Deadly Blows and Setbacks Deepened Hezbollah’s Crisis During War with Israel

Hezbollah supporters watch a televised speech delivered by Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah in Dahieh in November 2019. (AFP)
Hezbollah supporters watch a televised speech delivered by Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah in Dahieh in November 2019. (AFP)
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Deadly Blows and Setbacks Deepened Hezbollah’s Crisis During War with Israel

Hezbollah supporters watch a televised speech delivered by Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah in Dahieh in November 2019. (AFP)
Hezbollah supporters watch a televised speech delivered by Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah in Dahieh in November 2019. (AFP)

Months before his assassination, former Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah believed that the “support war” his party had launched against Israel in October 2023 in support of Gaza would remain within the limits of the “rules of engagement”. He believed that Iran would not allow four decades of “Islamic resistance” in Lebanon to fall easy prey to the enemy.

However, a series of wrong calculations prevented the party from taking decisive decisions during the conflict, which by September 2024 had turned into an all-out war.

This report reveals how Israel’s assassination of major Hezbollah leaderships effectively cut off Nasrallah from knowing every detail of what was happening on the ground. Field leaders appointed to replace the slain ones did not have enough information. Others have speculated that the party’s problem did not lie in the commanders, but in the loss of rocket launcher operators, who were a “rare commodity” in the party and the war.

Asharq Al-Awsat interviewed a number of Lebanese and Iraqi figures, who were in touch with the Hezbollah leadership in 2024, for this report to help fill in some gaps in the various narratives that have emerged related to the buildup to Nasrallah’s assassination in September 2024.

Lebanese authorities say 3,768 people were killed and over 15,000 injured in the war, while Israeli figures have said that Hezbollah lost around 2,500 members in over 12,000 strikes.

War within limits

In the first weeks of the war, Hezbollah was convinced that the “rules of engagement” on the ground would remain in place and that it would not turn into an all-out war, revealed a Lebanese figure who was in close contact with party military commanders.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat on condition of anonymity, he stated that Nasrallah would tell meetings with influential party officials that the war would be limited to border skirmishes with Israel, as had happened in the past.

One leading Hezbollah member said the party believed that Iran would be able to “set the deterrence in the war and reach a ceasefire through maneuvering in its negotiations” with the West, added the Lebanese figure.

“The party was waiting on Iran to restore balance in the war that was tipped in Israel’s favor and to eventually reach a ceasefire without major losses,” he went on to say.

Iranian officials, led by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, have always said that Tehran would not abandon its allies. Nasrallah himself had always credited Iran with supporting his party financially and with weapons.

Three commanders

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat from his residence in Beirut’s southern suburbs, a Lebanese Shiite cleric said Hezbollah was slow in realizing that it was headed towards all-out war with Israel.

The cleric, who earned his religious studies in Iraq’s al-Najaf, lost four members of his family during the war.

Nasrallah, he added, lost key commanders who were his eyes and ears on the field.

Whenever Israel killed a field commander, it was as if Nasrallah “lost an eye that helped him see clearly. He was obsessed with following up on field developments” and Israel was taking these tools away from him, he revealed.

The greatest blows to Nasrallah were the losses of commanders Taleb Abdullah, Ibrahim Akeel, and Wissam al-Taweel.

Taweel was a prominent commander in the party’s al-Radwan unit. Israel killed him on January 8, 2024. Abdullah was responsible for Hezbollah’s operations in the central sector of the border with Israel and stretching to the Litani river. Israel killed him on June 11, 2024, in what the cleric said was the harshest blow to Nasrallah. Akeel was commander of Hezbollah’s military council. Israel killed him on September 20, 2024.

In the end, Nasrallah lost these three commanders and a state of chaos ensued in the operation rooms. “Other commanders on the field complained of how decisions were being improvised because members were acting out of alarm and suspicion instead of discipline,” said Lebanese sources.

Despite these major losses during a period of eight months, Nasrallah and his entourage continued to think inside the box and within the rules of engagement, still ruling out that an all-out war would happen.

Lebanese journalist Ali al-Amin said Nasrallah believed that the party was still capable of militarily deterring Israel and preventing a comprehensive war. He was ultimately wrong.

(From left to right) Slain Hezbollah commanders Ibrahim Akeel, Wissam al-Taweel and Taleb Abdullah.

Secrecy

Hezbollah’s problem lies in Hezbollah itself and how its commanders operate.

Lebanese sources explained that the field commanders killed between January and November 2024 were part of a disconnected chain of command, in that they were not a whole that relayed expertise and information smoothly.

The sources explained further: “When a commander is killed, his replacement does not have access to his predecessor’s field information and details, which are held in secrecy. This was one of Nasrallah’s problems in dealing with the war.”

More interviews with Asharq Al-Awsat revealed that each commander built his own network of relations, methods and information based on his own personal experience as an individual. When he is killed, this network dies with him, along with information about weapons caches or field plans.

At one point, Israeli drones hovering over a Hezbollah unit would have more information about the party than the newly appointed commander, said the cleric.

Israel’s infiltration

Nasrallah first started having doubts that Israel had breached Hezbollah after the assassination of Saleh al-Arouri, former Hamas deputy politburo chief, on January 2, 2024. Wissam al-Taweel was killed that same month.

The cleric said Nasrallah had not expected these assassinations and notably kept silent after they happened.

Later, he chose defense instead of offense, said Al-Amin. He revealed that field commanders had urgently requested a meeting with Nasrallah to call on him to launch an all-out war, because Israel was hunting down their members. Nasrallah adamantly refused.

Instead, the party became more isolated and began having deep doubts. The cleric explained that this is how Shiite movements in particular behave. They isolate themselves for internal reflection.

Security sources said that at the same time, Hezbollah reviewed its communications networks in the hopes of finding the Israeli breach.

A prominent Shiite figure, who has been in contact with Hezbollah since 2015, told Asharq Al-Awsat that the channels of communication with the party changed several times as more and more assassinations took place in Lebanon.

“We would come in contact with a new person every time we needed something from Dahieh (Beirut’s southern suburbs and a Hezbollah stronghold),” he added.

In August 2024, the Iranians asked Iraqi factions to support Hezbollah in its war. The Iraqi leader said they were instructed to make media statements that they were ready to go to war. A month later, Iraq’s Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada faction said it would send 100,000 fighters to the Lebanese borders, but none did.

Pager operation

The party grew more anxious to uncover how Israel had breached it. Then came the devastating pager operation in September.

The attack isolated leaders from each other and their field networks. Communications within the party were almost dead and at some point, the remaining leaderships even gave up trying to find out where the breach was from.

Following the attack, field units did not hear anything for days from their commanders, revealed the cleric. It took the command a long time to resume contacts.

During that time, a military commander asked Nasrallah if the rules of engagement still stood. Nasrallah did not give a definitive answer, which was unusual for him, according to information obtained by Asharq Al-Awsat.

Nasrallah realized that he was now in an open war that he did not want, but it was already too late, revealed sources from leading officials who had attended important meetings.

Political science professor Ali Mohammed Ahmed tried to explain why Hezbollah refused to change its course of action. He said that maintaining the rules of engagement would ultimately not fall in Israel’s favor.

But what really tipped the war in its favor was its superior technology that Hezbollah had not taken into account.

Despite major losses during a period of eight months, Nasrallah and his entourage continued to think inside the box. (AFP)

The final scene

On the day of his assassination on September 27, Nasrallah headed to Dahieh with deputy Quds Force commander in Lebanon Abbas Nilforoushan. We will never know what they discussed. They headed to an underground Hezbollah compound and soon after Israel pounded the site with tons of bunker buster bombs.

Tons of questions were raised the day after in Dahieh and everywhere.

Looking at photos of his slain relatives, the Lebanese cleric said: “It took Hezbollah supporters a long time to recover from the shock. When they did, they asked, ‘who let down whom? The party or Iran? The resistance or Wilayet al-Faqih?’”

Ahmed said Hezbollah operated in a single basic way: it could not quit a war imposed on it, and so, it fought on.

Al-Amin stressed that Nasrallah would never have opened the “support front” without backing from Iran and his conviction that Israel would take into account threats from Tehran’s proxies in Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen.

However, the successive military and security setbacks led to a state of disarray and Nasrallah effectively cut the connection between Iran and Hezbollah, he added. Eventually, both sides realized that they had fallen into a trap.

Ahmed underlined one important development that took place early on during the war. Israel killed the strategic rocket launcher operators. The operators are a “rare commodity” and difficult to replace.

Hezbollah’s problem did not lie in its loss of field commanders, but the rocket operators, he said.

When the party launched hundreds of rockets at Israel a day before the ceasefire took effect, “we realized that it succeeded in replacing the slain operators,” he added.

“No one let down anyone. The problem lies in both Iran and Hezbollah and how they seemingly could not move on from the October 7, 2023 attack. Time was moving, but they were not,” he stated.

Iraqi researcher Akeel Abbas explained that the party and Iran did not grasp the extent of the major change that was taking place, even after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that October 7 was like his country’s September 11.

“Everyone understood that the old rules no longer stood and that new ones were being imposed by force,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“Iran was incapable of keeping pace with the major changes Israel was creating. It needed more time to prepare for such a largescale confrontation,” he remarked.



Iran's Postponed War: Who Holds the Power to Ignite It?

A US F-15E Strike Eagle fighter jet refuels from a KC-135 tanker aircraft during an aerial patrol over the Middle East (CENTCOM)
A US F-15E Strike Eagle fighter jet refuels from a KC-135 tanker aircraft during an aerial patrol over the Middle East (CENTCOM)
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Iran's Postponed War: Who Holds the Power to Ignite It?

A US F-15E Strike Eagle fighter jet refuels from a KC-135 tanker aircraft during an aerial patrol over the Middle East (CENTCOM)
A US F-15E Strike Eagle fighter jet refuels from a KC-135 tanker aircraft during an aerial patrol over the Middle East (CENTCOM)

With Israel preparing for possible military strikes against Iran, and Washington showing restraint ahead of the US midterm elections, questions are mounting over whether the region is experiencing a temporary pause dictated by electoral calculations or a final opportunity for a political settlement.

While one strategic affairs expert expects a major confrontation by the end of November, two others downplay the influence of election results on decisions by US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, arguing that strategic considerations will ultimately prove decisive.

The question in Washington and Tel Aviv is no longer simply whether war with Iran will resume, but when, on what scale and with what objectives.

Reports that Israel prepared a large-scale bombing campaign against Iranian targets before postponing it following Trump's objections have revived a sensitive question: Is the war awaiting the conclusion of the US and Israeli elections, or does its postponement reflect deeper disagreements over the merits of escalation?

These questions are gaining urgency as elections approach in both countries. Assessments by three American experts reveal differing expectations about military developments and political calculations, but converge on one central point: Election results alone will not determine the outcome of the confrontation.

US President Donald Trump greets Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as he arrives at the West Wing of the White House in Washington, DC on September 29, 2025. (Photo by Jim WATSON / AFP)

A War Awaiting Its Moment

The Financial Times reported Wednesday that Netanyahu had instructed the Israeli military to prepare a large-scale bombing campaign against Iran, initially scheduled for October 10, before the operation was canceled after Trump objected to resuming military action ahead of the US elections.

According to the newspaper, the plan included strikes on nuclear facilities, civilian infrastructure and sites associated with the Iranian regime.

Israeli officials also presented US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth with a list of targets based on new intelligence during his unannounced visit to Israel on Monday.

Axios had previously reported that the Pentagon requested the completion of preparations for extensive military operations without setting a date for their execution.

The outlet cited officials as saying that Hegseth and US military commanders in the region were pushing for renewed strikes, while most of Trump's advisers favored continuing sanctions and economic pressure.

These developments suggest that the disagreement concerns the timing and necessity of military force more than the ultimate objectives.

Washington wants to secure Iranian concessions on Tehran's nuclear program and the Strait of Hormuz, while Israel fears that continued negotiations could allow Iran to rebuild its military capabilities.

Scenarios for Escalation

Offering a more pessimistic assessment, Farzin Nadimi, an expert on Iranian military and security affairs at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, told Asharq Al-Awsat that all indicators point toward a major military confrontation involving the United States, Israel and Iran, and potentially other regional countries, by the end of November.

Nadimi did not rule out the possibility that intensive diplomatic efforts could prevent escalation, but considered the chances of success extremely slim.

He outlined a scenario beginning with a renewed wave of strikes targeting senior leaders and command-and-control centers, followed by attacks on nuclear and missile facilities and air defense systems, eventually escalating into a comprehensive bombing campaign against Iranian military and security installations.

Whether the campaign would expand to infrastructure, oil and gas facilities, and petrochemical plants would depend on the nature of Iran's response, he said.

Nadimi warned that Tehran might make a more determined effort this time to sink US warships and shoot down manned aircraft, while also deploying longer-range, medium-range ballistic missiles.

He raised an even more dangerous possibility: a ground incursion into Kuwait or Saudi Arabia from Iraq, carried out by Shiite factions linked to the Popular Mobilization Forces.

This remains a hypothetical scenario proposed by the researcher, rather than confirmed evidence of an Iranian plan to carry out such an operation.

At the same time, Nadimi ruled out a US ground invasion of Iran, suggesting that the next confrontation would more closely resemble the previous 39-day war.

Washington's Calculations

Brian Katulis, a foreign policy and regional affairs expert at the Middle East Institute, downplayed the significance of election results in determining the course of the war.

He told Asharq Al-Awsat that the US midterm elections were unlikely to substantially affect decisions by the Trump administration or Israel regarding Iran, because the threats posed by Tehran would remain the primary factor shaping their next steps.

Katulis noted that Trump is experiencing his weakest political position across his two presidential terms, amid declining approval ratings and the possibility that Republicans could lose seats in Congress.

In his view, however, that does not mean the election results will constrain the president's ability to take military action, given the executive branch's broad national security powers relative to those of Congress.

Katulis identified two more consequential factors in the administration's calculations.

The first is a shortage of certain types of ammunition and military equipment following the previous phase of the war, which has left US forces more exposed in the region and elsewhere. The second is the economic cost of another confrontation.

These concerns are particularly significant amid continuing tensions surrounding the Strait of Hormuz and global energy markets, as renewed operations against Iranian facilities could cause further disruptions to oil supplies.

As for Israel, Katulis argued that disagreements among political leaders tend to diminish when the perceived Iranian threat is at issue.

Beyond the Ballot Box

Michael Rubin, director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum, went further, dismissing the possibility that the elections would fundamentally change the political dynamics governing decisions about war.

He told Asharq Al-Awsat that Trump would remain the ultimate decision-maker regardless of developments in Congress.

Indeed, Rubin suggested that Trump might feel greater freedom to make military decisions after the elections, given that he would not face another presidential election.

In Israel, Rubin argued that widespread opposition to Netanyahu does not necessarily translate into comparable divisions over Iran.

In his assessment, there is broad agreement among Israeli candidates on both the right and left regarding the nature of the threats posed by Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah.

Rubin also pointed to a striking possibility: Another Israeli prime minister might be able to act more effectively than Netanyahu because some objections from members of Congress, diplomats and foreign ministers are directed more at Netanyahu personally than at Israel itself.

Consequently, Netanyahu's electoral defeat would not necessarily reduce the likelihood of confrontation, just as Republican losses in Congress would not automatically give lawmakers the power to prevent Trump from resuming military operations.

Ultimately, the elections appear more likely to influence the timing of a confrontation than to determine its objectives.

Trump's decision to postpone military action does not mean the military option has been abandoned, just as Israel's preparations do not mean that a final decision to go to war has been made.

Negotiations remain the alternative path, despite continuing disagreements over nuclear concessions and the conditions for ending the war.

The conclusion of the elections could remove one reason for postponement, but it would not eliminate the military, economic and political obstacles.

The central question remains whether Washington will use its military preparations to secure a negotiated settlement or view the failure of diplomacy as justification for resuming the war.

In either case, Trump's decision, rather than election results alone, will be the most influential factor in determining the direction of the crisis.


What's Holding Up Washington's $14 bn Arms Sale to Taiwan?

Washington -- Taipei's most important security backer -- has held off on an arms sale package worth $14 billion. I-Hwa Cheng / AFP/File
Washington -- Taipei's most important security backer -- has held off on an arms sale package worth $14 billion. I-Hwa Cheng / AFP/File
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What's Holding Up Washington's $14 bn Arms Sale to Taiwan?

Washington -- Taipei's most important security backer -- has held off on an arms sale package worth $14 billion. I-Hwa Cheng / AFP/File
Washington -- Taipei's most important security backer -- has held off on an arms sale package worth $14 billion. I-Hwa Cheng / AFP/File

Taiwan has been waiting months for US President Donald Trump to approve a $14 billion sale of weapons and equipment, which the island democracy would use to fend off a potential Chinese attack.

Washington -- Taipei's most important security backer -- has sold many billions of dollars' worth of arms to Taiwan, most recently in December when it approved a record $11.1 billion package, said AFP.

China opposes American military support for Taiwan, which Beijing claims is part of its territory and has threatened to seize with force.

Trump, who last month hailed his "great friendship" with Chinese President Xi Jinping, has resisted US political pressure, including from Republican lawmakers, to give the green light for the current arms package.

AFP takes a look at what's in it and why it's being held up:

- Why is Taiwan buying US arms? -

Taiwan is spending huge sums upgrading its defense capabilities and expanding its domestic weapons production capacity, but it still needs US arms to deter China.

Since Washington switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 1979, the United States has stuck to its commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act to provide weapons to Taiwan for its defense.

But Trump said in May that US arms sales to Taiwan could be a bargaining chip with China, setting off alarm bells across the world.

Taipei has reminded Trump of US commitments, and US officials including Secretary of State Marco Rubio have insisted American policy on Taiwan has not changed.

The sale would signal US support for Taiwan and send a message to Beijing that if it launched an attack, it would not face "Taiwan alone", said Wang Ting-yu, a senior lawmaker in President Lai Ching-te's Democratic Progressive Party.

- What's in the package? -

Taiwan is developing a multi-layered air defense system, known as the T-Dome, that it hopes could counter a potential Chinese attack.

Patriot missiles, an automated command and control system and a 360-degree air defense radar system are seen as critical components of this system and are among the items in the $14 billion package.

"Together these systems can strengthen the resilience of Taiwan's strategic air defenses," said Su Tzu-yun, a military expert at the Taipei-based Institute for National Defense and Security Research.

Money for the weapons system is expected to come from a $25 billion defense spending bill passed by Taiwan's parliament in May after months of political wrangling.

- Why has it been delayed? -

Trump and Xi met in Beijing in May -- the first of four expected meetings for 2026 -- as the rival leaders sought to ease trade tensions between their countries.

Xi issued a blunt warning to Trump that missteps on Taiwan could push the US and China into "conflict".

A record $14 billion arms sale to Taiwan could threaten the US-China trade truce.

"I'm going to make a determination. I'm going to see," Trump said after the summit in response to a question about whether he would go ahead with arms sales to Taiwan.

Rubio said in June that the proposed package was "under review", while officials said in May they were assessing whether American weapons stockpiles were sufficient for its Iran operations.

A US official said recently that the chances of the package being split into smaller chunks "have gone way up".

Some Taiwanese officials have said they do not care if the US bundles the arms into a single package or multiple -- they just want the weapons.

"Militarily... Taiwan is racing against time," said the analyst Su.

"Acquiring weapons is not like ordering at a drive-through. Production, delivery and training all take time before the systems can enter service and become effective."


Israel's Election May Change Its Leader, But Not Iran War Policy

21 October 2026, Israel, Mitzpe Ramon: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu delivers an address during the Israeli army officer course graduation ceremony at the Bahad 1 Officers School. Photo: Kobi Gideon/Israel Gpo via ZUMA Press Wire/dpa
21 October 2026, Israel, Mitzpe Ramon: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu delivers an address during the Israeli army officer course graduation ceremony at the Bahad 1 Officers School. Photo: Kobi Gideon/Israel Gpo via ZUMA Press Wire/dpa
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Israel's Election May Change Its Leader, But Not Iran War Policy

21 October 2026, Israel, Mitzpe Ramon: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu delivers an address during the Israeli army officer course graduation ceremony at the Bahad 1 Officers School. Photo: Kobi Gideon/Israel Gpo via ZUMA Press Wire/dpa
21 October 2026, Israel, Mitzpe Ramon: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu delivers an address during the Israeli army officer course graduation ceremony at the Bahad 1 Officers School. Photo: Kobi Gideon/Israel Gpo via ZUMA Press Wire/dpa

Israel's election next week may change its leader, but not its strategy: Iran will remain its chief adversary, military force will continue to be its preferred tool and Palestinian statehood a distant prospect, regional policymakers and analysts say.

That is because the strategic assumptions underpinning Israeli policy were hardened by the October 7, 2023, attacks on southern Israeli communities by Palestinian group Hamas and by the wars in Gaza, Lebanon and Iran.

If anything, Israel could toughen its security policy, the analysts said, as victory for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with the backing of far-right coalition partners could embolden him to step up the war with Iran, tighten Israel's grip on the occupied West Bank and push diplomacy further to the margins.

Israel's security doctrine now rests on three pillars: breaking Iran, holding buffer zones beyond its borders and using force to deter enemies.

The real divide is one of degree rather than direction — how aggressively Israel fights its wars, how far it expands Jewish settlements in the West Bank and whether any leader opts for diplomacy, the analysts said.

From Tehran to Riyadh, Tuesday's election is not seen as a potential turning point but as a test of whether the Middle East is settling into a long confrontation, where wars ‌ebb and flow while ‌the underlying conflicts are unresolved.

"If Netanyahu is elected, he'll do whatever he thinks he wants to do," said Aviv ‌Bushinsky, a ⁠former adviser to Netanyahu. "Expansion ⁠of the settlements will continue. The wars against Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah will continue."

"What you see now is what you'll see after the election, maybe even more aggressively," he said. "As long as Iran is in such a situation, it's a waste of time talking about Palestine.”

Netanyahu said on Sunday that Israel must prioritize “prevention and offence over containment and defense”, including pre-emptive strikes to thwart emerging threats, while establishing Israel as a regional power and maximizing its independence in armaments.

WHY THE COURSE IS UNLIKELY TO CHANGE

The election pits Netanyahu's right-wing Likud and its ultranationalist allies against an opposition led by former military chief Gadi Eisenkot's Yashar party. Palestinian analyst Ghassan al-Khatib sees no prospect of a fundamental shift in policy towards the Palestinians, with Israeli political parties competing to project harder-line positions as public opinion moves further to the right.

“The substance of the policy remains the same: No to a Palestinian state and yes to further ⁠settlement expansion. On this, they are all in agreement,” he said.

A government led by Netanyahu's opponents might seek to repair ‌Israel's international standing by curbing some settler violence or pursuing settlement expansion with less fanfare. But such changes would ‌be a shift in style rather than substance, al-Khatib said.

In response to Reuters questions on Iran and the West Bank, a State Department spokesperson said Washington would continue to pressure Tehran "as long ‌as Iran devotes its energy revenues to financing attacks on our allies, supporting terrorism around the world, and pursuing other destabilizing actions, we will use all the tools ‌at our disposal to hold the regime accountable."

The spokesperson also said the  United States did not support Israel annexing the West Bank.

"A stable West Bank keeps Israel secure and is in line with this administration’s goal to achieve peace in the region," they said.

Michael Young of the Carnegie Middle East Center said Israel's security establishment and much of its political class share a common strategic outlook, centered on confronting Iran, maintaining "forward defense" and preserving military deterrence, reducing the scope for big policy shifts.

Joost Hiltermann of the International Crisis Group, who has conducted research in the West Bank, said ‌growing settler violence, mounting Palestinian frustration and the absence of a "political horizon" had created combustible conditions, where even a minor trigger could spark a wider uprising.

'VENOMOUS OCTOPUS'

Some regional policymakers ask whether Israel's confrontation with Iran has become the organizing ⁠principle of Middle East security, regardless of who ⁠wins the election.

US President Donald Trump's praise of Netanyahu as a "great warrior prime minister" has reinforced expectations that the Israeli leader will try to finish the campaign against Tehran if he retains power.

Netanyahu has made clear his ambitions extend beyond containing Iran to toppling its clerical rulers.

"There is only one way to remove this threat once and for all: overthrow the regime in Iran," he said at a military officer graduation ceremony on Wednesday, adding it was his directive to the military, Mossad and other security agencies.

“Completing the task means toppling the terrorist regime in Iran, the head of the venomous octopus,” he said in another speech this week.

But military and political analysts question whether anything short of a US-Israeli ground invasion would force Tehran to abandon what it views as its core security interests in what it sees as an existential fight. After surviving months of war, Iran may be betting it can outlast its opponents while continuing to exert pressure through regional allies.

"This is a quagmire," Young said. "The Iranians can outlast Trump."

Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza have been weakened, but the broader network of Iran-aligned groups has survived and the conflict could strengthen Tehran's determination to pursue a nuclear deterrent, the analysts said.