Hezbollah’s Legacy in Syria: Drug Labs, Counterfeit Money Factories

Syrian border security forces patrol a border area in Wadi al-Hourani, Hawik village, near the Lebanese border (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Syrian border security forces patrol a border area in Wadi al-Hourani, Hawik village, near the Lebanese border (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Hezbollah’s Legacy in Syria: Drug Labs, Counterfeit Money Factories

Syrian border security forces patrol a border area in Wadi al-Hourani, Hawik village, near the Lebanese border (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Syrian border security forces patrol a border area in Wadi al-Hourani, Hawik village, near the Lebanese border (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Syrian border security forces have discovered dozens of factories producing narcotics, Captagon pills, hashish, and counterfeit US dollars in abandoned warehouses on a hilltop in Al Qusayr’s village of Hawik, near the western countryside of Homs, close to the Syrian-Lebanese border.

The illicit goods were intended for smuggling into neighboring countries and beyond, authorities said.

The border area, facing Lebanon’s Baalbek province, was until recently under the control of Hezbollah. Following the group’s expulsion, Syrian security forces dismantled the drug operations, paving the way for the Lebanese army to secure the region, according to officials.

In a makeshift drug lab perched on a remote hill along a secondary road in Hawik—just a few hundred meters from the Lebanese border—Syrian security forces found stockpiles of equipment and materials used in drug production.

Inside the warehouses, they uncovered industrial machinery, large blue storage tanks filled with raw substances for Captagon production, as well as wooden containers and sealed plastic boxes containing hashish.

Homs border security chief Maj. Nadim Mdakhneh told Asharq Al-Awsat that the previous regime and Hezbollah had turned the area into a drug smuggling route and a hub for illegal drug production, weapons trafficking, and counterfeiting before being expelled this month.

Syrian military operations forces launched a sweeping security campaign this week, targeting villages near the Lebanese border, including Hawik, Jarmash, Wadi al-Hourani, Akoum, and Wadi Hanna.

Clashes erupted with Hezbollah fighters, remnants of the ousted regime, and drug and arms traffickers.

The forces seized full control of the border strip, set up checkpoints, and implemented strict measures to prevent smuggling, officials said.

The crackdown included raids in several Syrian villages, particularly Hawik, Jarmash, and Hit—key hubs for drug trafficking.

Mdakhneh said security forces discovered around 15 drug production facilities and a counterfeit currency printing press.

“We seized massive shipments of weapons, drugs, and raw materials intended for smuggling,” Mdakhneh said. “These areas were the economic lifeline of these criminal networks.”

Syria and Lebanon share a 330-kilometer border, much of it unmarked and stretching across valleys and rugged mountains—terrain long exploited by drug smugglers and arms dealers.

Counterfeit Money Operation

In a third warehouse, Hezbollah operatives set up a counterfeit money operation, producing fake $100 bills using advanced printers, holograms, ultraviolet scanners, and an offset printing press, security officials said.

During Syria’s war, the country became the region’s top producer of Captagon, especially under ousted President Bashar al-Assad. Some reports have called Syria a “narco-state,” with British data estimating it produced nearly 80% of the world’s Captagon supply by the end of last year.

In another warehouse hidden in a mountainous area, a security officer opened a device and found round drug tablets inside.

“This is how they made and hid the drugs before smuggling them to the Gulf and beyond,” said security officer Nader Abu al-Bara, who took part in the raid.

Captagon Pills, Hashish Stored in Packages

Captagon pills were packed in sealed bags. Hashish was stored in medium-sized wooden crates and plastic containers, while processed batches were wrapped in red gloves for identification, security officials said.

Residents of the border region said civilians were strictly prohibited from approaching the heavily guarded drug production sites.

“No one was allowed near these facilities,” said Ahmad al-Saab, 55, a resident of Hawik. “Syrian intelligence and Hezbollah fighters stationed in the area kept us away. We often smelled strange, unpleasant odors, but we had no idea what was happening inside. We only heard rumors about factories, but no one dared to get close.”

Security forces discovered surveillance cameras and network lines connected to Lebanese territory during their operations, officials said.

Mdakhneh stressed that the crackdown was limited to Syrian villages near the Lebanese border.

He said coordination between Syrian military operations and the Lebanese army is ongoing, adding that “for the first time in 14 years, the Lebanese army has begun deploying in this area.”

Mdakhneh said clashes erupted with Hezbollah fighters and traffickers, and during the raids, security forces found documents linking members of Lebanese tribal families to the smuggling operations.

The trade in Captagon pills in Syria was worth an estimated $6 billion by the end of 2024, according to United Nations figures. The drugs were primarily smuggled to neighboring Iraq and Jordan before being trafficked onward to Gulf states.



Askari, Iran Revolutionary Guards’ Shadow Envoy in Baghdad

Iraqi security personnel stand beside the coffin of a Popular Mobilization Forces member killed in an attack in al-Qaim district (AFP)
Iraqi security personnel stand beside the coffin of a Popular Mobilization Forces member killed in an attack in al-Qaim district (AFP)
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Askari, Iran Revolutionary Guards’ Shadow Envoy in Baghdad

Iraqi security personnel stand beside the coffin of a Popular Mobilization Forces member killed in an attack in al-Qaim district (AFP)
Iraqi security personnel stand beside the coffin of a Popular Mobilization Forces member killed in an attack in al-Qaim district (AFP)

Abu Ali al-Askari, whose death was recently announced by Iraq’s Kataib Hezbollah, may not have been a single man, but a full diplomatic apparatus representing Iran’s Revolutionary Guards in Baghdad.

Most likely, Askari, a covert account on X, functioned as a banner for a group rotating the role of a “shadow ambassador,” enforcing the policies of Iran’s Revolution in Baghdad, including setting a strict tempo for political decision-making.

Kataib Hezbollah, one of the Iran-aligned armed groups, said on March 16 that Askari had been killed, without giving details of time or place.

The announcement is believed to have followed a rocket strike on a house in Baghdad’s Karrada district, where influential figures from armed factions were holding an “operational” meeting. Security sources, however, said he may have been targeted in one of two attacks, one on a vehicle and another on a separate house east of the capital.

In a statement signed by Ahmad al-Hamidawi, who is the group’s leader, Askari was described as “the artery linking battlefields with media platforms.”

For about five years, this pseudonym issued a stream of hardline positions that helped entrench rigid policies in Iraq, often reflecting Iran’s unofficial stances, not those of its ambassador in Baghdad.

The account was repeatedly deleted or suspended and re-created, with its statements often circulating through media outlets or screenshots rather than directly from the source.

A lingering mystery

Askari remained an enduring enigma, the subject of constant speculation about his identity.

Iraqi researcher Hisham al-Hashimi, who was shot dead by a Kataib Hezbollah member in the summer of 2020, had said Askari was MP Hussein Moanes of the Huqooq Movement, the group’s political wing.

Many denied any link. Over time, a different narrative took hold, portraying Askari as a shadowy operative handling highly sensitive roles, while identifying himself online as “the security official of Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq.”

After the announcement of his death, conflicting accounts emerged. Initial reports said he was among those killed in the Karrada strike, naming him as Abu Ali al-Amiri, a special adviser and aide to the group’s leader.

Later, platforms close to armed factions said he was one of Abu Hussein al-Hamidawi's brothers. Other assessments suggested the group fabricated his death to cover up the killing of several faction leaders in precise strikes across Baghdad since the outbreak of the war with Iran.

In the end, Abu Ali al-Askari appears to be a collective identity. The multiplicity of personas fits a media strategy that mirrors the Revolutionary Guard’s use of ambiguity to project intimidation. It also raises the possibility that the reported death masks a significant internal development, since the death of a “virtual account” can be concealed.

Sources say the figure, or figures, behind the account likely included a security official within the group, a member of its shura council, and a military adviser trained by the Revolutionary Guard to shape both field and political strategies.

In all cases, Askari stands as one of the Guard’s most significant political investments in Baghdad.

An Iranian yardstick

Abu Ali al-Askari may not even be a pseudonym, but a functional title for one of Iran’s most sensitive roles in Iraq. By weight of influence, it acted as a tool steering political outcomes toward Tehran’s approach.

Days before his reported death, Askari wrote that “the appointment of the next prime minister will not take place without the fingerprint of the Islamic resistance.”

At a time when the Coordination Framework was deadlocked over the rejected nomination of Nouri al-Maliki, his position set the tone for Shiite political behavior and signaled a threshold aligned with Iran’s vision, including the selection of a premier approved by Tehran first.

He kept alive his drumbeat of criticism to the government of Mustafa al-Kadhimi, then softened rhetoric toward the government of Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, which emerged after violent clashes between supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr and security forces in the Green Zone. He had endorsed the current government early.

Over the years, Askari commented on nearly every domestic decision, including opposing plans to extend an Iraqi oil pipeline to Jordan.

With similar force, he helped derail the “majority government” project that Muqtada al-Sadr sought after the 2021 elections, calling it “exclusionary toward the factions’ weapons and aligned with the American vision.”

In 2019, when protesters demanding an end to Iranian influence were killed in operations attributed to a “third party,” Askari described them as infiltrators pursuing suspicious foreign agendas, rhetoric widely seen as incitement against hundreds of young demonstrators.

In that sense, identifying his true identity may matter less than understanding the scale of influence Kataib Hezbollah has built.

Askari’s role extended to setting rules of engagement, defining the political weight of Sunni and Kurdish actors, and signaling red lines in Iraq’s external relations, including ties with Arab, Gulf, and international actors. At one stage, he warned against “reintegrating Syria and rehabilitating its new leadership within the international community.”

Iran’s shadow ambassador

After the 2017 independence referendum in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region, Askari took a hardline stance against Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani, effectively giving an informal green light for punitive measures, calling the move a “division project backed by the United States and Israel.”

For Askari, the rise of Mohammed al-Halbousi to the speakership in 2018 reflected non-national balances in an externally backed deal. In his view, the Sunni leader of the Taqaddum party paid the price for what he described as an “intersection with a suspicious external project.”

In January 2020, after the killing of Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, Askari wrote that “US forces in Iraq have become legitimate targets.”

Five years on, these positions read as if issued by a “shadow embassy” for Iran, articulating hardline stances that are acted upon literally, without being voiced by official diplomats.


Iran’s Larijani, the Man Whose Power Grew During Mideast War

06 February 2009, Bavaria, Munich: Ali Larijani, then chairman of the Iranian parliament, speaks at the 45th Munich Security Conference in Munich. (dpa)
06 February 2009, Bavaria, Munich: Ali Larijani, then chairman of the Iranian parliament, speaks at the 45th Munich Security Conference in Munich. (dpa)
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Iran’s Larijani, the Man Whose Power Grew During Mideast War

06 February 2009, Bavaria, Munich: Ali Larijani, then chairman of the Iranian parliament, speaks at the 45th Munich Security Conference in Munich. (dpa)
06 February 2009, Bavaria, Munich: Ali Larijani, then chairman of the Iranian parliament, speaks at the 45th Munich Security Conference in Munich. (dpa)

When Israeli and US strikes killed Ali Khamenei at the start of the Middle East war, Iran's security chief Ali Larijani became even more powerful than he had been for decades.

Israel's Defense Minister Israel Katz said on Tuesday that Larijani had been killed, though Iran's authorities have not confirmed his death.

Larijani had since the start of the war played a far more visible role than the new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, who has not been seen in public since he was appointed to replace his slain father.

The security chief, on the other hand, was seen walking with crowds at a pro-government rally last week in Tehran, in a sign of defiance against Israel and the US.

His killing, if confirmed, would be a major blow against Iran, undermining a key figure seen as capable of navigating both ideology and diplomacy.

- Pragmatist -

Adept at balancing ideological loyalty with pragmatic statecraft, Larijani was central prior to the war to Iran's nuclear policy and strategic diplomacy.

Bespectacled and known for his measured tone, the 68-year-old was believed to enjoy the confidence of the late Khamenei, after a long career in the military, media and legislature.

In 2025, after Iran's last war with Israel and the US, he was appointed head of Iran's top security body, the Supreme National Security Council -- a position he had held nearly two decades earlier -- coordinating defense strategies and overseeing nuclear policy.

He later became increasingly visible in the diplomatic arena, travelling to Gulf states such as Oman and Qatar as Tehran cautiously engaged in nuclear negotiations that were ultimately scuppered by the war.

- 'Canny operator' -

"Larijani is a true insider, a canny operator, familiar with how the system operates," Ali Vaez, the International Crisis Group's project director for Iran, said before the Middle East war began.

Born in Najaf, Iraq in 1957 to a prominent Shiite cleric who was close to the Islamic Republic's founder Khomeini, Larijani's family has been influential within Iran's political system for decades.

Some of his relatives have been the targets of corruption allegations over the years, which they denied.

He earned a PhD in Western Philosophy from the University of Tehran.

A veteran of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps during the Iran-Iraq war, Larijani later headed state broadcasting IRIB for a decade from 1994 before serving as parliamentary speaker from 2008 to 2020.

In 1996, he was appointed as Khamenei's representative to the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). He later became secretary of the SNSC and chief nuclear negotiator, leading talks with Britain, France, Germany and Russia between 2005 and 2007.

He ran in the 2005 presidential elections, losing to populist candidate Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, with whom he later had disagreements over nuclear diplomacy.

Larijani was then disqualified from running for president in both 2021 and 2024.

Observers viewed his return as the head of the SNSC as signaling a turn reflecting his reputation as a conservative capable of combining ideological commitment with pragmatism.

Larijani supported the landmark 2015 nuclear deal with world powers which unraveled three years later after US President Donald Trump withdrew from the agreement.

In March 2025, Larijani warned that sustained external pressure could alter Iran's nuclear posture.

"We are not moving towards (nuclear) weapons, but if you do something wrong in the Iranian nuclear issue, you will force Iran to move towards that because it has to defend itself," he told state television.

Larijani repeatedly insisted negotiations with Washington should remain confined to the nuclear file and defended uranium enrichment as Iran's sovereign right.

- Violent repression -

Larijani was among officials sanctioned by the US in January over what Washington described as "violently repressing the Iranian people", following nationwide protests which erupted weeks earlier due to the rising cost of living.

According to rights groups, thousands of people were killed in the government's brutal crackdown of the protests.

Larijani acknowledged that economic pressures had "led to the protests", but blamed the violence which ensued on foreign involvement by the United States and Israel.


Who Is Leading Iran? Western Sources Map the Inner Circle of the New Supreme Leader

 A demonstrator holds a portrait of the Mojtaba Khamenei during the Quds day in London, England, Sunday, March 15, 2026. (AP)
A demonstrator holds a portrait of the Mojtaba Khamenei during the Quds day in London, England, Sunday, March 15, 2026. (AP)
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Who Is Leading Iran? Western Sources Map the Inner Circle of the New Supreme Leader

 A demonstrator holds a portrait of the Mojtaba Khamenei during the Quds day in London, England, Sunday, March 15, 2026. (AP)
A demonstrator holds a portrait of the Mojtaba Khamenei during the Quds day in London, England, Sunday, March 15, 2026. (AP)

Western diplomatic sources have outlined to Asharq Al-Awsat the tight inner circle surrounding Iran’s new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, shedding light on the key figures shaping decision-making at a critical moment for the country.

According to these sources, any serious discussion of a comprehensive ceasefire in the ongoing war with Israel and the US is unlikely to begin until this inner circle concludes that the country has reached a point of military exhaustion and that prolonging the conflict would only deepen its strategic predicament.

The sources also dismissed claims over Khamenei’s lack of experience over decision-making. Khamenei has long been involved in the decision-making process within the office of his late father, former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, they stressed. He has also maintained extensive ties with Iran’s military leadership, particularly within the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

A key figure in this circle is Mohsen Rezaei, appointed by Mojtaba Khamenei as a senior military adviser. Often described as a “man of war”, Rezaei is also believed to have been among those who advised Khomeini to accept the ceasefire with Iraq at the end of the Iran-Iraq War, when Iranian forces were reportedly exhausted.

The sources identified several influential figures in the Supreme Leader’s inner circle. The most prominent among them is parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, a former IRGC commander who is said to have played a leading role during last year’s 12-day conflict with Israel.

Other key figures include General Ahmad Vahidi, the commander of the IRGC, who previously served as minister under both presidents Ebrahim Raisi and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and was the first commander of the Quds Force, the foreign arm of the IRGC.

General Rahim Safavi, a senior adviser during the tenure of the slain Khamenei, General Ali Abdollahi, head of operations at the armed forces’ general staff, General Majid Mousavi, commander of the IRGC’s missile unit, and Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri, head of its naval forces, are also part of the new supreme leader’s inner circle.

Despite the heavy blows, the Iranian regime has so far succeeded in preventing any fragmentation within its military and leaderships, the sources noted.

Developments indicate that Iran’s military leadership had preprepared a strategy aimed at making any war against it extremely costly for both the region and the global economy.

This strategy, they said, rests on two main pillars: first, “drawing Gulf states into the theater of war through missile and drone attacks under the pretext of targeting US presence”; and second, “causing widespread or total disruption to maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.”

The sources added that Tehran is betting on what it perceives as US President Donald Trump’s limited patience for prolonged conflict, especially amid rising oil prices, which Iran hopes could approach $200 per barrel, the proximity of US midterm elections, and the lack of broad public support for war.

On the other side, US and Israeli forces have escalated strikes in an effort to demonstrate the scale of destruction inflicted on Iran’s military arsenal and defense industries.

The objective of regime change appears to have receded in favor of a strategy of attrition, one that could compel Iran to scale back what the sources described as its “self-destructive behavior.”

The sources suggested that the new supreme leader may initially find it difficult to adopt a flexible or conciliatory stance in his first test of leadership. However, a growing sense that continued attrition could trigger internal unrest — or even raise questions about the regime’s survival — may ultimately lead senior military figures to conclude that preserving the system justifies accepting painful compromises.

They also warned that missile and drone attacks targeting Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries could prove counterproductive, particularly as they have largely struck civilian targets.

The sources stressed that the Gulf states’ significant regional and international standing could form the basis for mounting global pressure on Iran to agree to a ceasefire. When that moment comes, Tehran may find that the war has set it back by years.