From Haftar to Dbeibah: The Map of Control and Influence in Libya

Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 
Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 
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From Haftar to Dbeibah: The Map of Control and Influence in Libya

Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 
Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 

Libya, once held together under the iron grip of Muammar Gaddafi, exploded into chaos after his ouster in 2011. Fourteen years later, the country remains fractured, yet a new map of military, political, and territorial control has emerged. It reflects not stability but shifting alliances, entrenched divisions, and the tug-of-war between rival powers vying for supremacy, from Khalifa Haftar in the east to Abdul Hamid Dbeibah in the west.

In 2014, General Khalifa Haftar, a former Gaddafi-era officer, launched a campaign to rebuild Libya’s disbanded army. As Tripoli and other western cities welcomed Islamist factions and extremist militias, Haftar began consolidating forces under a new banner -the Libyan National Army. Backed by the eastern-based House of Representatives, he was formally appointed commander-in-chief in 2015 by Speaker Aguila Saleh and was promoted to Field Marshal the following year.

Haftar’s supporters, such as Khaled Al-Turjuman, view this effort as a revival of the national military. What began as a force of just over 300 personnel has reportedly grown to more than 120,000 officers and soldiers. A recent military parade in Benghazi put this strength on full display, showcasing a broad arsenal of advanced weaponry. Haftar took the opportunity to issue a warning to rivals: “In the critical moment, the army will have the final word.”

Haftar’s influence extends beyond eastern Libya. His forces have consolidated control from Benghazi through Sirte and Jufra in the center, down to the southern borders with Sudan, Chad, Niger, and Algeria. One of the most strategically vital areas under his command is the oil crescent along the northeastern coast, encompassing Ras Lanuf, Sidra, Brega, and Zueitina, essential hubs for Libya’s oil exports.

Since 2019, Haftar has shifted his focus further south, targeting key cities such as Sabha, Brak al-Shati, and Ubari, and extending his reach to the far southwest in Ghat. He also controls southeastern border areas like Kufra, Al-Jawf, Al-Uwaynat, and the Tibesti Mountains near Chad. This southern push, some analysts argue, is part of a calculated strategy to project power beyond the traditional east-west divide. While Tripoli remains home to key sovereign institutions such as the Central Bank and National Oil Corporation, Haftar’s growing territorial grip has led critics to accuse him of attempting to militarize the state.

Military analyst Adel Abdul Kafi notes that most of Libya’s southern borders are now under Haftar’s effective control. He also points to a US-backed initiative involving joint forces from the east and west to secure Libya’s frontiers and coastlines.

Control over Libya’s energy resources remains a central pillar of Haftar’s power. Beyond the oil ports along the coast, he oversees several major oilfields in the south. The Sharara field in Ubari, producing approximately 315,000 barrels per day, and the El Feel (Elephant) field, with around 70,000 barrels daily, are among the most significant. Though these fields are managed by the National Oil Corporation headquartered in Tripoli, protection on the ground often comes from a patchwork of facility guards and local militias -- some loyal to Haftar, others to Dbeibah, and some switching sides as needed.

Haftar commands a network of military bases that support his campaigns in the east, center, and south. These include the Jufra Airbase, used as a launchpad during his failed 2019 offensive on Tripoli; Al-Khadim (also known as Al-Kharouba), where drone operations have been reported; Al-Abrag and Gamal Abdel Nasser airbases in the east; the Tamanhent base near Sabha; and Brak Al-Shati, which secures critical southern supply lines. Another strategic base, Ma’tan al-Sarra near Kufra, is rumored to host Russian forces, giving Moscow a potential gateway to the African Sahel.

Haftar’s military strength is matched by political clout. Though the eastern-based government of Osama Hammad is not internationally recognized, it operates with Haftar’s backing and funds development projects through the Libya Development and Reconstruction Fund, headed by Qassem Haftar, the commander’s son. Despite their expired mandates, the House of Representatives and the High Council of State continue to pass legislation and negotiate over the formation of a new government—deepening Libya’s institutional deadlock.

The Presidential Council, headed by Mohamed al-Menfi, was established under the 2020 Geneva agreement and holds formal international legitimacy. However, its actual power is limited. Though it is nominally the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, internal divisions and political agreements strip it of much of its authority. Even in the west, where it is based, the Council is overshadowed by the Government of National Unity under Abdul Hamid Dbeibah.

Dbeibah’s legitimacy has come under increasing scrutiny, especially after violent clashes erupted in Tripoli in May, sparked by the killing of militia leader Abdul Ghani Al-Kikli (Ghneiwa). These confrontations exposed the fragility of the security landscape in the capital and significantly weakened Dbeibah’s position. Though his term officially ended after being appointed in early 2021, he refuses to step down without elections, leaning on continued international support.

Despite controlling public spending and state institutions, Dbeibah’s grip on security is largely dependent on a volatile network of militias. Previously aligned with powerful groups like the Stability Support Apparatus and the Special Deterrence Force, Dbeibah has since fallen out with many of these factions. Following Ghneiwa’s death, he disbanded the SSA and entered into open conflict with Abdul Rauf Kara’s Deterrence Force, escalating tensions across Tripoli.

Today, Dbeibah relies primarily on the 444th Combat Brigade, led by Major General Mahmoud Hamza, who also heads Military Intelligence in western Libya. He is supported by the Joint Operations Force in Misrata and other militia groups, including Battalion 55 under Muammar Al-Dawi. These forces benefit from extensive support from Türkiye, which provides Bayraktar TB2 drones, limited radar systems, and military training facilities under prior agreements signed with former Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj.

Western Libya’s military infrastructure includes several important bases. Al-Watiya Airbase, southwest of Tripoli near the Tunisian border, is vital for control over the western region. Mitiga Airbase in Tripoli, currently controlled by the Deterrence Force, serves as a civilian and military airport. Abu Sitta Naval Base in Tripoli functions as the headquarters of the General Staff, with strong Turkish naval ties. Misrata Airbase, among the country’s most fortified, hosts Turkish personnel and hardware. Other key sites include Yarmouk Camp in Tripoli -- now reportedly housing Syrian mercenaries --April 7 Camp in Bab Ben Ghashir, and the Khums Naval Base near the city of Khums.

Tripoli remains the nerve center of Libya’s institutional framework, hosting the Unity Government, the Presidential Council, the High Council of State, the Central Bank, and the National Oil Corporation. Yet, control over western Libya’s border regions with Tunisia, Algeria, and Niger remains tenuous. In areas like Ubari, Ghat, and Murzuq -home to Tuareg and Tebu communities - authority shifts frequently among competing forces.

The frontline between the rival eastern and western coalitions lies just west of Sirte. Haftar’s forces control the city, while Dbeibah’s militias are stationed in its outskirts, near Misrata. Buwairat al-Husun marks the main demarcation line. Periodic troop mobilizations and skirmishes in the area fuel ongoing fears of a new confrontation.

 

 



Mass Wedding in Gaza Celebrates New Life After Years of War and Tragedy 

Palestinian couples participate in a mass wedding ceremony in Hamad City in Khan Younis, Gaza Strip, Tuesday, Dec. 2, 2025. (AP)
Palestinian couples participate in a mass wedding ceremony in Hamad City in Khan Younis, Gaza Strip, Tuesday, Dec. 2, 2025. (AP)
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Mass Wedding in Gaza Celebrates New Life After Years of War and Tragedy 

Palestinian couples participate in a mass wedding ceremony in Hamad City in Khan Younis, Gaza Strip, Tuesday, Dec. 2, 2025. (AP)
Palestinian couples participate in a mass wedding ceremony in Hamad City in Khan Younis, Gaza Strip, Tuesday, Dec. 2, 2025. (AP)

Eman Hassan Lawwa was dressed in traditional Palestinian prints and Hikmat Lawwa wore a suit as they walked hand-in-hand past the crumbled buildings of southern Gaza in a line of other couples dressed in exactly the same way.

The 27-year-old Palestinians were among 54 couples to get married Tuesday in a mass wedding in war-ravaged Gaza that represented a rare moment of hope after two years of devastation, death and conflict.

"Despite everything that has happened, we will begin a new life," Hikmat Lawwa said. "God willing, this will be the end of the war," he said.

Weddings are a key part of Palestinian culture that have become rare in Gaza during the war. The tradition has begun to resume in the wake of a fragile ceasefire, even if the weddings are different from the elaborate ceremonies once held in the territory.

As roaring crowds waved Palestinian flags in the southern city of Khan Younis, the celebrations were dampened by the ongoing crisis across Gaza.

Most of Gaza's 2 million residents, including Eman and Hikmat Lawwa, have been displaced by the war, entire areas of cities have been flattened and aid shortages and outbursts in conflict continue to plague the daily lives of people.

The young couple, who are distant relatives, fled to the nearby town of Deir al-Balah during the war and have struggled to find basics like food and shelter. They said they don’t know how they’re going to build their lives together given the situation around them.

"We want to be happy like the rest of the world. I used to dream of having a home, a job, and being like everyone else," Hikmat said. "Today, my dream is to find a tent to live in."

"Life has started to return, but it's not like we hoped it would," he added.

Palestinians watch and celebrate a mass wedding ceremony in Hamad City in Khan Younis Tuesday, Dec. 2, 2025. (AP)

The celebration was funded by Al Fares Al Shahim, a humanitarian aid operation backed by the United Arab Emirates. In addition to holding the event, the organization offered couples a small sum of money and other supplies to start their lives together.

For Palestinians, weddings are often elaborate dayslong celebrations, seen as both an important social and economic choice that spells out the future for many families. They include joyful dances and processions through the streets by massive families in fabric patterns donned by the couple and their loved ones and heaping plates of food.

Weddings can also be a symbol of resilience and a celebration of new generations of families carrying on Palestinian traditions, said Randa Serhan, a professor of sociology at Barnard College who has studied Palestinian weddings.

"With every new wedding is going to come children and it means that the memories and the lineages are not going to die," Serhan said. "The couples are going to continue life in an impossible situation."

On Tuesday, a procession of cars carrying the couples drove through stretches of collapsed buildings. Hikmat and Eman Lawwa waved Palestinian flags with other couples as families surrounding them danced to music blaring over crowds.

Eman, who was cloaked in a white, red and green traditional dress, said the wedding offered a small moment of relief after years of suffering. But she said it was also marked by the loss of her father, mother, and other family members who were killed during the war.

"It’s hard to experience joy after such sorrow," she said, tears streaming down her face. "God willing, we will rebuild brick-by-brick."


‘Some Took Part in Israeli Captive Handover’…How Hamas Fighters Hid in Rafah Tunnels ?

Israeli captive Avera Mengistu stands on the handover platform as part of a prisoner exchange agreement between Hamas and Israel in Rafah in February (Reuters)
Israeli captive Avera Mengistu stands on the handover platform as part of a prisoner exchange agreement between Hamas and Israel in Rafah in February (Reuters)
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‘Some Took Part in Israeli Captive Handover’…How Hamas Fighters Hid in Rafah Tunnels ?

Israeli captive Avera Mengistu stands on the handover platform as part of a prisoner exchange agreement between Hamas and Israel in Rafah in February (Reuters)
Israeli captive Avera Mengistu stands on the handover platform as part of a prisoner exchange agreement between Hamas and Israel in Rafah in February (Reuters)

A series of Israeli military statements reporting the killing or capture of members of Hamas’s Izz al Din al Qassam Brigades inside Rafah’s tunnel network has sharpened scrutiny of who these fighters were and how long they had remained hidden underground.

The operations targeted men who had spent months beneath a city Israel moved to occupy in May 2024 and later brought under full control.

For more than a month, indirect contacts had sought to arrange the fighters’ safe withdrawal from the tunnels unarmed, an effort that helped expedite the handover of the body of Israeli officer Hadar Goldin on November 9.

But Israel later backed away from informal understandings with the United States, which had been engaging on the issue with Türkiye, over allowing the fighters to exit safely.

As weeks passed, Israel began hunting them down, killing and capturing them in groups through airstrikes or direct pursuit once they emerged from tunnels or ambush positions.

The pressure mounted as the fighters became confined to the last pockets of tunnels in Rafah’s eastern al-Jneina neighborhood.

Eight months in tunnels and ambush positions

Field sources from Hamas told Asharq Al-Awsat that the fighters had spent most of the two year war inside the city’s tunnels despite the presence of Israeli forces above ground and despite Israel’s entry into many of the passageways.

The sources said the tunnels had been built in ways that made them difficult for Israel to uncover fully even now.

They said that during the first truce which lasted seven days in November 2023, the fighters surfaced, then returned underground when the fighting resumed.

They alternated between staying in the tunnels and emerging into ambush positions above ground. Communication with their commanders continued until a second truce was reached in January of this year which lasted until March 18.

One source said that before the fighting resumed, and despite Israel’s deployment in Rafah, the fighters managed to emerge above ground, reach Khan Yunis, meet their commanders and take part in the handover of Israeli captives.

Some participated in the February release of Avera Mengistu, who had been held in Gaza since the 2014 war.

After the war resumed and diplomatic efforts to halt it failed, Qassam fighters returned to Rafah through the tunnels and resumed their ambush positions above ground.

From late March until August, the fighters remained in touch with their command and carried out a string of attacks that inflicted casualties on Israeli forces even after Israel declared it had brought Rafah under full control.

The Qassam Brigades at the time launched a series of attacks named Gates of Hell that killed about six Israeli soldiers.

The attacks involved detonating military vehicles, booby trapped houses and tunnel openings. In one incident in May, Qassam fighters attempted to seize an Israeli soldier.

Hamas, which was then engaged in negotiations to halt the war, sought through these operations to show that the Rafah Brigade remained active at a time when Israeli military sources were claiming the brigade had been dismantled after its battalions were destroyed.

According to information obtained by Asharq Al-Awsat, Rafah fighters and their immediate commanders spent more than eight months inside tunnels and in above ground ambush positions.

How did they obtain food and water

Field sources in the factions told Asharq Al-Awsat that the tunnels had been stocked with limited supplies of food and water.

One source who had experienced a similar shortage in a previous Gaza war said the fighters had likely relied on whatever food they could find.

This included leftover supplies from Israeli soldiers in some of the houses they had occupied or food in homes of residents that had not been destroyed.

The source cited social media posts from months earlier showing handwritten notes left by Hamas and Islamic Jihad fighters apologizing to homeowners for taking food.

The sources said duties differed inside the Qassam Brigades. Some fighters handled logistics, others manned ambush positions and others moved between units while maintaining direct coordination with field commanders.

Senior commanders

Among those whose photos Israeli media circulated after they were killed were the commander of Rafah’s eastern battalion, Mohammad al-Bawab, and his deputy, Ismail Abu Labda. Al-Bawab was married to Abu Labda’s sister.

Another senior figure killed was Tawfiq Salem, commander of the battalion’s elite company, according to the sources.

Abu Labda appeared in the February handover of Mengistu and was in direct contact with the International Committee of the Red Cross during the transfer. The sources said al-Bawab monitored the process from a distance but did not take part directly.

The sources added that al-Bawab and Abu Labda were among those who oversaw the capture of Israeli officer Hadar Goldin during the 2014 war.

Israel also killed Abdullah Hamad, the son of senior Hamas political bureau member Ghazi Hamad and a member of the movement’s negotiating delegation.

Field sources said the younger Hamad had been active in the Qassam Brigades and had graduated from the Rabat Military College run by the Hamas government before the war, later becoming an instructor.

He was killed alongside his cousin Ahmed Saeed Hamad, the son of Ghazi Hamad’s brother, while they were in a tunnel with Qassam commanders and other fighters.

The sources said Saeed Hamad had lost three daughters in Israeli strikes on their homes. The daughters were killed after their husbands took part in the October 7, 2023 attack and in other operations during the war.


Israeli Settler Outposts Spread Among West Bank Villages and Fuel Fear of More Attacks

An Israeli settler outpost stands in the middle of a valley next to olive trees in the West Bank town of Turmus Ayya, Wednesday, Nov. 12, 2025. (AP)
An Israeli settler outpost stands in the middle of a valley next to olive trees in the West Bank town of Turmus Ayya, Wednesday, Nov. 12, 2025. (AP)
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Israeli Settler Outposts Spread Among West Bank Villages and Fuel Fear of More Attacks

An Israeli settler outpost stands in the middle of a valley next to olive trees in the West Bank town of Turmus Ayya, Wednesday, Nov. 12, 2025. (AP)
An Israeli settler outpost stands in the middle of a valley next to olive trees in the West Bank town of Turmus Ayya, Wednesday, Nov. 12, 2025. (AP)

The fear is palpable in this Palestinian village. It’s clear in how farmers gather their harvests quickly, how they scan the valley for movement, how they dare not stray past certain roads. At any time, they say, armed Israeli settlers could descend.

“In a matter of minutes, they get on their phones. They gather themselves, and they surprise you,” said Yasser Alkam, a Palestinian-American lawyer and farmer from the village of Turmus Ayya. “They hide between the trees. They ambush people and beat them up severely.”

In recent months, Alkam says Turmus Ayya has weathered near-daily attacks by settlers, especially after they set up an outpost that the anti-settlement watchdog group Peace Now says is on his village’s land.

Alkam says he can’t reach his own fields for fear of being assaulted. In a particularly gruesome attack, he watched a settler beat a Palestinian woman unconscious with a spiky club.

The fear is shared throughout the West Bank. During October's olive harvest, settlers across the territory launched an average of eight attacks daily, according to the United Nations humanitarian office, the most since it began collecting data in 2006. The attacks continued in November, with the UN recording at least 136 more by Nov. 24.

Settlers burned cars, desecrated mosques, ransacked industrial plants and destroyed cropland. Israeli authorities have done little beyond issuing occasional condemnations of the violence.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu described the attackers as a minority that did not represent most settlers in the West Bank, where settlements are considered illegal by most of the international community. But their continued expansion of outposts — conducted in public with seemingly few legal repercussions — and the violence have cemented a fearful status quo for their Palestinian neighbors.

A brutal assault on a grandmother

While driving in fields east of Turmus Ayya on Oct. 19, Alkam saw Afaf Abu Alia, a grandmother from a nearby village, harvesting a grove of olive trees. They were loaned to her after the Israeli military bulldozed her own 500 trees this year, she said.

She worked until she heard yelling in Hebrew. Settlers descended on the road nearby. Suddenly, one ran toward her with a club.

“The monsters started beating me,” she told The Associated Press three weeks after the attack. “After that, my memories get all blurry.”

Video of the attack obtained by the AP shows a settler beating Alia with the jagged club, even after she was motionless. She was hospitalized for four days, requiring 20 stitches on her head, she said.

Asked for comment on the attack, the military said its troops and police had “defused” a confrontation in which Israeli civilians were torching vehicles and using violence.

In rare move, Israel charges settler responsible Police arrested a man named Ariel Dahari for beating Abu Alia. An Israeli court charged him later with terrorism.

Dahari is being represented by Honenu, an organization that provides legal aid to settlers, who say the West Bank is part of the biblical Jewish homeland and often cast attacks as self-defense. According to an article about Dahari on the group's website, he has received at least 18 administrative orders since 2016 that included house arrest and confinement to his town in Israel.

He told the Israeli news site Arutz Sheva in 2023 that he had been kicked out of the territory twice. It is not clear how he was able to return.

Palestinians and human rights workers say Israeli soldiers and police routinely fail to prosecute attacks by violent settlers. Their sense of impunity has deepened under Israel's far-right National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, a settler, and Defense Minister Israel Katz, who in January released settlers from administrative detention, Israel’s practice of detaining individuals without charge or trial.

The number of investigations opened into settler violence since 2023, Ben-Gvir's first year in office, has plummeted, according to a report by Israel's Channel 12 TV that cited official police data. Police opened only 60 investigations into settler violence in 2024, compared with 150 cases in 2023 and 235 cases in 2022, the report said.

About 94% of all investigation files opened by Israeli police into settler violence from 2005 to 2024 ended without an indictment, according to Israeli rights group Yesh Din. Since 2005, just 3% of those investigations led to convictions.

Dahari told Arutz Sheva that he was determined to stay in the West Bank.

“We will not give up our grip on our land because of one order or another. We will continue to build it and make it flourish everywhere,” he said, adding that he hoped “the security establishment” would “invest all its resources in the war against the Arab enemy, who is the real enemy of us all.”

When reached by the AP, Dahari’s lawyer, Daniel Shimshilashvili, sent a statement from Honenu, saying there was “slim evidence” against Dahari.

Threats are reinforced by settler outposts

The villagers from Turmus Ayya say it's not enough to arrest one settler — the threat of violence is reinforced by the outpost in the nearby valley called Emek Shilo.

Emek Shilo was founded this year on private Palestinian land, according to Peace Now. It was started by a well-known settler named Amishav Melet, said three Palestinians living in Turmus Ayya and Yair Dvir, the spokesperson for Israeli rights group B'tselem. On his personal X account, Melet posted videos of the outpost’s construction.

Villagers alleged that Melet travels the valley in an all-terrain vehicle, surveilling their activities. He’s frequently armed, they said.

Usually little more than a few sheds and a pen for livestock, such outposts can impose control on nearby land and water sources. They often turn into authorized settlements, spelling the end of Palestinian communities.

Israeli police did not comment when asked about Melet.

Abdel Nasser Awwad had to halt construction of a new family home when the outpost was established. In security camera footage he shared with AP, masked figures showed up at the construction site, smashing his truck with a club and appearing to cut piping. He said they have stoned three of his workers.

When AP visited the village, groups of settlers were visible around the outpost and a settler tractor patrolled the area. Drones hummed in the air.

Melet was convicted of assaulting police in 2014, according to court records. In an interview with Israel's Ynet news in 2015, Melet said he had received administrative orders barring him from the West Bank.

In response to questions from the AP, Melet said he was a “peace activist.”

“Any claim against me that I am active or connected to violence or terrorism or any illegal action is a lie and a falsehood!” he wrote.

He called the AP’s questions “part of a cruel and false campaign” against Zionism that “reeks” of antisemitism.

In video from Oct. 20 shared with the AP by Alkam, a man who Alkam said was Melet was recorded telling a farmer picking olives to leave. The farmer responded, “The army allowed us to be here today.”

“Where is the army?” the man identified as Melet said. “I am the army.”

When settlers descend on Turmus Ayya, the mosque emits a loud siren. Young men dash quickly to the village entrance, forming a barrier between their families and the settlers.

During the harvest, many villagers brought cameras into the fields, hoping footage showing assaults would help hold settlers accountable.

It’s a far cry from past olive harvests, when families spent all day in the groves, picnicking beneath the trees.

Abu Alia, the grandmother, said nothing will prevent her from returning.

“I’ll be back next year.”