In the Arabic dictionary, the verb “yumana’” or “tamana’” derives from “mana’”, with its noun form being “mumana’a”, meaning “resistance” or “opposition.” The dictionary defines “mumana’a” as a form of “dispute” that arises between two or more parties.
On the surface, Iranian officials present their relationship with Washington as adversarial, engaging in rhetorical confrontations. However, beneath the surface, there is neither true conflict nor outright resistance. In reality, Iran consistently avoids direct or even indirect confrontation with its adversaries and remains open to reaching understandings—whether through direct negotiations or indirect talks facilitated by mediators.
Negotiation is the gateway to conflict resolution, and resolving disputes often requires multiple mediators. In Iran’s case, given the numerous unresolved or suspended issues between Tehran and its neighbors - as well as between Iran, the broader region, and the international community - the need for multiple intermediaries becomes evident. Even the parties seeking to resolve disputes with Iran may hesitate to rely on a single mediator.
This explains the influx of initiatives and statements from various international actors, either as independent efforts or as part of broader attempts to resolve the ongoing conflict between Washington and Tehran. Iran does not outwardly reject a resolution; instead, it skillfully draws out offers, leveraging mediation to its advantage.
The variety of mediators in negotiations with Iran reflects the complexity of the conditions Washington insists must be addressed. The US administration’s stance is clear and uncompromising: either a new nuclear agreement is reached, or war becomes the alternative. This marks the end of the previous phase - there will be no deal without enforcement mechanisms. While the previous agreement slowed Iran’s nuclear program, it simultaneously expanded its strategic and regional influence. The new agreement, it seems, will come with a set of interlinked conditions that cannot be separated except through mediation.
From Tehran’s perspective, involving multiple mediators creates opportunities to disentangle different issues, allowing Iran to dilute pressure and stall parties eager for quick resolutions - most notably, US President Donald Trump. Thus, Iran is expected to use mediators to separate the nuclear issue from its ballistic missile program and its regional influence. For instance, the nuclear file - most likely handled by Moscow, based on Russian officials’ statements - may remain under Russia’s mediation.
Meanwhile, a Gulf or Arab state could step in regarding Iran’s ballistic missile program, given its regional sensitivity. This state may also have strong ties with Israel, which is the primary stakeholder in this matter. Additionally, a third party with influence over Iran-backed armed groups may intervene to rein in these factions and mitigate their threats to local and regional stability.
Furthermore, a significant regional power may go beyond mere mediation and play a larger role - one that fosters Iran’s reconciliation with its Arab and regional neighbors. This mediator might even extract a commitment from Tehran regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, potentially pushing Iran to accept a two-state solution.
Tehran’s apparent preference for multiple mediators likely reflects a strategy of dispersing negotiation tracks, which, in turn, exhausts all involved parties. Iran bets on its ability to decide when to advance on one file while postponing another. Through this approach, it may successfully impose negotiation flexibility on Washington, using time as a bargaining chip to extract concessions and gains.
Iran fully understands that its counterpart - President Trump - is a businessman looking for a profitable deal. Tehran, in contrast, aims to secure agreements that benefit both sides, albeit at differing scales. In essence, what Trump seeks as a comprehensive package, Iran may deliver in piecemeal form.
