More than three years after Saudi Arabia and Iran signed their agreement in Beijing, brokered by China, the reconciliation between Riyadh and Tehran is facing one of its most difficult tests, amid accusations that Iran is supporting armed groups in Yemen and Iraq that have targeted Saudi Arabia, and as the Houthis move toward the Bab al-Mandab Strait, raising concerns over the Kingdom's security and navigation in the Red Sea.
AFP reported, citing two Houthi military sources, that experts from Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps had visited the Bab al-Mandab area, the port and airport of Mokha, and the Jabal al-Nar camp east of the city. The sources said the experts had supervised the digging of tunnels in the mountains overlooking Mokha and the Bab al-Mandab Strait and had discussed installing radars near Mokha and on Zuqar Island in the southern Red Sea.
Analysts who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat said the latest developments not only test Tehran's commitment to its pledges, but also put China's role under scrutiny. The issue is no longer limited to maintaining diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, but also concerns the agreement's ability to curb sources of indirect threats and prevent armed groups from being used to pressure countries in the region.
Riyadh and Tehran signed an agreement in Beijing under Chinese sponsorship to resume diplomatic relations after a break of nearly seven years.
Bab al-Mandab: A Serious Test for the Agreement
Dr. Abdulaziz bin Sager, Chairman of the Gulf Research Center, said the Beijing Agreement, signed in March 2023, was based on three main components: restoring diplomatic relations after seven years of estrangement, reactivating bilateral cooperation agreements, and respecting the sovereignty of states and noninterference in their internal affairs. He described the third component as "the most important and most sensitive."
In an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, bin Sager said Iran's actions through the Houthis near the Bab al-Mandab Strait "represent a serious test of the Saudi-Iranian agreement" because they violate both its provisions and its spirit, which was based on building trust. He added that the commitments should not be limited to Iran's direct actions, but should also cover the conduct of groups linked to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.
"There is no meaning to any agreement with Iran that does not cover the actions of its regional proxies that threaten regional and international security," he said, considering support for the Houthis or incitement to threaten the Kingdom's security a "blatant violation" of the commitment to respect sovereignty and refrain from interference.
Abdulaziz Al-Shaibani, a researcher and adviser on Chinese and Asian affairs, takes a different view. He said Iranian actions near the Bab al-Mandab Strait test the Beijing Agreement but do not mean that it has collapsed. The agreement was designed primarily to restore relations and open channels for dialogue, not to end the rivalry between Riyadh and Tehran or establish a strategic partnership between them.
The Proxy Policy
Saudi political analyst Dr. Khalid Al-Habbas said the militia policy is one of Tehran's most important tools for expanding its regional influence. He said the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps supports, trains, and organizes these groups, enabling them to play roles that serve Iranian objectives when needed.
Al-Habbas places the latest Houthi moves, as well as the earlier activities of Iran-aligned factions in Iraq, within the context of growing military and economic pressure on Tehran and its efforts to open alternative fronts of pressure. He said moves toward the Bab al-Mandab Strait could threaten maritime navigation, drive up energy prices, and disrupt supply chains.
Dr. Khalid cautioned against relying on Houthi pledges not to target ships, saying that the experience of the Red Sea since late 2023 has demonstrated otherwise. He stressed that protecting maritime navigation "is an international responsibility, not one that falls on the Kingdom alone," given the global importance of the waterway.
According to Al-Habbas, Saudi Arabia, while remaining committed to resolving disputes peacefully and keeping the door to diplomacy open, has the right to defend itself under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. It also has the right to "demand that Iran comply with the terms of the agreement and review it in light of the extent to which Tehran has honored its commitments."
Has the Testing Period Ended?
Dr. Samir Salha, a professor of international law and international relations at Istanbul University, takes a more forceful position. "We have moved beyond the question of testing the understandings. It is clear that the Iranian side has departed from their spirit and begun pursuing a regional policy different from what it had pledged," he said.
He added that the central question is no longer simply whether Tehran is complying, but who is arming the Houthis, training them, and directing their operations.
"The threats appear Houthi on the surface, but at their core they are Iranian," he said, arguing that the mobilization of Iran-aligned groups in Yemen, Iraq, and Lebanon reflects an Iranian priority that has not changed despite the restoration of relations with Riyadh.
In Salha's assessment, Saudi Arabia will not base its options solely on waiting for China to act. Instead, it will continue exploring strategic alternatives to ensure its security while keeping the diplomatic track open, a process he said has already begun in recent months.
Beijing: Opening the Way Is Not Enough
The analysts agree that China has significant tools for influencing Iran, given the depth of their economic, political, and military ties. But they say Beijing is being called upon to move from its symbolic role as sponsor of the agreement to a more decisive role in monitoring its implementation.
Bin Sager said Beijing "is capable of verifying Iranian conduct that violates the agreement," but tends to favor ambiguity and avoids taking decisive positions when crises do not directly affect its national security. What is needed now, he said, is a clear mechanism for verifying Tehran's compliance and restraining its proxies.
Salha, meanwhile, said China faces a difficult choice between simply protecting its relationship with Iran and defending its broader interests with the Gulf states and the trade routes that pass through the Red Sea. "This is primarily a test for Iran, but secondarily a test for Beijing," he said.
"Beijing faces a difficult, sensitive, and delicate situation. There have been positive indications in its positions and political messages toward Iran recently, but betting that Tehran will accept and heed what Beijing says is difficult," he added.
Dr. Samir noted that "Beijing succeeded in opening the way for a new test in Saudi-Iranian relations, but it now needs to go further if it wants to protect its interests and relations with the Gulf states."
Al-Shaibani, for his part, said Beijing tends to favor diplomacy and avoid direct intervention, and is not expected to decisively side with either party. He concluded that the future of the agreement will depend on China's ability to keep dialogue open and contain crises, while Saudi Arabia retains the right to protect its security and interests through its own capabilities and regional partnerships.
