Gaza Prepares for First Local Elections in Two Decades

Election campaign banners showing candidates for the upcoming municipal elections hang on a building in Deir al-Balah in the central Gaza Strip on April 21, 2026. (AFP)
Election campaign banners showing candidates for the upcoming municipal elections hang on a building in Deir al-Balah in the central Gaza Strip on April 21, 2026. (AFP)
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Gaza Prepares for First Local Elections in Two Decades

Election campaign banners showing candidates for the upcoming municipal elections hang on a building in Deir al-Balah in the central Gaza Strip on April 21, 2026. (AFP)
Election campaign banners showing candidates for the upcoming municipal elections hang on a building in Deir al-Balah in the central Gaza Strip on April 21, 2026. (AFP)

Deir al-Balah in central Gaza will hold the enclave’s first local elections in nearly two decades, with voting set to begin on Saturday alongside municipal polls in the occupied West Bank.

A decree by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas designated Deir al-Balah as the only voting site in Gaza, citing its relatively limited damage from the Israeli war and better-preserved infrastructure compared with other areas.

Gaza last held local elections in 2005, when Hamas secured a majority. It followed with a legislative election win a year later and in 2007 consolidated control of the enclave after a conflict with rival Fatah. From 2005 to 2023, Hamas appointed members of local councils and municipalities across Gaza.

This vote comes after a two-year war that has reshaped the enclave and added political and operational challenges.

Who can vote?

The Central Elections Commission said about 70,449 registered voters in Deir al-Balah are eligible to cast ballots at 12 polling centers. These include open areas fitted with tents, while schools remain shelters for displaced residents.

The figure excludes many displaced people now living in the city, as only original residents are allowed to vote.

The commission has accredited 292 observers from 10 local monitoring groups and 45 journalists. Around 675 staff will run polling operations to ensure compliance with legal and professional standards.

Jamil al-Khalidi, the commission’s regional director in Gaza, told Asharq Al-Awsat the system uses closed lists. Voters select one list and cast votes for five candidates from it. A 15-member municipal council will be formed from the candidates who get the most votes, with at least four seats reserved for women.

Khalidi said ballot boxes and papers were ready ahead of Saturday, with 12 centers prepared across nine tents and three civil society facilities. Each center will include eight polling stations.

Preliminary results are expected on Sunday morning. All competing lists are independent and clan-based, with competition driven largely by geographic and family ties.

Who will secure the vote?

Khalidi said the Palestinian civil police, effectively the Hamas-run force, will secure the process.

He added that officers will keep their distance from polling centers due to the risk of Israeli strikes. They will deploy without weapons and intervene only if needed, before returning to positions outside the sites.

A private security company had been considered to handle the task, but Gaza’s civil police insisted on taking responsibility, and a plan was agreed with all parties, Khalidi said.

Commitment to the PLO program

Four lists are competing and campaigning has been more visible online than on the ground, with limited posters. Observers say the lists are self-funded, without factional backing.

Candidates were required to sign a pledge committing to the program of the Palestine Liberation Organization and recognizing it as the legitimate representative.

This requirement is contentious for Hamas, as it implies adherence to positions including recognition of Israel. The Palestinian Authority is seeking to enforce the pledge in line with its commitment to a two-state solution.

A local source said some candidates have past ties to Fatah and Hamas but are running as independents. No faction has publicly endorsed any of the competing lists.



UN Says 5.8 mn Refugee Children Out of School

Syrian refugee children attend a class at a school in Mount Lebanon, October 7, 2016. REUTERS/Mohamed Azaki
Syrian refugee children attend a class at a school in Mount Lebanon, October 7, 2016. REUTERS/Mohamed Azaki
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UN Says 5.8 mn Refugee Children Out of School

Syrian refugee children attend a class at a school in Mount Lebanon, October 7, 2016. REUTERS/Mohamed Azaki
Syrian refugee children attend a class at a school in Mount Lebanon, October 7, 2016. REUTERS/Mohamed Azaki

Some 5.8 million refugee children were out of school in 2025, the United Nations said Friday, warning that funding cuts threatened to make the situation worse.

UNHCR, the UN refugee agency, said 44 percent of the world's 13.1 million school-age refugee children were out of school last year.

"Education is protection. But it is also a pathway to opportunity and self-reliance," said Barham Salih, the UN high commissioner for refugees, AFP reported.

"At a time of severe pressure on humanitarian and development financing, cuts to education risk reversing decades of collective investment and closing opportunities for a generation of young people."

The former Iraqi president, who was a refugee, said that looking back on his own life, "education gave me opportunities that displacement might otherwise have denied me".

"Displacement should not determine the limits of a child's life."

UNHCR said that while 65 percent of refugee children of primary school age were enrolled in education in 2025, only 32 percent were enrolled in secondary.

Refugee tertiary education enrolment reached a record 11 percent in 2025.

Earlier this week, UNHCR said its available funding had fallen from $5.2 billion in 2024 to $3.9 billion in 2025, while the number of people it is mandated to protect is hovering around historically high levels.

UNHCR said it needed $8.5 billion this year to protect refugees, but by the end of July had received only 32 percent of that amount ($2.7 billion).

UNHCR said nearly 8.3 million refugees and other forcibly displaced people faced losing vital assistance from the agency as protection services crumble due to the "severe" funding cuts.


Who Are Hezbollah's Remaining Allies in Lebanon?

Hezbollah supporter weeps during a ceremony to mark the second anniversary of the death of party leader Hassan Nasrallah . Nasrallah was killed in a massive Israeli air strike on September 27, 2024. Photo: Marwan Naamani/dpa
Hezbollah supporter weeps during a ceremony to mark the second anniversary of the death of party leader Hassan Nasrallah . Nasrallah was killed in a massive Israeli air strike on September 27, 2024. Photo: Marwan Naamani/dpa
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Who Are Hezbollah's Remaining Allies in Lebanon?

Hezbollah supporter weeps during a ceremony to mark the second anniversary of the death of party leader Hassan Nasrallah . Nasrallah was killed in a massive Israeli air strike on September 27, 2024. Photo: Marwan Naamani/dpa
Hezbollah supporter weeps during a ceremony to mark the second anniversary of the death of party leader Hassan Nasrallah . Nasrallah was killed in a massive Israeli air strike on September 27, 2024. Photo: Marwan Naamani/dpa

The second anniversary of the assassinations of former Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and Hashem Safieddine exposed a grim reality facing Hezbollah inside Lebanon. It showed that the group has lost its network of domestic allies, as evidenced by the absence, for the first time in two decades, of figures who had been allied with the group before the 2024 war.

Two years after the assassinations, observers closely following the group's situation say Hezbollah is facing not only the challenge of rebuilding its capabilities and reorganizing its ranks, but also the erosion of the network of alliances it built over many years. A number of political forces appear to have reconsidered the value of maintaining ties with the group amid shifts in the balance of power domestically and regionally.

Among its most prominent former allies, the only one to attend the commemoration of Nasrallah was Suleiman Frangieh, head of the Marada Movement, who had been the group's candidate for the presidency before President Joseph Aoun was elected, along with leaders representing the Amal Movement, its partner in the Shiite duo.

Political Cover Unravels

Hezbollah succeeded in building a broad network of political alliances spanning most of Lebanon's sects and denominations after signing the 2006 memorandum of understanding with the Free Patriotic Movement. According to its opponents, this enabled the group to secure "political cover" for retaining its weapons and expanding its influence, eventually entrenching a parallel reality alongside state institutions.

But this network began to gradually unravel after the "Gaza Support" war, alongside the major military setback suffered by Hezbollah and the resulting change in its position within Lebanon's political equation. One of the most prominent signs of this unraveling was the distancing of key allies, foremost among them the Free Patriotic Movement on the Christian political scene, along with the declining presence of its allies among Sunni and Druze forces.

The distancing of Hezbollah's allies is not linked solely to the shift in the balance of power after the war, but also to the political and financial risks that have come to accompany close ties with Hezbollah. This comes amid US sanctions that have already targeted individuals and entities linked to the group or accused of supporting it, as well as threats to expand the sanctions to include other allies and political figures. This has prompted some of the group's allies to reassess their calculations, fearing that their relationship with Hezbollah could turn from a source of political influence into a source of costs and sanctions.

Transactional Alliances

Dr. Hilal Khashan, a professor of political science at the American University of Beirut, said the "cross-sectarian network" the group sought to build after entering politics was essentially "marginal." He noted that "the group long benefited from its military strength to build broad political influence and from presenting itself as a force capable of establishing a balance with Israel."

According to Khashan, the group spent years "entrenching a narrative based on taking the battle to the Galilee and portraying the existence of a military balance with Israel," a narrative that "a large part of the Shiite community believed." But the military strength Hezbollah had amassed, which was considered one of its main sources of influence in the region, "suffered an unprecedented blow during the war, which inevitably affected its political position."

Khashan told Asharq Al-Awsat that Hezbollah had, throughout the past period, "provided political cover for parties and forces in exchange for obtaining cover for its policies and weapons, making many of the alliances closer to transactional alliances and exchanges of interests than to firmly established political or ideological partnerships."

Khashan believes that "the collapse of the balance of power that allowed the group to manage these relationships will make rebuilding its previous network of alliances extremely difficult, particularly as political forces that once saw benefits and political protection in an alliance with it now face a different reality." He expects the Amal Movement, through new figures, to assume leadership of the Shiite community in the coming phase.

Alienation Likely to Increase

Political writer and editor-in-chief of the Janoubia website Ali Al-Amin, for his part, said Hezbollah, which had been "a center of attraction for allies and political patronage for many years, is no longer so today, three years after the start of the Support War. It currently lacks allies and is facing an internal and external siege, a reality that can be readily observed." Al-Amin added: "This was clearly evident at the commemoration of the assassinations of its two former secretaries-general, as most of those who had once competed to sit in the front row were absent."

Al-Amin told Asharq Al-Awsat that "this alienation is likely to increase," noting that "the issue of weapons is another matter related to Hezbollah's role and position, which does not appear to have understood what befell it, the Shiites, and Lebanon as a result of a major catastrophe. It remains committed to its role as an Iranian tool subject to the calculations set by the Supreme Leader from inside Iran."

Al-Amin concluded: "In light of the current political and security circumstances, and with the group continuing to use rhetoric that is at odds with reality and its new facts, it will find no resonance beyond its supporters. Its visits to some political forces have not produced anything that could be described as a restoration of its alliances or friendships. In practical terms, it is trying to climb out of the hole it fell into by falling into more holes, which will deepen its predicament and expose its inability to redefine its existence on the foundations of the state."

He added: "In view of all this, it cannot be expected that the group will repair its fractured alliances. Rather, they will continue to collapse and disappear."


Al-Alimi Announces Start of Full-Scale Military Campaign Against Houthis

Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council Chairman Rashad Al-Alimi (Saba)
Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council Chairman Rashad Al-Alimi (Saba)
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Al-Alimi Announces Start of Full-Scale Military Campaign Against Houthis

Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council Chairman Rashad Al-Alimi (Saba)
Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council Chairman Rashad Al-Alimi (Saba)

Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council Chairman Rashad Al-Alimi on Sunday announced the start of military operations to reclaim the remaining territory of the republic and extend the authority of the state and its institutions across the entire country, marking an official transition from a phase of preparation and mobilization to open military action.

In an address to the Yemeni people, Al-Alimi said the decision to begin the operations was taken after the necessary procedures and measures had been completed and based on decisions by the National Defense Council. He said he had instructed the armed forces, security forces, and all military formations to carry out their duties according to approved plans "until the country is liberated from the grip of the terrorist militia."

Al-Alimi justified the decision by saying that opportunities for de-escalation had been exhausted. He said the state had given peace sufficient time and opportunities, while the Houthi group had responded with further mobilization, escalation, attacks, and threats against civilians, national facilities, neighboring countries, and international waterways.

He stressed that the announced battle is not a war against residents of areas under Houthi control, nor against any sect or tribe, but rather "a battle for the state and its citizens and to restore its institutions." He said its objective is to end the seizure of Yemenis' will and political future through the use of force.

Al-Alimi delivered a direct message to residents in Houthi-controlled areas, calling on them to stay away from military positions, gatherings, and supply routes, and to protect their children from being drawn into the fighting. At the same time, he reiterated the state's commitment to the safe return and declared amnesty for those who lay down their weapons and stop fighting alongside the group.

In a message to government forces and the resistance, the chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council stressed that the mission is "not only to reclaim the land, but to restore the state to it." He called for the protection of civilians and property and adherence to the law, stressing that there would be no room for revenge, retaliation, or attacks on innocent people.

Directives to the Government

On the civilian front, Al-Alimi said he had instructed the government to prepare a program of action to run in parallel with the military operations, so that state institutions would begin assuming their responsibilities in areas reclaimed by government forces as they are recovered.

The priorities he outlined include resuming the payment of state employees' salaries and addressing outstanding dues retroactively, launching an urgent recovery and reconstruction program, repairing damaged roads, electricity and water networks, and facilities, and creating conditions for the return of displaced people and the resumption of economic activity.

Al-Alimi said the success of the battle would not be measured by the number of cities reclaimed, but by the number of citizens who regain security, families that return to their homes, and measures that prevent a return to practices of killing, oppression, and depriving the people of their will.

He also reiterated the commitment of the Presidential Leadership Council and the government to the outcome of the Saudi-sponsored south-south dialogue, in a manner that ensures a fair and comprehensive solution to the southern issue. He called on brothers and friends, as well as the international community, to support Yemen, its armed forces, and national institutions, and to support humanitarian and economic efforts and recovery and reconstruction programs.

Al-Alimi concluded by announcing that the state's military, security, and civilian institutions had entered a "state of full mobilization" until the mission was accomplished, stressing that the new phase seeks to restore the state to its territory and institutions and return weapons to their "natural place under the authority of the law."