Report: Assad’s Exiled Spy Chief and Billionaire Cousin Plot Syrian Uprisings from Russia

A poster of Bashar al-Assad is seen on the ground at the presidential palace in Damascus after he fled Syria on December 8, 2024. (AP)
A poster of Bashar al-Assad is seen on the ground at the presidential palace in Damascus after he fled Syria on December 8, 2024. (AP)
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Report: Assad’s Exiled Spy Chief and Billionaire Cousin Plot Syrian Uprisings from Russia

A poster of Bashar al-Assad is seen on the ground at the presidential palace in Damascus after he fled Syria on December 8, 2024. (AP)
A poster of Bashar al-Assad is seen on the ground at the presidential palace in Damascus after he fled Syria on December 8, 2024. (AP)

Former loyalists to Bashar al-Assad who fled Syria after the dictator’s fall are funneling millions of dollars to tens of thousands of potential fighters, hoping to stir uprisings against the new government and reclaim some of their lost influence, a Reuters investigation has found.

Assad, who escaped to Russia last December, is largely resigned to exile in Moscow, say four people close to the family. But other senior figures from his inner circle, including his brother, have not come to terms with losing power.

Two of the men once closest to Assad, Maj. Gen. Kamal Hassan and billionaire Rami Makhlouf, are competing to form militias in coastal Syria and Lebanon made up of members of their minority Alawite sect, long associated with the Assad family, Reuters found.

All told, the two men and other factions jostling for power are financing more than 50,000 fighters in hope of winning their loyalty.

Assad’s brother, Maher, who is also in Moscow and still controls thousands of former soldiers, has yet to give money or orders, said the four people close to the Assads.

One prize for Hassan and Makhlouf is control of a network of 14 underground command rooms built around coastal Syria toward the end of Assad’s rule, as well as weapons caches. Two officers and a Syrian regional governor confirmed the existence of these concealed rooms, details of which appear in Photos seen by Reuters.

Hassan, who was Bashar’s military intelligence chief, has been tirelessly making calls and sending voice messages to commanders and advisors.

In them, he seethes about his lost influence and outlines grandiose visions of how he would rule coastal Syria, home to the majority of Syria’s Alawite population and Assad’s former powerbase.

Makhlouf, a cousin of the Assads, once used his business empire to fund the dictator during the civil war, only to run afoul of his more powerful relatives and wind up under years of house arrest. He now portrays himself in conversations and messages as a messianic figure who will return to power after ushering in an apocalyptic final battle.

Hassan and Makhlouf did not respond to requests for comment for this report. Bashar and Maher Assad couldn’t be reached. Reuters also sought comment from the Assad brothers through intermediaries, who didn’t reply.

From their exiles in Moscow, Hassan and Makhlouf envision a fractured Syria, and each wants control of the Alawite-majority areas. Both have spent millions of dollars in competing efforts to build forces, Reuters found. Their deputies are in other countries including Russia and Lebanon.

To counter the plotters, Syria’s new government is deploying another former Assad loyalist – a childhood friend of new President Ahmed al-Sharaa who became a paramilitary leader for Assad and then switched sides mid-war after the dictator turned against him. The task of that man, Khaled al-Ahmad, is to persuade Alawite ex-soldiers and civilians that their future lies with the new Syria.

“This is an extension of the Assad regime’s power struggle,” said Annsar Shahhoud, a researcher who studied the dictatorship for more than a decade. “This competition continues now, but instead of the goal being to please Assad, the focus is on finding his replacement and controlling the Alawite community.”

Details of the scheming are based on interviews with 48 people with direct knowledge of the competing plans. All spoke on condition of anonymity. Reuters also reviewed financial records, operational documents, and exchanges of voice and text messages.

The governor of the coastal region of Tartous, Ahmed al-Shami, said Syrian authorities are aware of the outlines of the plans and ready to combat them.

He confirmed the existence of the command-room network as well, but said it has been weakened.

“We are certain they cannot do anything effective, given their lack of strong tools on the ground and their weak capabilities,” al-Shami told Reuters in response to questions about the plotting.

The Lebanese Interior Ministry and the Russian Foreign Ministry did not respond to requests for comment. A UAE official said its government is committed to preventing the use of its territory for “all forms of illicit financial flows.”

An uprising could destabilize Syria’s new government as the United States and regional powers throw their support behind Sharaa, the former opposition commander who toppled Assad last December and is now navigating a fractured political landscape. It would risk igniting another round of deadly sectarian violence, which has roiled the new Syria over the past year.

For now, the prospects of a successful uprising seem low.

Chief plotters Hassan and Makhlouf are virulently at odds with one another. Their hopes are fading to win backing from Russia, once Assad’s most powerful political and military supporter. Many Alawites in Syria, who also suffered under Assad, mistrust the pair.

And the new government is working to stymie their plans.

In a brief statement in response to the Reuters findings, the government’s Alawite point man al-Ahmad said the “work of healing – of uprooting sectarian hatred and honoring the dead – remains the only path toward a Syria that can live with itself again.”

'PERHAPS THOUSANDS MORE WILL DIE'

Hassan claims control of 12,000 fighters, while Makhlouf claims control of at least 54,000, according to their factions’ internal documents. Commanders on the ground said fighters are paid a pittance and taking money from both sides.

The exiles don't appear to have mobilized any forces yet. Reuters could not confirm the fighter figures or determine specific action plans. Tartous governor Al-Shami said potential fighters numbered in the tens of thousands.

The new government took power after emerging victorious a year ago in the nearly 14-year civil war that plunged the country into sectarian bloodshed.

In March, nearly 1,500 civilians were killed across the Mediterranean coast by government-affiliated forces after a failed uprising in an Alawite town. Both Hassan and Makhlouf promise to protect Syria’s Alawites from the insecurity that has continued since March.

Alawite anger toward the new government erupted on November 25, when thousands took to the streets in Homs and coastal cities. They demanded more autonomy and the release of detainees.

The protests marked the first large-scale demonstrations Syria had witnessed since Assad’s fall.

Neither Makhlouf nor Hassan were behind the protests, but rather a cleric who opposes both men and publicly called on people to demonstrate peacefully. Makhlouf attacked the cleric the next day in a social media post, saying, “all these movements will only bring calamity, for the time is not yet right.”

One of Hassan’s top military coordinators told Reuters that fighting is the only way to restore Alawite dignity.

“We are lucky that only this number of our people have died so far,” said the coordinator, a former Assad-era military intelligence officer who is now in Lebanon. “Perhaps thousands more will die, but the sect must offer up sacrificial lambs” to defend the community.

According to January 2025 documents seen by Reuters, Assadist forces drew up initial plans to build a paramilitary force of 5,780 fighters and supply them from the subterranean command rooms. These are essentially large storerooms equipped with arms, solar power, internet, GPS units and walkie-talkies.

Nothing came of that early plan, and the command rooms – along a spine in coastal Syria about 180 kilometers from north to south – remain operational but essentially idle, according to two people with knowledge of them and photos seen by Reuters.

One photo showed a room with five stacked crates, three of which were open to reveal a collection of AK-47s, ammunition and hand grenades. The room also held three desktop computers, two tablets, a set of walkie-talkies, and a power bank. In the center was a wooden table topped with a large map.

For the plotters, “this network is Treasure Island, and they are all boats trying to reach it,” said one of the people, a commander who monitors the readiness of the rooms.

Al-Shami, the Tartous governor, said the network is real but poses little danger. “These centers have been significantly weakened since the liberation,” he said. “There is no concern about their continued existence.”

As senior military officials and ranking government figures escaped abroad in December 2024, many mid-level commanders remained in Syria. Most fled to the coastal regions dominated by Alawites, a Muslim minority that makes up a little over 10% of Syria’s population. Those officers started recruiting fighters, according to a retired commander involved in the effort.

“The most fertile ground was the military,” the retired commander said. “Thousands of young men from the sect had been conscripted into the army, which was dissolved in December, and they suddenly found themselves exposed.”

Then came the failed uprising on March 6. An Alawite unit operating independently ambushed security forces from the new Syrian government in rural Latakia, killing 12 men and capturing more than 150, according to a brigadier general who was involved with the ambush and has since left for Lebanon.

The new Syrian government says hundreds of its security forces died in the fighting that followed – a claim largely echoed by the pro-Assad fighters.

The brigadier general said 128 pro-Assad forces died in the uprising, which was quelled by the new government.

The Assadist exiles neither started nor commanded the uprising, according to the officers who were there, but those days marked a turning point. They began to organize.

AN ASSAD FAMILY FEUD

It was on March 9 that Makhlouf started calling himself “The Coast Boy,” declaring in a statement that he had been entrusted with a divine mission to help Alawites. “I’m back, and blessed be the return,” the statement read. It did not mention that he was in Moscow.

Makhlouf dominated Syria’s economy for more than two decades, with holdings estimated by the British government at well over a billion dollars in industries as varied as telecoms, construction and tourism. He used his money to fund Syrian army units and allied militias during the civil war, which broke out in 2011.

When Assad’s victory seemed assured in 2019, Makhlouf publicly claimed credit. Soon after, Assad seized Makhlouf's businesses, ostensibly because they were indebted to the state, and put him under years of house arrest.

Makhlouf escaped to Lebanon in an ambulance the night of December 8, 2024, as Damascus fell to Sharaa’s forces. Makhlouf’s brother Ehab also tried to flee that night in his Maserati, but was shot to death near the border and robbed of millions of dollars he was carrying in cash, according to four close associates of the family and a customs officer with direct knowledge of the events.

Reuters could not independently verify the events of that night.

Makhlouf now lives on a private floor in a luxurious Radisson hotel in Moscow under tight security, according to nine aides and relatives. He quotes frequently from the Quran. They said he became deeply religious during house arrest.

The Radisson in Moscow and group headquarters in Brussels did not respond to a request for comment.

Using trusted business administrators in Lebanon and Russia, Makhlouf is transferring money to Alawite officers for salaries and equipment, according to a financial manager and receipts and payroll tables seen by Reuters.

The documents show the money is funneled through two prominent Syrian officers who reunited with Makhlouf in Moscow: Suhail Hassan and Qahtan Khalil, who both held the rank of major general.

Hassan and Khalil claimed to have created a force for Makhlouf totaling what they said were 54,053 willing fighters, including 18,000 officers, organized into 80 battalions and groups in and around the cities of Homs, Hama, Tartous and Latakia. Many rank-and-file soldiers conscripted under Assad, however, gave up fighting when his government fell.

Hassan and Khalil didn’t reply to requests for comment about their role in transferring money.

One of his financial managers told Reuters that Makhlouf has spent at least $6 million on salaries. Payroll tables and salary receipts created by financial aides to Makhlouf in Lebanon claimed he spent $976,705 in May, and that one group of 5,000 fighters received $150,000 in August.

The total force numbers are real, according to five leaders of military groups in Syria who are on Makhlouf’s payroll and lead about a fifth of his following. But Makhlouf’s funding falls short of their needs, amounting to just $20 to $30 a month per fighter.

In addition, Makhlouf’s staff has sought to provide weapons. They have mapped the possible location of dozens of caches hidden during the Assad era totaling a few thousand firearms, according to schematics Reuters viewed. These stockpiles are separate from the hidden command rooms.

They have also been in discussions with smugglers in Syria for new weapons.

People familiar with the discussions said they didn’t know if new weapons were actually purchased or delivered.

Altogether, the five local military leaders said they command about 12,000 men in various stages of readiness. One of them told Reuters the time wasn’t yet right for action.

Another of the five commanders derided Makhlouf as trying to buy loyalty with “crumbs of money.”

All five said they had accepted money from both Makhlouf and Hassan, the spy chief. They saw no issue with overlapping paymasters.

“Thousands of Alawites, whether former Syrian soldiers or civilians dismissed from state jobs, live in extreme poverty,” one of the men said. “There is nothing wrong with taking some cash from these whales who sucked our blood for years.”

‘BE PATIENT’

Hassan ran the Assad dictatorship’s military detention system, which was notorious for extorting money at scale from prisoners’ families, according to a 2024 United Nations report about the system.

A Reuters investigation this year found it was Hassan who proposed moving a mass grave containing thousands of bodies in 2018 to the Dhumair desert outside Damascus to hide the scope of the Assad government atrocities.

Abandoned by Assad’s disintegrating army, Hassan fled first to the UAE’s embassy in Damascus and then took refuge in the Russian embassy in December 2024 for nearly two weeks. He was infuriated at what he perceived as ill-treatment by his hosts, who provided a single room with just one hard chair to sit on, according to two people close to him.

“Kamal Hassan is not one to sit on a wooden chair for days!” he said in one WhatsApp voice message to his inner circle from this spring, reviewed by Reuters.

Hassan ultimately took up residence in a three-story villa in suburban Moscow, according to an officer who met him over the summer. Since then, he has seen Maher al-Assad once and maintains close ties with Bashar’s Russian protectors, according to the two people aware of Hassan’s movements.

According to Hassan’s operations coordinator in Lebanon, Hassan has spent $1.5 million since March on 12,000 fighters in Syria and Lebanon.

“Be patient, my people, and don’t surrender your arms. I am the one who will restore your dignity,” he said in another WhatsApp voice message from April that appeared aimed at commanders. Two recipients confirmed the message was from him.

In mid-year, a charity called the “Development of Western Syria” announced its creation and said it was funded by “the Syrian citizen Maj. Gen. Kamal Hassan,” according to one of its initial Facebook posts. Three officers linked to Hassan and a manager in the organization described it as a humanitarian cover so Hassan could build influence among Alawites.

In August, the charity paid $80,000 to shelter 40 Syrian Alawite families, according to an announcement of its first action. That same month, Hassan sent $200,000 in cash to 80 officers in Lebanon, according to a payroll document seen by Reuters.

Over the summer, Hassan also recruited about 30 hackers once affiliated with his military intelligence branch, according to an aide in Moscow and one of the hackers, a computer engineer. Their orders were to carry out cyberattacks against the new government and plant spyware in its computer systems.

By September, Syrian government datasets that the engineer said his team stole were for sale on the dark web for $150 to $500. Reuters found several of the sets he identified online, including databases with staff details for the communications and health ministries.

The engineer said former spy chief Hassan plans a multifaceted attack to reclaim his place in Syria. “Major General Kamal knows that war is not only on the ground but on every front,” he said.

THE OTHER ASSAD

A potential key player in attempts to instigate an uprising is Maher al-Assad, the ex-dictator’s younger brother.

Maher controlled both a business empire and the most powerful unit of the Syrian military, the 4th Armored Division. Under him, according to research by the US think tank New Lines Institute, the division gained power and financial independence that made it akin to a state within a state – to the point where it received its own sanctions from the United States, Britain and the European Union.

A senior division commander, now in Lebanon, said Maher’s financial empire remains largely operational except for his alleged sales of Captagon, an illicitly produced amphetamine. His assets are believed to be stashed in shell companies both inside and outside Syria, according to a businessman close to him.

The commander said while Bashar al-Assad is focused on his private life and businesses, Maher still wants influence in Syria. The younger brother cannot fathom how the children of Hafez al-Assad, the dictatorship’s founder, could be forced out of Syria, he said.

Two division officers say many of its 25,000 fighters, both inside and outside Syria, still consider Maher al-Assad their commander and he can mobilize them if he gives the order.

Makhlouf isn’t seeking the Assads’ backing: Publicly, he has derided his cousins as “the fugitives.” Hassan, relying on years of personal ties and collaboration with the Assads, is appealing for Maher’s support, according to three senior sources in both camps.

Russia has so far withheld support for Hassan and Makhlouf, according to six people with direct knowledge of the exiles’ attempts to win over the Kremlin.

While Moscow is harboring the exiles, the Russian government has been clear that its priority is continued access to the military bases it still operates in coastal Syria, according to two diplomats familiar with Russia’s position.

In bidding for Russian help, one key figure is a senior Syrian officer, Ahmed al-Malla, who has had Russian citizenship since early in the civil war. Al-Malla brokered separate informal meetings in Moscow beginning in March between Russian officials and Hassan and Makhlouf’s two Russia-based deputies, according to handwritten minutes from one meeting seen by Reuters. According to the notes, the Russians told the exiles: organize yourselves, and let us see your plans.

Al-Malla did not respond to requests for comment about his role as a mediator.

But the meetings between Russian officials and the exiled Syrian factions have grown infrequent, said two people with direct knowledge of their scheduling. They said there have been none since President Sharaa visited Moscow in October to secure Kremlin support.

During the visit, Sharaa raised the issue of Hassan and Makhlouf with the Russian government, said al-Shami, the Tartous governor. Al-Shami said Russia – and, separately, Lebanon – “expressed their willingness to increase coordination and prevent any activity by these individuals within their territories.” He was unaware of any meetings the plotters may have had with Russian officials.

One of the diplomats said Sharaa’s meeting at the Kremlin “sent a signal to Alawite insurgents: There was no one abroad coming to save them.”

There are indications that Makhlouf, whose business accounts have been frozen due to international sanctions, is having cash flow problems. October salaries have yet to arrive, according to three people with knowledge of the transfers.

THE MAN ON THE GROUND

Since the March killings, the Damascus government has relied on a point man to counter the plotting: Khaled al-Ahmad, a childhood friend of President Sharaa.

An Alawite, al-Ahmad was once in Assad’s inner circle. He served as a shadow diplomat and a founder of the National Defense Forces, Assad’s largest allied paramilitary.

Like Makhlouf, al-Ahmad believed he was responsible for Assad’s victory in the civil war. Assad gave al-Ahmad much the same treatment as his cousin, stripping him of privileges and ordering him drafted, according to two aides.

Al-Ahmad fled to Cyprus, and then, in 2021, visited northwestern Syria’s Idlib to meet up with his old friend, Sharaa, according to accounts from three people who have worked with both men. They discussed Sharaa’s plan to topple Assad, according to the three people.

It materialized in December 2024.

Reuters reviewed WhatsApp voice messages from al-Ahmad in late 2024 in which he told key military officials that it was futile to stick with the losing dictator and promised clemency if they abandoned him and prevented a bloodbath.

In his statement to Reuters, al-Ahmad said his objective as the government fell in December was to prevent more bloodshed, but acknowledged being unable to fully “spare Syrians from further loss, or from the sectarian shadows that continue to darken our society.”

Today al-Ahmad is Syria’s most powerful Alawite, moving between a Beirut penthouse overlooking the sea and a fortified villa in Damascus.

“His role is considered crucial in fostering trust between the Alawite community and the new government,” said al-Shami, the Tartous governor.

Four aides said al-Ahmad is funding and coordinating job creation and economic development because he believes they are the solution to the destabilizing high unemployment that followed the fall of Assad, when the army was dissolved and Alawites lost government posts.

In late October, the Interior Ministry announced the arrest of a coastal cell it said was funded by Makhlouf that was plotting to assassinate journalists and activists.

In all, Tartous governor al-Shami said, the number of arrests of people linked to Makhlouf and Hassan was in the dozens.

Along that same coast, stockpiles of gear are quietly gathering dust in underground rooms, according to the field commander, who personally keeps watch over several of them.

They’ll be ready when needed, he said, but so far he sees no side worth choosing.



Is Iran Pushing Houthis Toward Military Action Against Washington?

Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 
Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 
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Is Iran Pushing Houthis Toward Military Action Against Washington?

Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 
Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 

As US military movements intensify in the Middle East and the possibility of strikes on Iran looms, Yemen’s Houthi group has continued military preparations, mobilizing fighters and establishing new weapons sites.

The Houthi mobilization comes at a time when the group is widely viewed as one of Iran’s most important regional arms for retaliation.

Although the Iran-backed group has not issued any official statement declaring its position on a potential US attack on Iran, its leaders have warned Washington against any military action and against bearing full responsibility for any escalation and its consequences.

They have hinted that any response would be handled in accordance with the group’s senior leadership's assessment, after evaluating developments and potential repercussions.

Despite these signals, some interpret the Houthis’ stance as an attempt to avoid drawing the attention of the current US administration, led by President Donald Trump, to the need for preemptive action in anticipation of a potential Houthi response.

The Trump administration previously launched a military campaign against the group in the spring of last year, inflicting heavy losses.

Islam al-Mansi, an Egyptian researcher specializing in Iranian affairs, said Iran may avoid burning all its cards unless absolutely necessary, particularly given US threats to raise the level of escalation should any Iranian military proxies intervene or take part in a confrontation.

Iran did not resort to using its military proxies during its confrontation with Israel or during a limited US strike last summer because it did not perceive an existential threat, al-Mansi said.

That calculation could change in the anticipated confrontation, potentially prompting Houthi intervention, including targeting US allies, interests, and military forces, he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Al-Mansi added that although Iran previously offered, within a negotiating framework, to abandon its regional proxies, including the Houthis, this makes it more likely that Tehran would use them in retaliation, noting that Iran created these groups to defend its territory from afar.

Many intelligence reports suggest that Iran’s Revolutionary Guard has discussed with the Houthis the activation of alternative support arenas in a potential US-Iran confrontation, including the use of cells and weapons not previously deployed.

Visible readiness

In recent days, Chinese media outlets cited an unnamed Houthi military commander as saying the group had raised its alert level and carried out inspections of missile launch platforms in several areas across Yemen, including the strategically important Red Sea region.

In this context, Yemeni political researcher Salah Ali Salah said the Houthis would participate in defending Iran against any US attacks, citing the group’s media rhetoric accompanying mass rallies, which openly supports Iran’s right to defend itself.

While this rhetoric maintains some ambiguity regarding Iran, it repeatedly invokes the war in Gaza and renews Houthi pledges to resume military escalation in defense of the besieged enclave’s population, Salah told Asharq Al-Awsat.

He noted that Iran would not have shared advanced and sophisticated military technologies with the Houthis without a high degree of trust in their ability to use them in Iran’s interest.

In recent months, following Israeli strikes on the unrecognized Houthi government and several of its leaders, hardline Houthi figures demonstrating strong loyalty to Iran have become more prominent.

On the ground, the group has established new military sites and moved equipment and weapons to new locations along and near the coast, alongside the potential use of security cells beyond Yemen’s borders.

Salah said that if the threat of a military strike on Iran escalates, the Iranian response could take a more advanced form, potentially including efforts to close strategic waterways, placing the Bab al-Mandab Strait within the Houthis’ target range.

Many observers have expressed concern that the Houthis may have transferred fighters and intelligence cells outside Yemen over recent years to target US and Western interests in the region.

Open options

After a ceasefire was declared in Gaza, the Houthis lost one of their key justifications for mobilizing fighters and collecting funds. The group has since faced growing public anger over its practices and worsening humanitarian conditions, responding with media messaging aimed at convincing audiences that the battle is not over and that further rounds lie ahead.

Alongside weekly rallies in areas under their control in support of Gaza, the Houthis have carried out attacks on front lines with Yemen’s internationally recognized government, particularly in Taiz province.

Some military experts describe these incidents as probing attacks, while others see them as attempts to divert attention from other activities.

In this context, Walid al-Abara, head of the Yemen and Gulf Studies Center, said the Houthis entered a critical phase after the Gaza war ended, having lost one of the main justifications for their attacks on Red Sea shipping.

As a result, they may seek to manufacture new pretexts, including claims of sanctions imposed against them, to maintain media momentum and their regional role.

Al-Abara told Asharq Al-Awsat that the group has two other options. The first is redirecting its activity inward to strengthen its military and economic leverage, either to impose its conditions in any future settlement or to consolidate power.

The second is yielding to international and regional pressure and entering a negotiation track, particularly if sanctions intensify or its economic and military capacity declines.

According to an assessment by the Yemen and Gulf Studies Center, widespread protests in Iran are increasingly pressuring the regime’s ability to manage its regional influence at the same pace as before, without dismantling its network of proxies.

This reality is pushing Tehran toward a more cautious approach, governed by domestic priorities and cost-benefit calculations, while maintaining a minimum level of external influence without broad escalation.

Within this framework, al-Abara said Iran is likely to maintain a controlled continuity in its relationship with the Houthis through selective support that ensures the group remains effective.

However, an expansion of protests or a direct military strike on Iran could open the door to a deeper Houthi repositioning, including broader political and security concessions in exchange for regional guarantees.


The Gaza Ceasefire Began Months Ago. Here’s Why the Fighting Persists

Israeli soldiers and tanks stand in Gaza, as seen from the Israeli side of the Israel-Gaza border, in Israel, February 4, 2026. REUTERS/Amir Cohen
Israeli soldiers and tanks stand in Gaza, as seen from the Israeli side of the Israel-Gaza border, in Israel, February 4, 2026. REUTERS/Amir Cohen
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The Gaza Ceasefire Began Months Ago. Here’s Why the Fighting Persists

Israeli soldiers and tanks stand in Gaza, as seen from the Israeli side of the Israel-Gaza border, in Israel, February 4, 2026. REUTERS/Amir Cohen
Israeli soldiers and tanks stand in Gaza, as seen from the Israeli side of the Israel-Gaza border, in Israel, February 4, 2026. REUTERS/Amir Cohen

As the bodies of two dozen Palestinians killed in Israeli strikes arrived at hospitals in Gaza on Wednesday, the director of one asked a question that has echoed across the war-ravaged territory for months.

“Where is the ceasefire? Where are the mediators?” Shifa Hospital's Mohamed Abu Selmiya wrote on Facebook.

At least 556 Palestinians have been killed in Israeli strikes since a US-brokered truce came into effect in October, including 24 on Wednesday and 30 on Saturday, according to Gaza's Health Ministry. Four Israeli soldiers have been killed in Gaza in the same period, with more injured, including a soldier whom the military said was severely wounded when militants opened fire near the ceasefire line in northern Gaza overnight.

Other aspects of the agreement have stalled, including the deployment of an international security force, Hamas' disarmament and the start of Gaza's reconstruction. The opening of the Rafah border crossing between Gaza and Egypt raised hope of further progress, but fewer than 50 people were allowed to cross on Monday, The Associated Press said.

Hostages freed as other issues languish In October, after months of stalled negotiations, Israel and Hamas accepted a 20-point plan proposed by US President Donald Trump aimed at ending the war unleashed by Hamas' Oct. 7, 2023, attack into Israel.

At the time, Trump said it would lead to a “Strong, Durable, and Everlasting Peace."

Hamas freed all the living hostages it still held at the outset of the deal in exchange for thousands of Palestinian prisoners held by Israel and the remains of others.

But the larger issues the agreement sought to address, including the future governance of the strip, were met with reservations, and the US offered no firm timeline.

The return of the remains of hostages meanwhile stretched far beyond the 72-hour timeline outlined in the agreement. Israel recovered the body of the last hostage only last week, after accusing Hamas and other militant groups of violating the ceasefire by failing to return all of the bodies. The militants said they were unable to immediately locate all the remains because of the massive destruction caused by the war — a claim Israel rejected.

The ceasefire also called for an immediate influx of humanitarian aid, including equipment to clear rubble and rehabilitate infrastructure. The United Nations and humanitarian groups say aid deliveries to Gaza's 2 million Palestinians have fallen short due to customs clearance problems and other delays. COGAT, the Israeli military body overseeing aid to Gaza, has called the UN's claims “simply a lie.”

Ceasefire holds despite accusations

Violence has sharply declined since the ceasefire paused a war in which more than 71,800 Palestinians have been killed, according to the Gaza Health Ministry. The ministry is part of the Hamas-led government and maintains detailed records seen as generally reliable by UN agencies and independent experts.

Hamas-led militants killed some 1,200 people in the initial October 2023 attack and took around 250 hostage.

Both sides say the agreement is still in effect and use the word “ceasefire” in their communications. But Israel accuses Hamas fighters of operating beyond the truce line splitting Gaza in half, threatening its troops and occasionally opening fire, while Hamas accuses Israeli forces of gunfire and strikes on residential areas far from the line.

Palestinians have called on US and Arab mediators to get Israel to stop carrying out deadly strikes, which often kill civilians. Among those killed on Wednesday were five children, including two babies. Hamas, which accuses Israel of hundreds of violations, called it a “grave circumvention of the ceasefire agreement.”

In a joint statement on Sunday, eight Arab and Muslim countries condemned Israel’s actions since the agreement took effect and urged restraint from all sides “to preserve and sustain the ceasefire.”

Israel says it is responding to daily violations committed by Hamas and acting to protect its troops. “While Hamas’ actions undermine the ceasefire, Israel remains fully committed to upholding it,” the military said in a statement on Wednesday.

“One of the scenarios the (military) has to be ready for is Hamas is using a deception tactic like they did before October 7 and rearming and preparing for an attack when it’s comfortable for them,” said Lt. Col. Nadav Shoshani, a military spokesperson.

Some signs of progress

The return of the remains of the last hostage, the limited opening of the Rafah crossing, and the naming of a Palestinian committee to govern Gaza and oversee its reconstruction showed a willingness to advance the agreement despite the violence.

Last month, US envoy Steve Witkoff, who played a key role in brokering the truce, said it was time for “transitioning from ceasefire to demilitarization, technocratic governance, and reconstruction.”

That will require Israel and Hamas to grapple with major issues on which they have been sharply divided, including whether Israel will fully withdraw from Gaza and Hamas will lay down its arms.

Though political leaders are holding onto the term “ceasefire” and have yet to withdraw from the process, there is growing despair in Gaza.

On Saturday, Atallah Abu Hadaiyed heard explosions in Gaza City during his morning prayers and ran outside to find his cousins lying on the ground as flames curled around them.

“We don’t know if we’re at war or at peace,” he said from a displacement camp, as tarpaulin strips blew off the tent behind him.


What to Know as Iran and US Set for Nuclear Talks in Oman

The flags of USA and Iran are displayed in Muscat, Oman, 25 April 2025. EPA/ALI HAIDER
The flags of USA and Iran are displayed in Muscat, Oman, 25 April 2025. EPA/ALI HAIDER
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What to Know as Iran and US Set for Nuclear Talks in Oman

The flags of USA and Iran are displayed in Muscat, Oman, 25 April 2025. EPA/ALI HAIDER
The flags of USA and Iran are displayed in Muscat, Oman, 25 April 2025. EPA/ALI HAIDER

Iran and the United States will hold talks Friday in Oman, their latest over Tehran's nuclear program after Israel launched a 12-day war on the country in June and Iran launched a bloody crackdown on nationwide protests.

US President Donald Trump has kept up pressure on Iran, suggesting America could attack Iran over the killing of peaceful demonstrators or if Tehran launches mass executions over the protests. Meanwhile, Trump has pushed Iran's nuclear program back into the frame as well after the June war disrupted five rounds of talks held in Rome and Muscat, Oman, last year.

Trump began the diplomacy initially by writing a letter last year to Iran’s 86-year-old Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to jump start these talks. Khamenei has warned Iran would respond to any attack with an attack of its own, particularly as the theocracy he commands reels following the protests.

Here’s what to know about Iran’s nuclear program and the tensions that have stalked relations between Tehran and Washington since the 1979 Iranian Revolution.

Trump writes letter to Khamenei Trump dispatched the letter to Khamenei on March 5, 2025, then gave a television interview the next day in which he acknowledged sending it. He said: “I’ve written them a letter saying, ‘I hope you’re going to negotiate because if we have to go in militarily, it’s going to be a terrible thing.’”

Since returning to the White House, the president has been pushing for talks while ratcheting up sanctions and suggesting a military strike by Israel or the US could target Iranian nuclear sites.

A previous letter from Trump during his first term drew an angry retort from the supreme leader.

But Trump’s letters to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in his first term led to face-to-face meetings, though no deals to limit Pyongyang’s atomic bombs and a missile program capable of reaching the continental US.

Oman mediated previous talks

Oman, a sultanate on the eastern edge of the Arabian Peninsula, has mediated talks between Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and US Mideast envoy Steve Witkoff. The two men have met face to face after indirect talks, a rare occurrence due to the decades of tensions between the countries.

It hasn't been all smooth, however. Witkoff at one point made a television appearance in which he suggested 3.67% enrichment for Iran could be something the countries could agree on. But that’s exactly the terms set by the 2015 nuclear deal struck under former President Barack Obama, from which Trump unilaterally withdrew America. Witkoff, Trump and other American officials in the time since have maintained Iran can have no enrichment under any deal, something to which Tehran insists it won't agree.

Those negotiations ended, however, with Israel launching the war in June on Iran.

The 12-day war and nationwide protests Israel launched what became a 12-day war on Iran in June that included the US bombing Iranian nuclear sites. Iran later acknowledged in November that the attacks saw it halt all uranium enrichment in the country, though inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency have been unable to visit the bombed sites.

Iran soon experienced protests that began in late December over the collapse of the country's rial currency. Those demonstrations soon became nationwide, sparking Tehran to launch a bloody crackdown that killed thousands and saw tens of thousands detained by authorities.

Iran’s nuclear program worries the West Iran has insisted for decades that its nuclear program is peaceful. However, its officials increasingly threaten to pursue a nuclear weapon. Iran now enriches uranium to near weapons-grade levels of 60%, the only country in the world without a nuclear weapons program to do so.

Under the original 2015 nuclear deal, Iran was allowed to enrich uranium up to 3.67% purity and to maintain a uranium stockpile of 300 kilograms (661 pounds). The last report by the International Atomic Energy Agency on Iran’s program put its stockpile at some 9,870 kilograms (21,760 pounds), with a fraction of it enriched to 60%.

US intelligence agencies assess that Iran has yet to begin a weapons program, but has “undertaken activities that better position it to produce a nuclear device, if it chooses to do so.” Iranian officials have threatened to pursue the bomb.

Decades of tense relations between Iran and the US Iran was once one of the US’s top allies in the Mideast under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who purchased American military weapons and allowed CIA technicians to run secret listening posts monitoring the neighboring Soviet Union. The CIA had fomented a 1953 coup that cemented the shah’s rule.

But in January 1979, the shah, fatally ill with cancer, fled Iran as mass demonstrations swelled against his rule. The Iranian Revolution followed, led by Grand Khomeini, and created Iran’s theocratic government.

Later that year, university students overran the US Embassy in Tehran, seeking the shah’s extradition and sparking the 444-day hostage crisis that saw diplomatic relations between Iran and the US severed.

The Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s saw the US back Saddam Hussein. The “Tanker War” during that conflict saw the US launch a one-day assault that crippled Iran at sea, while the US later shot down an Iranian commercial airliner that the US military said it mistook for a warplane.

Iran and the US have seesawed between enmity and grudging diplomacy in the years since, with relations peaking when Tehran made the 2015 nuclear deal with world powers. But Trump unilaterally withdrew America from the accord in 2018, sparking tensions in the Mideast that persist today.