Jalili, Ghalibaf, and Between them, Pezeshkian

The Iranian presidential elections taking place today could be exceptional by every metric, especially in terms of the situation of the region and the globe. Iranian decision-makers want a hardliner suitable for this moment fraught with major crises that Iran itself- not only in its spheres of influence but also domestically- will not be immune to. Regarding the challenges it faces within the country, the regime needs to boost turnout to project legitimacy and show that the regime enjoys popular support. On the other hand, the manner in which the contest was managed- the particular individuals it was limited to and how they were selected- give credence to the conviction that Iranian decision-makers have engineered the elections to ensure that one of their preferred candidates takes office at this stage. Indeed, the regime wants to ensure that the regime and state institutions are fully aligned to avoid going back to the struggle between the reformist and conservative camps.
Two candidates vying for the votes of the conservative camp that supports the regime and the revolution, who represent no more than 20 percent of the Iranian population, a base that includes both ideological and pragmatic supporters. However, this solid, ideologically homogeneous force is sharply polarized as a result of the clear conflict within the radical circles running the country and competing over who takes control in the future. The conflict within this camp is a struggle between radical military forces, the IRGC and Basij, whose candidate is General Ghalibaf, and puritanical civilian loyalists supported by the religious establishment, who support Saeed Jalili.
The power struggle between the military (that is, the IRGC) and the ideological religious establishment is underway at this juncture because of a series of factors, and it will have an array of ramifications. It is clear that the next president will not be a cleric, meaning that he will not be among the candidates to become Iran’s Supreme Leader. Nonetheless, he will be at the top of the pyramid during the transitional phase in which a new Supreme Leader will be chosen, and his endorsement could be consequential. In other words, he will shape and manage the state and regime for a long time, making him the main man in Iran.
Thus, ideological civilians (the puritanical camp) are apprehensive that the state could be militarized if the candidate closest to the IRGC, former General and current Speaker of Parliament Ghalibaf, becomes president. A Ghalibaf victory would grant the generals greater influence within the state and the regime, allowing them to totally dominate the transitional phase. They already have their near-total control over the security, military, and economic institutions, and their candidate’s victory would grant them the executive power for the first time since 1979.
On the other hand, supporters of the puritanical candidate, Saeed Jalili, want to safeguard the essence of the Islamic system and prevent the military from taking hold of the highest position in Iran during the transitional phase. This opens the door to future speculation about Iran’s future and the shape of the regime in light of these internal conflicts, as well as the near-total disconnect between the revolutionary regime and the majority of Iranians, which was evident during the Hijab Uprising of 2022 and the boycott of the parliamentary elections in 2024.
However, between Jalili and Ghalibaf, a previously overlooked candidate has risen to prominence. He poses a genuine threat to the plans of these decision-makers, and there is a real possibility that their electoral engineering could fail. According to the latest figures, the reformist candidate is ahead of all of his competitors. In recent days, he has been endorsed by leaders from both the reformist and moderate camps. Their endorsements could well impel the large reformist base that had been sitting on the sidelines to walk back on their decision to boycott the elections. This development pushed the Supreme Leader to suggest, during his most recent speech, that the president should not go against the slogans and principles of the revolution, in what was a clear message directed at Masoud Pezeshkian.
It is obvious that the establishment will not manage to decide the election in the first round, which could signal a decline in its popularity. Iran’s rulers might fail to rally the entirety of their base behind their preferred candidate in the second round. This means a major upset, one that is reminiscent of the Mohammad Khatami and Ali Akbar Nategh-Nouri contest of 1997, is on the cards.