Iraq's Political Future in Limbo as Factions Vie for Power

FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
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Iraq's Political Future in Limbo as Factions Vie for Power

FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa

Political factions in Iraq have been maneuvering since the parliamentary election more than a month ago to form alliances that will shape the next government.

The November election didn't produce a bloc with a decisive majority, opening the door to a prolonged period of negotiations, said The Associated Press.

The government that eventually emerges will be inheriting a security situation that has stabilized in recent years, but it will also face a fragmented parliament, growing political influence by armed factions, a fragile economy, and often conflicting international and regional pressures, including the future of Iran-backed armed groups.

Uncertain prospects

Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani's party took the largest number of seats in the election. Al-Sudani positioned himself in his first term as a pragmatist focused on improving public services and managed to keep Iraq on the sidelines of regional conflicts.

While his party is nominally part of the Coordination Framework, a coalition of Iran-backed Shiite parties that became the largest parliamentary bloc, observers say it’s unlikely that the Coordination Framework will support al-Sudani’s reelection bid.

“The choice for prime minister has to be someone the Framework believes they can control and doesn't have his own political ambitions,” said Sajad Jiyad, an Iraqi political analyst and fellow at The Century Foundation think tank.

Al-Sudani came to power in 2022 with the backing of the Framework, but Jiyad said that he believes now the coalition “will not give al-Sudani a second term as he has become a powerful competitor.”

The only Iraqi prime minister to serve a second term since 2003 was Nouri al-Maliki, first elected in 2006. His bid for a third term failed after being criticized for monopolizing power and alienating Sunnis and Kurds.

Jiyad said that the Coordination Framework drew a lesson from Maliki “that an ambitious prime minister will seek to consolidate power at the expense of others.”

He said that the figure selected as Iraq's prime minister must generally be seen as acceptable to Iran and the United States — two countries with huge influence over Iraq — and to Iraq’s top Shiite cleric, Grand Ali al-Sistani.

Al-Sudani in a bind

In the election, Shiite alliances and lists — dominated by the Coordination Framework parties — secured 187 seats, Sunni groups 77 seats, Kurdish groups 56 seats, in addition to nine seats reserved for members of minority groups.

The Reconstruction and Development Coalition, led by al-Sudani, dominated in Baghdad, and in several other provinces, winning 46 seats.

Al-Sudani's results, while strong, don't allow him to form a government without the support of a coalition, forcing him to align the Coordination Framework to preserve his political prospects.

Some saw this dynamic at play earlier this month when al-Sudani's government retracted a terror designation that Iraq had imposed on the Lebanese Hezbollah militant group and Yemen’s Houthis— Iran-aligned groups that are allied with Iraqi armed factions — just weeks after imposing the measure, saying it was a mistake.

The Coalition Framework saw its hand strengthened by the absence from the election of the powerful Sadrist movement led by Shiite cleric Muqtada Sadr, which has been boycotting the political system since being unable to form a government after winning the most seats in the 2021 election.

Hamed Al-Sayed, a political activist and official with the National Line Movement, an independent party that boycotted the election, said that Sadr’s absence had a “central impact.”

“It reduced participation in areas that were traditionally within his sphere of influence, such as Baghdad and the southern governorates, leaving an electoral vacuum that was exploited by rival militia groups,” he said, referring to several parties within the Coordination Framework that also have armed wings.

Groups with affiliated armed wings won more than 100 parliamentary seats, the largest showing since 2003.

Other political actors

Sunni forces, meanwhile, sought to reorganize under a new coalition called the National Political Council, aiming to regain influence lost since the 2018 and 2021 elections.

The Kurdish political scene remained dominated by the traditional split between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan parties, with ongoing negotiations between the two over the presidency.

By convention, Iraq’s president is always a Kurd, while the more powerful prime minister is Shiite and the parliamentary speaker Sunni.

Parliament is required to elect a speaker within 15 days of the Federal Supreme Court’s ratification of the election result, which occurred on Dec. 14.

The parliament should elect a president within 30 days of its first session, and the prime minister should be appointed within 15 days of the president’s election, with 30 days allotted to form the new government.

Washington steps in

The incoming government will face major economic and political challenges.

They include a high level of public debt — more than 90 trillion Iraqi dinars ($69 billion) — and a state budget that remains reliant on oil for about 90% of revenues, despite attempts to diversify, as well as entrenched corruption.

But perhaps the most delicate question will be the future of the Popular Mobilization Forces, a coalition of militias that formed to fight the ISIS group as it rampaged across Iraq more than a decade ago.

It was formally placed under the control of the Iraqi military in 2016 but in practice still operates with significant autonomy. After the Hamas-led attack in southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023 sparked the devastating war in Gaza, some armed groups within the PMF launched attacks on US bases in the region in retaliation for Washington’s backing of Israel.

The US has been pushing for Iraq to disarm Iran-backed groups — a difficult proposition, given the political power that many of them hold and Iran’s likely opposition to such a step.

Two senior Iraqi political officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity because they weren't authorized to comment publicly, said that the United States had warned against selecting any candidate for prime minister who controls an armed faction and also cautioned against letting figures associated with militias control key ministries or hold significant security posts.

“The biggest issue will be how to deal with the pro-Iran parties with armed wings, particularly those... which have been designated by the United States as terrorist entities,” Jiyad said.



Lebanon’s Latest Conflict Brings Rare Public Backlash Against Hezbollah as War Flares Again

Two women look at the sea as boxes of food prepared for Iftar during Ramadan lie on a bench along the Corniche, following an escalation between Hezbollah and Israel amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Beirut, Lebanon, March 10, 2026. (Reuters)
Two women look at the sea as boxes of food prepared for Iftar during Ramadan lie on a bench along the Corniche, following an escalation between Hezbollah and Israel amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Beirut, Lebanon, March 10, 2026. (Reuters)
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Lebanon’s Latest Conflict Brings Rare Public Backlash Against Hezbollah as War Flares Again

Two women look at the sea as boxes of food prepared for Iftar during Ramadan lie on a bench along the Corniche, following an escalation between Hezbollah and Israel amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Beirut, Lebanon, March 10, 2026. (Reuters)
Two women look at the sea as boxes of food prepared for Iftar during Ramadan lie on a bench along the Corniche, following an escalation between Hezbollah and Israel amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Beirut, Lebanon, March 10, 2026. (Reuters)

The Lebanese mother of two had just awakened to prepare the pre-dawn meal before another day of fasting during the holy month of Ramadan when Israeli warplanes began attacking southern Lebanon in retaliation for rockets and drones launched by Hezbollah.

The family quickly packed up and headed toward Beirut, seeking safety from another deadly war between Israel and Hezbollah. With tens of thousands of others fleeing on that March 2 day, the usually one-hour trip from the southern city of Nabatiyeh took 15 hours.

“I am against giving pretexts to Israel,” said the 45-year-old woman, who spoke on condition of anonymity for fear of reprisals from the Hezbollah supporters she lives among.

“I am totally against Hezbollah’s decision to start with the first strike,” said the woman, who is now living with her husband, their 17- and 12-year-old children, and her mother-in-law inside a school turned into a shelter in the Lebanese capital.

As Hezbollah enters a new round of fighting with Israel just 15 months after the last Israel-Hezbollah war ended with a November 2024 US-brokered ceasefire, the Iran-backed group and political party is facing increasing grassroots discontent within its base and problems with the Lebanese authorities.

Population still reeling from the previous war

On March 2, two days after Israel and the US launched attacks on Iran, igniting a war in the Middle East, Hezbollah fired missiles and drones into Israel for the first time in more than a year.

Hundreds of thousands of residents of southern Lebanon, the eastern Bekaa valley and Beirut’s southern suburbs have fled their homes after Israeli warnings that their neighborhoods, towns and villages would be targeted.

The new round of fighting comes as Shiite communities that suffered the brunt of the last conflict are still reeling from it. The last Israel-Hezbollah war killed more than 4,000 people in Lebanon and caused $11 billion in damage, according to the World Bank.

Unlike in the past, when many people were afraid to publicly criticize Hezbollah, some Lebanese Shiites are openly blaming the group for their current misery as they find themselves living in the street, on public squares, or with relatives or friends amid cold weather and fasting during Ramadan.

For Hussein Ali, it was the second time in less than two years that he was forced to leave his house in Beirut’s southern suburb of Haret Hreik. During the last Israel-Hezbollah war, the apartment where he lived was destroyed and now the vegetable vendor is worried the same thing will happen again.

“No one wanted this war,” said the man, who is also staying in the school and relying on aid to survive. “People haven’t recovered from the previous war."

Government takes a harsher stance

After the end of Lebanon's civil war in 1990, militias were required to disarm, but Hezbollah was exempted because it was fighting Israel's occupation of southern Lebanon at the time.

Now the Lebanese government has sought to crack down on the group’s armed wing and end its status as a parallel armed force outside of state control.

The shift was clear when, on March 2, the Lebanese government moved to declare Hezbollah’s military activities illegal, with all but two of the 24 Cabinet ministers voting in favor; only the two Hezbollah ministers voted no. Even ministers from Hezbollah’s strongest ally, the Amal group of Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, voted to approve the measure.

“The government confirms that the decision of war and peace is only in the hand of the state,” Prime Minister Nawaf Salam said, adding that the government “orders the immediate ban on all of Hezbollah’s military activities as they are illegal and it should be forced to hand over its weapons to the Lebanese state.”

The Lebanese army has since begun to crack down and last week arrested three Hezbollah members who were found transporting weapons at a checkpoint. But the men were released on bail Monday.

Government officials have accused Hezbollah of repeatedly taking unilateral military actions that should be under state authority. On Oct. 8, 2023, the group began attacking Israel a day after the assault led by the Iranian-backed Hamas on southern Israel triggered the war in Gaza.

Now, the group has entered the fray on behalf of Iran to avenge the killing of its supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, as well as in retaliation, it says, for Israeli violations of the November 2024 ceasefire.

Some Hezbollah supporters see the war as justified

Ali al-Amin, a Lebanese journalist who is a harsh critic of Hezbollah, said that while some people are now criticizing the armed group more than in the past, many still remain quiet out of fear for their safety.

“Criticism could have a high cost and not all people express their opinions,” said al-Amin, a Shiite from south Lebanon, who added that many poor Shiites rely on assistance that could be cut off anytime by Hezbollah or the allied Amal movement.

In the past, people who criticized Hezbollah on social media were sometimes roughed up by its supporters and forced to make new videos saying they were wrong.

But the group still has many supporters. They say that Hezbollah's decision to strike was justified because Israel had not abided by the November 2024 ceasefire.

Since the ceasefire, Israel has continued to carry out almost daily airstrikes against Hezbollah, which have killed about 400 people, including dozens of civilians, and that have also prevented the reconstruction of destroyed areas.

“We cannot tolerate that anymore,” said Ali Saleh who was displaced from a southern village near Nabatiyeh. “I pray for God to protect our young men and make them victorious against Israel."

Even the Shiite woman who criticized Hezbollah's move to strike first said that if the party hadn't, the result might have been the same.

“If we attack they will attack us and if we don’t attack they would have attacked us,” she said.

Sadek Nabulsi, a political science professor at the Lebanese University whose thinking aligns with Hezbollah, said the latest complaints are nothing new and don’t represent a fissure in grassroots support for the Iranian-allied groups. There was a similar outcry during the 14-month Israel-Hezbollah war that ended in 2024 and the monthlong war in 2006, he said.

“Hezbollah’s base of support is known for ... tolerating pain,” Nabulsi said. “If you look at this base of support, despite all the harsh conditions, it is still coherent, patient and waiting for salvation.”


Gaza Patients Face Death Again as Rafah Crossing Stays Closed

Palestinian patients sit in wheelchairs in the courtyard of the Red Crescent Hospital in Khan Younis while waiting to leave for treatment (AFP)
Palestinian patients sit in wheelchairs in the courtyard of the Red Crescent Hospital in Khan Younis while waiting to leave for treatment (AFP)
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Gaza Patients Face Death Again as Rafah Crossing Stays Closed

Palestinian patients sit in wheelchairs in the courtyard of the Red Crescent Hospital in Khan Younis while waiting to leave for treatment (AFP)
Palestinian patients sit in wheelchairs in the courtyard of the Red Crescent Hospital in Khan Younis while waiting to leave for treatment (AFP)

Patients and wounded in Gaza are facing increasingly harsh conditions after Israeli authorities again closed the Rafah land crossing, which had been partially reopened for a short period under a ceasefire agreement following a prolonged shutdown that prevented tens of thousands from leaving for medical treatment.

The crossing’s reopening at the beginning of February had raised hopes among patients and the wounded that they would be able to travel abroad for treatment. However, Israeli restrictions on the number of people permitted to leave further complicated the situation.

Those hopes faded when the crossing was closed again following the start of the war with Iran on the 28th of last month.

Twelve-year-old Asmaa al-Shawish, who suffers from a rare disease known as Sanfilippo syndrome, has for years faced the threat of death as her health has recently deteriorated sharply, her mother told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Her mother said the girl had obtained a medical referral to receive treatment abroad in 2023, shortly before the war began, but did not manage to travel in time. She remained inside Gaza, and her condition has continued to worsen day by day.

She said her daughter is losing the ability to drink water and suffers from brain atrophy as well as enlargement of the liver and spleen. The child also experiences constant seizures and requires daily treatment in hospitals in an effort to keep her alive as long as possible. Her condition, she added, is deteriorating rapidly.

“When the Rafah crossing opened, we felt a little hope that we might be able to travel again,” she said. “But the large number of patients and wounded waiting like us delayed our departure until the occupation closed it again, leaving us to face our fate on our own.”

“Every time I see my daughter in this condition, I grieve over her harsh circumstances,” she added. “I see her taking her last breaths, and she could die at any moment.”

20,000 Patients

According to the Gaza Health Ministry, more than 20,000 patients and wounded people urgently need treatment abroad. Deaths are already being recorded among those waiting for the crossing to reopen regularly, as it operated before the war, so they can travel and save their lives.

The ministry said hospitals in the enclave lack the medical capabilities needed to save these patients amid the difficult conditions imposed by the Israeli blockade. It added that some medicines have completely run out, while others are close to being depleted.

According to the government media office, the total number of travelers and returnees during the period when the Rafah land crossing was partially open reached 1,148 out of the 3,400 expected to travel in both directions. This represents about 33% compliance with the agreement that was supposed to be implemented after the ceasefire.

Government sources from Hamas told Asharq Al-Awsat that there are “no promises to reopen the Rafah land crossing, even partially.”

Hazem Qassem, a spokesman for Hamas, said the continued closure of the Rafah crossing “under flimsy security pretexts and false claims” represents a “blatant and dangerous violation” of the ceasefire agreement and a retreat from commitments made to mediators, particularly Egypt.

He said the move is part of efforts to “tighten the blockade” imposed on the enclave, preventing tens of thousands of wounded people from traveling to receive what he described as their natural right to medical treatment.

Continued Killings

On the ground, Israel has continued its escalation, killing more Palestinians and striking multiple targets across the enclave.

The Israeli military said on Tuesday it had killed six Palestinians, three of whom it said had crossed the “yellow line” north of the enclave, and three armed Hamas members in tunnels in Rafah.

The number of Palestinian deaths since the ceasefire has risen to more than 656, including at least 20 killed since the start of the war with Iran. The cumulative toll since Oct. 7, 2023, has reached 72,134 deaths.

This coincided with Israeli airstrikes, artillery shelling and gunfire in several areas on both sides of the yellow line in the enclave. For the second consecutive day, bulldozers were seen demolishing what remained of homes east of Khan Younis, about 20 meters from Salah al-Din Road.

A warplane also struck a house whose residents had evacuated following an Israeli order in northern Khan Younis. Another strike hit a mobile phone charging point and an internet service station in an empty area next to tents housing displaced people southwest of Gaza City.


Trump’s Tough Test: Is Military Success Enough to End the War?

US President Donald Trump dances during a private celebration with the Republican majority in the House of Representatives in Florida on Monday (AFP)
US President Donald Trump dances during a private celebration with the Republican majority in the House of Representatives in Florida on Monday (AFP)
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Trump’s Tough Test: Is Military Success Enough to End the War?

US President Donald Trump dances during a private celebration with the Republican majority in the House of Representatives in Florida on Monday (AFP)
US President Donald Trump dances during a private celebration with the Republican majority in the House of Representatives in Florida on Monday (AFP)

On the eleventh day of the war, the conflict with Iran looks closer to a military decision than a political settlement. By most circulating estimates, the US and Israel have dealt heavy blows to Iran’s missile infrastructure, air defenses and military command structure, sharply reducing Tehran’s ability to strike its neighbors as it did in the opening days.

But the key question remains unanswered: is military success enough to end the war?

Here, the ambiguity of US President Donald Trump comes into view. He says the war “will end soon” and suggests he could talk to Iran. Yet he also insists Washington “has won in many ways, but not enough,” warning of tougher strikes if Tehran continues threatening shipping and energy flows.

The contradiction is not just rhetorical. It reveals a real dilemma: a battlefield achievement that still lacks the political formula to turn it into a stable endgame.

Iran, meanwhile, does not appear to be winning militarily. The appointment of Mojtaba Khamenei as a new supreme leader, widely read as a defiant signal, was followed by statements from senior officials pledging to continue the fight and rejecting negotiations.

The regime’s response to the strikes has not been compromise but tighter alignment with the Revolutionary Guards.

Tehran’s calculation is straightforward: political survival matters more than battlefield losses. If it prevents its adversaries from forcing total surrender, endurance itself can be seen as a form of victory.

Oil: Iran’s Most Powerful Card

As Iran loses conventional military tools, oil remains its most potent weapon. The Strait of Hormuz is not merely a shipping lane; it is a critical chokepoint for global energy markets. Any disruption there reverberates instantly through prices, shipping costs, insurance premiums and political nerves in Washington and Western capitals.

That is why markets have quickly become part of the war.

Iran knows it cannot match the United States and Israel in airpower or technology. What it can do is raise the economic and political price of the conflict, for both its adversaries and the world.

As oil prices climb, pressure builds inside the United States and Europe to end the war quickly. Not because Iran has prevailed militarily, but because it has turned energy into a strategic lever.

This is what makes the decision to stop the bombing so sensitive. If Washington halts the war simply because oil prices spike or political pressures grow, Tehran will draw a clear lesson: threatening energy flows ensures survival.

That would be more consequential than any short-term battlefield gain. It would mean Iran, even after losing much of its arsenal, still holds a deterrent capable of helping it rebuild its position later.

If, however, the US and Israel continue the pressure until Iran loses the ability to threaten shipping and disrupt energy markets, the regime would be stripped of its last major lever. Only then would halting the strikes resemble ending a war rather than freezing it.

The “Day After” Question

The central criticism aimed at Trump in Washington and abroad is simple: he lacks a coherent plan for the day after.

Who governs Iran? Who prevents chaos? Who signs ceasefire arrangements and nuclear restrictions? And who ensures the country does not slide into instability like that in Iraq or Syria?

The question is legitimate, but it may not match Trump’s own logic.

The US president does not appear interested in rebuilding Iran or managing a political transition there, as Washington attempted in earlier post-September 11 interventions. His approach seems simpler and harsher: destroy the regime’s ability to threaten US and regional interests.

What happens to power in Tehran afterward may not be a direct American responsibility.

In that sense, Washington does not seem intent on toppling the regime and then inheriting the burden of governing the country. The objective appears to be weakening it enough that it can no longer pose the same threat.

If the regime collapses internally, that would be an added bonus. If it survives but with far fewer capabilities, that too can be framed as a win.

This approach is less about nation-building and more about strategic punishment followed by withdrawal.

But such a method carries risks. There is no strong evidence that the regime is close to collapse despite visible fractures in its leadership. Nor is there an organized alternative ready to take its place.

Pushing Iran toward internal fragmentation or civil conflict could open the door to far wider instability, displacement and regional violence.

For that reason, the absence of a detailed day-after plan may not mean the administration lacks a goal. It may simply mean it has deliberately lowered its political ambitions.

The promise is not a new, stable and democratic Iran—only a weaker one.

Such a gamble will succeed only if Iran accepts the new reality, or proves unable to resist it. So far, Tehran shows little sign of doing so.

Three Possible Endings

The first scenario is a conditional ceasefire after the core strikes are completed. Operations would continue for days or weeks until Washington and Tel Aviv conclude that Iran’s missile, nuclear and military structures have been damaged enough. Indirect channels would then open to impose a ceasefire formula on US-Israeli terms.

This is the most rational outcome. It would allow Trump to claim victory without becoming trapped in a regime-change operation or the occupation of a large, complex country.

The second scenario is a longer war than Washington wants. That would happen if Mojtaba Khamenei rejects any settlement that looks like surrender and continues betting on exhausting markets and raising costs for the Gulf and the wider world.

Iran might not win militarily. But it could pursue a political objective: pushing the US to stop before turning its battlefield gains into a full strategic victory.

The third, and perhaps most likely, scenario is a victory without resolution.

The US and Israel would destroy a significant share of Iran’s capabilities and curb its ability to threaten shipping and its neighbors. Yet the regime survives – more hard-line and more tightly bound to the Revolutionary Guard, convinced that survival requires rebuilding deterrence later.

In that case, the conflict is not solved at its roots. It is merely postponed. What changes is the balance of power, not the conflict itself.

Will Trump Stop the Bombing Now?

The most realistic answer: not yet, but not indefinitely either.

Stopping now under pressure from oil markets and financial panic would allow Tehran to claim it succeeded in setting limits on Washington. Continuing indefinitely without a political horizon could turn military success into an open-ended drain.

Trump is therefore operating in the gray zone between those outcomes: seeking enough strikes to claim a decisive military victory while avoiding the burdens of the “day after” that previous US administrations accepted.

The risk is that this middle path produces only an incomplete victory.

Iran would be weaker but not politically defeated. The war would fade, but its deeper causes would remain.

The coming days will determine not only when the war ends, but also what its ending means: a settlement imposing new realities on Iran, or merely a pause from which the regime emerges wounded yet convinced that oil leverage saved it.

That is the real test facing Trump, not in the number of targets destroyed, but in the kind of ending he ultimately delivers.