Former Spy Chief and Assad’s Cousin Plot Syrian Uprisings from Russia

A member of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham stands guard near an image of Syria's Bashar al-Assad at the fourth division headquarters in Damascus, Syria, January 23, 2025 (Reuters)
A member of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham stands guard near an image of Syria's Bashar al-Assad at the fourth division headquarters in Damascus, Syria, January 23, 2025 (Reuters)
TT

Former Spy Chief and Assad’s Cousin Plot Syrian Uprisings from Russia

A member of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham stands guard near an image of Syria's Bashar al-Assad at the fourth division headquarters in Damascus, Syria, January 23, 2025 (Reuters)
A member of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham stands guard near an image of Syria's Bashar al-Assad at the fourth division headquarters in Damascus, Syria, January 23, 2025 (Reuters)

Two former loyalists to Bashar al-Assad who fled Syria after his fall are funneling millions of dollars to tens of thousands of potential fighters, hoping to stir uprisings against the new government and reclaim some of their lost influence, a Reuters investigation has found.

Assad, who escaped to Russia last December, is largely resigned to exile in Moscow, say four people close to the family. But other senior figures from his inner circle, including his brother, have not come to terms with losing power.

Reuters found that two of the men once closest to Assad, Maj. Gen. Kamal Hassan and billionaire Rami Makhlouf, are competing to form militias in coastal Syria and Lebanon made up of members of their minority Alawite sect, long associated with the Assad family.

All told, the two men and other factions jostling for power are financing more than 50,000 fighters in hope of winning their loyalty.

Assad’s brother, Maher, who is also in Moscow and still controls thousands of former soldiers, has yet to give money or orders, said the four people close to the Assads.

One prize for Hassan and Makhlouf is control of a network of 14 underground command rooms built around coastal Syria toward the end of Assad’s rule, as well as weapons caches.

Two officers and a Syrian regional governor confirmed the existence of these concealed rooms, details of which appear in photos seen by Reuters.

Hassan, who was Bashar’s military intelligence chief, has been tirelessly making calls and sending voice messages to commanders and advisors. In them, he seethes about his lost influence and outlines grandiose visions of how he would rule coastal Syria, home to the majority of Syria’s Alawite population and Assad’s former powerbase.

Makhlouf, a cousin of the Assads, once used his business empire to fund the ousted President during the civil war, only to run afoul of his more powerful relatives and wind up under years of house arrest. He now portrays himself in conversations and messages as a messianic figure who will return to power after ushering in an apocalyptic final battle.

Hassan and Makhlouf did not respond to requests for comment for this report. Bashar and Maher Assad couldn’t be reached. Reuters also sought comment from the Assad brothers through intermediaries, who didn’t reply.

From their exiles in Moscow, Hassan and Makhlouf envision a fractured Syria, and each wants control of the Alawite-majority areas.

Both have spent millions of dollars in competing efforts to build forces, Reuters found. Their deputies are located in several countries.

To counter the plotters, Syria’s new government is deploying another former Assad loyalist – a childhood friend of new President Ahmed al-Sharaa who became a paramilitary leader for Assad and then switched sides mid-war after the ousted President turned against him. The task of that man, Khaled al-Ahmad, is to persuade Alawite ex-soldiers and civilians that their future lies with the new Syria.

Details of the scheming are based on interviews with 48 people with direct knowledge of the competing plans. All spoke on condition of anonymity.

Reuters also reviewed financial records, operational documents, and exchanges of voice and text messages.

The governor of the coastal region of Tartous, Ahmed al-Shami, said Syrian authorities are aware of the outlines of the plans and ready to combat them. He confirmed the existence of the command-room network as well, but said it has been weakened.

“We are certain they cannot do anything effective, given their lack of strong tools on the ground and their weak capabilities,” al-Shami told Reuters in response to questions about the plotting.

The Lebanese Interior Ministry and the Russian Foreign Ministry did not respond to requests for comment. A UAE official said its government is committed to preventing the use of its territory for “all forms of illicit financial flows.”

For now, the prospects of a successful uprising seem low.

Chief plotters Hassan and Makhlouf are virulently at odds with one another.

Their hopes are fading to win backing from Russia, once Assad’s most powerful political and military supporter. Many Alawites in Syria, who also suffered under Assad, mistrust the pair. And the new government is working to stymie their plans.

In a brief statement in response to the Reuters findings, the government’s Alawite point man al-Ahmad said the “work of healing – of uprooting sectarian hatred and honoring the dead – remains the only path toward a Syria that can live with itself again.”

Hassan claims control of 12,000 fighters, while Makhlouf claims control of at least 54,000, according to their factions’ internal documents. Commanders on the ground said fighters are paid a pittance and taking money from both sides.

The exiles don't appear to have mobilized any forces yet. Reuters could not confirm the fighter figures or determine specific action plans. Tartous governor Al-Shami said potential fighters numbered in the tens of thousands.

In interviews, the people closest to the plotters said they’re aware that tens of thousands of Syrian Alawites could face violent retribution if they implement their plans against the new leadership.

In March, nearly 1,500 civilians were killed across the Mediterranean coast by government-affiliated forces after a failed uprising in an Alawite town.

Both Hassan and Makhlouf promise to protect Syria’s Alawites from the insecurity that has continued since March, including near-daily killings and kidnappings.

Neither Makhlouf nor Hassan were behind the protests, but rather a cleric who opposes both men and publicly called on people to demonstrate peacefully.

Makhlouf attacked the cleric the next day in a social media post, saying, “all these movements will only bring calamity, for the time is not yet right.”
One of Hassan’s top military coordinators told Reuters that fighting is the only way to restore Alawite dignity.

“We are lucky that only this number of our people have died so far,” said the coordinator, a former Assad-era military intelligence officer who is now in Lebanon. “Perhaps thousands more will die, but the sect must offer up sacrificial lambs” to defend the community.

According to January 2025 documents seen by Reuters, Assadist forces drew up initial plans to build a paramilitary force of 5,780 fighters and supply them from the subterranean command rooms. These are essentially large storerooms equipped with arms, solar power, internet, GPS units and walkie-talkies.

Nothing came of that early plan, and the command rooms – along a spine in coastal Syria about 180 kilometers from north to south – remain operational but essentially idle, according to two people with knowledge of them and photos seen by Reuters.

One photo showed a room with five stacked crates, three of which were open to reveal a collection of AK-47s, ammunition and hand grenades. The room also held three desktop computers, two tablets, a set of walkie-talkies, and a power bank. In the center was a wooden table topped with a large map.

For the plotters, “this network is Treasure Island, and they are all boats trying to reach it,” said one of the people, a commander who monitors the readiness of the rooms.

Al-Shami, the Tartous governor, said the network is real but poses little danger.

As senior military officials and ranking government figures escaped abroad in December 2024, many mid-level commanders remained in Syria. Most fled to the coastal regions dominated by Alawites, a Muslim minority that makes up a little over 10% of Syria’s population.

Those officers started recruiting fighters, according to a retired commander involved in the effort.

“The most fertile ground was the military,” the retired commander said. “Thousands of young men from the sect had been conscripted into the army, which was dissolved in December, and they suddenly found themselves exposed.”

Then came the failed uprising on March 6. An Alawite unit operating independently ambushed security forces from the new Syrian government in rural Latakia, killing 12 men and capturing more than 150, according to a brigadier general who was involved with the ambush and has since left for Lebanon.

The new Syrian government says hundreds of its security forces died in the fighting that followed – a claim largely echoed by the pro-Assad fighters.

The brigadier general said 128 pro-Assad forces died in the uprising, which was quelled by the new government. The insurgency sparked reprisals that killed nearly 1,500 Alawites.

The Assadist exiles neither started nor commanded the uprising, according to the officers who were there, but those days marked a turning point. They began to organize.

An Assad Family Feud
It was on March 9 that Makhlouf started calling himself “The Coast Boy,” declaring in a statement that he had been entrusted with a divine mission to help Alawites. “I’m back, and blessed be the return,” the statement read. It did not mention that he was in Moscow.

Makhlouf dominated Syria’s economy for more than two decades, with holdings estimated by the British government at well over a billion dollars in industries as varied as telecoms, construction and tourism. He used his money to fund Syrian army units and allied militias during the civil war, which broke out in 2011.

When Assad’s victory seemed assured in 2019, Makhlouf publicly claimed credit. Soon after, Assad seized Makhlouf’s businesses, ostensibly because they were indebted to the state, and put him under years of house arrest.

Makhlouf escaped to Lebanon in an ambulance the night of December 8, 2024, as Damascus fell to Sharaa’s rebels.

Makhlouf’s brother Ehab also tried to flee that night in his Maserati, but was shot to death near the border and robbed of millions of dollars he was carrying in cash, according to four close associates of the family and a customs officer with direct knowledge of the events. Reuters could not independently verify the events of that night.

Makhlouf now lives on a private floor in a luxurious Radisson hotel in Moscow under tight security, according to nine aides and relatives.

The Radisson in Moscow and group headquarters in Brussels did not respond to a request for comment.

According to Makhlouf’s Facebook posts and WhatsApp messages to associates, he believes God gave him money and influence so he can play a messianic role in a prophecy involving the battle of Armageddon in Damascus.
In his interpretation, the apocalypse will arrive after the end of US President Donald Trump’s term.

Using trusted business administrators three countries, Makhlouf is transferring money to Alawite officers for salaries and equipment, according to a financial manager and receipts and payroll tables seen by Reuters.

The documents show the money is funneled through two prominent Syrian officers who reunited with Makhlouf in Moscow: Suhail Hassan and Qahtan Khalil, who both held the rank of major general. Hassan and Khalil claimed to have created a force for Makhlouf totaling what they said were 54,053 willing fighters, including 18,000 officers, organized into 80 battalions and groups in and around the cities of Homs, Hama, Tartous and Latakia.

Many rank-and-file soldiers conscripted under Assad, however, gave up fighting when his government fell.

Hassan and Khalil didn’t reply to requests for comment about their role in transferring money.

An UAE official said the government maintains strict oversight over its economic sectors and fully “supports Syria’s efforts to safeguard its security, stability, and sovereignty over all territories.’

One of his financial managers told Reuters that Makhlouf has spent at least $6 million on salaries. Payroll tables and salary receipts created by financial aides to Makhlouf in Lebanon claimed he spent $976,705 in May, and that one group of 5,000 fighters received $150,000 in August.

The total force numbers are real, according to five leaders of military groups in Syria who are on Makhlouf’s payroll and lead about a fifth of his following. But Makhlouf’s funding falls short of their needs, amounting to just $20 to $30 a month per fighter.

In addition, Makhlouf’s staff has sought to provide weapons. They have mapped the possible location of dozens of caches hidden during the Assad era totaling a few thousand firearms, according to schematics Reuters viewed.

These stockpiles are separate from the hidden command rooms.

They have also been in discussions with smugglers in Syria for new weapons.

People familiar with the discussions said they didn’t know if new weapons were actually purchased or delivered.

Altogether, the five local military leaders said they command about 12,000 men in various stages of readiness. One of them told Reuters the time wasn’t yet right for action.

Another of the five commanders derided Makhlouf as trying to buy loyalty with “crumbs of money.”

All five said they had accepted money from both Makhlouf and Hassan, the spy chief. They saw no issue with overlapping paymasters.

Mass Grave and Hiding Atrocities
Hassan ran the Assad dictatorship’s military detention system, which was notorious for extorting money at scale from prisoners’ families, according to a 2024 United Nations report about the system.

A Reuters investigation this year found it was Hassan who proposed moving a mass grave containing thousands of bodies in 2018 to the Dhumair desert outside Damascus to hide the scope of the Assad government atrocities.

With Assad’s fall, Hassan took refuge in the Russian embassy in December 2024 for nearly two weeks.

He was infuriated at what he perceived as ill-treatment by his hosts, who provided a single room with just one hard chair to sit on, according to two people close to him.

“Kamal Hassan is not one to sit on a wooden chair for days!” he said in one WhatsApp voice message to his inner circle from this spring, reviewed by Reuters.

Hassan ultimately took up residence in a three-story villa in suburban Moscow, according to an officer who met him over the summer.

Since then, he has seen Maher al-Assad once and maintains close ties with Bashar’s Russian protectors, according to the two people aware of Hassan’s movements.

According to Hassan’s operations coordinator in Lebanon, Hassan has spent $1.5 million since March on 12,000 fighters in Syria and Lebanon.

“Be patient, my people, and don’t surrender your arms. I am the one who will restore your dignity,” he said in another WhatsApp voice message from April that appeared aimed at commanders. Two recipients confirmed the message was from him.

In mid-year, a charity called the “Development of Western Syria” announced its creation and said it was funded by “the Syrian citizen Maj. Gen. Kamal Hassan,” according to one of its initial Facebook posts.

Three officers linked to Hassan and a manager in the organization described it as a humanitarian cover so Hassan could build influence among Alawites.

In August, the charity paid $80,000 to shelter 40 Syrian Alawite families, according to an announcement of its first action. That same month, Hassan sent $200,000 in cash to 80 officers in Lebanon, according to a payroll document seen by Reuters.



From Black Death to Covid, Ships Have Long Hosted Outbreaks

Passengers stand aboard the Bahamas-registered cruise ship Ambition after they were confined following the outbreak of a gastrointestinal illness onboard, at the Bordeaux port in Bordeaux, southwestern France on May 13, 2026. (AFP)
Passengers stand aboard the Bahamas-registered cruise ship Ambition after they were confined following the outbreak of a gastrointestinal illness onboard, at the Bordeaux port in Bordeaux, southwestern France on May 13, 2026. (AFP)
TT

From Black Death to Covid, Ships Have Long Hosted Outbreaks

Passengers stand aboard the Bahamas-registered cruise ship Ambition after they were confined following the outbreak of a gastrointestinal illness onboard, at the Bordeaux port in Bordeaux, southwestern France on May 13, 2026. (AFP)
Passengers stand aboard the Bahamas-registered cruise ship Ambition after they were confined following the outbreak of a gastrointestinal illness onboard, at the Bordeaux port in Bordeaux, southwestern France on May 13, 2026. (AFP)

A deadly outbreak on a cruise liner is just the latest in a long history of infectious diseases spreading rapidly in the cramped confines of ships, from the Black Death to Covid.

People around the world remain in quarantine or self-isolation after a rare outbreak of hantavirus on a cruise ship left three dead and infected at least seven more.

Another scare came on Wednesday, when more than 1,700 passengers were confined to a cruise ship docked in the French city of Bordeaux after an elderly passenger man died of a heart attack.

Dozens of passengers showed symptoms of a stomach bug, however initial tests ruled out norovirus -- a common infection on cruises -- and officials said there was no connection to hantavirus.

The latest incidents shone a light on how ships -- whether they are cruise liners, aircraft carriers or old wooden boats -- can be the ideal environment for viruses to spread.

"The worst place to have an epidemic, like a fire, is in close quarters far from help, such as a ship on the high seas," US historian Alfred Crosby once wrote about the Spanish influenza pandemic of 1918.

Jean-Pierre Auffray, the honorary president of the French Society of Maritime Medicine, told AFP that "the risk is twofold".

There is the danger that passengers and crew transmit the disease to each other on the ship -- and then the risk they transport their illness across the land, he explained.

"Ships remain enclosed environments where there is prolonged, repeated and close contact, which facilitates the spread of some outbreaks," he said.

This is particularly the case for viruses "transmitted through the air, such as influenza and Covid-19, and those transmitted through contact or food, such as norovirus," added Auffray, whose book about seafaring infections will be published next month.

The Andes strain of hantavirus, which spread onboard the MV Hondius cruise ship, can be spread via aerosols, research has suggested.

The World Health Organization has warned that more hantavirus cases could yet emerge, but also stressed there "is no sign that we are seeing the start of a larger outbreak".

- Sailors or retirees? -

At the height of the pandemic in 2020, Covid tore through many vessels.

The luxury cruise ship Zaandam and its many sick passengers were turned away by numerous Latin American countries before finally docking in the US state of Florida.

Hundreds of sailors onboard the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle also contracted Covid.

While sailors on military ships are often young and fit, cruise ship passengers tend to be more elderly and vulnerable.

However the viruses spread in the same way: in close quarters where people regularly share equipment.

"We learned from the Covid pandemic, and there have been improvements on cruise ships," Auffray said.

"We've improved the ventilation systems, which allow us to better combat aerosol transmission."

"There is better training for the ship's doctors," Auffray added.

- 'Woe to us' -

The other threat comes when infected passengers disembark.

Before the MV Hondius docked in the Canary Islands on the weekend, the local government had initially opposed taking it in.

In previous centuries, quarantined ships were kept away from ports, sometimes forced to dock at tiny islands called lazarettos.

"The ethics were not the same. Quarantine meant: 'You'll die on your ship -- don't come and infect us'," Auffray said.

Now, the passengers of outbreak ships like the MV Hondius can be tracked, to ensure they do not spread disease to their home countries.

People who merely came in contact with passengers are currently being isolated and checked for hantavirus in several countries.

While diseases can now hop continents on airplanes, for most of human history they crossed seas on boats.

This was how the Black Death -- the most devastating pandemic in human history -- arrived on Europe's shores back in the 1340s.

Sailors from Genoa were laying siege to the ancient Crimean trading hub of Caffa when they became infected by plague-ridden corpses catapulted over the walls by the Mongol Golden Horde.

When the sailors journeyed back across the Mediterranean, they brought with them a plague that wiped out up to 60 percent of the population in parts of Europe.

"Woe to us for we cast at them the darts of death!" Italian notary Gabriel de Mussis wrote at the time.

"Whilst we spoke to them, whilst they embraced us and kissed us, we scattered the poison from our lips."


Grief Silenced, Suppressed as South Lebanon, Beirut Suburbs Are ‘Barred’ from Mourning War Dead

Women mourn during the funeral procession for three Lebanese Civil Defense members killed in an Israeli airstrike on the village of Majdal Zoun in southern Lebanon. (dpa)
Women mourn during the funeral procession for three Lebanese Civil Defense members killed in an Israeli airstrike on the village of Majdal Zoun in southern Lebanon. (dpa)
TT

Grief Silenced, Suppressed as South Lebanon, Beirut Suburbs Are ‘Barred’ from Mourning War Dead

Women mourn during the funeral procession for three Lebanese Civil Defense members killed in an Israeli airstrike on the village of Majdal Zoun in southern Lebanon. (dpa)
Women mourn during the funeral procession for three Lebanese Civil Defense members killed in an Israeli airstrike on the village of Majdal Zoun in southern Lebanon. (dpa)

Residents of South Lebanon and Beirut’s southern suburbs are caught between grief and resilience, a feeling unlike any other, and one that is suffocating most families.

Some have the courage to raise their voices and express the pain, grief, and regret they feel over their losses. Others feel ashamed to speak out because of social constraints imposed on them, which make their grief seem disgraceful or forbidden.

Comparisons over loss are always present, and the main justification remains that what people lose is nothing compared with the blood of those who fall defending their land.

In the largely devastated South today, grief is not allowed to take its natural space. A mother who loses her son or husband, a woman who loses her home, a father who loses his source of income, and others all find themselves facing a social system that forces them to suppress their emotions.

This suppression, in turn, becomes a form of self-censorship that prevents any citizen from grieving or crying. Silence becomes the only option, because expressing pain may be interpreted as weakness, lack of patience, or even a moral failing toward the “larger cause” championed by Hezbollah.

This is the reality now lived by almost every family that has lost, or continues to lose, homes and loved ones in Beirut’s southern suburbs, the Bekaa, and the South. Towns are being destroyed, memories are being erased, and any hope of return is fading.

Meanwhile, expressing pain has become an act of betrayal on social media, where it has become a social court that judges people’s feelings and emotions.

This is what happened to many people who dared to raise their voices in grief and blame those who made the decision to go to war, namely, Hezbollah.

A women grieves as she rests her head on one of nine people killed the day before in an Israeli airstrike on the southern Lebanese village of Jibchit, during their funeral in the city of Sidon on May 10, 2026. (AFP)

Accusations of treason

Nour, who remains displaced with her family in a school and lives each day hoping she will not receive news that her home in the South has been destroyed, said: “We are all doing our best to endure, but some people cannot bear more than they can handle.”

She said that expressing what a citizen from the South feels is now met with ready-made accusations. “He is considered against the resistance [Hezbollah], an agent and a traitor,” she revealed, adding: “People have started setting the standards and deciding what is right and what is wrong.”

“We have become a people left to our fate, and no one asks about us,” she lamented. “Those who criticize us for expressing our pain are the ones living comfortable lives and passing judgment from afar.”

“Those who see expressing our pain as a crime should live one day like the days we are living, and then talk about dignity and patriotism,” she added.

‘Forbidden from expressing our pain’

Zeinab also spoke of the pressure faced by those who express their pain.

“It is as if families who lose their livelihoods, their children, their homes and the work of years are expected to show patience and the morals of Ahl al-Bayt, morals that those accusing others of betrayal do not possess as they throw around charges of treason at random,” she said.

“I am a daughter of this environment, and I know very well what people say when they speak about their pain,” she declared. “But we are not allowed to express this pain out loud, or we are deemed traitors.”

“My house, which my husband and I built over 10 years in the South, was destroyed. My husband lost his shop, and today I look at my children and do not know where to take them, what their future will be, or who will compensate us for our losses.”

Organized suppression

Against this backdrop, sociologist Mona Fayyad told Asharq Al-Awsat: “What is happening today in the environment controlled by Hezbollah is a policy of silencing people, within a narrative that is being imposed by force.”

She said that in the past, Hezbollah had achieved a measure of success that covered up losses. The party also had organized bodies capable of providing psychological and financial support to families, helping contain losses and giving them meaning through slogans, such as the “liberation of Jerusalem” and others.

That, she said, pushed people to suppress their pain and express it only within that framework.

“Today, however, the situation has started to change little by little, and people have begun daring to raise their voices, which is why campaigns accusing them of betrayal are increasing,” Fayyad explained.

A man watches as rescuers work at the site of an Israeli strike that took place on May 6, in the southern suburbs of Beirut, Lebanon, May 7, 2026. (Reuters)

Pent-up feelings

Fayyad spoke of the suffering of Lebanese people in general, and residents of the South, Beirut’s southern suburbs, and areas under Israeli bombardment in particular.

“People are hurting on several levels, and all Lebanese are living in a difficult state of waiting, unable to plan for the future, which is one of the hardest things a person can experience,” she said.

“We are now in the unknown, and we are threatened in terms of security and the economy.”

She said residents of the South and Beirut's southern suburbs who lost their homes face double suffering, amid insecurity, displacement and tens of thousands of destroyed homes that leave them unable to know their fate.

“These people are carrying a heavy burden, and they are forbidden from expressing it, but the pressure will inevitably explode somewhere,” Fayyad remarked.

“The problem is that they have no horizon ahead of them, amid declining support, losses turning into numbers with no value, and a refusal to acknowledge defeat.”

“And yet, voices have begun to emerge. But shock is still dominant, and people have not yet absorbed what happened,” Fayyad went on to say.

“With time, and as the picture becomes clearer, this pain will unfortunately come out into the open in different forms, from psychological and physical illnesses to nervous breakdowns.”


Arafat and Tehran: From Revolutionary Embrace to Open Hostility

Yasser Arafat during a visit to Tehran on February 17, 1979. He was the first official figure to visit Iran after the "Islamic Revolution" (Getty).
Yasser Arafat during a visit to Tehran on February 17, 1979. He was the first official figure to visit Iran after the "Islamic Revolution" (Getty).
TT

Arafat and Tehran: From Revolutionary Embrace to Open Hostility

Yasser Arafat during a visit to Tehran on February 17, 1979. He was the first official figure to visit Iran after the "Islamic Revolution" (Getty).
Yasser Arafat during a visit to Tehran on February 17, 1979. He was the first official figure to visit Iran after the "Islamic Revolution" (Getty).

Yasser Arafat was the first foreign leader to visit Iran after Khomeini’s 1979 Iranian Revolution. At the time, he believed the Palestinian cause was gaining a powerful new ally in revolutionary Iran, which immediately closed the Israeli embassy and handed it over to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). But Arafat soon discovered that Tehran’s public support for Palestine was neither unconditional nor straightforward. What began as a honeymoon quickly unraveled into a lasting rupture.88888

Associates of Arafat, who was known for his wit and political sharpness, recalled his surprise when Khomeini insisted on using a Persian translator during their meeting despite speaking fluent Arabic. Arafat was even more unsettled when Khomeini urged him to declare the Palestinian revolution an Islamic one. Those moments deepened Arafat’s suspicions that Iran’s support came with ideological and political conditions attached.

Arafat’s ties with Iranian revolutionaries had predated the revolution, and he responded cautiously. He told Khomeini that the Palestinian struggle was not an Islamic revolution but a national movement representing all Palestinians, Muslims and Christians alike. Later, he would joke about the irony of the leader of the Islamic Revolution pretending not to speak Arabic—the language of the Quran—even though the two men had previously spoken in Arabic before the revolution succeeded.

Arafat–Tehran: Open Hostility

Despite his reservations, Arafat initially maintained cordial relations with Tehran. But the relationship collapsed after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980. Iranian leaders demanded that Arafat publicly support them against Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Instead, Arafat leaned toward Iraq. From that point on, relations spiraled into open confrontation.

 

Iran increasingly sought to weaken Arafat and the PLO by cultivating rival Palestinian factions. Palestinians still remember that Tehran did little to help Arafat during Israel’s siege of Beirut in 1982, while he was simultaneously confronting Syria, then one of Iran’s closest regional allies. Damascus supported and financed a major split within Fatah led by Said Moussa Muragha, better known as Abu Musa, who later founded the breakaway movement Fatah al-Intifada and settled in Syria. Tehran also encouraged divisions within other factions operating under the PLO umbrella.

Palestinians also remember the role played by Lebanese Shiite militias affiliated with the Amal Movement, which had pledged allegiance to Khomeini and later participated in massacres inside Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon.

From that point onward, relations between Iran and the PLO, and later the Palestinian Authority, remained deeply strained. Mutual accusations continued even after Arafat’s death, eventually evolving into something close to declared hostility.

Between periods of tension and cautious rapprochement, Iran eventually found an opening with the establishment of the Palestinian Authority through its growing ties with Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Tehran initially offered the two groups public political support, then financial and military backing, eventually integrating them into a broader regional axis. That axis remained intact until the Hamas-led October 2023 attack on Israel, which triggered devastating consequences not only for Hamas but for Iran’s entire regional network, ultimately reverberating back to Tehran itself.

Supporting Rival Factions to Undermine Fatah

Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad established relations with Iran in the late 1980s, shortly after both movements were founded. Those ties deepened throughout the 1990s and intensified during the Second Intifada, which erupted in late 2000. Iranian support expanded further after Hamas seized control of Gaza in 2007.

That takeover gave Iran unprecedented influence inside the Palestinian territories. Tehran intensified military cooperation with Hamas and Islamic Jihad through joint meetings, strategic coordination, and training programs. Fighters from Gaza were sent to Iran and to Hezbollah camps in Lebanon for military training under the supervision of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Iran poured money into both groups and trained their operatives to manufacture and launch rockets and other weapons, significantly strengthening their military capabilities. At the same time, the Palestinian Authority and Fatah accused Tehran of fueling Palestinian division through its limitless support for Islamist factions.

Two Hamas sources, one inside Gaza and one abroad, told Asharq Al-Awsat that Hamas’ takeover of Gaza opened the door to an entirely new relationship with Tehran. According to the source outside Gaza, Iran provided extensive financial and military support while helping improve the movement’s combat expertise.

A source inside Gaza said Iran proposed establishing training facilities inside the enclave, but Hamas rejected the idea and instead limited cooperation to sending selected operatives abroad for training. Even so, the relationship substantially enhanced Hamas’ military capabilities.

Islamic Jihad’s relationship with Tehran was even older and stronger. A source from the movement said Iran played a decisive role in arming Palestinian factions during that period, supplying ready-made Grad rockets and Iranian-made Fajr missiles before local production capabilities were later developed using Iranian technical expertise.

Iran’s influence became so visible in Gaza that smaller armed groups also received funding, while some organizations openly embraced Shiite ideology or even called themselves “Palestinian Hezbollah.”

Although Hamas and Islamic Jihad insisted that their political decisions remained independent, Iranian influence became impossible to conceal. Neither movement directly answered questions about whether Tehran had deliberately encouraged Palestinian fragmentation. Instead, sources maintained that Iran’s primary objective was to strengthen the “resistance” against Israel and reinforce Gaza’s front line.

The Turning Point of the Syrian Revolution

The Syrian uprising against President Bashar al-Assad in 2011 exposed the fragility of the Hamas-Iran alliance. Hamas sided against Assad and left Damascus in 2012, enraging Tehran. Iran sharply reduced its financial support to the movement, a fact later acknowledged publicly by Hamas political leader Khaled Meshaal.

Meshaal admitted that Hamas’ dispute with Assad severely damaged ties with Iran and that Tehran was no longer the movement’s primary financial backer. Iran had expected Hamas to support Assad during the uprising, and Hamas’s refusal cost the group both its Syrian base and substantial Iranian funding.

Still, Tehran did not abandon its efforts. Instead, it tried to cultivate influence within Hamas itself. Sources said Iran shifted toward providing limited support directly to Hamas’ armed wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, in an apparent attempt to create tension with the movement’s political leadership.

At minimum, Iran succeeded in deepening internal debates within Hamas over regional alliances and political loyalties. The period proved difficult for both sides, and repeated attempts at reconciliation angered Hamas’s Sunni support base because of Iran’s growing regional role.

Abu Marzouk Debunks Iran’s Claims

As Hezbollah worked behind the scenes to repair relations, a leaked phone call revealed unprecedented criticism from within Hamas itself. In January 2012, Asharq Al-Awsat obtained and published a recording of Mousa Abu Marzouk, then deputy head of Hamas’s political bureau, sharply attacking Iran and denying Iranian claims that it had significantly supported Palestinian resistance since 2009.

In the recording, Abu Marzouk criticized Tehran’s regional policies, including its role in Yemen, and described Iranian diplomacy as manipulative. He also claimed Iran conditioned its support on Hamas helping improve Tehran’s relations with countries such as Sudan, describing that as part of Iran’s pressure tactics. He accused Iranian officials of exaggerating their support, saying: “Every ship they lose, they claim was heading to Gaza. A ship was seized in Nigeria and they said it was for us. I told them: apparently every intercepted ship in the world belongs to us.”

A Hamas source abroad told Asharq Al-Awsat that the leaked recording infuriated Iran and forced Hamas leaders to provide explanations to Tehran during an already dangerous turning point in the relationship. The crisis was eventually contained, but it exposed the deep mistrust underlying the alliance.

Building the Axis and the “Unity of Fronts”

Within months of that incident, efforts to restore ties resumed. Relations steadily improved as Hamas’ Gaza leadership tightened its grip over the movement’s political bureau elected in 2017, headed by Ismail Haniyeh, with Yahya Sinwar leading in Gaza and the military wing gaining unprecedented influence.

A source said Iran had strong incentives to preserve the relationship with Hamas because it remained “the largest Sunni Islamist movement in Palestine, with broader reach and capabilities than any other faction.” The relationship, he noted, never completely broke down, and once Hamas’s military leadership gained prominence, ties deepened further in ways that served both sides’ interests.

Relations continued to improve as Hezbollah and Iranian officials worked to restore Hamas’ ties even with the Syrian regime, though reconciliation was never fully completed before Bashar al-Assad’s government collapsed.

Hamas regained Iranian backing, and Tehran consolidated a regional axis in which the movement became a central pillar. Iran also promoted the idea of the “unity of fronts,” convincing its allies that all arenas confronting Israel were interconnected. That appears to have helped persuade Sinwar that Tehran would stand firmly behind Hamas after the October 7 attack, something that did not happen.

Iran, which denied prior knowledge of the attack, chose not to intervene directly, raising serious doubts about the cohesion of the so-called “axis,” the credibility of the “unity of fronts,” and the true extent of coordination among its members.

Even Palestinian Islamic Jihad, despite receiving substantial Iranian support alongside Hamas, reportedly had no prior knowledge of the attack. The movement was generally viewed as more closely aligned with Tehran, or at least more willing to accommodate Iranian political priorities.

The October 7 Turning Point

Islamic Jihad was not immune to Iranian demands that went beyond support for “the resistance.” In 2015, the two sides entered a serious but short-lived crisis over Yemen after the Palestinian movement refused to issue a statement backing the Houthis and their seizure of large parts of the country, including the capital, Sanaa.

Iran responded by cutting support to Islamic Jihad, much as it had previously done with Hamas, and redirected funding to the Sabireen Movement, a splinter faction formed by former Islamic Jihad figures with Iranian backing.

A source from Islamic Jihad told Asharq Al-Awsat that the sharp decline in Iranian support marked one of the most difficult periods the movement had ever faced.

Ultimately, Iran could not escape paying a price itself. It found itself pulled into confrontation with the United States and Israel after wars had already engulfed Hamas and Hezbollah. Those cascading conflicts were set in motion by the October 7 attack, which reshaped not only Iran’s regional axis but the broader Middle East.

The War’s Endgame

The war is still ongoing, and it remains unclear whether Iran will eventually abandon Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, and the Houthis to protect itself. Tehran continues to assure the Palestinian factions that support will continue, although that support has slowed in recent months because of the war, regional instability, and intensified Israeli and American efforts targeting Iranian financial and logistical networks.

Israel has assassinated several Iranian officials responsible for managing ties with Palestinian factions, while Washington has increasingly demanded that Tehran halt support for its regional proxies.

The Palestinian Authority Cuts the Final Thread

Throughout the war, Hamas and Islamic Jihad publicly sided with Iran, signaling their desire to preserve the relationship, though it remained unclear how much control they truly had over that decision, or what the alliance’s future might look like.

The Palestinian Authority, however, appears to have decisively severed what Arabs often call the “Muawiya thread,” the final strand holding a relationship together.

During the Gaza war, the Authority not only attacked Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, for praising Hamas’s October 7 operation — accusing him of sacrificing Palestinian lives and land to serve Iran’s agenda — but also said Hamas was serving Iranian interests rather than Palestinian national ones.

At the same time, the Palestinian Authority refrained from condemning the joint American-Israeli strikes on Iran while later condemning Iranian attacks on Arab countries.

The war pushed the Authority more firmly into alignment with the so-called “moderate Arab axis” in opposition to the Iranian-led camp, abandoning much of the ambiguity that had long characterized its political posture.

A well-informed source told Asharq Al-Awsat that the Palestinian Authority had not changed its position so much as clarified it. “Its stance is not new,” the source said, “but it is now more explicit. The Authority is strengthening its place within the moderate camp against the Iranian axis.”

The Palestinian Authority believes everything changed after October 7. But it also believes the wars unleashed by the attack will ultimately vindicate its own political strategy while weakening Iran and its regional allies.