh and other prominent figures in the 2017 politburo elections.

The 2021 elections were marred with fraud allegations and the vote was “repeated three or four times” to ensure that Sinwar was the victor. Mansour said this was all part of the buildup to the October 7 attack. “It was clear that Sinwar and the Qassam had their plans,” he stated. Soon after, Sinwar worked tirelessly in developing the military wing.

“Sinwar only aspires to be the number one official in the movement. He is extremely ambitious. That drove him, even when he was in prison, to always be the top official in Hamas,” said Dawla.

“He believes that none of the current leaders have the right to be superiors over him. Not now, not ever,” he added.

Khalil al-Hayyah, Ismail Haniyeh and Sinwar visit the Rafah crossing on September 19, 2017. (Reuters)

Early signs of the Aqsa flood

Dawla said Sinwar always wanted “to do something big”. He believed that several Hamas and Qassam figures remained in prison and the Shalit swap was not enough to release them. Several of the remaining detainees sent angry messages to the Hamas leadership over this, leaving Sinwar with a “moral obligation to rectify what the Shalit deal could not achieve,” explained Dawla.

Several factors led to the buildup of the October 7 attack. Sinwar tried reconciliation with the Palestinian Authority and failed. He tried another prisoner swap and failed. He tried to lift the siege on Gaza and also failed, recalled Mansour. So, he had no choice but to carry out the al-Aqsa Flood Operation.

“Had other options been available, the attack may never have happened,” he added.

Symbol of the war

Sinwar has become Israel’s symbol of the Gaza war, stressed Mansour. He has become the biggest catch for its military and political institutions. Israel holds him fully responsible for the October 7 attack and wants the world to associate the war with him, putting him on the same level as Hitler, Saddam, Qaddafi and other dictators in the world, he added.

Israel is trying to lump all the current developments and the entire Palestinian cause in this “diabolical” figure, he said. The Israelis believe that the war will end with Sinwar’s assassination or arrest.

Those who knew Sinwar during his time in prison speak of his pragmatism. Mansour noted: “Some will be surprised to learn that he can strike deals. He has already struck them with the Israelis and can reach middle ground according to his views.”

The situation is different now. Israel views Sinwar as a “dead man walking.” It has razed Gaza to the ground searching for him. “The amount of hatred, incitement and accusations that have been thrown his way by Israel and across the globe make it impossible for Israel to take one step back by striking a deal with him,” stressed Mansour.

“Israel will never be at peace knowing that he is alive,” he remarked.

On Sinwar’s end, Taleb stated that after all the destruction, he is unlikely to show any flexibility in negotiations. “I believe that he planned and predicted that the war will continue for the months – if not years – to come.”



Is Iran Pushing Houthis Toward Military Action Against Washington?

Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 
Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 
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Is Iran Pushing Houthis Toward Military Action Against Washington?

Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 
Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 

As US military movements intensify in the Middle East and the possibility of strikes on Iran looms, Yemen’s Houthi group has continued military preparations, mobilizing fighters and establishing new weapons sites.

The Houthi mobilization comes at a time when the group is widely viewed as one of Iran’s most important regional arms for retaliation.

Although the Iran-backed group has not issued any official statement declaring its position on a potential US attack on Iran, its leaders have warned Washington against any military action and against bearing full responsibility for any escalation and its consequences.

They have hinted that any response would be handled in accordance with the group’s senior leadership's assessment, after evaluating developments and potential repercussions.

Despite these signals, some interpret the Houthis’ stance as an attempt to avoid drawing the attention of the current US administration, led by President Donald Trump, to the need for preemptive action in anticipation of a potential Houthi response.

The Trump administration previously launched a military campaign against the group in the spring of last year, inflicting heavy losses.

Islam al-Mansi, an Egyptian researcher specializing in Iranian affairs, said Iran may avoid burning all its cards unless absolutely necessary, particularly given US threats to raise the level of escalation should any Iranian military proxies intervene or take part in a confrontation.

Iran did not resort to using its military proxies during its confrontation with Israel or during a limited US strike last summer because it did not perceive an existential threat, al-Mansi said.

That calculation could change in the anticipated confrontation, potentially prompting Houthi intervention, including targeting US allies, interests, and military forces, he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Al-Mansi added that although Iran previously offered, within a negotiating framework, to abandon its regional proxies, including the Houthis, this makes it more likely that Tehran would use them in retaliation, noting that Iran created these groups to defend its territory from afar.

Many intelligence reports suggest that Iran’s Revolutionary Guard has discussed with the Houthis the activation of alternative support arenas in a potential US-Iran confrontation, including the use of cells and weapons not previously deployed.

Visible readiness

In recent days, Chinese media outlets cited an unnamed Houthi military commander as saying the group had raised its alert level and carried out inspections of missile launch platforms in several areas across Yemen, including the strategically important Red Sea region.

In this context, Yemeni political researcher Salah Ali Salah said the Houthis would participate in defending Iran against any US attacks, citing the group’s media rhetoric accompanying mass rallies, which openly supports Iran’s right to defend itself.

While this rhetoric maintains some ambiguity regarding Iran, it repeatedly invokes the war in Gaza and renews Houthi pledges to resume military escalation in defense of the besieged enclave’s population, Salah told Asharq Al-Awsat.

He noted that Iran would not have shared advanced and sophisticated military technologies with the Houthis without a high degree of trust in their ability to use them in Iran’s interest.

In recent months, following Israeli strikes on the unrecognized Houthi government and several of its leaders, hardline Houthi figures demonstrating strong loyalty to Iran have become more prominent.

On the ground, the group has established new military sites and moved equipment and weapons to new locations along and near the coast, alongside the potential use of security cells beyond Yemen’s borders.

Salah said that if the threat of a military strike on Iran escalates, the Iranian response could take a more advanced form, potentially including efforts to close strategic waterways, placing the Bab al-Mandab Strait within the Houthis’ target range.

Many observers have expressed concern that the Houthis may have transferred fighters and intelligence cells outside Yemen over recent years to target US and Western interests in the region.

Open options

After a ceasefire was declared in Gaza, the Houthis lost one of their key justifications for mobilizing fighters and collecting funds. The group has since faced growing public anger over its practices and worsening humanitarian conditions, responding with media messaging aimed at convincing audiences that the battle is not over and that further rounds lie ahead.

Alongside weekly rallies in areas under their control in support of Gaza, the Houthis have carried out attacks on front lines with Yemen’s internationally recognized government, particularly in Taiz province.

Some military experts describe these incidents as probing attacks, while others see them as attempts to divert attention from other activities.

In this context, Walid al-Abara, head of the Yemen and Gulf Studies Center, said the Houthis entered a critical phase after the Gaza war ended, having lost one of the main justifications for their attacks on Red Sea shipping.

As a result, they may seek to manufacture new pretexts, including claims of sanctions imposed against them, to maintain media momentum and their regional role.

Al-Abara told Asharq Al-Awsat that the group has two other options. The first is redirecting its activity inward to strengthen its military and economic leverage, either to impose its conditions in any future settlement or to consolidate power.

The second is yielding to international and regional pressure and entering a negotiation track, particularly if sanctions intensify or its economic and military capacity declines.

According to an assessment by the Yemen and Gulf Studies Center, widespread protests in Iran are increasingly pressuring the regime’s ability to manage its regional influence at the same pace as before, without dismantling its network of proxies.

This reality is pushing Tehran toward a more cautious approach, governed by domestic priorities and cost-benefit calculations, while maintaining a minimum level of external influence without broad escalation.

Within this framework, al-Abara said Iran is likely to maintain a controlled continuity in its relationship with the Houthis through selective support that ensures the group remains effective.

However, an expansion of protests or a direct military strike on Iran could open the door to a deeper Houthi repositioning, including broader political and security concessions in exchange for regional guarantees.


The Gaza Ceasefire Began Months Ago. Here’s Why the Fighting Persists

Israeli soldiers and tanks stand in Gaza, as seen from the Israeli side of the Israel-Gaza border, in Israel, February 4, 2026. REUTERS/Amir Cohen
Israeli soldiers and tanks stand in Gaza, as seen from the Israeli side of the Israel-Gaza border, in Israel, February 4, 2026. REUTERS/Amir Cohen
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The Gaza Ceasefire Began Months Ago. Here’s Why the Fighting Persists

Israeli soldiers and tanks stand in Gaza, as seen from the Israeli side of the Israel-Gaza border, in Israel, February 4, 2026. REUTERS/Amir Cohen
Israeli soldiers and tanks stand in Gaza, as seen from the Israeli side of the Israel-Gaza border, in Israel, February 4, 2026. REUTERS/Amir Cohen

As the bodies of two dozen Palestinians killed in Israeli strikes arrived at hospitals in Gaza on Wednesday, the director of one asked a question that has echoed across the war-ravaged territory for months.

“Where is the ceasefire? Where are the mediators?” Shifa Hospital's Mohamed Abu Selmiya wrote on Facebook.

At least 556 Palestinians have been killed in Israeli strikes since a US-brokered truce came into effect in October, including 24 on Wednesday and 30 on Saturday, according to Gaza's Health Ministry. Four Israeli soldiers have been killed in Gaza in the same period, with more injured, including a soldier whom the military said was severely wounded when militants opened fire near the ceasefire line in northern Gaza overnight.

Other aspects of the agreement have stalled, including the deployment of an international security force, Hamas' disarmament and the start of Gaza's reconstruction. The opening of the Rafah border crossing between Gaza and Egypt raised hope of further progress, but fewer than 50 people were allowed to cross on Monday, The Associated Press said.

Hostages freed as other issues languish In October, after months of stalled negotiations, Israel and Hamas accepted a 20-point plan proposed by US President Donald Trump aimed at ending the war unleashed by Hamas' Oct. 7, 2023, attack into Israel.

At the time, Trump said it would lead to a “Strong, Durable, and Everlasting Peace."

Hamas freed all the living hostages it still held at the outset of the deal in exchange for thousands of Palestinian prisoners held by Israel and the remains of others.

But the larger issues the agreement sought to address, including the future governance of the strip, were met with reservations, and the US offered no firm timeline.

The return of the remains of hostages meanwhile stretched far beyond the 72-hour timeline outlined in the agreement. Israel recovered the body of the last hostage only last week, after accusing Hamas and other militant groups of violating the ceasefire by failing to return all of the bodies. The militants said they were unable to immediately locate all the remains because of the massive destruction caused by the war — a claim Israel rejected.

The ceasefire also called for an immediate influx of humanitarian aid, including equipment to clear rubble and rehabilitate infrastructure. The United Nations and humanitarian groups say aid deliveries to Gaza's 2 million Palestinians have fallen short due to customs clearance problems and other delays. COGAT, the Israeli military body overseeing aid to Gaza, has called the UN's claims “simply a lie.”

Ceasefire holds despite accusations

Violence has sharply declined since the ceasefire paused a war in which more than 71,800 Palestinians have been killed, according to the Gaza Health Ministry. The ministry is part of the Hamas-led government and maintains detailed records seen as generally reliable by UN agencies and independent experts.

Hamas-led militants killed some 1,200 people in the initial October 2023 attack and took around 250 hostage.

Both sides say the agreement is still in effect and use the word “ceasefire” in their communications. But Israel accuses Hamas fighters of operating beyond the truce line splitting Gaza in half, threatening its troops and occasionally opening fire, while Hamas accuses Israeli forces of gunfire and strikes on residential areas far from the line.

Palestinians have called on US and Arab mediators to get Israel to stop carrying out deadly strikes, which often kill civilians. Among those killed on Wednesday were five children, including two babies. Hamas, which accuses Israel of hundreds of violations, called it a “grave circumvention of the ceasefire agreement.”

In a joint statement on Sunday, eight Arab and Muslim countries condemned Israel’s actions since the agreement took effect and urged restraint from all sides “to preserve and sustain the ceasefire.”

Israel says it is responding to daily violations committed by Hamas and acting to protect its troops. “While Hamas’ actions undermine the ceasefire, Israel remains fully committed to upholding it,” the military said in a statement on Wednesday.

“One of the scenarios the (military) has to be ready for is Hamas is using a deception tactic like they did before October 7 and rearming and preparing for an attack when it’s comfortable for them,” said Lt. Col. Nadav Shoshani, a military spokesperson.

Some signs of progress

The return of the remains of the last hostage, the limited opening of the Rafah crossing, and the naming of a Palestinian committee to govern Gaza and oversee its reconstruction showed a willingness to advance the agreement despite the violence.

Last month, US envoy Steve Witkoff, who played a key role in brokering the truce, said it was time for “transitioning from ceasefire to demilitarization, technocratic governance, and reconstruction.”

That will require Israel and Hamas to grapple with major issues on which they have been sharply divided, including whether Israel will fully withdraw from Gaza and Hamas will lay down its arms.

Though political leaders are holding onto the term “ceasefire” and have yet to withdraw from the process, there is growing despair in Gaza.

On Saturday, Atallah Abu Hadaiyed heard explosions in Gaza City during his morning prayers and ran outside to find his cousins lying on the ground as flames curled around them.

“We don’t know if we’re at war or at peace,” he said from a displacement camp, as tarpaulin strips blew off the tent behind him.


What to Know as Iran and US Set for Nuclear Talks in Oman

The flags of USA and Iran are displayed in Muscat, Oman, 25 April 2025. EPA/ALI HAIDER
The flags of USA and Iran are displayed in Muscat, Oman, 25 April 2025. EPA/ALI HAIDER
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What to Know as Iran and US Set for Nuclear Talks in Oman

The flags of USA and Iran are displayed in Muscat, Oman, 25 April 2025. EPA/ALI HAIDER
The flags of USA and Iran are displayed in Muscat, Oman, 25 April 2025. EPA/ALI HAIDER

Iran and the United States will hold talks Friday in Oman, their latest over Tehran's nuclear program after Israel launched a 12-day war on the country in June and Iran launched a bloody crackdown on nationwide protests.

US President Donald Trump has kept up pressure on Iran, suggesting America could attack Iran over the killing of peaceful demonstrators or if Tehran launches mass executions over the protests. Meanwhile, Trump has pushed Iran's nuclear program back into the frame as well after the June war disrupted five rounds of talks held in Rome and Muscat, Oman, last year.

Trump began the diplomacy initially by writing a letter last year to Iran’s 86-year-old Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to jump start these talks. Khamenei has warned Iran would respond to any attack with an attack of its own, particularly as the theocracy he commands reels following the protests.

Here’s what to know about Iran’s nuclear program and the tensions that have stalked relations between Tehran and Washington since the 1979 Iranian Revolution.

Trump writes letter to Khamenei Trump dispatched the letter to Khamenei on March 5, 2025, then gave a television interview the next day in which he acknowledged sending it. He said: “I’ve written them a letter saying, ‘I hope you’re going to negotiate because if we have to go in militarily, it’s going to be a terrible thing.’”

Since returning to the White House, the president has been pushing for talks while ratcheting up sanctions and suggesting a military strike by Israel or the US could target Iranian nuclear sites.

A previous letter from Trump during his first term drew an angry retort from the supreme leader.

But Trump’s letters to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in his first term led to face-to-face meetings, though no deals to limit Pyongyang’s atomic bombs and a missile program capable of reaching the continental US.

Oman mediated previous talks

Oman, a sultanate on the eastern edge of the Arabian Peninsula, has mediated talks between Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and US Mideast envoy Steve Witkoff. The two men have met face to face after indirect talks, a rare occurrence due to the decades of tensions between the countries.

It hasn't been all smooth, however. Witkoff at one point made a television appearance in which he suggested 3.67% enrichment for Iran could be something the countries could agree on. But that’s exactly the terms set by the 2015 nuclear deal struck under former President Barack Obama, from which Trump unilaterally withdrew America. Witkoff, Trump and other American officials in the time since have maintained Iran can have no enrichment under any deal, something to which Tehran insists it won't agree.

Those negotiations ended, however, with Israel launching the war in June on Iran.

The 12-day war and nationwide protests Israel launched what became a 12-day war on Iran in June that included the US bombing Iranian nuclear sites. Iran later acknowledged in November that the attacks saw it halt all uranium enrichment in the country, though inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency have been unable to visit the bombed sites.

Iran soon experienced protests that began in late December over the collapse of the country's rial currency. Those demonstrations soon became nationwide, sparking Tehran to launch a bloody crackdown that killed thousands and saw tens of thousands detained by authorities.

Iran’s nuclear program worries the West Iran has insisted for decades that its nuclear program is peaceful. However, its officials increasingly threaten to pursue a nuclear weapon. Iran now enriches uranium to near weapons-grade levels of 60%, the only country in the world without a nuclear weapons program to do so.

Under the original 2015 nuclear deal, Iran was allowed to enrich uranium up to 3.67% purity and to maintain a uranium stockpile of 300 kilograms (661 pounds). The last report by the International Atomic Energy Agency on Iran’s program put its stockpile at some 9,870 kilograms (21,760 pounds), with a fraction of it enriched to 60%.

US intelligence agencies assess that Iran has yet to begin a weapons program, but has “undertaken activities that better position it to produce a nuclear device, if it chooses to do so.” Iranian officials have threatened to pursue the bomb.

Decades of tense relations between Iran and the US Iran was once one of the US’s top allies in the Mideast under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who purchased American military weapons and allowed CIA technicians to run secret listening posts monitoring the neighboring Soviet Union. The CIA had fomented a 1953 coup that cemented the shah’s rule.

But in January 1979, the shah, fatally ill with cancer, fled Iran as mass demonstrations swelled against his rule. The Iranian Revolution followed, led by Grand Khomeini, and created Iran’s theocratic government.

Later that year, university students overran the US Embassy in Tehran, seeking the shah’s extradition and sparking the 444-day hostage crisis that saw diplomatic relations between Iran and the US severed.

The Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s saw the US back Saddam Hussein. The “Tanker War” during that conflict saw the US launch a one-day assault that crippled Iran at sea, while the US later shot down an Iranian commercial airliner that the US military said it mistook for a warplane.

Iran and the US have seesawed between enmity and grudging diplomacy in the years since, with relations peaking when Tehran made the 2015 nuclear deal with world powers. But Trump unilaterally withdrew America from the accord in 2018, sparking tensions in the Mideast that persist today.