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Detained Sailors Reveal Houthi Smuggling Routes from Iran to Yemen

Smuggled rockets that were part of a shipment of Iranian weapons seized by Yemeni forces in the Red Sea. (EPA)
Smuggled rockets that were part of a shipment of Iranian weapons seized by Yemeni forces in the Red Sea. (EPA)
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Detained Sailors Reveal Houthi Smuggling Routes from Iran to Yemen

Smuggled rockets that were part of a shipment of Iranian weapons seized by Yemeni forces in the Red Sea. (EPA)
Smuggled rockets that were part of a shipment of Iranian weapons seized by Yemeni forces in the Red Sea. (EPA)

Confessions by detained sailors have revealed the smuggling routes used by the Houthi militants in Yemen to smuggle weapons from Iran.

Yemeni forces arrested in July seven people on board a ship they intercepted in the Red Sea. The sailors revealed the details of a significant smuggling network run by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) that ran routes through Beirut, Damascus, Somalia and Djibouti to reach the Houthi-held ports of Hodeidah.

The confessions were aired by al-Joumhouriya television that is run by the Yemeni national resistance that is based on the western Yemeni coast.

Four sailors confessed to smuggling arms shipments from Iran’s Bandar Abbas port to Hodeidah. They have been identified as Amer Masawa, Ali Qassir, Issa Qassir and Abdullah Afifi.

Masawa revealed that a Houthi official in Hodeidah had tasked him back in 2023 to return a ship from Iran to Yemen. Masawa headed to Houthi-held Sanaa with others where they were granted passports. From there, they boarded a Yemenia Airways flight to the Jordanian capital Amman.

From there, they continued on to the Lebanese capital Beirut where a man in his 60s escorted them to an apartment that was ready to receive them. They remained there for three days before being transported by car to the Syrian capital Damascus and from there they flew to Tehran, Iran.

In Tehran, a man escorted the travelers to a Houthi camp run by leading Houthi member Mohammed al-Talebi. Yemeni authorities identify him as a Houthi representative of the smuggling network from Iran.

After ten days in Tehran, they were flown to Bandar Abbas city where they stayed in a villa owned by Talebi who explained to them their mission. Soon after, they were joined by ten Somali sailors.

Oman route

The second sailor, Ali Qassir, recalled how he was recruited by people affiliated with a Houthi official at Hodeidah’s al-Salif port, Hussein al-Attas, to bring a ship from Iran to Yemen.

Ali Qassir and others were taken to the Jowf province east of Sanaa where they met with another smuggler who escorted them along a desert route through Jawf, Marib and Hadramawt to the al-Mahra province bordering Oman.

At the Sarfait border crossing, a smuggler escorted them to Oman where another person took them to Salalah city. Three days later, they were transported to Muscat where they were flown to Bandar Abbas.

They were taken to a camp run by the Houthis and where they joined their fellow sailors, as well as the ten Somalis. Talebi then set about explaining their missions.

Issa Qassir, Ali’s brother, said they were divided into two groups to sail with the illegal cargo back to Yemen. They were informed that they were transporting children’s toys, power generators and boxes of cancer treatment, which they were instructed must remain refrigerated.

As they sailed off the Omani coast, their vessel broke down. They contacted Omani authorities that transported them to Muscat, where they stayed for ten days until the ship was repaired, after which they headed to Yemen.

A third sailor said the people on the ship were unaware of the true nature of the cargo they were carrying, assuming it was battering and construction equipment. The coastguard eventually stopped their vessel and boarded it to discover the illegal shipment that included rockets and other weapons.

Further confessions revealed that the IRGC used three smuggling routes from Iran. The first was a direct route from Bandar Abbas to al-Salif, the second ran through Somalia and the third through Djibouti to al-Salif.

The sailors revealed that international patrols in the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea never intercepted their vessels. While sailing at night, they would cross the Bab al-Mandeb Strait and sail west of the international shipping route to avoid detection by Yemen’s coastguard and national resistance.

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Arab World

Syria Cautiously Welcomes Abdi’s Integration Announcement, Awaits Implementation

SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi with his fighters wearing the military uniform of the Syrian army in February. (Social media)
SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi with his fighters wearing the military uniform of the Syrian army in February. (Social media)
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Syria Cautiously Welcomes Abdi’s Integration Announcement, Awaits Implementation

SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi with his fighters wearing the military uniform of the Syrian army in February. (Social media)
SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi with his fighters wearing the military uniform of the Syrian army in February. (Social media)

Ahmed al-Hilali, deputy governor of Syria’s Hasakah province and spokesperson for the presidential team tasked with overseeing integration with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), welcomed SDF commander Mazloum Abdi’s announcement on integration, describing it as an acknowledgment of the SDF’s dissolution.

He cautioned, however, that “there is a difference between announcing an integration decision and completing its implementation on the ground.”

Syrian Kurdish writer and political researcher Ali Tami told Asharq Al-Awsat that integration was “complex and intertwined and cannot be concluded with a statement.”

He also challenged Abdi’s assertion that fighters who had come to support the SDF had left the region, noting that thousands of foreign fighters and remnants of the former regime remained in Hasakah.

Al-Hilali and Abdi attended celebrations Thursday marking the 100th anniversary of the founding of Qamishli. In a speech, Abdi announced the “completion of the military, security and administrative integration” of his forces into Syrian state institutions under the January 29 agreement.

Late Thursday, al-Hilali told Syria’s Al-Ikhbariya television that Abdi’s remarks were “an important and positive development,” viewing them as a clear transition from understandings to actual implementation of integration into state institutions.

He explained that the announcement would translate into practical measures, including unifying institutions and administrative authority and restoring the state’s full powers, ensuring unified decision-making and Syrian sovereignty.

Abdi's remarks were aimed at ending “dual structures and parallel entities” and establishing “one state, one army and unified institutions,” he added.

Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi meet in Damascus earlier in August. (SANA)

Implementation

Al-Hilali stressed that the issue could not be considered definitively resolved through statements alone.

“What was announced, together with earlier steps, such as removing partisan symbols and flags from institutions and public squares, confirms that the process is moving forward,” he noted.

While describing the announcement as a highly significant political step, he emphasized that it did not mean all stages of administrative, security and military implementation had been completed.

The objective now is to turn the decisions into a fully institutionalized reality in which Syrian state institutions become the sole authority, all institutions and bodies return to the state framework, and security, military and administrative decision-making is unified, he explained.

In separate remarks carried by Syria TV, al-Hilali said Abdi’s declaration that military and security integration had been completed as an acknowledgment of the SDF’s dissolution.

Integration declared complete

Abdi announced that the integration of military, service and administrative institutions into national state institutions had been completed and that “from now on, a new process begins.”

In areas formerly under the Kurdish Autonomous Administration, new institutions are being established in the name of the Syrian state while existing institutions will continue operating, he explained, urging residents to protect them.

Abdi also announced that forces from other “parts of Kurdistan” that had supported the SDF during Syria’s civil war had withdrawn under an agreement and at the SDF’s own request, an apparent reference to Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) fighters.

Tami remained skeptical, arguing that the SDF had not formally announced its dissolution and that integration was too complicated to be settled by statements alone.

He maintained that the PKK controls the SDF and regards it as one of its instruments in confronting Türkiye, making it unlikely that the group would surrender its weapons before the direction of the peace process in Türkiye becomes clearer.

“In principle, we all support sparing the region further bloodshed, and integration is possible, but unfortunately the chances of success are very slim,” Tami lamented.

He also dismissed Abdi’s assertion that Kurdish forces that previously assisted the SDF had left the region as “illogical,” pointing to thousands of foreign fighters and former regime remnants still in Hasakah.

With efforts underway to ease tensions, integration continues to face major difficulties and challenges, he remarked.

SDF fighters in Ain al-Arab. (Reuters file)

From Autonomous Administration to integration

The Autonomous Administration traces its origins to the Kurdish Supreme Committee, formed by Syria’s Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the Kurdish National Council following the July 12, 2012, Erbil agreement. Its armed structures included the People’s Protection Units (YPG), Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) and Asayish security forces, followed in 2015 by the Kurdish-dominated SDF.

The administration expanded between 2014 and 2023, accompanied by growth in its military, security and civilian institutions, which employ tens of thousands.

The SDF lost a significant portion of its territory during nearly two weeks of clashes with the Syrian army in late 2025 and early 2026, followed by the January 29 agreement.

The accord provides for a ceasefire and gradual integration of Kurdish-established military and civilian institutions into the Syrian state, the handover of border crossings and oil and gas fields, and the departure of foreign fighters.

In July, residents in Hasakah mobilized for several days to demand that the state extend its authority across the entire province, allow displaced people to return to their towns and villages, and end SDF dominance and its abuses against residents.

Arab World

Houthis Tighten Security Grip in Ibb

 A Houthi rally in Sanaa called by the group’s leader in support of land and maritime attacks (AFP) 
 A Houthi rally in Sanaa called by the group’s leader in support of land and maritime attacks (AFP) 
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Houthis Tighten Security Grip in Ibb

 A Houthi rally in Sanaa called by the group’s leader in support of land and maritime attacks (AFP) 
 A Houthi rally in Sanaa called by the group’s leader in support of land and maritime attacks (AFP) 

The Iran-backed Houthi group has tightened its security grip on Yemen’s Ibb governorate amid rising tensions and clashes along surrounding front lines, deploying elite units to areas near battlefronts with Taiz, Hodeidah and Al-Dhale.

Local sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that the group had intensified its security presence in Ibb city and areas near the front lines in the west of the governorate, reinforced routes leading to the fronts and imposed tighter surveillance on residents’ movements and communications.

Ibb is strategically important because it lies along supply routes linking Houthi-controlled areas with fronts in Hodeidah, Taiz and Al-Dhale, about 192 kilometers (119 miles) south of Sanaa.

The Houthis have moved the headquarters of the military command covering Ibb, Al-Dhale and Taiz to Damt, east of Ibb, and deployed two elite units known as the Al-Samad Brigades near the front lines, the sources said.

The group sent fighters recruited from Ibb to frontline positions while keeping the two Al-Samad units behind the front to monitor the forces and prevent local fighters from fleeing or retreating during clashes.

According to the sources, the deployment reflects distrust of fighters recruited from the governorate as the Houthis tighten security in cities and towns and along roads leading to combat zones.

Operations Hub

The Houthis have turned eastern Ibb into a center for managing military operations on surrounding fronts while redeploying units near the frontlines.

The moves come amid mounting tensions on several fronts and as the group strengthens its security grip over Ibb, one of its main recruitment and supply areas.

They coincide with the first anniversary of a sweeping arrest campaign in Ibb that targeted more than 115 educators, academics, doctors and engineers, according to local sources.

The campaign lasted more than three months, from late May to October last year. Fourteen detainees have since been released at different times, the latest about a week ago, while the others remain in custody.

Several people wanted by the Houthis remain unable to leave the governorate for government-controlled areas, while around 260 families have managed to flee Houthi-held territory and reach areas under government control.

Siham al-Abab, daughter of educator Sadiq al-Abab, meanwhile revealed that her father’s health had deteriorated after more than a year in Houthi detention, with his family unable to visit him or obtain information about his condition. Her father called several days ago and sounded clearly tired, she said, adding that the family did not know what was wrong with him and could neither see nor check on him.

She added that the call had a profound psychological impact and that her father’s voice remained with her afterward. She had previously described her family’s suffering in his absence, saying he had left behind a small family in need of support while remaining imprisoned without the family knowing what charges he faced.

The Houthis detained Sadiq al-Abab during a sweeping arrest campaign targeting hundreds of people in Ibb, Taiz and Al-Bayda, including doctors, teachers, lawyers, employees and community figures, according to local sources.

Detention Without Legal Process

Zakaria al-Jaberi said his father has been forcibly detained by the Houthis at the Political Security headquarters in Ibb since June 12, 2025.

The family has communicated with him only three times. Its sole permitted visit came more than 11 months after his detention, before further visits were barred.

Al-Jaberi noted that the Houthis had allowed only limited phone calls, leaving the family unaware of his detention conditions or physical and psychological state despite authorities knowing he has health problems.

The family has approached numerous officials and individuals seeking answers or assistance, but was often told that those responsible knew nothing about the case and that the authority handling it was in Sanaa.

Al-Jabri questioned who had ordered his father’s detention, why he had not been referred to prosecutors and why the family had not been informed of the charges or any legal process.

The family does not know “who has the authority to make the decision or who can end this detention,” he underlined, adding that the prolonged detention had taken a heavy psychological and social toll. He said the case reflected the absence of any clear official authority the family could turn to despite repeated appeals to government bodies, civil society organizations and local dignitaries.

 

 

 

Arab World

Sudan Farms Lie Barren as El Nino Leaves Nile Banks Dry

A photograph shows the exposed riverbed of the Blue Nile in Khartoum on July 27, 2026. (AFP)
A photograph shows the exposed riverbed of the Blue Nile in Khartoum on July 27, 2026. (AFP)
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Sudan Farms Lie Barren as El Nino Leaves Nile Banks Dry

A photograph shows the exposed riverbed of the Blue Nile in Khartoum on July 27, 2026. (AFP)
A photograph shows the exposed riverbed of the Blue Nile in Khartoum on July 27, 2026. (AFP)

Along the bone-dry riverbanks of the Nile in Sudan, farmers struggle to pull water to their crops. Others gather to pray for rainfall over cracked earth.

Across the country, farmland that could feed the world's largest hunger crisis many times over lies fallow, as weary farmers once again find themselves in the crosshairs of faraway destruction.

First came war between the country's army and rival paramilitaries, which since April 2023 has killed more than 200,000 people and pushed nearly 20 million into crisis levels of hunger.

Then a more distant conflict, between Iran and the United States, crippled fuel and fertilizer supply through the Strait of Hormuz, causing costs to soar.

And now the powerful El Nino climate pattern strengthening in the Pacific Ocean, which impacts winds and rains across the world, has delayed crucial rains and led water levels in the life-giving Nile to drop precipitously.

Just south of the capital Khartoum, farmer Al-Tigani Fadlallah points to an island that shouldn't be there.

"The water usually covers it by July, but you can see it even now," he told AFP this month, seeing in the sunbaked sandbank a bad omen for his parched crops.

Through the length of Sudan, from the northern fields near Egypt, along the Nile river to the Ethiopian border, farmers told AFP reporters the water they need is not rising from the riverbanks nor falling from the sky.

The UN's food and agriculture organization says the season "is unfolding under heightened climate risk, driven by El Nino conditions" including delayed and below average rains, and long and frequent dry spells.

Farmers say it is one of the hardest seasons in recent memory, but climate research shows it will not be the last.

- Pray for rain -

Climate and hydrology scientist Elfatih Eltahir, at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has studied the link between El Nino and the Nile for thirty years.

His research has shown El Nino is closely associated with low Nile flow and, when it begins in late spring, as it did this year, brings a high probability of drought in southeastern Sudan and northwestern Ethiopia, where the Blue Nile originates.

Water levels at the reservoir behind Ethiopia's massive Grand Renaissance dam on the Blue Nile, which contributes the majority of water feeding the Nile river, was six meters lower this July compared to the same month last year, according to data from Germany's University of Tubingen.

A Sudanese farmer ploughs agricultural land in Gedaref State, eastern Sudan, on July 18, 2026. (AFP)

But Eltahir warns "more transparency and cooperation" are also needed between Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan over Addis Ababa's management of the reservoir, especially as climate change brings more extreme floods and droughts.

This summer, the Blue Nile basin has already seen as little as half of its usual rainfall, according to UC Santa Barbara's Climate Hazards Center, and regional forecasts predict below average rainfall for the rest of the rainy season.

Farmers in Gedaref state on the Ethiopian border, where the bulk of Sudan's staple crops such as sorghum and sesame are planted, are already feeling it.

When August rolled in and their usually-verdant fields were still a dull brown, frustrated farmers gathered behind local imams for rain-invoking prayers.

"We need these rains for our crops and our livestock, and they're late," local farmer Abdelmajid Hussein told AFP after a prayer.

Agriculture minister Ismat Qurashi told AFP farmers are being told to choose drought-resistant crops and to delay planting.

Moussa Yaacoub, 75, has planted sesame for decades, including three wartime growing seasons each harder than the last.

Now, standing sentinel over the cracked earth, he wonders if he will make it through the next, with his land now costing him "four times as much to plant".

- Can't catch a break -

Downstream, in Sudan's other breadbasket state Al-Jazira, Hassan Ahmed stares out at the farm that has been in his family for 100 years.

When Ahmed returned to it last year, after the army recaptured Al-Jazira from the Rapid Support Forces, he found it had been ransacked by looting paramilitaries, and his trees stood wilting in the sun.

He and his sons got to work bringing it back to life, but this year have struggled anew.

"I'm 63 and I have never seen the Nile this low in August," he told AFP. "By now we should have taken our water pump out because the flood had drenched the soil several meters in."

Buffeted by a perfect storm -- low water, soaring costs and a crippled market -- many farmers have abandoned their lands, at a time when 65 percent of Sudan's vast arable land is already out of commission.

Some farmers, hopeful at the start of the season, "planted their crops but then left them to die because it just wasn't worth the harvest," young farmer Mohamed al-Tijani told AFP near Khartoum.

Sudan imports all of its fuel and most of its fertilizer, costs for which have multiplied by up to five this year as a result of war in the Middle East.

Veteran farmer Ahmed Othman is one of many who know he won't break even in the market, already devastated with most of the country out of work.

"But at least I can say I'm working at all," he told AFP, back bent from decades of toiling in the fields.