‘Cubs of the Caliphate’... ISIS Threatens New Syria

 A man hugs another after being allowed to leave the al-Hol camp. (AFP)
A man hugs another after being allowed to leave the al-Hol camp. (AFP)
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‘Cubs of the Caliphate’... ISIS Threatens New Syria

 A man hugs another after being allowed to leave the al-Hol camp. (AFP)
A man hugs another after being allowed to leave the al-Hol camp. (AFP)

Ahmed el-Jouri

Khaled (a pseudonym) never expected this interview to reopen a door to the past.

At first, he hesitated, as if choosing his words carefully. But as he spoke, his tone felt strangely familiar. Then, as the conversation unfolded, a moment came that made my heart race.

"I was 13 when I became a prison guard. We had no choice. They gave orders, and if we refused, we were punished. I opened cell doors, brought food, and watched the prisoners. Some cried, some screamed, and some stayed silent. We treated them as enemies, though we didn’t know why they were there," Khaled recounted.

His words sent a chill down my spine. Al-Mayadeen Prison. 2015. A 13-year-old was guarding me and the other detainees. My mind flashed back to that dark time when I was arrested in Syria for refusing to work as a pharmacist for ISIS.

The group demanded total loyalty, especially from medical professionals. Those who resisted faced threats, arrests, or worse.

One night, they came for me. I later learned my neighbor, an ISIS member, had turned me in for listening to music. That was enough to send me to prison - where I met my young jailer.

As I conducted this interview - one of 17 testimonies I gathered on ISIS youth or the so-called "Cubs of the Caliphate" - questions filled my mind, but I held back. I didn’t want to be too direct, yet curiosity gnawed at me.

I asked careful questions, trying to confirm my suspicions without alarming Khaled, now in his mid-20s. But when he described the prison - the corridors, the meager meals, the way he was ordered to open and close cell doors - I knew the truth. He had been my jailer.

A wave of emotions hit me. Part of me wanted to tell him I had been there, that he had stood before me, holding the keys. But another part hesitated.

How could I say it? What difference would it make? I now see that Khaled was just a child, a pawn in a larger system. Any anger or resentment I felt couldn’t be directed at him. Still, I struggled to separate the man before me from his past.

"Were you cruel to the prisoners?" I finally asked.

He sighed, lowering his head. "Sometimes, I tried to be kind - giving extra food or leaving a door open a little longer. But other times... I was harsh. I was afraid. If I showed weakness, they would have locked me up too."

His words struck me.

I don’t know if Khaled remembers me or if I was just another prisoner. But I see now - he is still fighting his own battle.

Khaled’s story is just one of 17 firsthand accounts gathered over the past six months, revealing how past trauma collides with present and future struggles. This report follows two key figures: Khaled, a former prison guard trying to move on, and Sami (a pseudonym), who once faced his captor at his weakest moment.

Their experiences, along with others, highlight the lasting impact of violence and forced recruitment on a generation robbed of its childhood. But they also raise a crucial question: Has ISIS truly been defeated, or could it return?

With Syria’s shifting power dynamics - Bashar al-Assad’s downfall and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham taking control - young men like Khaled and Sami now face new challenges in an increasingly unstable country. The ongoing security chaos and power struggles among armed factions have fueled fears of ISIS regaining strength.

At the center of this uncertainty is the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which still controls thousands of ISIS detainees, including men, women, and children. This detainee issue has become a bargaining tool, with SDF using it to secure military and political support from global and regional powers.

Without clear solutions, these prisoners risk being used for political or military gain. The possible closure of Syria’s al-Hol camp, where many are held, only adds to concerns about what happens next - and where they will go.

A generation of children was born in the camp that mostly holds ISIS families in Syria. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

ISIS threatens Syria’s new government

ISIS has warned Syria’s new government against "straying from the right path," fueling fears that its threats are more than just propaganda - they could be part of a plan to regain influence.

Though the group’s remnants remain active in Syria’s and Iraq’s deserts, launching occasional attacks, the real danger lies in its ability to exploit security gaps and rebuild.

Adding to concerns, some local forces - including remnants of the old regime and the SDF - might use the ISIS threat to their advantage. By keeping the danger alive, they could seek more support from international players, raising fears that ISIS operations might be tolerated or even leveraged in ongoing power struggles.

ISIS is determined to avenge its defeats, understanding that losing land doesn’t mean the end of its ideology. The group is rebuilding by taking advantage of local grievances, tribal divisions, economic decline, and the hopelessness of many former fighters, especially those recruited as children.

These young people, raised in a war-torn environment, now face rejection from their communities, lack of job opportunities, and a stigma they can’t escape. Without proper rehabilitation programs, the risk of them returning to ISIS remains high, as the group continues to exploit their isolation and lack of future prospects.

So, are these former child soldiers a threat to Syria’s stability? Or are they victims of tough circumstances, hoping for reintegration into society as part of the solution?

Despite the fall of its so-called "caliphate," ISIS is still trying to regain its power, using more complex and decentralized methods. These tactics make it harder to track or eliminate the group.

With tasks now handled outside the central leadership, recruits sometimes receive multiple offers from different ISIS factions, unaware of their true connections to the original group.

Khaled recalled: "After I was freed, a man I didn’t know approached me. He didn’t directly say he was from ISIS, but he hinted that the past wasn’t over and there was a chance to return to the group. He knew personal details about me, even things I’d never told anyone. How did he know?"

Like Khaled, Sami also received indirect offers, but through social media. ISIS uses fake accounts on Telegram and WhatsApp to reach young people. Sami said: "I got a message from an unknown person on Telegram. He said he knew my struggles and that there was a way for me to rebuild my life. He spoke about injustice, how we were used and abandoned. His words felt like a therapist exploiting my weaknesses."

In addition to traditional methods, ISIS is now using modern technology, video games that spread extremist ideas, and private forums. They sometimes send links disguised as educational offers or scholarships, but they are traps to recruit individuals.

At one point, the group also relied on civilians working in accepted jobs, like aid workers or logistics staff, to spread their influence. Khaled revealed: "A friend told me he was working with a man distributing food and supplies to poor villages. Later, I found out it was just a cover, and some of the workers were former ISIS members."

Police affiliated with the new Syrian authorities are seen near a mosque in Palmyra on February 7, 2025. (AFP)

ISIS’ continued influence

The tough economic situation and social stigma faced by former ISIS members play a major role in the group's ongoing recruitment. Many young people from these backgrounds live in areas with few job opportunities and are marginalized by society, making them vulnerable to ISIS’s financial offers.

Sami said: "When I was released, I couldn’t find work. I tried to start over, but everyone saw me as a threat. I had nothing, no future. In my desperation, I thought, ‘What if I go back? At least I’d get something for the risk. No one will hire me here.’"

Khaled, like many others, feels isolated. "Society rejects us, and the government doesn’t trust us. We’re stuck, not knowing where to go. When someone says, ‘We haven’t forgotten you, you’re still one of us,’ you start thinking about it."

One witness added: "When there’s no food and no one will hire you because of your past, you start to consider your options. Some are strong enough to resist, but others may not be."

Psychological struggles persist

The survivors also feel as if ISIS is still watching them. It’s not just messages or attempts to meet; sometimes they are approached by people who know private details about their lives.

Khaled recalled: "After my release, I lived far from anything related to the group. But suddenly, a man appeared at the mosque where I prayed in. He spoke about how some of us had lost our way but could still return. When I asked him what he meant, he said, ‘You were there. You know what I mean.’"

Though ISIS’ physical caliphate has fallen, its ideology remains. The group’s tactics continue to change to adapt to new situations. For Khaled, Sami, and others, the fight is not just about weapons. It’s a psychological struggle to hold onto their new identities, while dealing with the past and the persistent attempts to bring them back into the fold, all in a Syria filled with uncertainty.



In Finland, Radioactive Spent Nuclear Fuel Soon to Be Buried Underground

Picture taken on May 18, 2026 shows the "hot cell" fuel handling chamber at the encapsulation plant of nuclear waste management company Posiva at the site of what is expected to be the world's first permanent repository for radioactive spent nuclear fuel at the Onkalo nuclear repository in Eurajoki, southwestern Finland. (AFP)
Picture taken on May 18, 2026 shows the "hot cell" fuel handling chamber at the encapsulation plant of nuclear waste management company Posiva at the site of what is expected to be the world's first permanent repository for radioactive spent nuclear fuel at the Onkalo nuclear repository in Eurajoki, southwestern Finland. (AFP)
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In Finland, Radioactive Spent Nuclear Fuel Soon to Be Buried Underground

Picture taken on May 18, 2026 shows the "hot cell" fuel handling chamber at the encapsulation plant of nuclear waste management company Posiva at the site of what is expected to be the world's first permanent repository for radioactive spent nuclear fuel at the Onkalo nuclear repository in Eurajoki, southwestern Finland. (AFP)
Picture taken on May 18, 2026 shows the "hot cell" fuel handling chamber at the encapsulation plant of nuclear waste management company Posiva at the site of what is expected to be the world's first permanent repository for radioactive spent nuclear fuel at the Onkalo nuclear repository in Eurajoki, southwestern Finland. (AFP)

The elevator display reads "433", the number of meters below ground. The doors slide open, revealing the entrance to what is expected to be the world's first permanent repository for radioactive spent nuclear fuel.

Blasted into 1.9 billion-year-old stable bedrock in Eurajoki, southwest Finland, the geological repository for spent nuclear waste -- dubbed Onkalo which means "cave" in Finnish -- is nearly ready to start operations.

Countries have been wrestling with what to do with dangerous nuclear by-products since the first plants were built in the 1950s. Currently, most of it is in temporary storage.

Final repositories are being built in other countries, including neighboring Sweden and France, but Finland is expected to be first to open an underground storage solution.

The Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) is due to give approval in its final assessment in June, after which an operating license can be granted.

"We hope we can start the operation either at the end of this year or most probably at the beginning of next year," said Philippe Bordarier, chief executive of nuclear operator Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO).

His voice echoed in the damp tunnel where the spent nuclear fuel will be buried in holes drilled into the bedrock, where it will remain harmfully radioactive for thousands of years.

The waste currently cooled in water pools at an interim storage site, at the nearby Olkiluoto power plant next to the Baltic Sea, will be first to be deposited, Bordarier said.

With space for 6,500 tons of uranium, Onkalo is aimed at providing permanent storage for spent fuel from Finland's five nuclear reactors -- three of them located in Olkiluoto.

Nuclear waste management company Posiva began building the site in 2004, with the cost now estimated at one billion euros ($1.16 billion).

- 'Forever'-

Spent fuel is planned to be deposited in Onkalo's massive network of tunnels for 100 years, but operations may be extended if new nuclear reactors are built.

Subsequently, the vault will be sealed to provide safe storage for at least 100,000 years.

"Basically, it needs to be safe forever," noted Lauri Parviainen, a Posiva chemist who showed reporters around the facilities.

The fuel will be highly radioactive for "tens of thousands of years", he said.

After 100,000 years, they will be "about the same level as the uranium ore of which the fuel is made."

Above ground, the spent nuclear fuel will be encapsulated in highly corrosion-resistant copper canisters.

The canisters will be lowered into holes drilled in the tunnels, before the holes are filled with bentonite clay to seal them, Parviainen explained.

"So if the bentonite stays in place, we are safe," he said.

Once each 300-meter-long disposal tunnel is filled, it will be sealed with a steel-reinforced concrete plug.

- Long-term risks -

Jarkko Kyllonen, an expert on nuclear safety at Finland's nuclear regulator STUK, has assessed risk scenarios for the Onkalo project stretching up to a million years into the future.

Considering the "hazard potential of the waste, the first 10,000 years are very important for keeping the capsules intact," he told AFP.

The main long-term risks are corrosion of the copper canisters or earthquakes during future ice ages, which could potentially damage the capsules and cause radioactive fuel to leak, Kyllonen said.

But the results of various risk assessments conducted over the years have been "positive".

While France's plans for a similar underground nuclear tomb have met with strong opposition, Onkalo has received broader backing in Finland.

There was some opposition locally when the plans were first introduced in the 1970s, but "people have gotten used to it, and they trust the assessments made by STUK", Matti Kojo, social sciences professor at Lut University, told AFP.

"At the moment, support for nuclear power is at a historically high level in Finland," he noted.

The Finnish Association for Nature Conservation remains critical of the project, however, insisting that nuclear waste poses a long-term, serious risk.

"No one can guarantee the safety of Onkalo for thousands of years," director Tapani Veistola told AFP in an e-mail.

- Finland's nuclear push -

Under Finnish law, nuclear waste produced in Finland has to be deposited in the country, Climate and Environment Minister Sari Multala told AFP.

"Before the legal change in 1994, the spent nuclear fuel was exported to, for example, Russia," she said.

Increasing nuclear power in Finland has been a priority for the right-wing government, and the country is considering building so-called small modular reactors (SMRs).

How the spent nuclear fuel from future SMRs would be managed "has not been decided yet," Multala said. An assessment should be completed by March next year, she added.


Iran's Strongest Card in Nuclear Talks: Its Highly Enriched Uranium

Centrifuges at the Fordow nuclear facility before the June 2025 attacks (Reuters)
Centrifuges at the Fordow nuclear facility before the June 2025 attacks (Reuters)
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Iran's Strongest Card in Nuclear Talks: Its Highly Enriched Uranium

Centrifuges at the Fordow nuclear facility before the June 2025 attacks (Reuters)
Centrifuges at the Fordow nuclear facility before the June 2025 attacks (Reuters)

Iran and the United States are in discussions to extend ‌their ceasefire so as to start negotiations on issues including Tehran's nuclear program, where Washington insists Iran must not be able to make a nuclear weapon.

While much of Iran's uranium enrichment infrastructure was destroyed or badly damaged when Israel and the US bombed it in June, a large part of the highly enriched uranium it amassed is thought to have survived. That is the biggest US concern ahead of nuclear talks.

On Friday Trump said in a social media post that Iran must agree that the enriched uranium buried underground after earlier US strikes be "unearthed" and destroyed in coordination with Iran and the UN nuclear watchdog.

WHAT IS HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM?

One of two fissile materials, along with plutonium, with which one can make the core of a nuclear bomb. While plutonium is usually extracted from the spent fuel of a nuclear reactor, requiring large and highly visible infrastructure, uranium can be enriched using centrifuges that have a much smaller footprint. Two of Iran's three enrichment sites that are known to have been operating when Israel and the ‌US attacked in ‌June were underground. The above-ground one was clearly destroyed.

Uranium is highly enriched when it ‌has ⁠reached 20% purity, and ⁠weapons-grade as of around 90%.

Modern reactors generally use fuel enriched to up to 5%, but some use fuel enriched to higher levels. The ones that power US nuclear submarines reportedly use fuel enriched beyond 90%.

HOW MUCH DOES IRAN HAVE?

Iran has not informed the UN nuclear watchdog of the fate of its enriched uranium since the June attacks or let its inspectors return to the sites where it was stored.

The International Atomic Energy Agency estimates Iran had these amounts when the first Israeli bombs fell on June 13:

- 440.9 kg enriched to up to 60%

- 184.1 kg enriched to up to 20%

- 6,024.4 kg enriched to ⁠up to 5%

- 2,391.1 kg enriched to up to 2%

According to an IAEA yardstick, ‌the amount at 60% is enough, if enriched further, for 10 nuclear weapons. ‌The 20% stock would be enough for one and the 5% could produce 12. How much has survived is unclear. IAEA chief ‌Rafael Grossi has said his agency believes "a bit more than 200 kg" of the 60% stock is stored at a ‌tunnel complex in Isfahan that appears to have been largely unharmed by the June attacks. Some was also at the Natanz nuclear site, he said.

WHY THE CONCERN? US concern has been focused on the 60% material because that would be easiest and thus quickest to make a bomb with. Washington wants it gone. Iran denies seeking nuclear weapons.

As the enrichment level of uranium increases, it becomes exponentially easier to enrich ‌further. Getting from 60% to 90% is easier than getting from unenriched to 5%.

President Donald Trump pulled the United States out of a nuclear deal between Iran and ⁠major powers that kept Tehran ⁠at a far greater distance from being able to produce an atom bomb than it is at now. The US withdrawal in 2018 caused the deal to unravel, and Iran quickly expanded its atomic program.

Under that 2015 deal, Iran did not enrich beyond 3.67%.

Even at 90%, however, it takes more steps to produce the core of a bomb. When it is enriched, the uranium is in gas form. It must then be turned into metal for use in a weapon.

CAN YOU MOVE IT?

Yes. Iran moved enriched material between sites under IAEA monitoring before the June attacks.

Under the 2015 deal and a precursor to it, Iran's stocks of uranium enriched to up to 20% were diluted or turned into reactor fuel plates and shipped out of the country.

Moving nuclear material like highly enriched uranium internationally is a sensitive but relatively routine procedure.

"It requires some precaution but it can be moved," Grossi told PBS in March when asked about the 60% material.

WILL IRAN GIVE IT UP? Iran's supreme leader has issued a directive that the 60% material should not be sent abroad, two senior Iranian sources said last week.

Iranian sources say Tehran might agree to send half of it to a third country, receiving uranium enriched to 5% in return, and dilute the other half inside Iran.


Beaufort Castle: Israel’s Geographic Gateway to South Lebanon

 Smoke rises near the Beaufort Castle, as seen from Marjeyoun, southern Lebanon, May 29, 2026. (Reuters)
Smoke rises near the Beaufort Castle, as seen from Marjeyoun, southern Lebanon, May 29, 2026. (Reuters)
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Beaufort Castle: Israel’s Geographic Gateway to South Lebanon

 Smoke rises near the Beaufort Castle, as seen from Marjeyoun, southern Lebanon, May 29, 2026. (Reuters)
Smoke rises near the Beaufort Castle, as seen from Marjeyoun, southern Lebanon, May 29, 2026. (Reuters)

Repeated Israeli strikes on the medieval Beaufort Castle and its surroundings east of Nabatieh have revived debate over one of southern Lebanon’s most sensitive sites due to its elevated position overlooking Palestinian territories, Syria and Lebanon.

For decades, the Crusader fortress was a commanding military position and a battlefield etched into Israeli and Lebanese memory. Now, as fighting escalates in the south, it is back at the center of events. Military assessments say its battlefield value remains, despite major changes in warfare over recent decades.

The renewed focus on Beaufort Castle comes as Israel intensifies strikes around the site and the heights overlooking Nabatieh. The attacks have raised fresh questions about the military value of a position that has remained present in major confrontations in southern Lebanon since Israel's 1982 invasion.

Heritage landmark

Beaufort Castle, known in Arabic as Qalaat al-Shaqif, is one of southern Lebanon’s most prominent historical and heritage landmarks, and among the most important Crusader castles in the Levant.

The Crusaders named it Beaufort, meaning “beautiful fortress.” It later fell to Salaheddine after a long siege. The Crusaders then retook it for a period, and the Knights Templar inhabited it, before the Mamluks, led by Sultan al-Zahir Baybars, seized it in 1268.

Smoke rises from Beaufort Castle following strikes, as seen from Marjeyoun, southern Lebanon, May 27, 2026. (Reuters)

Although the Romans first built initial fortifications at the strategic site, the Crusaders greatly expanded it and built most of its existing structures.

Since 2024, the castle has held “enhanced protection” status under the Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, Lebanon's Arnoun municipality said in a statement.

The municipality warned that repeated Israeli strikes could damage the castle and urged Lebanese authorities and relevant international organizations to act to protect the landmark and prevent further harm.

Battlefield advantage

Claiming the castle has long been seen as a battlefield advantage. In the 1970s, it came under heavy Israeli airstrikes after the Palestine Liberation Organization used it as a position to fire at Israel. In 1982, it was the scene of one of the fiercest battles between Israeli forces and Palestinian fighters and their Lebanese allies. Israel occupied it until 2000.

Retired Brigadier General Bassam Yassine said Beaufort Castle’s importance today is little different from the value that made it a focus of battles since the 1982 invasion. The site, he said, remains one of southern Lebanon’s most prominent commanding military positions.

“Beaufort Castle has been present in all wars and battles with Israel from 1982 until today because of its strategic location,” Yassine told Asharq Al-Awsat, saying it offers a commanding view over wide areas of southern Lebanon and northern occupied Palestine.

“Beaufort Castle overlooks the settlement of Metula, which is less than four kilometers away. It overlooks the area between the Litani and Zahrani rivers and is considered the highest hill in this sector,” he said.

The site gives whoever controls it a major military advantage, Yassine said.

“From Beaufort Castle, one can observe Taybeh, Deir Seryan and Qantara, where the Israeli army is present today. That is why it cannot leave it outside its control if it wants to remain in the area where it is deployed,” he said.

Yassine said this importance is not new. Before Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon in 2000, it controlled hills and heights around the area, including Beaufort Castle, to secure battlefield superiority and maintain observation over its surroundings.

Destroyed buildings are pictured in the village of Kfar Kila in southern Lebanon as seen from across the border in the Upper Galilee region of northern Israel on May 29, 2026, with the Crusader-period Beaufort Castle pictured in Lebanon in the background. (AFP)

Asked which sectors the castle exposes, he said: “It directly overlooks Yohmor al-Shaqif, eastern Zawtar, western Zawtar, Kfar Tebnit and Nabatieh al-Fawqa. All these areas are exposed from the castle.”

“It also protects forces on the Yohmor and Zawtar axes, and provides cover for troops deployed in Taybeh, Deir Seryan and Qantara, and across this entire sector,” he added.

Yassine said the castle’s military value also lies in its defensive terrain.

“If any resistance force managed to infiltrate the castle and possess anti-armor missiles there, it would become very difficult to remove it from the site or destroy it because of the geography of the location,” he explained.

He said Israel had faced that problem before, during the period of Palestinian armed presence in the south.

“The Israelis tried many times to destroy the castle during the Palestinian period, but they did not succeed because of its geography,” he said.

Yassine said the site includes old historical passages and tunnels.

“The castle has tunnels that reach the Litani River below. They have existed since the Crusader era and are not newly built tunnels, which gives the site additional defensive value,” he said.

Control of the castle does not mean control of the area

Retired Brig. Gen. Dr. Bahaa Halal said Beaufort Castle is one of southern Lebanon’s most important military and geopolitical sites because of its strategic location.

“Israeli military doctrine views Beaufort Castle as a key point for achieving visual and intelligence superiority, which forms part of fire superiority, as it allows the monitoring of movements between south and north of the Litani, the tracking of routes toward the western Bekaa and Iqlim al-Tuffah, as well as monitoring the operational environment of attack drones and FPV aircraft,” Halal told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Any “resistance force that is able to deploy freely around Beaufort Castle gains a tactical advantage in missile maneuvering, managing ambushes and concealing combat infrastructure inside the mountainous terrain,” he added, making the area a constant Israeli security concern.

“Israel can theoretically reach the surroundings of Beaufort Castle through air cover, prior destruction and special forces. But there is a major difference between reaching the area and maintaining stable control,” he remarked.

Holding it, he said, would require secure supply lines, fire control over the castle’s surroundings, preventing flanking moves and ambushes, and ensuring permanent superiority in observation.

Such conditions are difficult to secure in an area geographically connected to Arnoun, Yohmor, Zawtar, Iqlim al-Tuffah and the valleys leading to the Litani, he stressed.