A senior figure in Sudan’s dissolved ruling party has revealed that the country’s Islamist movement is preparing for a return to power once the ongoing conflict ends, even if it means supporting prolonged military rule in the interim.
The remarks, made by Ahmed Haroun, former head of the National Congress Party and one of four Sudanese figures wanted by the International Criminal Court, reflect growing confidence among Islamists following their military involvement in the war.
The war, now in its third year, pits Sudan’s army against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and has triggered massive displacement, famine, and ethnic violence. Despite the RSF holding strategic ground in Darfur and parts of southern Sudan, the army has recently gained momentum on multiple fronts.
Islamist factions claim credit for assisting in these advances, contributing fighters and logistical support.
According to military and government sources, the Islamist movement has been increasingly visible on the battlefield.
These networks, dismantled following the 2019 uprising that ousted Omar al-Bashir, have resurfaced amid the chaos of war.
A leaked party document reviewed by Reuters outlines the movement’s growing role, stating that between 2,000 and 3,000 Islamist fighters were mobilized in the conflict’s first year, with over 70,000 civilians trained for combat under the army’s call for general mobilization.
While military leadership has downplayed connections to political factions, army sources and Islamists alike acknowledge that coordination exists, particularly within elite units where Islamist-trained operatives are embedded. Islamist forces have reportedly reinforced dwindling army ranks, especially in key battles around the capital, Khartoum.
Ahmed Haroun, who escaped from prison at the onset of the conflict, proposed a governance model that preserves military control over national sovereignty and security, with a civilian prime minister emerging from future elections.
He insisted that Islamists will only return through elections, not via transitional arrangements, and argued that Sudan needs a tailored political model that accommodates military involvement due to ongoing security threats and foreign interference.
While denying the scale of Islamist involvement described in the leaked documents, Haroun admitted that supporting the army was part of a broader strategy in response to the national call for mobilization.
Military sources estimate that at least 5,000 fighters directly linked to the former ruling party are active, with many serving in specialized units or intelligence services.
Despite these developments, Haroun and other Islamist figures maintain that they do not wield authority over the army. Still, their growing influence on the battlefield and political landscape has sparked renewed concerns about the possible resurgence of Sudan’s old guard in the post-war order.
