Deadly Blows and Setbacks Deepened Hezbollah’s Crisis During War with Israel

Hezbollah supporters watch a televised speech delivered by Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah in Dahieh in November 2019. (AFP)
Hezbollah supporters watch a televised speech delivered by Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah in Dahieh in November 2019. (AFP)
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Deadly Blows and Setbacks Deepened Hezbollah’s Crisis During War with Israel

Hezbollah supporters watch a televised speech delivered by Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah in Dahieh in November 2019. (AFP)
Hezbollah supporters watch a televised speech delivered by Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah in Dahieh in November 2019. (AFP)

Months before his assassination, former Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah believed that the “support war” his party had launched against Israel in October 2023 in support of Gaza would remain within the limits of the “rules of engagement”. He believed that Iran would not allow four decades of “Islamic resistance” in Lebanon to fall easy prey to the enemy.

However, a series of wrong calculations prevented the party from taking decisive decisions during the conflict, which by September 2024 had turned into an all-out war.

This report reveals how Israel’s assassination of major Hezbollah leaderships effectively cut off Nasrallah from knowing every detail of what was happening on the ground. Field leaders appointed to replace the slain ones did not have enough information. Others have speculated that the party’s problem did not lie in the commanders, but in the loss of rocket launcher operators, who were a “rare commodity” in the party and the war.

Asharq Al-Awsat interviewed a number of Lebanese and Iraqi figures, who were in touch with the Hezbollah leadership in 2024, for this report to help fill in some gaps in the various narratives that have emerged related to the buildup to Nasrallah’s assassination in September 2024.

Lebanese authorities say 3,768 people were killed and over 15,000 injured in the war, while Israeli figures have said that Hezbollah lost around 2,500 members in over 12,000 strikes.

War within limits

In the first weeks of the war, Hezbollah was convinced that the “rules of engagement” on the ground would remain in place and that it would not turn into an all-out war, revealed a Lebanese figure who was in close contact with party military commanders.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat on condition of anonymity, he stated that Nasrallah would tell meetings with influential party officials that the war would be limited to border skirmishes with Israel, as had happened in the past.

One leading Hezbollah member said the party believed that Iran would be able to “set the deterrence in the war and reach a ceasefire through maneuvering in its negotiations” with the West, added the Lebanese figure.

“The party was waiting on Iran to restore balance in the war that was tipped in Israel’s favor and to eventually reach a ceasefire without major losses,” he went on to say.

Iranian officials, led by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, have always said that Tehran would not abandon its allies. Nasrallah himself had always credited Iran with supporting his party financially and with weapons.

Three commanders

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat from his residence in Beirut’s southern suburbs, a Lebanese Shiite cleric said Hezbollah was slow in realizing that it was headed towards all-out war with Israel.

The cleric, who earned his religious studies in Iraq’s al-Najaf, lost four members of his family during the war.

Nasrallah, he added, lost key commanders who were his eyes and ears on the field.

Whenever Israel killed a field commander, it was as if Nasrallah “lost an eye that helped him see clearly. He was obsessed with following up on field developments” and Israel was taking these tools away from him, he revealed.

The greatest blows to Nasrallah were the losses of commanders Taleb Abdullah, Ibrahim Akeel, and Wissam al-Taweel.

Taweel was a prominent commander in the party’s al-Radwan unit. Israel killed him on January 8, 2024. Abdullah was responsible for Hezbollah’s operations in the central sector of the border with Israel and stretching to the Litani river. Israel killed him on June 11, 2024, in what the cleric said was the harshest blow to Nasrallah. Akeel was commander of Hezbollah’s military council. Israel killed him on September 20, 2024.

In the end, Nasrallah lost these three commanders and a state of chaos ensued in the operation rooms. “Other commanders on the field complained of how decisions were being improvised because members were acting out of alarm and suspicion instead of discipline,” said Lebanese sources.

Despite these major losses during a period of eight months, Nasrallah and his entourage continued to think inside the box and within the rules of engagement, still ruling out that an all-out war would happen.

Lebanese journalist Ali al-Amin said Nasrallah believed that the party was still capable of militarily deterring Israel and preventing a comprehensive war. He was ultimately wrong.

(From left to right) Slain Hezbollah commanders Ibrahim Akeel, Wissam al-Taweel and Taleb Abdullah.

Secrecy

Hezbollah’s problem lies in Hezbollah itself and how its commanders operate.

Lebanese sources explained that the field commanders killed between January and November 2024 were part of a disconnected chain of command, in that they were not a whole that relayed expertise and information smoothly.

The sources explained further: “When a commander is killed, his replacement does not have access to his predecessor’s field information and details, which are held in secrecy. This was one of Nasrallah’s problems in dealing with the war.”

More interviews with Asharq Al-Awsat revealed that each commander built his own network of relations, methods and information based on his own personal experience as an individual. When he is killed, this network dies with him, along with information about weapons caches or field plans.

At one point, Israeli drones hovering over a Hezbollah unit would have more information about the party than the newly appointed commander, said the cleric.

Israel’s infiltration

Nasrallah first started having doubts that Israel had breached Hezbollah after the assassination of Saleh al-Arouri, former Hamas deputy politburo chief, on January 2, 2024. Wissam al-Taweel was killed that same month.

The cleric said Nasrallah had not expected these assassinations and notably kept silent after they happened.

Later, he chose defense instead of offense, said Al-Amin. He revealed that field commanders had urgently requested a meeting with Nasrallah to call on him to launch an all-out war, because Israel was hunting down their members. Nasrallah adamantly refused.

Instead, the party became more isolated and began having deep doubts. The cleric explained that this is how Shiite movements in particular behave. They isolate themselves for internal reflection.

Security sources said that at the same time, Hezbollah reviewed its communications networks in the hopes of finding the Israeli breach.

A prominent Shiite figure, who has been in contact with Hezbollah since 2015, told Asharq Al-Awsat that the channels of communication with the party changed several times as more and more assassinations took place in Lebanon.

“We would come in contact with a new person every time we needed something from Dahieh (Beirut’s southern suburbs and a Hezbollah stronghold),” he added.

In August 2024, the Iranians asked Iraqi factions to support Hezbollah in its war. The Iraqi leader said they were instructed to make media statements that they were ready to go to war. A month later, Iraq’s Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada faction said it would send 100,000 fighters to the Lebanese borders, but none did.

Pager operation

The party grew more anxious to uncover how Israel had breached it. Then came the devastating pager operation in September.

The attack isolated leaders from each other and their field networks. Communications within the party were almost dead and at some point, the remaining leaderships even gave up trying to find out where the breach was from.

Following the attack, field units did not hear anything for days from their commanders, revealed the cleric. It took the command a long time to resume contacts.

During that time, a military commander asked Nasrallah if the rules of engagement still stood. Nasrallah did not give a definitive answer, which was unusual for him, according to information obtained by Asharq Al-Awsat.

Nasrallah realized that he was now in an open war that he did not want, but it was already too late, revealed sources from leading officials who had attended important meetings.

Political science professor Ali Mohammed Ahmed tried to explain why Hezbollah refused to change its course of action. He said that maintaining the rules of engagement would ultimately not fall in Israel’s favor.

But what really tipped the war in its favor was its superior technology that Hezbollah had not taken into account.

Despite major losses during a period of eight months, Nasrallah and his entourage continued to think inside the box. (AFP)

The final scene

On the day of his assassination on September 27, Nasrallah headed to Dahieh with deputy Quds Force commander in Lebanon Abbas Nilforoushan. We will never know what they discussed. They headed to an underground Hezbollah compound and soon after Israel pounded the site with tons of bunker buster bombs.

Tons of questions were raised the day after in Dahieh and everywhere.

Looking at photos of his slain relatives, the Lebanese cleric said: “It took Hezbollah supporters a long time to recover from the shock. When they did, they asked, ‘who let down whom? The party or Iran? The resistance or Wilayet al-Faqih?’”

Ahmed said Hezbollah operated in a single basic way: it could not quit a war imposed on it, and so, it fought on.

Al-Amin stressed that Nasrallah would never have opened the “support front” without backing from Iran and his conviction that Israel would take into account threats from Tehran’s proxies in Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen.

However, the successive military and security setbacks led to a state of disarray and Nasrallah effectively cut the connection between Iran and Hezbollah, he added. Eventually, both sides realized that they had fallen into a trap.

Ahmed underlined one important development that took place early on during the war. Israel killed the strategic rocket launcher operators. The operators are a “rare commodity” and difficult to replace.

Hezbollah’s problem did not lie in its loss of field commanders, but the rocket operators, he said.

When the party launched hundreds of rockets at Israel a day before the ceasefire took effect, “we realized that it succeeded in replacing the slain operators,” he added.

“No one let down anyone. The problem lies in both Iran and Hezbollah and how they seemingly could not move on from the October 7, 2023 attack. Time was moving, but they were not,” he stated.

Iraqi researcher Akeel Abbas explained that the party and Iran did not grasp the extent of the major change that was taking place, even after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that October 7 was like his country’s September 11.

“Everyone understood that the old rules no longer stood and that new ones were being imposed by force,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“Iran was incapable of keeping pace with the major changes Israel was creating. It needed more time to prepare for such a largescale confrontation,” he remarked.



Ethiopia Builds Secret Camp to Train Sudan RSF Fighters 

Satellite imagery shows new construction and drone support infrastructure at Asosa airport in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 28, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)
Satellite imagery shows new construction and drone support infrastructure at Asosa airport in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 28, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)
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Ethiopia Builds Secret Camp to Train Sudan RSF Fighters 

Satellite imagery shows new construction and drone support infrastructure at Asosa airport in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 28, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)
Satellite imagery shows new construction and drone support infrastructure at Asosa airport in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 28, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)

Ethiopia is hosting a secret camp to train thousands of fighters for the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in neighboring Sudan, Reuters reporting has found, in the latest sign that one of the world’s deadliest conflicts is sucking in regional powers from Africa and the Middle East.

The camp is the first direct evidence of Ethiopia’s involvement in Sudan’s civil war, marking a potentially dangerous development that provides the RSF a substantial supply of fresh soldiers as fighting escalates in Sudan’s south.

Eight sources, including a senior Ethiopian government official, said the United Arab Emirates financed the camp’s construction and provided military trainers and logistical support to the site, a view also shared in an internal note by Ethiopia’s security services and in a diplomatic cable, reviewed by Reuters.

The news agency could not independently verify UAE involvement in the project or the purpose of the camp. In response to a request for comment, the UAE foreign ministry said it was not a party to the conflict or “in any way” involved in the hostilities.

Reuters spoke to 15 sources familiar with the camp's construction and operations, including Ethiopian officials and diplomats, and analyzed satellite imagery of the area. Two Ethiopian intelligence officials and the satellite images provided information that corroborated details contained in the security memo and cable.

The location and scale of the camp and the detailed allegations of the UAE’s involvement have not been previously reported. The images show the extent of the new development, as recently as in the past few weeks, along with construction for a drone ground control station at a nearby airport.

Satellite imagery shows a camp with hundreds of tents in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 22, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)

Activity picked up in October at the camp, which is located in the remote western region of Benishangul-Gumuz, near the border with Sudan, satellite images show.

Ethiopia’s government spokesperson, its army and the RSF did not respond to detailed requests for comment about the findings of this story.

On January 6, UAE and Ethiopia issued a joint statement that included a call for a ceasefire in Sudan, as well as celebrating ties they said served the defense of each other’s security.

The Sudanese Armed Forces did not respond to a request for comment.

As of early January, 4,300 RSF fighters were undergoing military training at the site and “their logistical and military supplies are being provided by the UAE,” the note by Ethiopia’s security services seen by Reuters read.

Sudan's army has previously accused the UAE of supplying the RSF with weapons, a claim UN experts and US lawmakers have found credible.

The camp’s recruits are mainly Ethiopians, but citizens from South Sudan and Sudan, including from the SPLM-N, a Sudanese rebel group that controls territory in Sudan’s neighboring Blue Nile state, are also present, six officials said.

Reuters was unable to independently establish who was at the camp or the terms or conditions of recruitment.

A senior leader of the SPLM-N, who declined to be named, denied his forces had a presence in Ethiopia.

The six officials said the recruits are expected to join the RSF battling Sudanese soldiers in Blue Nile, which has emerged as a front in the struggle for control of Sudan. Two of the officials said hundreds had already crossed in recent weeks to support the paramilitaries in Blue Nile.

The internal security note said General Getachew Gudina, the Chief of the Defense Intelligence Department of the Ethiopian National Defense Force, was responsible for setting up the camp. A senior Ethiopian government official as well as four diplomatic and security sources confirmed Getachew’s role in launching the project.

Getachew did not respond to a request for comment.

The camp was carved out of forested land in a district called Menge, about 32 km from the border and strategically located at the intersection of the two countries and South Sudan, according to the satellite imagery and the diplomatic cable.

The first sign of activity in the area began in April, with forest clearing and the construction of metal-roofed buildings in a small area to the north of what is now the area of the camp with tents, where work began in the second half of October.

Satellite imagery shows a forested area where, ten months later, a camp with hundreds of tents was built in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, December 15, 2024. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)

The diplomatic cable, dated November, described the camp as having a capacity of up to 10,000 fighters, saying activity began in October with the arrival of dozens of Land Cruisers, heavy trucks, RSF units and UAE trainers. Reuters is not revealing the country that wrote the cable, to protect the source.

Two of the officials described seeing trucks with the logo of the Emirati logistics company Gorica Group heading through the town of Asosa and towards the camp in October. Gorica did not respond to a request for comment.

The news agency was able to match elements of the timeframe specified in the diplomatic cable with satellite imagery. Images from Airbus Defense and Space show that after the initial clearing work, tents began filling the area from early November. Multiple diggers are visible in the imagery.

An image taken by US space technology firm Vantor on November 24 shows more than 640 tents at the camp, approximately four meters square. Each tent could comfortably house four people with some individual equipment, so the camp could accommodate at least 2,500 people, according to an analysis of the satellite imagery by defense intelligence company Janes.

Janes said it could not confirm the site was military based on their analysis of the imagery.

New recruits were spotted travelling to the camp in mid-November, two senior military officials said.

Satellite imagery shows an area where trucks come and go at a camp in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 22, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)

On November 17, a column of 56 trucks packed with trainees rumbled through dirt roads of the remote region, the officials, who witnessed the convoys, told Reuters, with each truck holding between 50 and 60 fighters, the officials estimated.

Two days later, both officials saw another convoy of 70 trucks carrying soldiers driving in the same direction, they said.

The November 24 image shows at least 18 large trucks at the site. The vehicles’ size, shape and design match those of models frequently used by the Ethiopian military and its allies to transport soldiers, according to Reuters analysis.

Development continued in late January, the Vantor images show, including new clearing and digging in the riverbed just north of the main camp and dozens of shipping containers lined around the camp visible in a January 22 image. A senior Ethiopian government official said construction on the camp was ongoing but did not elaborate on future building plans.

Sudan’s civil war erupted in 2023 after a power struggle between the Sudanese army and the RSF ahead of a planned transition to civilian rule.


Gaza Girls Take Up Boxing to Heal War’s Scars

Palestinian girls and young women attend a boxing training session between displacement tents in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 9, 2026. (AFP)
Palestinian girls and young women attend a boxing training session between displacement tents in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 9, 2026. (AFP)
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Gaza Girls Take Up Boxing to Heal War’s Scars

Palestinian girls and young women attend a boxing training session between displacement tents in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 9, 2026. (AFP)
Palestinian girls and young women attend a boxing training session between displacement tents in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 9, 2026. (AFP)

In a makeshift boxing ring etched into the sand between the tens of displaced Palestinians in southern Gaza, a dozen young girls warmed up before delivering fierce blows at their coach's command.

Osama Ayub once ran a boxing club in Gaza City, in the north of the Palestinian territory, until it was destroyed in a strike along with his home during the war between Israel and Hamas.

After finding shelter in the southern city of Khan Younis, he opted to put his sporting skills at the service of displaced Gazans, crammed by the tens of thousands in tents and makeshift shelters.

"We decided to work inside the camp to offer the girls some psychological relief from the war", Ayub told AFP.

Behind him, some of the young athletes faced each other in the ring surrounded by cheering gymmates, while others trained on a punching bag.

"The girls have been affected by the war and the bombardments; some have lost their families or loved ones. They feel pain and want to release it, so they have found in boxing a way to express their emotions," said Ayub.

Ayub now runs these free training sessions for 45 boxers aged between 8 and 19 three times a week, with positive feedback from his students as well as from the community.

One of the youngsters, Ghazal Radwan, aged 14, hopes to become a champion and represent her country.

"I practice boxing to develop my character, release pent-up energy and to become a champion in the future, compete against world champions in other countries, and raise the Palestinian flag around the world", she told AFP.

- Call for aid -

One after the other, the girls trained with Ayub, shifting from right to left jabs, hooks and uppercuts at his command.

In war-devastated Gaza, where construction materials are scarce, Ayub had to improvise to build his small training facility.

"We brought wood and built a square boxing ring, but there are no mats or safety measures," he said.

He called on the international community to support the boxers and help them travel abroad to train, "to strengthen their confidence and offer them psychological support".

The strict blockade that Israel imposed on the Gaza Strip makes the reconstruction of sports facilities particularly complicated, as building materials are routinely rejected by Israeli officials.

The official Palestinian news agency Wafa reported in January that a shipment of artificial turf donated by China to Gaza's youth and sports council was not allowed in by Israel.

With medicine, food and fuel all in short supply, sports equipment comes much lower on the list of items entering the Palestinian territory.

Rimas, a 16-year-old boxer, said she and her friends continued "to practice boxing despite the war, the bombardments and the destruction".

"We, the girls who box, hope for your support, that you will bring us gloves and shoes. We train on sand and need mats and punching bags," she said in comments addressed to the international community.


Is Iran Pushing Houthis Toward Military Action Against Washington?

Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 
Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 
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Is Iran Pushing Houthis Toward Military Action Against Washington?

Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 
Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 

As US military movements intensify in the Middle East and the possibility of strikes on Iran looms, Yemen’s Houthi group has continued military preparations, mobilizing fighters and establishing new weapons sites.

The Houthi mobilization comes at a time when the group is widely viewed as one of Iran’s most important regional arms for retaliation.

Although the Iran-backed group has not issued any official statement declaring its position on a potential US attack on Iran, its leaders have warned Washington against any military action and against bearing full responsibility for any escalation and its consequences.

They have hinted that any response would be handled in accordance with the group’s senior leadership's assessment, after evaluating developments and potential repercussions.

Despite these signals, some interpret the Houthis’ stance as an attempt to avoid drawing the attention of the current US administration, led by President Donald Trump, to the need for preemptive action in anticipation of a potential Houthi response.

The Trump administration previously launched a military campaign against the group in the spring of last year, inflicting heavy losses.

Islam al-Mansi, an Egyptian researcher specializing in Iranian affairs, said Iran may avoid burning all its cards unless absolutely necessary, particularly given US threats to raise the level of escalation should any Iranian military proxies intervene or take part in a confrontation.

Iran did not resort to using its military proxies during its confrontation with Israel or during a limited US strike last summer because it did not perceive an existential threat, al-Mansi said.

That calculation could change in the anticipated confrontation, potentially prompting Houthi intervention, including targeting US allies, interests, and military forces, he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Al-Mansi added that although Iran previously offered, within a negotiating framework, to abandon its regional proxies, including the Houthis, this makes it more likely that Tehran would use them in retaliation, noting that Iran created these groups to defend its territory from afar.

Many intelligence reports suggest that Iran’s Revolutionary Guard has discussed with the Houthis the activation of alternative support arenas in a potential US-Iran confrontation, including the use of cells and weapons not previously deployed.

Visible readiness

In recent days, Chinese media outlets cited an unnamed Houthi military commander as saying the group had raised its alert level and carried out inspections of missile launch platforms in several areas across Yemen, including the strategically important Red Sea region.

In this context, Yemeni political researcher Salah Ali Salah said the Houthis would participate in defending Iran against any US attacks, citing the group’s media rhetoric accompanying mass rallies, which openly supports Iran’s right to defend itself.

While this rhetoric maintains some ambiguity regarding Iran, it repeatedly invokes the war in Gaza and renews Houthi pledges to resume military escalation in defense of the besieged enclave’s population, Salah told Asharq Al-Awsat.

He noted that Iran would not have shared advanced and sophisticated military technologies with the Houthis without a high degree of trust in their ability to use them in Iran’s interest.

In recent months, following Israeli strikes on the unrecognized Houthi government and several of its leaders, hardline Houthi figures demonstrating strong loyalty to Iran have become more prominent.

On the ground, the group has established new military sites and moved equipment and weapons to new locations along and near the coast, alongside the potential use of security cells beyond Yemen’s borders.

Salah said that if the threat of a military strike on Iran escalates, the Iranian response could take a more advanced form, potentially including efforts to close strategic waterways, placing the Bab al-Mandab Strait within the Houthis’ target range.

Many observers have expressed concern that the Houthis may have transferred fighters and intelligence cells outside Yemen over recent years to target US and Western interests in the region.

Open options

After a ceasefire was declared in Gaza, the Houthis lost one of their key justifications for mobilizing fighters and collecting funds. The group has since faced growing public anger over its practices and worsening humanitarian conditions, responding with media messaging aimed at convincing audiences that the battle is not over and that further rounds lie ahead.

Alongside weekly rallies in areas under their control in support of Gaza, the Houthis have carried out attacks on front lines with Yemen’s internationally recognized government, particularly in Taiz province.

Some military experts describe these incidents as probing attacks, while others see them as attempts to divert attention from other activities.

In this context, Walid al-Abara, head of the Yemen and Gulf Studies Center, said the Houthis entered a critical phase after the Gaza war ended, having lost one of the main justifications for their attacks on Red Sea shipping.

As a result, they may seek to manufacture new pretexts, including claims of sanctions imposed against them, to maintain media momentum and their regional role.

Al-Abara told Asharq Al-Awsat that the group has two other options. The first is redirecting its activity inward to strengthen its military and economic leverage, either to impose its conditions in any future settlement or to consolidate power.

The second is yielding to international and regional pressure and entering a negotiation track, particularly if sanctions intensify or its economic and military capacity declines.

According to an assessment by the Yemen and Gulf Studies Center, widespread protests in Iran are increasingly pressuring the regime’s ability to manage its regional influence at the same pace as before, without dismantling its network of proxies.

This reality is pushing Tehran toward a more cautious approach, governed by domestic priorities and cost-benefit calculations, while maintaining a minimum level of external influence without broad escalation.

Within this framework, al-Abara said Iran is likely to maintain a controlled continuity in its relationship with the Houthis through selective support that ensures the group remains effective.

However, an expansion of protests or a direct military strike on Iran could open the door to a deeper Houthi repositioning, including broader political and security concessions in exchange for regional guarantees.