A theory that genuine revolutions are those that change society, not the regime, has been ubiquitous in discussions of Syrian affairs. Nonetheless, this claim is more of a slogan than a theory- it says everything and nothing. That revolutions are assessed by the extent to which they change social relations, ideas, culture, education, questions of sex and gender, and consequently views of the self and the world, is self-evident. But is change on any of those fronts even possible without changing the political regime? Is toppling the regime not a necessary, albeit insufficient, condition for social change? Indeed, we are not talking about states that respect civil society’s independence or shy away from interfering in every social and cultural process. With regard to Syria in particular, the Assad apparatus that was called a state has always been infamous for two things above all else: interfering in every nook and cranny of its citizens' lives- their social relations, education, and even communication at the most basic level- and viciously punishing those who fail to conform to the standards it imposed. The macabre scenes we saw in Sednaya and elsewhere speak louder than words.
For this reason, it is entirely valid to read the "change society rather than the regime" theory as an attempt to find a way out of taking part in the effort to change the regime, and therefore as an indication of indifference to societal change.
On the other hand, Syrians and those concerned with Syria’s future must now contend with a different kind of problem in post-Bashar Syria: What happens when the regime is overthrown but social change does not begin, or when, as many Syrians fear, society finds itself risking a change for the worse?
Here, we are faced with the antithesis of the first theory: changing the regime is sufficient, making social change- or to be more precise, people’s freedom to change their society in line with their own experiences and aspirations- unnecessary.
The fact is that both theories cover only a fraction of the concept, albeit on antithetical grounds, and then replace the holistic definition with their fraction. They also both serve to maintain an authoritarian status quo and go against those who seek to dismantle it. Moreover, both are grounded in communal animosities that are not difficult to unpack. Traditionally, the first theory has seen secularism as the key to societal change, embracing the assumption that neutralizing religion allows for erasing the distinction between the majority and the minorities. In turn, the second theory historically- and currently- concludes that the answer is (either quasi-democratic or non-democratic) populist governance, that allows the numerical majority to determine the nature of "guarantees" and "reassurances" offered to minorities.
What can be said today is that the fall of the regime opens the door to the long, difficult, and complex task of "changing society." Here, the cultural struggle comes to occupy a central position, and opposing views of what kind of Syria Syrians aspire to clash. Actions and rhetoric that had once seemed to reflect "culturalism,” which puts culture in the position that politics should occupy and calls for societal change as a way of evading changes to the political system, no longer seem that way. Personal and public freedoms, the relationship between religion and politics, the status of women, historical narratives, and educational curricula are all likely to be subjects of fierce debate, alongside the unique identities of Syria’s various communities, whether sectarian, regional, or ethnic. All the more so in light of the lethal blows dealt to the "nationalist" forces and the "resistance" in Syria and across the Levant, which have removed the burden of irresolvable "existential" causes from the shoulders of societal and cultural questions that can be resolved.
Of course, those who are waging this struggle today have nothing in common with those who had called for changing society without changing the regime yesterday. The battle is being waged by the sons and daughters of the 2011 revolution, who have paid a heavy price for their effort to overthrow the regime, and they now find themselves confronted with the challenges of transforming society.
The most pressing question is not whether it will take three or four years to formulate a constitution and hold elections, but the climate that will prevail during this period. Will there be an effort to ensure a free and peaceful environment that makes the formation of organizations, associations, and parties, and the exchange of ideas possible? Or will Syrians who aspire to change that goes beyond the regime be clamped down on?
The reality is that this new struggle will not be easy. Syria is dealing with a grinding economic crisis, its population is scattered, the political situation differs according to region, and all of that is compounded by the political void left by the fallen regime. Additionally, the regime’s decades-long severe repression of social and cultural activism left the country with no foundations or accumulated efforts that could be built upon. Nevertheless, any prohibitions or obstacles sent by the new regime would set the stage for future conflicts that we hope the new Syria can be spared. Either the phase that is now emerging allows for a struggle over social and cultural matters in which peaceful engagement replaces military conflict, or ruin likely looms over the horizon.
