Former Spy Chief and Assad’s Cousin Plot Syrian Uprisings from Russia

A member of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham stands guard near an image of Syria's Bashar al-Assad at the fourth division headquarters in Damascus, Syria, January 23, 2025 (Reuters)
A member of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham stands guard near an image of Syria's Bashar al-Assad at the fourth division headquarters in Damascus, Syria, January 23, 2025 (Reuters)
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Former Spy Chief and Assad’s Cousin Plot Syrian Uprisings from Russia

A member of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham stands guard near an image of Syria's Bashar al-Assad at the fourth division headquarters in Damascus, Syria, January 23, 2025 (Reuters)
A member of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham stands guard near an image of Syria's Bashar al-Assad at the fourth division headquarters in Damascus, Syria, January 23, 2025 (Reuters)

Two former loyalists to Bashar al-Assad who fled Syria after his fall are funneling millions of dollars to tens of thousands of potential fighters, hoping to stir uprisings against the new government and reclaim some of their lost influence, a Reuters investigation has found.

Assad, who escaped to Russia last December, is largely resigned to exile in Moscow, say four people close to the family. But other senior figures from his inner circle, including his brother, have not come to terms with losing power.

Reuters found that two of the men once closest to Assad, Maj. Gen. Kamal Hassan and billionaire Rami Makhlouf, are competing to form militias in coastal Syria and Lebanon made up of members of their minority Alawite sect, long associated with the Assad family.

All told, the two men and other factions jostling for power are financing more than 50,000 fighters in hope of winning their loyalty.

Assad’s brother, Maher, who is also in Moscow and still controls thousands of former soldiers, has yet to give money or orders, said the four people close to the Assads.

One prize for Hassan and Makhlouf is control of a network of 14 underground command rooms built around coastal Syria toward the end of Assad’s rule, as well as weapons caches.

Two officers and a Syrian regional governor confirmed the existence of these concealed rooms, details of which appear in photos seen by Reuters.

Hassan, who was Bashar’s military intelligence chief, has been tirelessly making calls and sending voice messages to commanders and advisors. In them, he seethes about his lost influence and outlines grandiose visions of how he would rule coastal Syria, home to the majority of Syria’s Alawite population and Assad’s former powerbase.

Makhlouf, a cousin of the Assads, once used his business empire to fund the ousted President during the civil war, only to run afoul of his more powerful relatives and wind up under years of house arrest. He now portrays himself in conversations and messages as a messianic figure who will return to power after ushering in an apocalyptic final battle.

Hassan and Makhlouf did not respond to requests for comment for this report. Bashar and Maher Assad couldn’t be reached. Reuters also sought comment from the Assad brothers through intermediaries, who didn’t reply.

From their exiles in Moscow, Hassan and Makhlouf envision a fractured Syria, and each wants control of the Alawite-majority areas.

Both have spent millions of dollars in competing efforts to build forces, Reuters found. Their deputies are located in several countries.

To counter the plotters, Syria’s new government is deploying another former Assad loyalist – a childhood friend of new President Ahmed al-Sharaa who became a paramilitary leader for Assad and then switched sides mid-war after the ousted President turned against him. The task of that man, Khaled al-Ahmad, is to persuade Alawite ex-soldiers and civilians that their future lies with the new Syria.

Details of the scheming are based on interviews with 48 people with direct knowledge of the competing plans. All spoke on condition of anonymity.

Reuters also reviewed financial records, operational documents, and exchanges of voice and text messages.

The governor of the coastal region of Tartous, Ahmed al-Shami, said Syrian authorities are aware of the outlines of the plans and ready to combat them. He confirmed the existence of the command-room network as well, but said it has been weakened.

“We are certain they cannot do anything effective, given their lack of strong tools on the ground and their weak capabilities,” al-Shami told Reuters in response to questions about the plotting.

The Lebanese Interior Ministry and the Russian Foreign Ministry did not respond to requests for comment. A UAE official said its government is committed to preventing the use of its territory for “all forms of illicit financial flows.”

For now, the prospects of a successful uprising seem low.

Chief plotters Hassan and Makhlouf are virulently at odds with one another.

Their hopes are fading to win backing from Russia, once Assad’s most powerful political and military supporter. Many Alawites in Syria, who also suffered under Assad, mistrust the pair. And the new government is working to stymie their plans.

In a brief statement in response to the Reuters findings, the government’s Alawite point man al-Ahmad said the “work of healing – of uprooting sectarian hatred and honoring the dead – remains the only path toward a Syria that can live with itself again.”

Hassan claims control of 12,000 fighters, while Makhlouf claims control of at least 54,000, according to their factions’ internal documents. Commanders on the ground said fighters are paid a pittance and taking money from both sides.

The exiles don't appear to have mobilized any forces yet. Reuters could not confirm the fighter figures or determine specific action plans. Tartous governor Al-Shami said potential fighters numbered in the tens of thousands.

In interviews, the people closest to the plotters said they’re aware that tens of thousands of Syrian Alawites could face violent retribution if they implement their plans against the new leadership.

In March, nearly 1,500 civilians were killed across the Mediterranean coast by government-affiliated forces after a failed uprising in an Alawite town.

Both Hassan and Makhlouf promise to protect Syria’s Alawites from the insecurity that has continued since March, including near-daily killings and kidnappings.

Neither Makhlouf nor Hassan were behind the protests, but rather a cleric who opposes both men and publicly called on people to demonstrate peacefully.

Makhlouf attacked the cleric the next day in a social media post, saying, “all these movements will only bring calamity, for the time is not yet right.”
One of Hassan’s top military coordinators told Reuters that fighting is the only way to restore Alawite dignity.

“We are lucky that only this number of our people have died so far,” said the coordinator, a former Assad-era military intelligence officer who is now in Lebanon. “Perhaps thousands more will die, but the sect must offer up sacrificial lambs” to defend the community.

According to January 2025 documents seen by Reuters, Assadist forces drew up initial plans to build a paramilitary force of 5,780 fighters and supply them from the subterranean command rooms. These are essentially large storerooms equipped with arms, solar power, internet, GPS units and walkie-talkies.

Nothing came of that early plan, and the command rooms – along a spine in coastal Syria about 180 kilometers from north to south – remain operational but essentially idle, according to two people with knowledge of them and photos seen by Reuters.

One photo showed a room with five stacked crates, three of which were open to reveal a collection of AK-47s, ammunition and hand grenades. The room also held three desktop computers, two tablets, a set of walkie-talkies, and a power bank. In the center was a wooden table topped with a large map.

For the plotters, “this network is Treasure Island, and they are all boats trying to reach it,” said one of the people, a commander who monitors the readiness of the rooms.

Al-Shami, the Tartous governor, said the network is real but poses little danger.

As senior military officials and ranking government figures escaped abroad in December 2024, many mid-level commanders remained in Syria. Most fled to the coastal regions dominated by Alawites, a Muslim minority that makes up a little over 10% of Syria’s population.

Those officers started recruiting fighters, according to a retired commander involved in the effort.

“The most fertile ground was the military,” the retired commander said. “Thousands of young men from the sect had been conscripted into the army, which was dissolved in December, and they suddenly found themselves exposed.”

Then came the failed uprising on March 6. An Alawite unit operating independently ambushed security forces from the new Syrian government in rural Latakia, killing 12 men and capturing more than 150, according to a brigadier general who was involved with the ambush and has since left for Lebanon.

The new Syrian government says hundreds of its security forces died in the fighting that followed – a claim largely echoed by the pro-Assad fighters.

The brigadier general said 128 pro-Assad forces died in the uprising, which was quelled by the new government. The insurgency sparked reprisals that killed nearly 1,500 Alawites.

The Assadist exiles neither started nor commanded the uprising, according to the officers who were there, but those days marked a turning point. They began to organize.

An Assad Family Feud
It was on March 9 that Makhlouf started calling himself “The Coast Boy,” declaring in a statement that he had been entrusted with a divine mission to help Alawites. “I’m back, and blessed be the return,” the statement read. It did not mention that he was in Moscow.

Makhlouf dominated Syria’s economy for more than two decades, with holdings estimated by the British government at well over a billion dollars in industries as varied as telecoms, construction and tourism. He used his money to fund Syrian army units and allied militias during the civil war, which broke out in 2011.

When Assad’s victory seemed assured in 2019, Makhlouf publicly claimed credit. Soon after, Assad seized Makhlouf’s businesses, ostensibly because they were indebted to the state, and put him under years of house arrest.

Makhlouf escaped to Lebanon in an ambulance the night of December 8, 2024, as Damascus fell to Sharaa’s rebels.

Makhlouf’s brother Ehab also tried to flee that night in his Maserati, but was shot to death near the border and robbed of millions of dollars he was carrying in cash, according to four close associates of the family and a customs officer with direct knowledge of the events. Reuters could not independently verify the events of that night.

Makhlouf now lives on a private floor in a luxurious Radisson hotel in Moscow under tight security, according to nine aides and relatives.

The Radisson in Moscow and group headquarters in Brussels did not respond to a request for comment.

According to Makhlouf’s Facebook posts and WhatsApp messages to associates, he believes God gave him money and influence so he can play a messianic role in a prophecy involving the battle of Armageddon in Damascus.
In his interpretation, the apocalypse will arrive after the end of US President Donald Trump’s term.

Using trusted business administrators three countries, Makhlouf is transferring money to Alawite officers for salaries and equipment, according to a financial manager and receipts and payroll tables seen by Reuters.

The documents show the money is funneled through two prominent Syrian officers who reunited with Makhlouf in Moscow: Suhail Hassan and Qahtan Khalil, who both held the rank of major general. Hassan and Khalil claimed to have created a force for Makhlouf totaling what they said were 54,053 willing fighters, including 18,000 officers, organized into 80 battalions and groups in and around the cities of Homs, Hama, Tartous and Latakia.

Many rank-and-file soldiers conscripted under Assad, however, gave up fighting when his government fell.

Hassan and Khalil didn’t reply to requests for comment about their role in transferring money.

An UAE official said the government maintains strict oversight over its economic sectors and fully “supports Syria’s efforts to safeguard its security, stability, and sovereignty over all territories.’

One of his financial managers told Reuters that Makhlouf has spent at least $6 million on salaries. Payroll tables and salary receipts created by financial aides to Makhlouf in Lebanon claimed he spent $976,705 in May, and that one group of 5,000 fighters received $150,000 in August.

The total force numbers are real, according to five leaders of military groups in Syria who are on Makhlouf’s payroll and lead about a fifth of his following. But Makhlouf’s funding falls short of their needs, amounting to just $20 to $30 a month per fighter.

In addition, Makhlouf’s staff has sought to provide weapons. They have mapped the possible location of dozens of caches hidden during the Assad era totaling a few thousand firearms, according to schematics Reuters viewed.

These stockpiles are separate from the hidden command rooms.

They have also been in discussions with smugglers in Syria for new weapons.

People familiar with the discussions said they didn’t know if new weapons were actually purchased or delivered.

Altogether, the five local military leaders said they command about 12,000 men in various stages of readiness. One of them told Reuters the time wasn’t yet right for action.

Another of the five commanders derided Makhlouf as trying to buy loyalty with “crumbs of money.”

All five said they had accepted money from both Makhlouf and Hassan, the spy chief. They saw no issue with overlapping paymasters.

Mass Grave and Hiding Atrocities
Hassan ran the Assad dictatorship’s military detention system, which was notorious for extorting money at scale from prisoners’ families, according to a 2024 United Nations report about the system.

A Reuters investigation this year found it was Hassan who proposed moving a mass grave containing thousands of bodies in 2018 to the Dhumair desert outside Damascus to hide the scope of the Assad government atrocities.

With Assad’s fall, Hassan took refuge in the Russian embassy in December 2024 for nearly two weeks.

He was infuriated at what he perceived as ill-treatment by his hosts, who provided a single room with just one hard chair to sit on, according to two people close to him.

“Kamal Hassan is not one to sit on a wooden chair for days!” he said in one WhatsApp voice message to his inner circle from this spring, reviewed by Reuters.

Hassan ultimately took up residence in a three-story villa in suburban Moscow, according to an officer who met him over the summer.

Since then, he has seen Maher al-Assad once and maintains close ties with Bashar’s Russian protectors, according to the two people aware of Hassan’s movements.

According to Hassan’s operations coordinator in Lebanon, Hassan has spent $1.5 million since March on 12,000 fighters in Syria and Lebanon.

“Be patient, my people, and don’t surrender your arms. I am the one who will restore your dignity,” he said in another WhatsApp voice message from April that appeared aimed at commanders. Two recipients confirmed the message was from him.

In mid-year, a charity called the “Development of Western Syria” announced its creation and said it was funded by “the Syrian citizen Maj. Gen. Kamal Hassan,” according to one of its initial Facebook posts.

Three officers linked to Hassan and a manager in the organization described it as a humanitarian cover so Hassan could build influence among Alawites.

In August, the charity paid $80,000 to shelter 40 Syrian Alawite families, according to an announcement of its first action. That same month, Hassan sent $200,000 in cash to 80 officers in Lebanon, according to a payroll document seen by Reuters.



Lebanon’s Latest Conflict Brings Rare Public Backlash Against Hezbollah as War Flares Again

Two women look at the sea as boxes of food prepared for Iftar during Ramadan lie on a bench along the Corniche, following an escalation between Hezbollah and Israel amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Beirut, Lebanon, March 10, 2026. (Reuters)
Two women look at the sea as boxes of food prepared for Iftar during Ramadan lie on a bench along the Corniche, following an escalation between Hezbollah and Israel amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Beirut, Lebanon, March 10, 2026. (Reuters)
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Lebanon’s Latest Conflict Brings Rare Public Backlash Against Hezbollah as War Flares Again

Two women look at the sea as boxes of food prepared for Iftar during Ramadan lie on a bench along the Corniche, following an escalation between Hezbollah and Israel amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Beirut, Lebanon, March 10, 2026. (Reuters)
Two women look at the sea as boxes of food prepared for Iftar during Ramadan lie on a bench along the Corniche, following an escalation between Hezbollah and Israel amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Beirut, Lebanon, March 10, 2026. (Reuters)

The Lebanese mother of two had just awakened to prepare the pre-dawn meal before another day of fasting during the holy month of Ramadan when Israeli warplanes began attacking southern Lebanon in retaliation for rockets and drones launched by Hezbollah.

The family quickly packed up and headed toward Beirut, seeking safety from another deadly war between Israel and Hezbollah. With tens of thousands of others fleeing on that March 2 day, the usually one-hour trip from the southern city of Nabatiyeh took 15 hours.

“I am against giving pretexts to Israel,” said the 45-year-old woman, who spoke on condition of anonymity for fear of reprisals from the Hezbollah supporters she lives among.

“I am totally against Hezbollah’s decision to start with the first strike,” said the woman, who is now living with her husband, their 17- and 12-year-old children, and her mother-in-law inside a school turned into a shelter in the Lebanese capital.

As Hezbollah enters a new round of fighting with Israel just 15 months after the last Israel-Hezbollah war ended with a November 2024 US-brokered ceasefire, the Iran-backed group and political party is facing increasing grassroots discontent within its base and problems with the Lebanese authorities.

Population still reeling from the previous war

On March 2, two days after Israel and the US launched attacks on Iran, igniting a war in the Middle East, Hezbollah fired missiles and drones into Israel for the first time in more than a year.

Hundreds of thousands of residents of southern Lebanon, the eastern Bekaa valley and Beirut’s southern suburbs have fled their homes after Israeli warnings that their neighborhoods, towns and villages would be targeted.

The new round of fighting comes as Shiite communities that suffered the brunt of the last conflict are still reeling from it. The last Israel-Hezbollah war killed more than 4,000 people in Lebanon and caused $11 billion in damage, according to the World Bank.

Unlike in the past, when many people were afraid to publicly criticize Hezbollah, some Lebanese Shiites are openly blaming the group for their current misery as they find themselves living in the street, on public squares, or with relatives or friends amid cold weather and fasting during Ramadan.

For Hussein Ali, it was the second time in less than two years that he was forced to leave his house in Beirut’s southern suburb of Haret Hreik. During the last Israel-Hezbollah war, the apartment where he lived was destroyed and now the vegetable vendor is worried the same thing will happen again.

“No one wanted this war,” said the man, who is also staying in the school and relying on aid to survive. “People haven’t recovered from the previous war."

Government takes a harsher stance

After the end of Lebanon's civil war in 1990, militias were required to disarm, but Hezbollah was exempted because it was fighting Israel's occupation of southern Lebanon at the time.

Now the Lebanese government has sought to crack down on the group’s armed wing and end its status as a parallel armed force outside of state control.

The shift was clear when, on March 2, the Lebanese government moved to declare Hezbollah’s military activities illegal, with all but two of the 24 Cabinet ministers voting in favor; only the two Hezbollah ministers voted no. Even ministers from Hezbollah’s strongest ally, the Amal group of Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, voted to approve the measure.

“The government confirms that the decision of war and peace is only in the hand of the state,” Prime Minister Nawaf Salam said, adding that the government “orders the immediate ban on all of Hezbollah’s military activities as they are illegal and it should be forced to hand over its weapons to the Lebanese state.”

The Lebanese army has since begun to crack down and last week arrested three Hezbollah members who were found transporting weapons at a checkpoint. But the men were released on bail Monday.

Government officials have accused Hezbollah of repeatedly taking unilateral military actions that should be under state authority. On Oct. 8, 2023, the group began attacking Israel a day after the assault led by the Iranian-backed Hamas on southern Israel triggered the war in Gaza.

Now, the group has entered the fray on behalf of Iran to avenge the killing of its supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, as well as in retaliation, it says, for Israeli violations of the November 2024 ceasefire.

Some Hezbollah supporters see the war as justified

Ali al-Amin, a Lebanese journalist who is a harsh critic of Hezbollah, said that while some people are now criticizing the armed group more than in the past, many still remain quiet out of fear for their safety.

“Criticism could have a high cost and not all people express their opinions,” said al-Amin, a Shiite from south Lebanon, who added that many poor Shiites rely on assistance that could be cut off anytime by Hezbollah or the allied Amal movement.

In the past, people who criticized Hezbollah on social media were sometimes roughed up by its supporters and forced to make new videos saying they were wrong.

But the group still has many supporters. They say that Hezbollah's decision to strike was justified because Israel had not abided by the November 2024 ceasefire.

Since the ceasefire, Israel has continued to carry out almost daily airstrikes against Hezbollah, which have killed about 400 people, including dozens of civilians, and that have also prevented the reconstruction of destroyed areas.

“We cannot tolerate that anymore,” said Ali Saleh who was displaced from a southern village near Nabatiyeh. “I pray for God to protect our young men and make them victorious against Israel."

Even the Shiite woman who criticized Hezbollah's move to strike first said that if the party hadn't, the result might have been the same.

“If we attack they will attack us and if we don’t attack they would have attacked us,” she said.

Sadek Nabulsi, a political science professor at the Lebanese University whose thinking aligns with Hezbollah, said the latest complaints are nothing new and don’t represent a fissure in grassroots support for the Iranian-allied groups. There was a similar outcry during the 14-month Israel-Hezbollah war that ended in 2024 and the monthlong war in 2006, he said.

“Hezbollah’s base of support is known for ... tolerating pain,” Nabulsi said. “If you look at this base of support, despite all the harsh conditions, it is still coherent, patient and waiting for salvation.”


Gaza Patients Face Death Again as Rafah Crossing Stays Closed

Palestinian patients sit in wheelchairs in the courtyard of the Red Crescent Hospital in Khan Younis while waiting to leave for treatment (AFP)
Palestinian patients sit in wheelchairs in the courtyard of the Red Crescent Hospital in Khan Younis while waiting to leave for treatment (AFP)
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Gaza Patients Face Death Again as Rafah Crossing Stays Closed

Palestinian patients sit in wheelchairs in the courtyard of the Red Crescent Hospital in Khan Younis while waiting to leave for treatment (AFP)
Palestinian patients sit in wheelchairs in the courtyard of the Red Crescent Hospital in Khan Younis while waiting to leave for treatment (AFP)

Patients and wounded in Gaza are facing increasingly harsh conditions after Israeli authorities again closed the Rafah land crossing, which had been partially reopened for a short period under a ceasefire agreement following a prolonged shutdown that prevented tens of thousands from leaving for medical treatment.

The crossing’s reopening at the beginning of February had raised hopes among patients and the wounded that they would be able to travel abroad for treatment. However, Israeli restrictions on the number of people permitted to leave further complicated the situation.

Those hopes faded when the crossing was closed again following the start of the war with Iran on the 28th of last month.

Twelve-year-old Asmaa al-Shawish, who suffers from a rare disease known as Sanfilippo syndrome, has for years faced the threat of death as her health has recently deteriorated sharply, her mother told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Her mother said the girl had obtained a medical referral to receive treatment abroad in 2023, shortly before the war began, but did not manage to travel in time. She remained inside Gaza, and her condition has continued to worsen day by day.

She said her daughter is losing the ability to drink water and suffers from brain atrophy as well as enlargement of the liver and spleen. The child also experiences constant seizures and requires daily treatment in hospitals in an effort to keep her alive as long as possible. Her condition, she added, is deteriorating rapidly.

“When the Rafah crossing opened, we felt a little hope that we might be able to travel again,” she said. “But the large number of patients and wounded waiting like us delayed our departure until the occupation closed it again, leaving us to face our fate on our own.”

“Every time I see my daughter in this condition, I grieve over her harsh circumstances,” she added. “I see her taking her last breaths, and she could die at any moment.”

20,000 Patients

According to the Gaza Health Ministry, more than 20,000 patients and wounded people urgently need treatment abroad. Deaths are already being recorded among those waiting for the crossing to reopen regularly, as it operated before the war, so they can travel and save their lives.

The ministry said hospitals in the enclave lack the medical capabilities needed to save these patients amid the difficult conditions imposed by the Israeli blockade. It added that some medicines have completely run out, while others are close to being depleted.

According to the government media office, the total number of travelers and returnees during the period when the Rafah land crossing was partially open reached 1,148 out of the 3,400 expected to travel in both directions. This represents about 33% compliance with the agreement that was supposed to be implemented after the ceasefire.

Government sources from Hamas told Asharq Al-Awsat that there are “no promises to reopen the Rafah land crossing, even partially.”

Hazem Qassem, a spokesman for Hamas, said the continued closure of the Rafah crossing “under flimsy security pretexts and false claims” represents a “blatant and dangerous violation” of the ceasefire agreement and a retreat from commitments made to mediators, particularly Egypt.

He said the move is part of efforts to “tighten the blockade” imposed on the enclave, preventing tens of thousands of wounded people from traveling to receive what he described as their natural right to medical treatment.

Continued Killings

On the ground, Israel has continued its escalation, killing more Palestinians and striking multiple targets across the enclave.

The Israeli military said on Tuesday it had killed six Palestinians, three of whom it said had crossed the “yellow line” north of the enclave, and three armed Hamas members in tunnels in Rafah.

The number of Palestinian deaths since the ceasefire has risen to more than 656, including at least 20 killed since the start of the war with Iran. The cumulative toll since Oct. 7, 2023, has reached 72,134 deaths.

This coincided with Israeli airstrikes, artillery shelling and gunfire in several areas on both sides of the yellow line in the enclave. For the second consecutive day, bulldozers were seen demolishing what remained of homes east of Khan Younis, about 20 meters from Salah al-Din Road.

A warplane also struck a house whose residents had evacuated following an Israeli order in northern Khan Younis. Another strike hit a mobile phone charging point and an internet service station in an empty area next to tents housing displaced people southwest of Gaza City.


Trump’s Tough Test: Is Military Success Enough to End the War?

US President Donald Trump dances during a private celebration with the Republican majority in the House of Representatives in Florida on Monday (AFP)
US President Donald Trump dances during a private celebration with the Republican majority in the House of Representatives in Florida on Monday (AFP)
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Trump’s Tough Test: Is Military Success Enough to End the War?

US President Donald Trump dances during a private celebration with the Republican majority in the House of Representatives in Florida on Monday (AFP)
US President Donald Trump dances during a private celebration with the Republican majority in the House of Representatives in Florida on Monday (AFP)

On the eleventh day of the war, the conflict with Iran looks closer to a military decision than a political settlement. By most circulating estimates, the US and Israel have dealt heavy blows to Iran’s missile infrastructure, air defenses and military command structure, sharply reducing Tehran’s ability to strike its neighbors as it did in the opening days.

But the key question remains unanswered: is military success enough to end the war?

Here, the ambiguity of US President Donald Trump comes into view. He says the war “will end soon” and suggests he could talk to Iran. Yet he also insists Washington “has won in many ways, but not enough,” warning of tougher strikes if Tehran continues threatening shipping and energy flows.

The contradiction is not just rhetorical. It reveals a real dilemma: a battlefield achievement that still lacks the political formula to turn it into a stable endgame.

Iran, meanwhile, does not appear to be winning militarily. The appointment of Mojtaba Khamenei as a new supreme leader, widely read as a defiant signal, was followed by statements from senior officials pledging to continue the fight and rejecting negotiations.

The regime’s response to the strikes has not been compromise but tighter alignment with the Revolutionary Guards.

Tehran’s calculation is straightforward: political survival matters more than battlefield losses. If it prevents its adversaries from forcing total surrender, endurance itself can be seen as a form of victory.

Oil: Iran’s Most Powerful Card

As Iran loses conventional military tools, oil remains its most potent weapon. The Strait of Hormuz is not merely a shipping lane; it is a critical chokepoint for global energy markets. Any disruption there reverberates instantly through prices, shipping costs, insurance premiums and political nerves in Washington and Western capitals.

That is why markets have quickly become part of the war.

Iran knows it cannot match the United States and Israel in airpower or technology. What it can do is raise the economic and political price of the conflict, for both its adversaries and the world.

As oil prices climb, pressure builds inside the United States and Europe to end the war quickly. Not because Iran has prevailed militarily, but because it has turned energy into a strategic lever.

This is what makes the decision to stop the bombing so sensitive. If Washington halts the war simply because oil prices spike or political pressures grow, Tehran will draw a clear lesson: threatening energy flows ensures survival.

That would be more consequential than any short-term battlefield gain. It would mean Iran, even after losing much of its arsenal, still holds a deterrent capable of helping it rebuild its position later.

If, however, the US and Israel continue the pressure until Iran loses the ability to threaten shipping and disrupt energy markets, the regime would be stripped of its last major lever. Only then would halting the strikes resemble ending a war rather than freezing it.

The “Day After” Question

The central criticism aimed at Trump in Washington and abroad is simple: he lacks a coherent plan for the day after.

Who governs Iran? Who prevents chaos? Who signs ceasefire arrangements and nuclear restrictions? And who ensures the country does not slide into instability like that in Iraq or Syria?

The question is legitimate, but it may not match Trump’s own logic.

The US president does not appear interested in rebuilding Iran or managing a political transition there, as Washington attempted in earlier post-September 11 interventions. His approach seems simpler and harsher: destroy the regime’s ability to threaten US and regional interests.

What happens to power in Tehran afterward may not be a direct American responsibility.

In that sense, Washington does not seem intent on toppling the regime and then inheriting the burden of governing the country. The objective appears to be weakening it enough that it can no longer pose the same threat.

If the regime collapses internally, that would be an added bonus. If it survives but with far fewer capabilities, that too can be framed as a win.

This approach is less about nation-building and more about strategic punishment followed by withdrawal.

But such a method carries risks. There is no strong evidence that the regime is close to collapse despite visible fractures in its leadership. Nor is there an organized alternative ready to take its place.

Pushing Iran toward internal fragmentation or civil conflict could open the door to far wider instability, displacement and regional violence.

For that reason, the absence of a detailed day-after plan may not mean the administration lacks a goal. It may simply mean it has deliberately lowered its political ambitions.

The promise is not a new, stable and democratic Iran—only a weaker one.

Such a gamble will succeed only if Iran accepts the new reality, or proves unable to resist it. So far, Tehran shows little sign of doing so.

Three Possible Endings

The first scenario is a conditional ceasefire after the core strikes are completed. Operations would continue for days or weeks until Washington and Tel Aviv conclude that Iran’s missile, nuclear and military structures have been damaged enough. Indirect channels would then open to impose a ceasefire formula on US-Israeli terms.

This is the most rational outcome. It would allow Trump to claim victory without becoming trapped in a regime-change operation or the occupation of a large, complex country.

The second scenario is a longer war than Washington wants. That would happen if Mojtaba Khamenei rejects any settlement that looks like surrender and continues betting on exhausting markets and raising costs for the Gulf and the wider world.

Iran might not win militarily. But it could pursue a political objective: pushing the US to stop before turning its battlefield gains into a full strategic victory.

The third, and perhaps most likely, scenario is a victory without resolution.

The US and Israel would destroy a significant share of Iran’s capabilities and curb its ability to threaten shipping and its neighbors. Yet the regime survives – more hard-line and more tightly bound to the Revolutionary Guard, convinced that survival requires rebuilding deterrence later.

In that case, the conflict is not solved at its roots. It is merely postponed. What changes is the balance of power, not the conflict itself.

Will Trump Stop the Bombing Now?

The most realistic answer: not yet, but not indefinitely either.

Stopping now under pressure from oil markets and financial panic would allow Tehran to claim it succeeded in setting limits on Washington. Continuing indefinitely without a political horizon could turn military success into an open-ended drain.

Trump is therefore operating in the gray zone between those outcomes: seeking enough strikes to claim a decisive military victory while avoiding the burdens of the “day after” that previous US administrations accepted.

The risk is that this middle path produces only an incomplete victory.

Iran would be weaker but not politically defeated. The war would fade, but its deeper causes would remain.

The coming days will determine not only when the war ends, but also what its ending means: a settlement imposing new realities on Iran, or merely a pause from which the regime emerges wounded yet convinced that oil leverage saved it.

That is the real test facing Trump, not in the number of targets destroyed, but in the kind of ending he ultimately delivers.