Iraq's Kurds Caught Between Washington and Tehran

An Iranian Kurdish Peshmerga member of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) inspects the damage sustained at the Azadi Camp of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) following an Iranian cross-border attack in the town of Koye (Koysinjaq), in the east of Erbil district in the autonomous Kurdish region of northern Iraq on March 3, 2026. (Photo by Safin HAMID / AFP)
An Iranian Kurdish Peshmerga member of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) inspects the damage sustained at the Azadi Camp of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) following an Iranian cross-border attack in the town of Koye (Koysinjaq), in the east of Erbil district in the autonomous Kurdish region of northern Iraq on March 3, 2026. (Photo by Safin HAMID / AFP)
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Iraq's Kurds Caught Between Washington and Tehran

An Iranian Kurdish Peshmerga member of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) inspects the damage sustained at the Azadi Camp of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) following an Iranian cross-border attack in the town of Koye (Koysinjaq), in the east of Erbil district in the autonomous Kurdish region of northern Iraq on March 3, 2026. (Photo by Safin HAMID / AFP)
An Iranian Kurdish Peshmerga member of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) inspects the damage sustained at the Azadi Camp of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) following an Iranian cross-border attack in the town of Koye (Koysinjaq), in the east of Erbil district in the autonomous Kurdish region of northern Iraq on March 3, 2026. (Photo by Safin HAMID / AFP)

Despite repeated pledges by Kurdish leaders in Iraq’s Kurdistan region to remain neutral in the war between the United States and Israel on one side and Iran on the other, their territory has come under near-daily attacks from Iran or Tehran-aligned armed factions in Iraq.

The attacks have left Kurdish leaders facing what one Kurdish official described as an “existential dilemma,” particularly as they coincide with US pressure to open a military front in western Iran in cooperation with Iranian Kurdish opposition parties.

In recent days, US media reported that President Donald Trump spoke by phone with Kurdish leaders Masoud Barzani and Bafel Talabani, urging them to “assist the Iranian Kurdish opposition” participating in the conflict. According to those reports, the two leaders expressed reservations.

Iran has long viewed Kurdish opposition groups based in Iraq’s Kurdistan region with suspicion. In September 2023, Baghdad and Tehran signed a security agreement requiring the disarmament of those groups, the closure of their headquarters and their relocation away from the shared border. Iran had previously launched several attacks on their positions.

By Saturday, the Kurdistan region had faced 100 missile and drone attacks carried out by Iran and allied Iraqi factions.

A headquarters of the Peshmerga, the region’s guard forces, in Sulaimaniyah came under a drone attack late on Friday that was shot down by ground defenses. The Iran-aligned group Saraya Awliya al-Dam claimed responsibility.

Bridge, not battlefield

Reiterating Kurdish pledges to stay out of the war, Talabani, leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, restated the position in an interview with Fox News on Friday.

“Kurdistan needs to be a bridge, not a battlefield,” he said.

According to Talabani, the Kurds are in a unique position, as they are close allies of the US and at the same time neighbors of Iran. The Kurds can play a role in de-escalation when the time comes, he added.

Talabani said he currently sees a weaker Iranian regime, but added that its institutions remain intact despite differences with those in Kurdistan.

When the military objectives are achieved, diplomacy will begin, he said.

Talabani also described his call with Trump, saying the US president was very kind and very polite.

Talabani did not detail what the US president asked of Kurdish leaders, but said he understood that protecting civilians in Iraq was a priority and that Kurds in Iran deserve better treatment.

‘Existential dilemma’

A senior Kurdish official, speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat on condition of anonymity, described the situation as an “existential Kurdish dilemma.”

“Kurds often find themselves facing the same complex circumstances in conflicts across Iraq and the wider Middle East,” he said.

Today, he added, they face renewed fears about what might come next, especially as the Kurdistan region remains fragile because of internal divisions, disputes with Baghdad and hostility from Iran-aligned factions.

“Most Kurds hope the situation of their Iranian Kurdish brothers will improve, but they cannot offer meaningful assistance,” the official said. “The situation is extremely complicated, and involvement could turn into a real catastrophe for Kurdistan.”

He added that Kurdish experiences with the United States “have not been entirely encouraging,” noting that Washington recently abandoned Kurdish allies in Syria.

“Any Kurdish gamble in Iran will later backfire on Iraqi Kurdistan, especially if Washington eventually reaches some kind of settlement with Tehran,” he said.

The official also warned that the Kurdistan region is surrounded by hostile forces that could become even more antagonistic if it becomes involved in the war.

“Türkiye to the north will not allow the Iraqi Kurdistan model to be repeated in Iran,” he said.

“To the south we have the Iraqi government and Iran-aligned factions. If those factions overcome the consequences of the current war, they will vent their anger on us. I would not rule out an invasion of the region.”

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani discussed the latest security developments in a phone call on Friday with Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani, according to a government statement.

Both sides reaffirmed their rejection of attacks targeting Iraqi cities, including those in the Kurdistan region, and stressed that Iraqi territory should not be used as a launchpad for attacks on neighboring countries, while supporting steps aimed at strengthening security and stability in the region.



Israeli Attacks Kill at Least Four Palestinians in Gaza

FILE PHOTO: Displaced Palestinians shelter in a tent camp on a windy day in Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip, April 2, 2026. REUTERS/Haseeb Alwazeer/File Photo
FILE PHOTO: Displaced Palestinians shelter in a tent camp on a windy day in Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip, April 2, 2026. REUTERS/Haseeb Alwazeer/File Photo
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Israeli Attacks Kill at Least Four Palestinians in Gaza

FILE PHOTO: Displaced Palestinians shelter in a tent camp on a windy day in Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip, April 2, 2026. REUTERS/Haseeb Alwazeer/File Photo
FILE PHOTO: Displaced Palestinians shelter in a tent camp on a windy day in Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip, April 2, 2026. REUTERS/Haseeb Alwazeer/File Photo

Israeli military attacks killed at least four Palestinians in the Gaza Strip on Sunday, health officials in the enclave said.

Medics said an airstrike carried out by Israel's forces killed one person near the central village of Al-Mughraqa, while Israeli gunfire and tank shelling killed two others near Gaza City.

In another incident, Israeli forces shot and killed a 40-year-old ⁠woman in Khan ⁠Younis, in the south of the territory, health officials said. The Israeli military said it was unaware of any attack by its troops in that area at the time of the reported incident ⁠on Sunday.

The Israeli military said it was looking into the other reported strikes.

Separately, it said it had struck and killed several Hamas militants in Gaza since Friday.

Violence in Gaza has persisted despite an October 2025 ceasefire, with Israel conducting almost daily attacks on Palestinians.

At least 800 Palestinians have been killed since the ceasefire deal took ⁠effect, ⁠according to local medics, while Israel says militants have killed four of its soldiers over the same period.

Israel and Hamas have blamed each other for ceasefire violations.

More than 72,500 Palestinians have been killed since the Gaza war started in October 2023, most of them civilians, according to Gaza health authorities.

Hamas' October 7, 2023, attacks on Israel killed 1,200 people, according to Israeli tallies.


A 5-Step Approach to 'Dismantling Iraqi Militias'

PM Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani, head of the Popular Mobilization Forces Faleh Al-Fayyad, and PMF's chief of staff Abu Fadak (government media)
PM Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani, head of the Popular Mobilization Forces Faleh Al-Fayyad, and PMF's chief of staff Abu Fadak (government media)
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A 5-Step Approach to 'Dismantling Iraqi Militias'

PM Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani, head of the Popular Mobilization Forces Faleh Al-Fayyad, and PMF's chief of staff Abu Fadak (government media)
PM Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani, head of the Popular Mobilization Forces Faleh Al-Fayyad, and PMF's chief of staff Abu Fadak (government media)

Despite continuous American demands for the Iraqi authorities to curb and dismantle factions, observers noted that the meetings of the leaders of the Coordination Framework have not been tackling this issue.

This could threaten the loss of American support for the new government, while experts propose a 5-step approach to resolve the matter.

The American insistence on dismantling armed factions has become recently highly clear through a series of punitive measures, beginning with a $10 million reward for information leading to the leader of Kataib Hezbollah, Abu Hussein Al-Hamidawi, then placing seven factions on sanctions and terrorism lists, and finally a similar reward for information about Abu Alaa Al-Wala'i, leader of Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada.

Contrary to the discourse that escalated about three months ago regarding the necessity of disarming factions and restructuring the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), the Coordination Framework forces remain silent, despite the factions' actual involvement in the war with Iran and their missile attacks inside Iraqi territory and abroad on some Arab Gulf states.

War undermined efforts

A leading source from the Coordination Framework states that the war launched by the United States and Israel against Iran "undermined what could be called efforts to integrate the factions."

The source confirms to Asharq Al-Awsat that "the Coordination Framework had indeed begun preliminary discussions on mechanisms for addressing the issue, but the war ... provided the appropriate pretext for the factions to refuse to disarm, considering that the war represents an existential threat to them."

The source points out that "the leaders of the Coordination Framework recognize the seriousness and magnitude of the risks posed by American demands, but they are forced to ignore them due to pressure from the factions and the Iranian actor," indicating that "some forces and figures that possess armed factions have a genuine desire to integrate their elements into the army and restructure the PMF, but they appear incapable of taking any action due to the regional developments and the stalled efforts to form a government."

Dismantling the Funding System

Writer and political researcher Dr. Basil Hussein believes that dismantling the factions is linked to what he calls the "funding system."

He told Asharq Al-Awsat that the Coordination Framework forces are “a fragile coalition where disparate interests intersect.”

He points out that "armed factions are not merely an executive arm in the hands of political parties; rather, they are often the backbone upon which these parties are built economically, politically, and socially."

He further states that "any serious attempt to dismantle the factions will inevitably mean dismantling the entire funding system, which amounts to political suicide for anyone who undertakes it. Therefore, such efforts will always remain incomplete and selective, avoiding any harm to the core structure upon which the militias' influence rests."

In addition to these reasons, Hussein believes that "dismantling the factions is not a purely Iraqi decision; rather, it relates to the Iranian vision that has long viewed these factions as a cornerstone of Tehran's forward defense strategy.”

He adds that "when American pressure on the factions intensifies and their room for maneuver narrows, they will reluctantly bend rather than willingly, resorting to a superficial solution that masks their facade without touching their essence. They may change their name while retaining their structure, and formally dissolve into state institutions while maintaining their networks, weapons, and loyalties outside any actual oversight."

Mourners attend the funeral of fighters with Iraq’s Popular Mobilisation Forces who were killed in an airstrike, in Baghdad, Iraq, April 8, 2026. REUTERS/Thaier Al-Sudani

5 Steps to a Solution

For his part, Firas Elias, Professor of Political Science at the University of Mosul and a specialist in Iranian studies, proposes an approach that includes five steps that would help dismantle the factions.

He believes that the future of armed factions in Iraq will directly depend on the future of the war between Tehran and Washington, as they "will be directly affected by the outcome of this war."

Elias tells Asharq Al-Awsat that "discussing practical ways to deal with armed factions requires developing a new approach for the post-war phase. The practical method is not (immediate dismantling), but rather a gradual re-engineering of power through the state."

Elias anticipates that if the Framework forces succeed in forming a government, and under American pressure, they may move along five paths: "First: separating the PMF as an official body from the factions as political-military arms, establishing that the PMF, which receives salaries from the state, is exclusively subject to the Commander-in-Chief, while any formation that retains independent decision-making or external affiliation is treated as an entity outside the state."

The second move involves "controlling money before weapons. The most effective approach is to audit salaries, contracts, crossings, companies, economic offices, and transfers. When informal resources are cut off, the factions become less capable of maneuvering."

In the third path, Elias expects "restructuring leadership by changing sensitive positions within the PMF Commission, transferring some brigades to distant sectors away from the borders, integrating selected units into the army or Federal Police, and retiring undisciplined leaders or assigning them to symbolic positions."

The Iraqi expert adds a fourth path related to "dismantling from within, not through confrontation. The government may differentiate between three types: factions amenable to integration, factions requiring political containment, and completely resistant factions. The approach to dealing with them would be piecemeal: incentives for the disciplined, isolation for the resistant, and legal pressure on those involved."

He concludes with the fifth path, which concerns "transforming American pressure into internal political leverage. The Framework might tell the factions: either adhere to state discipline, or face sanctions, financial isolation, and security measures that affect everyone. Here, American pressure becomes a tool in the hands of the government, not merely an external threat."

Despite these five paths, Elias believes that "the 'Framework will not dismantle the factions in one stroke, because they are part of its political structure. However, it may work to gradually strip them of their military and financial independence, while retaining the PMF designation in a disciplined, institutional manner."


Four Killed in Israeli Strikes on Southern Lebanon

Israeli tanks drive in Lebanon, as seen from the Israeli side of the Israel-Lebanon border, in northern Israel, April 25, 2026. (Reuters)
Israeli tanks drive in Lebanon, as seen from the Israeli side of the Israel-Lebanon border, in northern Israel, April 25, 2026. (Reuters)
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Four Killed in Israeli Strikes on Southern Lebanon

Israeli tanks drive in Lebanon, as seen from the Israeli side of the Israel-Lebanon border, in northern Israel, April 25, 2026. (Reuters)
Israeli tanks drive in Lebanon, as seen from the Israeli side of the Israel-Lebanon border, in northern Israel, April 25, 2026. (Reuters)

Four people were killed on Saturday in Israeli strikes on southern Lebanon, Lebanon's state news agency reported, while the Israeli military said Hezbollah had fired rockets at Israel, the latest challenges to a tenuous, recently extended ceasefire.

The ceasefire agreed between Israel and Lebanon has led to a significant reduction in hostilities, ‌but Israel ‌and Iran-backed Hezbollah ‌have ⁠continued to clash ⁠in southern Lebanon, where Israel has kept soldiers in the self-declared buffer zone.

The Israeli military said on Saturday that it had struck loaded rocket launchers belonging to Hezbollah in three locations in southern Lebanon overnight ⁠and targeted several Hezbollah fighters in ‌separate strikes.

It was ‌unclear whether the deaths reported by the ‌state news agency were linked to those ‌Israeli strikes.

The Israeli military restated its warning for Lebanese residents not to approach the Litani River area in southern Lebanon while it battles ‌Hezbollah.

It said it had intercepted a "suspicious aerial target" within the area its ⁠forces ⁠are presently occupying, and that two rockets were fired by Hezbollah into northern Israel, one of which was intercepted. There were no reports of casualties.

A Hezbollah lawmaker said on Friday that a US-mediated ceasefire in the war with Israel was meaningless, a day after it was extended for three weeks. The truce had been due to expire on Sunday.