Deadly Blows and Setbacks Deepened Hezbollah’s Crisis During War with Israel

Hezbollah supporters watch a televised speech delivered by Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah in Dahieh in November 2019. (AFP)
Hezbollah supporters watch a televised speech delivered by Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah in Dahieh in November 2019. (AFP)
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Deadly Blows and Setbacks Deepened Hezbollah’s Crisis During War with Israel

Hezbollah supporters watch a televised speech delivered by Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah in Dahieh in November 2019. (AFP)
Hezbollah supporters watch a televised speech delivered by Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah in Dahieh in November 2019. (AFP)

Months before his assassination, former Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah believed that the “support war” his party had launched against Israel in October 2023 in support of Gaza would remain within the limits of the “rules of engagement”. He believed that Iran would not allow four decades of “Islamic resistance” in Lebanon to fall easy prey to the enemy.

However, a series of wrong calculations prevented the party from taking decisive decisions during the conflict, which by September 2024 had turned into an all-out war.

This report reveals how Israel’s assassination of major Hezbollah leaderships effectively cut off Nasrallah from knowing every detail of what was happening on the ground. Field leaders appointed to replace the slain ones did not have enough information. Others have speculated that the party’s problem did not lie in the commanders, but in the loss of rocket launcher operators, who were a “rare commodity” in the party and the war.

Asharq Al-Awsat interviewed a number of Lebanese and Iraqi figures, who were in touch with the Hezbollah leadership in 2024, for this report to help fill in some gaps in the various narratives that have emerged related to the buildup to Nasrallah’s assassination in September 2024.

Lebanese authorities say 3,768 people were killed and over 15,000 injured in the war, while Israeli figures have said that Hezbollah lost around 2,500 members in over 12,000 strikes.

War within limits

In the first weeks of the war, Hezbollah was convinced that the “rules of engagement” on the ground would remain in place and that it would not turn into an all-out war, revealed a Lebanese figure who was in close contact with party military commanders.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat on condition of anonymity, he stated that Nasrallah would tell meetings with influential party officials that the war would be limited to border skirmishes with Israel, as had happened in the past.

One leading Hezbollah member said the party believed that Iran would be able to “set the deterrence in the war and reach a ceasefire through maneuvering in its negotiations” with the West, added the Lebanese figure.

“The party was waiting on Iran to restore balance in the war that was tipped in Israel’s favor and to eventually reach a ceasefire without major losses,” he went on to say.

Iranian officials, led by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, have always said that Tehran would not abandon its allies. Nasrallah himself had always credited Iran with supporting his party financially and with weapons.

Three commanders

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat from his residence in Beirut’s southern suburbs, a Lebanese Shiite cleric said Hezbollah was slow in realizing that it was headed towards all-out war with Israel.

The cleric, who earned his religious studies in Iraq’s al-Najaf, lost four members of his family during the war.

Nasrallah, he added, lost key commanders who were his eyes and ears on the field.

Whenever Israel killed a field commander, it was as if Nasrallah “lost an eye that helped him see clearly. He was obsessed with following up on field developments” and Israel was taking these tools away from him, he revealed.

The greatest blows to Nasrallah were the losses of commanders Taleb Abdullah, Ibrahim Akeel, and Wissam al-Taweel.

Taweel was a prominent commander in the party’s al-Radwan unit. Israel killed him on January 8, 2024. Abdullah was responsible for Hezbollah’s operations in the central sector of the border with Israel and stretching to the Litani river. Israel killed him on June 11, 2024, in what the cleric said was the harshest blow to Nasrallah. Akeel was commander of Hezbollah’s military council. Israel killed him on September 20, 2024.

In the end, Nasrallah lost these three commanders and a state of chaos ensued in the operation rooms. “Other commanders on the field complained of how decisions were being improvised because members were acting out of alarm and suspicion instead of discipline,” said Lebanese sources.

Despite these major losses during a period of eight months, Nasrallah and his entourage continued to think inside the box and within the rules of engagement, still ruling out that an all-out war would happen.

Lebanese journalist Ali al-Amin said Nasrallah believed that the party was still capable of militarily deterring Israel and preventing a comprehensive war. He was ultimately wrong.

(From left to right) Slain Hezbollah commanders Ibrahim Akeel, Wissam al-Taweel and Taleb Abdullah.

Secrecy

Hezbollah’s problem lies in Hezbollah itself and how its commanders operate.

Lebanese sources explained that the field commanders killed between January and November 2024 were part of a disconnected chain of command, in that they were not a whole that relayed expertise and information smoothly.

The sources explained further: “When a commander is killed, his replacement does not have access to his predecessor’s field information and details, which are held in secrecy. This was one of Nasrallah’s problems in dealing with the war.”

More interviews with Asharq Al-Awsat revealed that each commander built his own network of relations, methods and information based on his own personal experience as an individual. When he is killed, this network dies with him, along with information about weapons caches or field plans.

At one point, Israeli drones hovering over a Hezbollah unit would have more information about the party than the newly appointed commander, said the cleric.

Israel’s infiltration

Nasrallah first started having doubts that Israel had breached Hezbollah after the assassination of Saleh al-Arouri, former Hamas deputy politburo chief, on January 2, 2024. Wissam al-Taweel was killed that same month.

The cleric said Nasrallah had not expected these assassinations and notably kept silent after they happened.

Later, he chose defense instead of offense, said Al-Amin. He revealed that field commanders had urgently requested a meeting with Nasrallah to call on him to launch an all-out war, because Israel was hunting down their members. Nasrallah adamantly refused.

Instead, the party became more isolated and began having deep doubts. The cleric explained that this is how Shiite movements in particular behave. They isolate themselves for internal reflection.

Security sources said that at the same time, Hezbollah reviewed its communications networks in the hopes of finding the Israeli breach.

A prominent Shiite figure, who has been in contact with Hezbollah since 2015, told Asharq Al-Awsat that the channels of communication with the party changed several times as more and more assassinations took place in Lebanon.

“We would come in contact with a new person every time we needed something from Dahieh (Beirut’s southern suburbs and a Hezbollah stronghold),” he added.

In August 2024, the Iranians asked Iraqi factions to support Hezbollah in its war. The Iraqi leader said they were instructed to make media statements that they were ready to go to war. A month later, Iraq’s Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada faction said it would send 100,000 fighters to the Lebanese borders, but none did.

Pager operation

The party grew more anxious to uncover how Israel had breached it. Then came the devastating pager operation in September.

The attack isolated leaders from each other and their field networks. Communications within the party were almost dead and at some point, the remaining leaderships even gave up trying to find out where the breach was from.

Following the attack, field units did not hear anything for days from their commanders, revealed the cleric. It took the command a long time to resume contacts.

During that time, a military commander asked Nasrallah if the rules of engagement still stood. Nasrallah did not give a definitive answer, which was unusual for him, according to information obtained by Asharq Al-Awsat.

Nasrallah realized that he was now in an open war that he did not want, but it was already too late, revealed sources from leading officials who had attended important meetings.

Political science professor Ali Mohammed Ahmed tried to explain why Hezbollah refused to change its course of action. He said that maintaining the rules of engagement would ultimately not fall in Israel’s favor.

But what really tipped the war in its favor was its superior technology that Hezbollah had not taken into account.

Despite major losses during a period of eight months, Nasrallah and his entourage continued to think inside the box. (AFP)

The final scene

On the day of his assassination on September 27, Nasrallah headed to Dahieh with deputy Quds Force commander in Lebanon Abbas Nilforoushan. We will never know what they discussed. They headed to an underground Hezbollah compound and soon after Israel pounded the site with tons of bunker buster bombs.

Tons of questions were raised the day after in Dahieh and everywhere.

Looking at photos of his slain relatives, the Lebanese cleric said: “It took Hezbollah supporters a long time to recover from the shock. When they did, they asked, ‘who let down whom? The party or Iran? The resistance or Wilayet al-Faqih?’”

Ahmed said Hezbollah operated in a single basic way: it could not quit a war imposed on it, and so, it fought on.

Al-Amin stressed that Nasrallah would never have opened the “support front” without backing from Iran and his conviction that Israel would take into account threats from Tehran’s proxies in Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen.

However, the successive military and security setbacks led to a state of disarray and Nasrallah effectively cut the connection between Iran and Hezbollah, he added. Eventually, both sides realized that they had fallen into a trap.

Ahmed underlined one important development that took place early on during the war. Israel killed the strategic rocket launcher operators. The operators are a “rare commodity” and difficult to replace.

Hezbollah’s problem did not lie in its loss of field commanders, but the rocket operators, he said.

When the party launched hundreds of rockets at Israel a day before the ceasefire took effect, “we realized that it succeeded in replacing the slain operators,” he added.

“No one let down anyone. The problem lies in both Iran and Hezbollah and how they seemingly could not move on from the October 7, 2023 attack. Time was moving, but they were not,” he stated.

Iraqi researcher Akeel Abbas explained that the party and Iran did not grasp the extent of the major change that was taking place, even after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that October 7 was like his country’s September 11.

“Everyone understood that the old rules no longer stood and that new ones were being imposed by force,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“Iran was incapable of keeping pace with the major changes Israel was creating. It needed more time to prepare for such a largescale confrontation,” he remarked.



Bandar Abbas, Iran’s Trade Hub on Hormuz Thrust to Frontline of US War

Fishermen check their nets and small boats on the seashore in the port city of Bandar Abbas, in southern Iran on August 10, 2026. (AFP)
Fishermen check their nets and small boats on the seashore in the port city of Bandar Abbas, in southern Iran on August 10, 2026. (AFP)
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Bandar Abbas, Iran’s Trade Hub on Hormuz Thrust to Frontline of US War

Fishermen check their nets and small boats on the seashore in the port city of Bandar Abbas, in southern Iran on August 10, 2026. (AFP)
Fishermen check their nets and small boats on the seashore in the port city of Bandar Abbas, in southern Iran on August 10, 2026. (AFP)

With a long shoreline on the Strait of Hormuz, Iran's southern trade hub of Bandar Abbas has found itself at the frontlines of the war with the United States, with residents struggling to revive livelihoods battered by months of fighting.

Like elsewhere in Iran, economic strain has squeezed households since US-Israeli strikes triggered the Middle East war on February 28. But unlike much of the country, the port city of around half a million people has remained exposed to fighting even after an April 8 ceasefire brought relief elsewhere.

But despite a lull in hostilities in July, residents still feel squeezed. Saeed Tajik, 42, used to work at a shipyard before losing his job and turning to driving a taxi.

"The prices of housing and food have become extremely high. Almost all the basics -- rice, yoghurt, and oil -- have doubled," said Tajik.

Fuel shortages have long been common in southern Iran, where authorities restrict supplies in an effort to curb widespread fuel smuggling.

But now, "the queues have become longer ... it happens that we wait in the long line for fuel only to get told 'there is none' upon arriving," Tajik said as he drove past a station where motorists waited under the punishing summer heat.

Hormuz has emerged as a central flashpoint after an April ceasefire and June framework deal failed to resolve disagreements between Washington and Tehran over the future management of the strait.

During the war, US strikes hit bridges, highways and railway infrastructure around Bandar Abbas until mid-July, in what analysts saw as attempts to cut off the city and disrupt Iranian military logistics in the south.

- 'Nothing left' -

Inside the city, under a towering concrete statue of two armed men with their arms trained towards Hormuz waters, economic strains play out in long queues snaking outside petrol stations and soaring prices squeezing shoppers in local markets.

The city's repeatedly hit airport remained largely closed until August 15, leaving travelers facing arduous road journeys, sometimes combined with flights and boat crossings.

Outside the city, construction crews still toil under the sweltering summer sun to repair the Gachin bridge, split by a US strike, as cars rumble along a dusty detour below.

Along the waterfront, traditional wooden vessels known as lenjes sit moored alongside fishing and commercial boats, part of a centuries-old trading network linking southern Iran with Arab states across the Gulf.

Arash Tondro, 45, used his lenj to carry Iranian fresh and dried fruit to the United Arab Emirates and return with household goods and other imports.

"My income dropped to zero at the beginning of the war," said Tondro, who later rerouted some trade through Oman's Khasab port as regional seaways were disrupted and "many of the lenjes were hit by drones".

After the UAE suspended trade with Iran on Tuesday following a missile attack on a ship that Tehran denied carrying out, Tondro said he was again unsure how his work would be impacted.

"People in the south mostly rely on trade or fishing. If you take the sea and trade away from them, there is practically nothing left. We don't have agriculture here; whatever there is comes from the sea," he said.

- 'No sales' -

As night falls and August's oppressive heat begins to ease, fish vendors set up along a busy street, laying out shark, tuna and shrimp as the smell of the day's catch hangs in the humid air.

Among them is 22-year-old Anoush Mallah, who recently moved onto the street after soaring rents forced him to close his shop in one of the city's bazaars.

"Business has been terrible since the war started. There are no sales, it's very weak," he told AFP.

"People are short of money. The fishermen aren't going fishing either."

Many fishermen around Bandar Abbas only began returning to sea in recent weeks, after months ashore for fear of being caught in the crossfire of US-Iran fighting.

Diplomatic efforts have so far failed to end the war. For Mallah, the uncertainty only adds to the strain.

"Let it (the war) start and get some result; right now, we're just left in limbo," he said.


The Ethiopian Dam Dispute and Egypt’s ‘Right to Self-Defense’

Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty. Photo: Foreign Ministry
Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty. Photo: Foreign Ministry
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The Ethiopian Dam Dispute and Egypt’s ‘Right to Self-Defense’

Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty. Photo: Foreign Ministry
Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty. Photo: Foreign Ministry

Over the past two weeks, Egypt has repeatedly stressed its right to prevent any actions by Addis Ababa on the Nile River that could harm its water interests, stressing that it possesses the “right to self-defense” over Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).

According to experts who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat, Egypt’s signaling means that it “will not hesitate to use all legitimate means to safeguard its water security.”

They explained that the message is a stern warning to Ethiopia and suggests that Cairo is seeking to shift from a policy of protesting Ethiopian measures to preventive deterrence, aimed at stopping the establishment of a new status quo on the Nile.

New Egyptian Warning

Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty said that “Egypt will not allow the construction of additional dams ... that affect its water interests,” stressing Cairo’s commitment to a legally binding agreement that guarantees its water rights.

In a television interview on Wednesday evening, Abdelatty said that Egypt does not oppose African countries’ right to development, noting Cairo’s participation in dam and infrastructure projects in several Nile Basin states. However, he stressed the need to balance the right to development with the rights of downstream countries.

He also underscored Egypt’s commitment to protecting its water interests. “We have the right to self-defense to protect our interests and water security,” said the minister. “We will not accept any agreement regarding the Nile River unless it is legally binding,” he reiterated.

Mohamed Hegazy, a member of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs and a former assistant foreign minister, says the right of self-defense is protected under international law after all peaceful means have been exhausted.

According to Hegazy, the core message is that Cairo still prefers agreement and negotiation, but it no longer accepts using negotiations to impose a fait accompli.

He argued that the most significant aspect of Abdelatty’s statements is that they send three simultaneous messages - Rejection of unilateral measures, rejection of additional dams, and insistence on the right of self-defense to protect water security.

Hussein El-Behairy, an African affairs expert at the National Center for Middle East Studies, said the minister’s recent statements reaffirm Egypt’s right to defend its historical and water rights in the Nile by whatever means the Egyptian state deems appropriate to preserve what Egyptians view as a matter of life and death.

Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Reuters

Escalating Egyptian Position

This is the third time Egypt has signaled the possibility of using its “right to self-defense” and preventing dam construction on the Nile.

On August 16, Egypt’s state news agency quoted an unnamed Egyptian official as saying that Cairo “will neither accept nor allow any party to control the flow of Nile waters to downstream countries,” stressing that the Egyptian state possesses multiple tools capable of protecting its people’s interests in the Nile.

The statement came in response to remarks attributed to Ethiopian Minister of Water and Energy Habtamu Itefa concerning the construction of additional dams on the Nile and control over water flows to downstream states, namely Egypt and Sudan.

Earlier, on August 4, Egyptian Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation Hani Sewilam stated during a press conference that Egypt “will not allow the construction of new Ethiopian dams on the Nile River.”

He said: “It is well known that Ethiopia has plans to build additional dams, but will the Egyptian state allow this? No.”

According to Hegazy, the ball is now in Ethiopia’s court. If Addis Ababa agrees to resume serious negotiations leading to a legally binding agreement on GERD, the crisis can be contained.

However, if Ethiopia continues to create new realities on the Nile, the scope for a diplomatic solution will narrow, making risk management and deterrence a more prominent part of Egypt’s strategy.

El-Behairy does not expect the escalation to pave the way for new negotiations on GERD unless the Ethiopian government is willing to make concessions in response to Cairo’s demands. These demands include reaching a legally binding agreement that guarantees Egypt’s water rights during periods of drought and severe drought, and providing Egypt with information regarding the operation of the dam in a manner that does not harm its water interests.


Train to Nowhere? South Korea’s Lonely Push for Peace with the North

A locomotive is seen at the Woljeong-ri Station in Cheorwon, Gangwon Province, in South Korea, near the demilitarized zone separating North and South Korea on August 10, 2026. (AFP)
A locomotive is seen at the Woljeong-ri Station in Cheorwon, Gangwon Province, in South Korea, near the demilitarized zone separating North and South Korea on August 10, 2026. (AFP)
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Train to Nowhere? South Korea’s Lonely Push for Peace with the North

A locomotive is seen at the Woljeong-ri Station in Cheorwon, Gangwon Province, in South Korea, near the demilitarized zone separating North and South Korea on August 10, 2026. (AFP)
A locomotive is seen at the Woljeong-ri Station in Cheorwon, Gangwon Province, in South Korea, near the demilitarized zone separating North and South Korea on August 10, 2026. (AFP)

Near the heavily fortified frontier dividing the Korean peninsula, the abandoned Woljeong-ri station is being recast as a symbol of South Korea's hopes to reconcile with the North.

But plans to reconnect South Korea's northernmost station to the rail network come at an awkward moment, as Pyongyang ignores Seoul's overtures while the South's old ally Washington pursues its own talks with Pyongyang.

A turbulent few days have raised doubts about the role of South Korea in any diplomatic push, despite President Lee Jae Myung's dovish line on the North since taking power last year.

US President Donald Trump abruptly scaled back annual military drills with Seoul this week, calling them "inappropriate and hostile" towards the nuclear-armed North.

He also berated South Korea for not helping in his war against Iran and said he would meet the North's leader Kim Jong Un this year.

North Korea then fired around 10 short-range ballistic missiles on Thursday, while Kim's powerful sister mocked Seoul's "master-servant" relationship with Washington.

The developments have overshadowed the Lee administration's outreach, including the Woljeong-ri project aimed at "eventual" reconciliation.

The modest station -- originally located inside today's demilitarized zone (DMZ) -- once sat on a line linking Seoul to Wonsan, but was destroyed during the 1950-53 Korean War. It was reconstructed at its current site in the border town of Cheorwon in 1988.

It is now an attraction for visitors to the nearby DMZ separating the two countries, and the line's former terminus -- Wonsan -- lies in North Korea.

Its history, however, underscores how vulnerable such hopes are to the politics of the peninsula.

Work began in 2015 but ground to a halt just a year later after North Korea's fourth nuclear test.

The latest reboot inspires more skepticism than hope for some in Cheorwon.

"It seems like they keep trying to reconcile with North Korea (through the railway project), but from our point of view, it isn't really practical," said resident Moon Jae-yong, 70.

- Lonely push for peace -

South Korea's reconciliation program eventually aims to restore rail links, such as Woljeong-ri, with the North.

Lee has also said he is ready for talks with Pyongyang without preconditions, including on formally ending the Korean War, which concluded with an armistice.

His unification minister said in July that Seoul had shifted from prioritizing denuclearization to curbing the expansion of North Korea's nuclear program.

But Pyongyang -- emboldened by support from traditional ally China, and Russia, whose invasion of Ukraine it is backing -- has been unmoved.

It has repeatedly declared itself an "irreversible" nuclear state and labelled Seoul its "most hostile" enemy.

The US leader may be trying to revive diplomacy to record a foreign policy win ahead of November's midterm elections, with many voters disenchanted by his intervention in the Middle East.

That has sidelined Seoul, with Lee voicing respect for Trump's decision and pledging to "do his utmost" to support his peacemaking efforts.

South Korea is "reasonably afraid that it gets sidelined -- China, Russia and now America are all engaged with Pyongyang in different ways, while Seoul is not," Vladimir Tikhonov, Korean Studies professor at the University of Oslo, told AFP.

"So, Seoul is desperate to get some opening with North Korea. But it can do very little, so far."

- Impossible dream? -

That leaves the rail project standing as a symbol of South Korea's lonely push for peace.

Along the disused line from Woljeong-ri towards Baengmagoji station to the south -- the section to be restored under the peace project -- vegetation crowds both sides of the tracks, nearly swallowing a stone wall.

"The iron horse wants to run," a sign reads, alongside a phrase in English: "We want to be back on track."

Preparing infrastructure in the South now could save time if inter-Korean links are eventually restored, said Lim Eul-chul, a professor at Kyungnam University.

"But realistically, it is virtually impossible under the current circumstances, and everyone knows that," he told AFP.

With few options on North Korea, Seoul has turned to projects it can "pursue unilaterally", Lim said.

The project also aims to boost tourism along the border, where residents face frequent disruptions and security risks.

Pyongyang sent trash-filled balloons and broadcast unsettling noises across the border during the administration of Lee's hawkish predecessor, Yoon Suk Yeol.

Kim Sun-hee, 70, described them as "like scraping cement, or even ghost-like noises. It was really frightening".

A bombed-out locomotive from the Korean War remains near Woljeong-ri station as a reminder of the division.

It is "heartbreaking to see", said visitor Ahn Seung-hyun.