After Two Years of War, Tally of Israel-Hamas Prisoner Swaps

A Hamas banner reading “We Are the Flood… We Are the Day After” during the handover of a group of Israeli hostages (file photo – AFP)
A Hamas banner reading “We Are the Flood… We Are the Day After” during the handover of a group of Israeli hostages (file photo – AFP)
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After Two Years of War, Tally of Israel-Hamas Prisoner Swaps

A Hamas banner reading “We Are the Flood… We Are the Day After” during the handover of a group of Israeli hostages (file photo – AFP)
A Hamas banner reading “We Are the Flood… We Are the Day After” during the handover of a group of Israeli hostages (file photo – AFP)

Israel’s military on Friday released new footage of the rescue of two hostages, Fernando Simon Marman and Norberto Louis Har, Israeli nationals who also hold Argentine citizenship, from a house in the southern Gaza city of Rafah.

The operation was carried out on Feb. 12, 2024, amid intense gunbattles with their captors from the Qassam Brigades, the armed wing of Hamas. Several of the gunmen were killed, along with other Palestinian civilians.

Since Oct. 7, 2023, when Hamas launched a surprise attack on Israeli towns and military sites along the Gaza border, and through the same month in 2025, three prisoner exchange deals were conducted between Israel and the Palestinian group.

The swaps took place during a two-year war in which Tel Aviv failed to recover additional hostages alive, although it retrieved numerous bodies.

Israel made several attempts to retrieve hostages by force. The army succeeded on three occasions, including the Rafah operation. In October 2023, it rescued soldier Ori Megidish from Al-Shati refugee camp west of Gaza City in a swift raid.

In June 2024, it recovered four hostages from the Nuseirat refugee camp in central Gaza during a large-scale military operation. The military also recovered the bodies of other captives in separate operations deep inside the enclave.

Across the three agreements, Hamas returned a total of 252 Israeli and foreign hostages, dead and alive, according to Israeli figures. Four of them had been captured in 2014, including two soldiers later confirmed dead, and two civilians who had crossed into Gaza and were said to have suffered from mental illness; both were returned alive.

In exchange, Israel released more than 3,985 Palestinians from Gaza, the West Bank, and Jerusalem.

They included 486 serving life sentences, 319 serving long-term sentences, among them 13 detained since before the Oslo Accords, 114 women, and 279 minors. Forty-one had previously been freed in the 2011 deal that secured the release of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit and were later rearrested.

Another 22 had not yet been sentenced.

Of the total, 2,724 were detained in Gaza after Oct. 7, 2023.

Negotiations were repeatedly marred by disputes over exchange ratios. Hamas demanded higher numbers in return for Israeli soldiers, at one stage seeking 500 Palestinian prisoners per soldier.

Israeli and mediator pressure led to agreed formulas of 30 prisoners for each civilian hostage and 50 for each soldier. However, Israel continued to release only 30 in some cases.

The first swap followed a six-day temporary truce in late November 2023. Hamas and other Palestinian factions released 50 Israeli hostages classified as humanitarian cases, including women and children, in exchange for 240 Palestinian prisoners, among them 169 boys and 71 women.

During the third week of the war, Hamas also freed four elderly Israeli women without compensation. Separately, 10 Thai workers and one Filipino were released alive during the deal through mediation efforts.

Efforts to extend the truce and secure further releases collapsed, and the war resumed with greater intensity for Gaza’s population.

After prolonged mediation, a three-phase ceasefire agreement was reached in mid-January 2025. The plan provided for the release of living civilian hostages in the first phase, soldiers in the second, and bodies in the third.

It stipulated the release of 30 Palestinian prisoners, including some serving life sentences, for each civilian freed by Hamas, and 50 Palestinians for each soldier, including 30 serving life terms and 20 serving long sentences.

Hamas released 25 living hostages classified as humanitarian cases, including women, children, civilians over 50, and wounded or sick non-combatants. It also handed over the bodies of eight hostages and freed five Thai workers without compensation.

After those releases, Israel refused to free the agreed number of Palestinians in exchange for soldiers and insisted on classifying Arbel Yehoud, whom Palestinians described as a soldier, as a civilian. Her release had been scheduled for late January, and the dispute temporarily stalled the deal.

Mediators later intervened, and she was freed after Israel maintained she was a civilian, allowing displaced residents to return from southern to northern Gaza after Israel had linked their return to her release.

During that phase, five female soldiers abducted from the Nahal Oz site east of Gaza were freed and classified as humanitarian cases, with 30 Palestinians released in exchange for each. At the time, at least 13 Israeli soldiers remained in Hamas captivity, including the highest-ranking officer, Asaf Hamami, commander of the Southern Brigade in the Gaza Division, who was later confirmed dead.

In that deal, Hamas surprised Israel with the number of hostages returned alive, despite Israeli assessments that some had been killed. They included Avera Mengistu and Hisham al-Sayed, who had entered Gaza in 2014 and were captured at the time. After years in captivity, both were confirmed alive upon their release.

Israel freed 1,778 Palestinians in that agreement, including 1,024 Gazans detained during the war. It also released 294 prisoners serving life or long-term sentences, among them 71 women.

On March 18 of the same year, Israel resumed its military campaign after talks to extend the truce failed.

On May 12, Hamas handed over hostage Edan Alexander, an Israeli soldier with US citizenship, as a goodwill gesture toward US President Donald Trump, in exchange for improvements to Gaza’s humanitarian conditions and progress in negotiations, without securing the release of Palestinian prisoners. Israel did not implement those understandings.

Following arduous negotiations, a comprehensive agreement to end the war was reached in October 2025. Israel recovered the remaining 20 living hostages in a single batch and retrieved the dead in stages after searches. The last was Israeli police officer Ran Gvili, whose body was found on Jan. 26 after weeks of efforts to recover it.

In return, Israel released 1,968 Palestinian prisoners, including 1,718 detained during the Gaza war. The group included 250 prisoners, among them 192 serving life sentences and 25 serving long terms. Most were deported outside Gaza to other countries.



A 5-Step Approach to 'Dismantling Iraqi Militias'

PM Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani, head of the Popular Mobilization Forces Faleh Al-Fayyad, and PMF's chief of staff Abu Fadak (government media)
PM Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani, head of the Popular Mobilization Forces Faleh Al-Fayyad, and PMF's chief of staff Abu Fadak (government media)
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A 5-Step Approach to 'Dismantling Iraqi Militias'

PM Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani, head of the Popular Mobilization Forces Faleh Al-Fayyad, and PMF's chief of staff Abu Fadak (government media)
PM Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani, head of the Popular Mobilization Forces Faleh Al-Fayyad, and PMF's chief of staff Abu Fadak (government media)

Despite continuous American demands for the Iraqi authorities to curb and dismantle factions, observers noted that the meetings of the leaders of the Coordination Framework have not been tackling this issue.

This could threaten the loss of American support for the new government, while experts propose a 5-step approach to resolve the matter.

The American insistence on dismantling armed factions has become recently highly clear through a series of punitive measures, beginning with a $10 million reward for information leading to the leader of Kataib Hezbollah, Abu Hussein Al-Hamidawi, then placing seven factions on sanctions and terrorism lists, and finally a similar reward for information about Abu Alaa Al-Wala'i, leader of Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada.

Contrary to the discourse that escalated about three months ago regarding the necessity of disarming factions and restructuring the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), the Coordination Framework forces remain silent, despite the factions' actual involvement in the war with Iran and their missile attacks inside Iraqi territory and abroad on some Arab Gulf states.

War undermined efforts

A leading source from the Coordination Framework states that the war launched by the United States and Israel against Iran "undermined what could be called efforts to integrate the factions."

The source confirms to Asharq Al-Awsat that "the Coordination Framework had indeed begun preliminary discussions on mechanisms for addressing the issue, but the war ... provided the appropriate pretext for the factions to refuse to disarm, considering that the war represents an existential threat to them."

The source points out that "the leaders of the Coordination Framework recognize the seriousness and magnitude of the risks posed by American demands, but they are forced to ignore them due to pressure from the factions and the Iranian actor," indicating that "some forces and figures that possess armed factions have a genuine desire to integrate their elements into the army and restructure the PMF, but they appear incapable of taking any action due to the regional developments and the stalled efforts to form a government."

Dismantling the Funding System

Writer and political researcher Dr. Basil Hussein believes that dismantling the factions is linked to what he calls the "funding system."

He told Asharq Al-Awsat that the Coordination Framework forces are “a fragile coalition where disparate interests intersect.”

He points out that "armed factions are not merely an executive arm in the hands of political parties; rather, they are often the backbone upon which these parties are built economically, politically, and socially."

He further states that "any serious attempt to dismantle the factions will inevitably mean dismantling the entire funding system, which amounts to political suicide for anyone who undertakes it. Therefore, such efforts will always remain incomplete and selective, avoiding any harm to the core structure upon which the militias' influence rests."

In addition to these reasons, Hussein believes that "dismantling the factions is not a purely Iraqi decision; rather, it relates to the Iranian vision that has long viewed these factions as a cornerstone of Tehran's forward defense strategy.”

He adds that "when American pressure on the factions intensifies and their room for maneuver narrows, they will reluctantly bend rather than willingly, resorting to a superficial solution that masks their facade without touching their essence. They may change their name while retaining their structure, and formally dissolve into state institutions while maintaining their networks, weapons, and loyalties outside any actual oversight."

Mourners attend the funeral of fighters with Iraq’s Popular Mobilisation Forces who were killed in an airstrike, in Baghdad, Iraq, April 8, 2026. REUTERS/Thaier Al-Sudani

5 Steps to a Solution

For his part, Firas Elias, Professor of Political Science at the University of Mosul and a specialist in Iranian studies, proposes an approach that includes five steps that would help dismantle the factions.

He believes that the future of armed factions in Iraq will directly depend on the future of the war between Tehran and Washington, as they "will be directly affected by the outcome of this war."

Elias tells Asharq Al-Awsat that "discussing practical ways to deal with armed factions requires developing a new approach for the post-war phase. The practical method is not (immediate dismantling), but rather a gradual re-engineering of power through the state."

Elias anticipates that if the Framework forces succeed in forming a government, and under American pressure, they may move along five paths: "First: separating the PMF as an official body from the factions as political-military arms, establishing that the PMF, which receives salaries from the state, is exclusively subject to the Commander-in-Chief, while any formation that retains independent decision-making or external affiliation is treated as an entity outside the state."

The second move involves "controlling money before weapons. The most effective approach is to audit salaries, contracts, crossings, companies, economic offices, and transfers. When informal resources are cut off, the factions become less capable of maneuvering."

In the third path, Elias expects "restructuring leadership by changing sensitive positions within the PMF Commission, transferring some brigades to distant sectors away from the borders, integrating selected units into the army or Federal Police, and retiring undisciplined leaders or assigning them to symbolic positions."

The Iraqi expert adds a fourth path related to "dismantling from within, not through confrontation. The government may differentiate between three types: factions amenable to integration, factions requiring political containment, and completely resistant factions. The approach to dealing with them would be piecemeal: incentives for the disciplined, isolation for the resistant, and legal pressure on those involved."

He concludes with the fifth path, which concerns "transforming American pressure into internal political leverage. The Framework might tell the factions: either adhere to state discipline, or face sanctions, financial isolation, and security measures that affect everyone. Here, American pressure becomes a tool in the hands of the government, not merely an external threat."

Despite these five paths, Elias believes that "the 'Framework will not dismantle the factions in one stroke, because they are part of its political structure. However, it may work to gradually strip them of their military and financial independence, while retaining the PMF designation in a disciplined, institutional manner."


Four Killed in Israeli Strikes on Southern Lebanon

Israeli tanks drive in Lebanon, as seen from the Israeli side of the Israel-Lebanon border, in northern Israel, April 25, 2026. (Reuters)
Israeli tanks drive in Lebanon, as seen from the Israeli side of the Israel-Lebanon border, in northern Israel, April 25, 2026. (Reuters)
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Four Killed in Israeli Strikes on Southern Lebanon

Israeli tanks drive in Lebanon, as seen from the Israeli side of the Israel-Lebanon border, in northern Israel, April 25, 2026. (Reuters)
Israeli tanks drive in Lebanon, as seen from the Israeli side of the Israel-Lebanon border, in northern Israel, April 25, 2026. (Reuters)

Four people were killed on Saturday in Israeli strikes on southern Lebanon, Lebanon's state news agency reported, while the Israeli military said Hezbollah had fired rockets at Israel, the latest challenges to a tenuous, recently extended ceasefire.

The ceasefire agreed between Israel and Lebanon has led to a significant reduction in hostilities, ‌but Israel ‌and Iran-backed Hezbollah ‌have ⁠continued to clash ⁠in southern Lebanon, where Israel has kept soldiers in the self-declared buffer zone.

The Israeli military said on Saturday that it had struck loaded rocket launchers belonging to Hezbollah in three locations in southern Lebanon overnight ⁠and targeted several Hezbollah fighters in ‌separate strikes.

It was ‌unclear whether the deaths reported by the ‌state news agency were linked to those ‌Israeli strikes.

The Israeli military restated its warning for Lebanese residents not to approach the Litani River area in southern Lebanon while it battles ‌Hezbollah.

It said it had intercepted a "suspicious aerial target" within the area its ⁠forces ⁠are presently occupying, and that two rockets were fired by Hezbollah into northern Israel, one of which was intercepted. There were no reports of casualties.

A Hezbollah lawmaker said on Friday that a US-mediated ceasefire in the war with Israel was meaningless, a day after it was extended for three weeks. The truce had been due to expire on Sunday.


Syria to Begin Trying Assad-Era Figures on Sunday, Says Justice Official

Residents gather in a street after Friday prayers to celebrate the arrest of Amjad Yousef, a key suspect in the 2013 Tadamon massacre, in Tadamon, Syria, April 24, 2026. (Reuters)
Residents gather in a street after Friday prayers to celebrate the arrest of Amjad Yousef, a key suspect in the 2013 Tadamon massacre, in Tadamon, Syria, April 24, 2026. (Reuters)
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Syria to Begin Trying Assad-Era Figures on Sunday, Says Justice Official

Residents gather in a street after Friday prayers to celebrate the arrest of Amjad Yousef, a key suspect in the 2013 Tadamon massacre, in Tadamon, Syria, April 24, 2026. (Reuters)
Residents gather in a street after Friday prayers to celebrate the arrest of Amjad Yousef, a key suspect in the 2013 Tadamon massacre, in Tadamon, Syria, April 24, 2026. (Reuters)

Trials of prominent figures from the rule of ousted Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad are set to begin this weekend, a justice ministry official told AFP on Saturday, starting with a former security official.

"The first trial sessions for symbolic former Syrian regime figures will begin on Sunday" with Atif Najib, who was arrested in January of last year, the official told AFP on condition of anonymity.

Najib is the former head of political security in south Syria's Daraa province, the cradle of the country's 2011 uprising, and is accused of orchestrating a crackdown there. He is also a cousin of the ousted leader.

The ministry official said trials would follow for Wassim al-Assad -- another of the former president's cousins -- and Amjad Youssef, the main suspect in a 2013 massacre who was arrested this week, as well as "pilots who took part in bombing Syrian cities and towns".

Syria's civil war began with a brutal crackdown on pro-democracy protests and spiraled into a 13-year conflict that killed more than half a million people.

Assad's forces pounded opposition-held areas, including with airstrikes and crude barrel bomb attacks, while tens of thousands of people disappeared, some into the country's brutal prison system.

Since seizing power in December 2024, Syria's new authorities have repeatedly announced the arrests of former officials, vowing to provide justice and accountability for Assad-era atrocities.

Assad fled to Russia with only a handful of confidants, abandoning senior officials and security officers, some of whom reportedly went abroad or took refuge in the coastal heartland of Assad's Alawite minority.

Syrian Justice Minister Mazhar al-Wais said Friday on X that the Damascus criminal court was ready "for the moment that victims have long waited for: the start of public trials", calling them "part of the transitional justice process".

Rights groups, activists and the international community have repeatedly emphasized the importance of transitional justice in the war-ravaged country.

The protest movement against Assad began in Daraa on March 15, 2011, after 15 students were arrested for allegedly writing anti-government slogans on the city's walls.

Residents said the students were tortured, leading to a protest to demand their release that ended in bloodshed.

Najib, blamed for the crackdown, was dismissed soon after. He was on a US Treasury sanctions list alongside other Syrian officials.

Wassim al-Assad was arrested last June. The US Treasury sanctioned him in 2023, saying he had led a paramilitary unit and was "a key figure in the regional drug trafficking network".