After the October 7 operation, Zionism became the subject of two readings and projections:
Either Zionism’s failure as a remedy for the Jewish question is concluded, a remedy that was claimed to be the only way to guarantee the Jews a homeland and state that safeguard their security, thereby allowing them to obtain the requisites for stability and prosperity; or affirming the need to renew and reinforce it by additional fangs to anchor this remedy, as well as greater certainty that there is no alternative, especially given the fact that the Jews outside Israel are less safe than they had been.
The fact is that today's world is brimming with factors that put Zionism, and nationalism in general, behind us: from the globalization of the economy to the globalization of environmental issues, and from the establishment of international institutions to fighting transnational crime...
Moreover, if we have in fact transcended nationalism as a whole, it is even more true that we have transcended Zionism, not only because it expelled a people whose existence it opted not to acknowledge, and replaced them with another, but also because it falls into the category of “communitarian nationalism.” By definition, this form of nationalism runs counter to cultural pluralism, the primacy of civil ties, and the application of human rights and other universal values...
With that, however, this transcendence remains theoretical. Indeed, this world that has gone beyond this form of nationalism is also simultaneously reaffirming and entrenching it. While it has gone beyond this need in material relations, it emphasizes it in its consciousness, which is reflected by the current consensus that we live in an era of identities accompanied by an accelerating global shift toward a form of tribalism.
Thus, we find ourselves faced with a major paradox. Zionism, which has been theoretically transcended, is becoming a model for others who are enticed to embrace doctrines similar to Zionism or establish states similar to Israel.
The desire to dismantle Zionism, which is both a legitimate and progressive desire, will probably not be actualized unless the identitarian and tribal surge wanes across the globe as a whole and in our region in particular. We need to go no further back than a few decades to be convinced that the burst of identity and tribalism, both its Zionist and anti-Zionist manifestations, is what gave rise to open-ended wars and perpetual disasters.
It would be fair to say, on the other hand, that nothing could shorten Zionism’s lifespan more than political (and by extension intellectual and ideological) breakthroughs. To give one of many examples, the climate that the Oslo Accords introduced in 1993 gave rise to “post-Zionism,” and with it the revisions of the “New Historians,” who have presented the most robust historical arguments for the cleansing and expulsions that accompanied the Nakba of 1948.
We also know that what killed the proposed single state for Arabs and Jews in historical Palestine, which would have led to an Arab numerical majority and a Jewish minority, is that the entire region was mired in conflicts between majorities and minorities, with numerical superiority being weaponized to resolve conflicts. Thus, it would be untenable for Israeli Jews, even the moderates, to accept such a solution as the mutual fears of the other are tangible around them. Sunnis and Shiites, Arabs and Kurds, and Muslims and Christians - these fears that could morph into death and destruction at any moment. Zionist aggression would have doubtlessly seemed more out of touch with the times and embarrassing if a single democratic and secular experiment in the Arab region had been fated to succeed.
It would not be an exaggeration to assume that any hardening of identitarian ties is an unadulterated gift to Zionism and an endorsement of its most bloody and barbaric “solutions,” which we are seeing today. This is as true for Arab nationalism as it is for political Islam or any similar bent. Just as Zionism's propensity for extremism and madness pushes those ties to corresponding degrees of extremism and madness, the opposite is true. Rather, the mere existence of Israeli Zionism undermines any criticism directed at partisan and militia movements that raise nationalist or Islamic slogans, and even strengthens those movements, and the latter undercuts any hope of the atrophy or erosion of Zionism. This hard fact might be among the misfortunes of our history.
We know that the inclinations of identity disregard all others, just as they disregard the zeitgeist of the times, pushing themselves and the world to apocalyptic conclusions.
Zionism, for example, established its state against a wave of decolonization, just one year after India’s independence. The Arab nationalist military coups, which were influenced by fascism before being influenced by Soviet communism, did not emerge until after fascism was defeated in World War II. As for the event that introduced the transition to political Islam, the Iranian revolution in 1979, it coincided with the transition toward calm in the region that Anwar Sadat had brought about as indications began mounting that the Cold War was beginning to exhaust itself.
For this reason, it seems that extracting Palestinian patriotism from the clutches of identities and tribes would do more than anything to reconcile it with the interests of the Palestinians themselves, while sparing it, and us, the evils of communitarian links, especially that which has the greatest capacity for inflicting evil and harm: Zionism. Of course, such a retreat towards patriotism, especially Palestinian patriotism, can only happen if it is done in parallel and solidarity with all the sides of this conflict.
Unfortunately, we see nothing of this sort today, leaving us with a greater degree of Zionism and its abiotic antis, in a region that is turning into a desolate landscape decorated with “victories.”
