Those calling for Hezbollah's disarmament, and for peace that ends the wars with Israel, rest their position on premises that are difficult to ignore.
At the most basic level, the wars have exhausted Lebanon, taken a toll on its already frail national fabric, and played a crucial role in the destruction of its economy, before bringing about an occupation of Lebanese land that could well expand. It has thus become urgent not merely to get out of this war, but to leave war behind altogether.
Then there is the qualitative imbalance of power between Lebanon and Israel, which precludes the Lebanese from influencing the terms of any peace agreement. Delaying disarmament aggravates the imbalance. As for the regional and international help some are depending on to create a bulwark against Israel, it is far weaker than the help being offered to bring peace through the framework proposed. It is highly doubtful that the Jewish state, after October 7, would accept anything less than a peace treaty or its equivalent.
Moreover, Lebanon remaining occupied and rejecting peace with Israel does nothing for the Palestinians, whose course is decided by other international and regional factors. Beyond that, and despite moral and conscientious sympathy, the Palestinian cause, or any cause, should no longer be allowed to maintain a veto over the sovereign decisions of Lebanon or of any Arab country.
The problem lies not in these premises as a theoretical text, but in the feasibility of their application. What those advocating this course overlook is precisely the difficulty of taking it- specifically, how it runs up against Lebanon as it has come to be understood: the country of "national unity,sectarian coexistence," and "no victor, no vanquished." This leaves one of two possibilities: either reconsidering Lebanon itself, or continuing to flounder. It is not insignificant that for two years and more we have been captive to a debate whose arguments we keep repeating and chewing over, although the debate is now behind us- not because it has been resolved, but precisely because it cannot be.
The president and the prime minister, and with them the army commander, will never move to disarm the party. This is not because of cowardly or hesitant temperaments, nor because of poor political choices, but precisely because of their representative positions at the head of this compromise-based arrangement, which the problem cannot be approached without also approaching.
So what do we find when we sketch the broad outlines of the state Lebanon is in?
There is the crushing defeat that has not driven Hezbollah's base to substantially or noticeably break with the party. In the event of a civil war, for example- which Israel could not possibly stay out of- peace advocates would find themselves in the deeply awkward position of fighting alongside the Israelis against their Lebanese compatriots. Even if we were to rule out a civil war, it is certain that a broad segment of the population would see the proposed peace as a reward for the near-genocidal campaign they had been subjected to, and would see the post-peace order as an extension of a repugnant peace. It may rightly be said that this rejectionist approach fails to solve the problem and instead entrenches it. But when have problems like these, or contests between major choices, ever been settled by cold, rational calculation?
Iran's grip on the party, one can safely assume, will ensure that it remains extremely disconnected from reality. It may be argued, on the other hand, that the Iranian regime’s collapse would accelerate decoupling of the party and its base. While this may be true, it would not suffice to overcome the bitterness fueled by the conception of peace as a victory for rival communities seen as an enemy- especially since that rivals go out of their way to present this peace as their triumph. In this regard, they are not wrong: peace validates these rivals’ longstanding opposition to Lebanon serving as a launchpad for wars against Israel, whether waged by the Palestine Liberation Organization or by Hezbollah. It also validates giving absolute priority to the nation-state and its interests over transnational and religious "brotherhood."
Peace will thus look like the triumph of one community over another. Equating rejection of the party's weapons (however widespread that rejection becomes) with acceptance of peace with Israel is therefore wishful thinking, so long as the issue plays out as a contest of power and domination among the sects.
In fact, broad segments of the Lebanese population see peace with Israel as antithetical to their sentiments and upbringing- even with the language they use automatically and reflexively. And this is while no Arab party is pushing the Lebanese in this direction, and as Israel's actions in post-Assad Syria only compound fears and doubts.
Peace is made even harder for many to swallow by considerations that cannot be ignored, foremost among them Netanyahu himself, for whom open-ended war amounts to a permanent political program. On top of this, the "framework agreement" makes no mention of "withdrawal" after the party is disarmed, speaking instead of a gradual redeployment outside Lebanese territory.
With so wide a chasm, the question of leaving the war behind cannot be raised without questioning the current national compact. Over the past three years, a deeply fragile consensus has been put to a difficult test- a consensus that the party's resistance keeps destroying, and that the optimism of those who believe in easy solutions keeps wrapping in gift warps.
