Osman Mirghani
TT
20

What Happens After the Liberation of Khartoum

In a week of swift military shifts, the Sudanese Armed Forces have completed the liberation of Bahri city, except for a few pockets that are currently being cleared. At the same time, there is little left to do to recapture Khartoum, and the army is advancing towards the capital from several fronts.

We can expect an official communique to be issued soon announcing the liberation of Khartoum and that the army has secured control of the Republican Palace, state ministries, and strategic facilities.

What are the implications of these developments? Militarily, it cannot, in any way, be said that the war has been settled- there is still a long road ahead. However, the balance of power has completely shifted in favor of the army, the joint forces, and the fighters it has mobilized.

The army leadership has said that after the battle to liberate Khartoum, they will advance to the Kordofan region and then to Darfur, where the nature of the battles will be entirely different. Instead of the difficult urban warfare, they have had to engage in so far, most of the fighting is expected to take place in relatively open areas.

It is clear now that the war has now entered a critical phase, and that the initiative is firmly in the hands of the army and the forces fighting alongside it. This shift has been paralleled by another in the psychological and media war. The army’s supporters and the civilians residing in liberated areas are celebrating. Meanwhile, its opponents have consistently denounced the military and sought to downplay its achievements.

I consider their messaging to be deliberate misinformation. They are claiming that the army’s gains (the liberation of Madani, then Bahri, and now Khartoum) were the result of an agreement to set the stage for negotiations after the army had improved its military position and that the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have not collapsed but decided on a tactical retreat.

This narrative is not supported by facts on the ground. The RSF has made uncoordinated retreats from its positions, leaving behind weapons and fleeing west wherever possible, making it clear that it is in disarray. Moreover, their propaganda entirely ignores the army leadership’s reiterations that it is committed to deciding the war militarily, effectively ruling out any negotiations at this stage.

Talk of the army achieving these victories without combat, and the RSF voluntarily withdrawing from their positions as part of a "deal," fails to account for the army's long-term strategy, which General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan has likened their approach to "drilling with needle"- a slow and deliberate gains aimed that allow for rebuilding the army’s military capabilities while gradually wearing the RSF out.

This strategy ultimately left the RSF surrounded from all directions, making it impossible for its forces to use their preferred tactic, which is to retreat and then try to go around the enemy.

Once they were surrounded, the RSF had two choices: either wage a suicidal battle under siege or flee. They chose the latter, abandoning their equipment in their retreat.

Moreover, the "negotiated withdrawal" theory is undermined by the infighting within the RSF, which has led to a purge of prominent RSF commanders who were blamed for its recent losses and accused of abandoning the fight.

Additionally, social media has been flooded with videos and recordings of RSF fighters criticizing their leadership and holding them responsible for their successive defeats.

In light of the above, what are the implications of Khartoum’s liberation, which we have every reason to believe is imminent?

Putting military consideration, and the expectations that Sudan’s armed forces will immediately press forward toward Kordofan and Darfur, to one side, another battle deserves our attention.

We will witness a battle to restore essential services and rebuild the capital’s infrastructure, to facilitate the return of its residents and the resumption of normal life. The return of displaced people to their homes will be a psychological and moral victory. They will return to their lives after having been forced to flee their neighborhoods, which were occupied by the RSF, with many of them being turned into military barracks, weapons depots, and storage sites for looted goods, and others outright destroyed.

Their return will also create immense challenges, and restoring electricity, water, healthcare, banking, and commercial services will have to be restored quickly.

Given that Khartoum (with its three major cities) is one of Sudan’s most densely populated areas, vast resources will be required to rise to this challenge. Clearing debris and deploying police forces to curb chaos must be the first steps, followed by reopening schools and universities.

The people also expect the government to resume its functions after returning to Khartoum. That must be a top priority, not only for its military, political, and symbolic significance but also because it would be the ultimate signal that citizens can return to their homes. After all, it would be untenable to ask people to return to the capital if the government itself were to remain in Port Sudan.

The government’s return would reassure the population and send a clear message to the world: the balance of this war has shifted, and, if the current trajectory continues, the conflict is about to end. Of course, the path ahead will not be easy. The war, with its complexities and the involvement of several foreign actors, has made that clear to everyone. However, it is fair to say that the worst may now be behind us. And maybe, the people will draw valuable lessons from this bitter experience.