US Plan for Gaza Force Faces Disagreements on Mission, Structure

Hamas fighters carry bodies after the group said it found the body of an Israeli soldier and was preparing to return it to Israel, in Gaza City. (Reuters)
Hamas fighters carry bodies after the group said it found the body of an Israeli soldier and was preparing to return it to Israel, in Gaza City. (Reuters)
TT

US Plan for Gaza Force Faces Disagreements on Mission, Structure

Hamas fighters carry bodies after the group said it found the body of an Israeli soldier and was preparing to return it to Israel, in Gaza City. (Reuters)
Hamas fighters carry bodies after the group said it found the body of an Israeli soldier and was preparing to return it to Israel, in Gaza City. (Reuters)

Regional and international reactions continued to pour in over a draft resolution the United States plans to present to the UN Security Council, calling for the creation of an international security force in the Gaza Strip for at least two years.

The proposal, aimed at stabilizing Gaza after years of conflict, has sparked disagreements among key powers and raised concerns that divisions could delay or derail its approval.

According to the US-based website Axios, Washington circulated the draft to several Security Council members on Monday. The text, described as “sensitive but not classified,” would authorize the United States and other participating countries to manage Gaza’s security and administration until the end of 2027, with an option to extend the mandate.

A US official told Axios that the force would be “executive rather than peacekeeping,” stressing that its primary task would be to secure Gaza, oversee disarmament, and dismantle or prevent the reconstruction of militant and military infrastructure.

The force would also seek the permanent disarmament of non-state armed groups in the territory.

Bishara Bahbah, a US-Palestinian mediator, told Asharq Al-Awsat earlier this week that there were four major points of contention among Security Council members regarding the composition and mission of the proposed force. These differences, he said, could make it difficult for the five permanent members - the US, Britain, France, Russia, and China - to reach agreement on the resolution.

A diplomatic source from a mediating country also told Asharq Al-Awsat that Washington might proceed to form the force independently if the Council fails to approve the measure, an approach favored by Israel but opposed by Arab mediators and guarantor states.

Under the draft plan, the international force would secure Gaza’s borders with Israel and Egypt, protect civilians and humanitarian corridors, and train a new Palestinian police force that would gradually assume responsibility during a transitional period.

Israel would, in turn, withdraw from additional parts of Gaza as the Palestinian Authority undertakes reforms to enable long-term governance of the territory.

The force is expected to include troops from several nations and operate under a unified command, in coordination with Egypt, Israel, and a proposed “Peace Council” for Gaza.

The Washington Post quoted a source as saying that Washington hopes to move swiftly, aiming to deploy the first contingent before the end of the year. The Trump administration reportedly views the establishment of such a force as a “critical step” toward post-war stabilization.

Diplomats said the text still requires clarification, particularly regarding the force’s rules of engagement and the specific areas of deployment. The draft mentions a role for Israeli security units in the disarmament process, but sets no clear timetable or benchmarks.

The resolution, which the US mission hopes to bring to a vote next week, does not invoke Chapter VII of the UN Charter - allowing the use of military force - but instead relies on Chapter VI, which governs peaceful settlement of disputes. This would make it similar to the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

A Western diplomat told Asharq Al-Awsat: “We are committed to ensuring the rapid implementation of the second phase of President Trump’s plan. Consultations are ongoing with the US, European, and regional partners, but discussions remain inconclusive.”

Palestinian and Israeli officials have both expressed reservations.

Palestinian sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that the Palestinian Authority will consult with Arab states to seek amendments to the US draft. “We welcome the establishment of the force through the Security Council,” one official said, “but we want clearer terms regarding the mandate, duration, and the Authority’s role in enabling Palestinian governance.”

Israeli media, citing government sources, reported that while the draft leans toward Israeli preferences, Tel Aviv still opposes having the force created through a Security Council resolution.

Israel also objects to any Turkish participation, but might accept the inclusion of a Palestinian police unit.

Israeli officials believe that Indonesia, Pakistan, and Azerbaijan are likely to provide troops for the mission. Members of the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee were recently briefed that soldiers from those countries - and possibly others - would form the initial composition of the proposed stabilization force.



Killing of Seif al-Islam al-Gadhafi Raises Succession Questions in September Current

Seif al-Islam al-Gadhafi (file photo, Reuters)
Seif al-Islam al-Gadhafi (file photo, Reuters)
TT

Killing of Seif al-Islam al-Gadhafi Raises Succession Questions in September Current

Seif al-Islam al-Gadhafi (file photo, Reuters)
Seif al-Islam al-Gadhafi (file photo, Reuters)

Since the killing of Seif al-Islam al-Gadhafi, son of Libya’s late leader Moammar Gadhafi, in the western Libyan city of Zintan last Tuesday, urgent questions have surfaced over who might succeed him in leading the political current he represented.

The questions reflect Seif al-Islam’s symbolic status among supporters of the former regime, known as the September Current, a reference to backers of the September 1 Revolution led by Moammar Gadhafi in 1969.

Search for new leadership

Othman Barka, a leading figure in the National Current that backed Seif al-Islam al-Gadhafi, said supporters of the former regime had yet to agree on a new leader but retained the organizational and political capacity to overcome the current phase and later move toward an alternative leadership framework.

Barka told Asharq Al-Awsat that ties to Gadhafi and his sons had been both emotional and political, but said that what he described as national work would continue. He said organized efforts would be made to reach a new leadership after the repercussions of the killing were overcome.

It remains unclear how Ahmed Gaddaf al-Dam, the political official in the Libyan National Struggle Front and one of the most prominent figures of the former regime, views the future leadership of the September Current following Seif al-Islam’s killing.

Sources close to him told Asharq Al-Awsat it was too early to speak of a new leadership while mourning ceremonies continued in Bani Walid.

Gaddaf al-Dam limited his public response to reposting a statement by those describing themselves as supporters of the Jamahiriya system on his Facebook page. He stressed unity, saying the killing would not lead to the fragmentation of the current and that September supporters remained a single, solid bloc.

In Bani Walid in western Libya, where Seif al-Islam was buried on Friday, shock was evident in the tone of Libyan activist Hamid Gadhafi, a member of the late leader’s tribe. He told Asharq Al-Awsat that clarity over the future leadership would emerge after about 10 days.

Possible successors

Libyan social media pages circulated the names of potential successors, including Seif al-Islam’s sister, Aisha, and his brother, Saadi. Libyan political analyst Ibrahim Belqasem rejected that view, telling Asharq Al-Awsat that the only remaining driver for supporters of the former regime would be the emergence of an unexpected, nonpolitical figure, describing it as an attempt to rescue the current.

After the fall of Gadhafi’s rule in 2011, following 42 years in power since the 1969 revolution, his supporters reemerged under the banner of the September Current. They are popularly known as the Greens, a reference to the Green Book.

Fragmented components and the absence of unified leadership mark the September Current. Seif al-Islam was widely seen as a central symbol among supporters, as well as among political figures and groups calling for the reintegration of former regime supporters into political life and for the recognition of their rights.

Nasser Saeed, spokesman for the Libyan Popular National Movement, one of the political arms of former regime supporters, said he expected a national political leadership to take shape in the coming phase to continue what he described as national work until the country stabilizes. Libyans can determine their future.

He said the emergence of a new leader or symbol was a matter for a later stage, stressing that the project was ideological rather than tied to individuals.

Saeed told Asharq Al-Awsat that Seif al-Islam al-Gadhafi’s legacy lay in a unifying national project that rejected foreign intervention and sought to restore sovereignty and stability. He said Seif al-Islam had represented hope for overcoming the crisis and that his project extended the path of the September Revolution as a liberation choice that still retained supporters.

Structural challenges

Organizationally, the former regime cannot be confined to a single political framework. Its structures and leadership are diverse, including independent organizations and figures.

Among the most prominent are the Libyan Popular National Movement, founded in 2012, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Libya, formed in 2016 by politicians and tribal leaders in support of Seif al-Islam al-Gadhafi.

Their representatives increased their presence after 2020, whether in the Geneva forum that led to the formation of the Government of National Unity or in UN-sponsored structured dialogue tracks, before suspending participation following Seif al-Islam’s killing.

Voices within the September Current believe the killing marked a decisive turning point that cast heavy shadows over the ability of former regime supporters to forge unified leadership, citing structural difficulties rooted in historical disagreements between what is known as the old guard and supporters of change led by Seif al-Islam.

Khaled al-Hijazi, a prominent political activist in the September Current, agreed with that assessment, saying Seif al-Islam’s symbolic role had helped balance internal disputes due to his reformist project before the February 17 uprising.

Al-Hijazi told Asharq Al-Awsat that the loss of that symbolism could revive old divisions and complicate efforts to recreate an inclusive leadership, amid internal and external factors that make unification highly complex in the foreseeable future.

Barka said differences were natural, stressing that the current was not a closed party and believed in democracy and pluralism. He said generational competition did not amount to conflict and noted there had been no violent clashes between supporters of different paths within the September Current.

He concluded by saying that the diversity of approaches served a single goal: the freedom and prosperity of Libyan citizens and the building of a sovereign state capable of overcoming the crisis that has persisted since 2011.


Hezbollah Overhaul Gives Qassem Tighter Administrative Control

Wafiq Safa, head of Hezbollah’s Liaison and Coordination Unit, speaks to the media at the site of the killing of Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s secretary-general, in Beirut’s southern suburbs last year (Social media)
Wafiq Safa, head of Hezbollah’s Liaison and Coordination Unit, speaks to the media at the site of the killing of Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s secretary-general, in Beirut’s southern suburbs last year (Social media)
TT

Hezbollah Overhaul Gives Qassem Tighter Administrative Control

Wafiq Safa, head of Hezbollah’s Liaison and Coordination Unit, speaks to the media at the site of the killing of Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s secretary-general, in Beirut’s southern suburbs last year (Social media)
Wafiq Safa, head of Hezbollah’s Liaison and Coordination Unit, speaks to the media at the site of the killing of Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s secretary-general, in Beirut’s southern suburbs last year (Social media)

The resignation of Wafiq Safa, head of Hezbollah’s Liaison and Coordination Unit, a move that bore the hallmarks of a dismissal, has lifted the lid on a far-reaching internal shake-up of the group’s organizational structure after the heaviest blows it has suffered in its history.

The restructuring follows Hezbollah’s latest war with Israel, which decimated the group’s senior leadership, killing its long-time secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah, his designated successor Hashem Safieddine, a third potential successor Nabil Qaouq, along with much of its military command.

Well-informed Lebanese sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that Safa’s exit marks only the visible edge of bigger changes underway as the group moves to overhaul its leadership, security, and political apparatus in response to the unprecedented damage inflicted by the war.

Previously, that post led the organization without delving into the executive council's responsibilities, which function as a government-like body within the party.

Another key shift is the growing role of political figures in decision-making at the expense of clerics who had dominated the leadership in the previous phase.

New figures have also entered the decision-making circle, including individuals who worked with Qassem in the Islamic Daawa Party and Islamic committees before joining Hezbollah after its founding.

Raad seen as deputy secretary-general

The picture becomes clearer with the entry of Mohammad Raad, head of Hezbollah’s parliamentary bloc Loyalty to the Resistance, into the party’s decision-making core. There is a clear trend toward appointing him deputy secretary-general.

However, the decision is unlikely to be announced before parliamentary elections. MP Hassan Fadlallah is expected to assume leadership of the bloc after the latest elections.

Fneish to lead the party’s executive council

Sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that former minister and MP Mohammad Fneish has taken over responsibility for Hezbollah’s executive council, where he is tasked with reorganizing the party’s administrative and institutional structure. Sheikh Ali Daamoush is handling operational and organizational duties within the council.

Internal organizational measures

Opposition sources familiar with Hezbollah’s internal affairs said Safa was among the first officials affected by internal organizational decisions that curtailed media activity. A directive from the secretary-general’s office barred him from making statements without prior approval from the party’s media relations department.

The same sources said the measures went beyond media restrictions and were accompanied by a noticeable reduction in Safa’s political role, including contacts with political forces and involvement in elections and nominations. According to this account, he has had no public presence in recent months as a political envoy, neither to allies nor rivals.

Redistribution of roles

Sources explained that the unit, previously known in practice as the Security Committee, had handled internal security disputes and field tensions within Hezbollah’s environment or with other parties, intervening directly before coordinating with relevant actors and later with Lebanese state institutions, including security and judicial bodies. It also followed detainee cases and brokered reconciliations.

They added that the unit’s head benefited from growing influence within the party, particularly after being pushed to the forefront in sensitive files such as indirect negotiations and prisoner exchanges, enabling him to build political and international networks, including external channels.

Limiting political authority

Sources tracking the organizational file said the expansion of this role eventually led the unit to exceed its strictly security mandate by performing political functions, including receiving delegations and relaying messages.

They said that after the current leadership took charge, clear instructions were issued to restrict the Liaison and Coordination Unit’s role to security and technical coordination only, barring it from any political, negotiating, or media activity.

According to sources, all political decisions and contacts are now confined to the party’s political leadership, specifically to Secretary-General Naim Qassem, parliamentary bloc head Mohammad Raad, or the secretary-general’s political aide, Hussein Khalil. The security unit’s role is limited to technical coordination with Lebanese security agencies.

Broader structural shifts

Observers link these changes to broader transformations within Hezbollah since Qassem assumed leadership. They note that the previous phase saw prominent roles for clerical figures in the second and third ranks, such as Hashem Safieddine and Nabil Qaouq, who Israel killed in the recent war.

The current scene, by contrast, is marked by the rise of non-clerical political figures, including Mohammad Raad, Mahmoud Qmati, and Ibrahim Mousawi, signaling a gradual shift toward reinforcing the party’s political character.

The sources said media affairs have been centralized under a single administration overseen by MP Ibrahim Mousawi, with direct coordination with the leadership, as part of a policy aimed at unifying messaging and restricting public statements to authorized figures.

War fallout behind Safa’s removal

Political analyst Ali al-Amin told Asharq Al-Awsat that Safa’s sidelining comes amid the fallout from the war and its direct repercussions on Hezbollah, as well as the impact of Iran’s retrenchment and ongoing US-Iran negotiations. He said the party has come to realize that what was possible in the past is no longer sustainable.

Al-Amin said the decision affects a body with both personal and institutional dimensions, noting that Safa is subject to US sanctions, making the move a clear signal that Hezbollah no longer enjoys the same level of control over security bodies amid US pressure and Lebanese state demands to dismantle the apparatus.

He said Hezbollah is trying to adapt to new realities, adding that acceptance of this path will depend on how the party handles implementation of the principle of exclusive state control over weapons.

He noted that recent statements by Mohammad Raad had a tone that could appear positive about weapons exclusivity but fell short of complete clarity. He described the current step as an initial practical measure whose impact will be assessed later, both at the Lebanese official level and by US officials closely following the Lebanese file.

Al-Amin said Hezbollah will continue, whenever possible, to present itself as a political party, even if only superficially, in an effort to project a peaceful, civilian image and show alignment with state institutions.

He added that any progress or disruption in US-Iran negotiations would be reflected in greater flexibility in the party’s domestic behavior, unless a decisive international decision is taken to end Hezbollah’s current status.

In this context, reports have circulated that Hussein Abdallah has been tasked with heading the Liaison and Coordination Unit. Abdallah previously served as Hezbollah’s security chief in southern Lebanon and is considered close to Naim Qassem. Responsibility for contacts with the state and abroad has reportedly been assigned to his deputy, Ahmed Mahna.

Party-aligned account

A source close to Hezbollah offered a different account, telling Asharq Al-Awsat that the measures affecting Safa are part of an organizational restructuring the party has pursued since the end of the war as part of a comprehensive internal review affecting multiple positions and officials.

The source stressed that Safa remains within Hezbollah’s organizational structure.

By contrast, Al-Jadeed television reported that Safa submitted his resignation as head of the Liaison and Coordination Unit with internal approval, citing deep disagreements with Secretary-General Naim Qassem, Shura Council member and parliamentary bloc head Mohammad Raad, and the curtailment of his powers.


Iraqi Guards Threatened by ISIS Prisoners

US military vehicles move along a road in a convoy transporting ISIS detainees being transferred to Iraq from Syria, on the outskirts of Qahtaniyah in Syria's northeastern Hasakah province on February 7, 2026. (Photo by Delil SOULEIMAN / AFP)
US military vehicles move along a road in a convoy transporting ISIS detainees being transferred to Iraq from Syria, on the outskirts of Qahtaniyah in Syria's northeastern Hasakah province on February 7, 2026. (Photo by Delil SOULEIMAN / AFP)
TT

Iraqi Guards Threatened by ISIS Prisoners

US military vehicles move along a road in a convoy transporting ISIS detainees being transferred to Iraq from Syria, on the outskirts of Qahtaniyah in Syria's northeastern Hasakah province on February 7, 2026. (Photo by Delil SOULEIMAN / AFP)
US military vehicles move along a road in a convoy transporting ISIS detainees being transferred to Iraq from Syria, on the outskirts of Qahtaniyah in Syria's northeastern Hasakah province on February 7, 2026. (Photo by Delil SOULEIMAN / AFP)

Iraq is continuing to transfer prisoners believed to be mostly ISIS members to its own detention facilities under a previous arrangement with Washington and the US-led coalition fighting the group, Iraqi security sources said.

The move is aimed at preventing jailbreaks following unrest last month in parts of northeastern Syria, which host camps and prisons holding thousands of ISIS fighters and their families.

Iraqi security officials said some detainees threatened Iraqi soldiers and guards during the transfer process, telling them, “We will kill you when we escape from prison,” an indication that the group’s violent ideology persists even while its members are in custody.

Iraq formally agreed last month to receive thousands of ISIS detainees held in northeastern Syria under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces, a step the government described as preemptive to protect national security and prevent escapes, particularly given the fragile security situation in the area.

At the end of January, Iraq’s National Security Ministerial Council approved the formation of a high-level security committee to fully oversee the transfer process and the handling of detainees, including security, judicial, and logistical aspects.

Prosecutions

The Security Media Cell said on Saturday that Iraq had received 2,250 militants from the Syrian side and had begun judicial classification procedures “in accordance with Iraqi laws in force related to counterterrorism.”

The head of the Security Media Cell, Lt. Gen. Saad Maan, told the state news agency that Iraq had received the 2,250 militants by land and air in coordination with the international coalition, following extensive efforts by the security forces, and that they were being held in tightly secured official facilities.

Maan said the government and security forces were fully prepared to deal with the numbers “to avert danger not only from Iraq, but globally,” adding that specialized teams had started initial investigations and classifying the detainees according to their level of risk, as well as recording their confessions under direct judicial supervision.

He said all those involved in crimes against Iraq and affiliated with ISIS would be tried before competent Iraqi courts, noting that the foreign ministry was in continuous contact with several countries regarding detainees of other nationalities.

He added that the process of handing over militants to their home countries would begin once legal requirements were completed. At the same time, security agencies continued their field and investigative duties in the case.

In the same context, the Supreme Judicial Council announced last week the opening of investigation procedures into 1,387 ISIS members who were recently received from Syrian territory.

Former judge Rahim al-Uqaili previously told Asharq Al-Awsat that detainees transferred from Syria could be tried before Iraqi criminal courts if they were charged with committing crimes outside Iraq that affected internal or external state security, among other offenses.

He expressed doubt, however, about the possibility of obtaining conclusive evidence in some cases.

Tight transfer measures

Security sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that most detainees transferred from Syria were being held in prisons and detention centers in Baghdad and Hilla, both of which host highly fortified facilities.

They said the Counter Terrorism Service was supervising the transport and distribution process, adding that detainees’ hands and feet were bound and their faces covered. Some hurled insults and direct death threats at guards if they managed to escape, while others remained silent.

The sources said security personnel had strict orders not to speak with or interact with detainees, and that most guards were unaware of the detainees' nationalities, as part of measures aimed at reducing risks and preventing communication or security breaches.