The old guard in the Palestinian arena consists not merely of individuals who have occupied and continue to hold leadership positions since its founding, it is also a formula that has governed the arena for decades without any fundamental renewal of its structure or figures.
Following the radical political shift brought about by the Oslo Accords - one of its key hallmarks being the recognition of Israel and the return of the Palestinian leadership, headed by the veteran leader Yasser Arafat, to parts of the homeland - what seems illogical occurred: the formula changed while the individuals remained, with the old guard completely occupying the new reality.
For the first time in the era of the Palestinian revolution and the PLO, general elections were held that produced a wholly elected parliament, and produced a government as well, also for the first time. Yet, the old guard remained in positions of leadership and decision-making, retaining control over all branches of both the Palestinian Authority and PLO.
Legally, the influence and formula of the old guard were safeguarded by a constitutional text that placed the newly established entity under its leadership. This was achieved by designating the nascent PA as a branch of the PLO, where Arafat, his aides, and the pillars of his administration were either drawn directly from the old guard or were disciples from subsequent generations.
During the era of the PA, Arafat, the founder of the old guard, led all that was new in the exact same manner and with the same concepts that had guided his leadership of the Palestinian cause throughout his long years at the helm. When he passed away, he was succeeded by Mahmoud Abbas, Arafat's partner in both the initial launch decision and the decision to establish the new entity.
Since I am not engaging in an extensive discussion about history - parts of which began the day Arafat and his leadership returned to the homeland through the Oslo Accords - what I am addressing in this article is where we are now after everything that has occurred: the collapse of the new reality associated with the Oslo process, and the survival of the old guard as it is, from its veteran leader Mahmoud Abbas to the aides surrounding him and the keepers of the PA's remaining influence, all of whom are either from Fatah or the PLO, or newcomers who became part of the scene through their integration with Abbas's leadership.
As I have stated, the old guard is not merely a group of individuals, but a formula as well. It is this old guard and its formula that are currently attempting to restore what has collapsed of the structure they founded and led for long decades. I am certain that combining the foundational tasks of decades ago - along with the leadership tasks during the era of rise, proliferation, and expansion, and the rebuilding of what has been destroyed under completely adverse conditions - and expecting the old guard, with its old formula, to undertake all of this, appears not only difficult, but illogical and bordering on the impossible.
One of the exits the old guard has resorted to is the attempt to involve the Palestinian people in the remediation process through elections of various kinds - the most important of which now are the legislative elections, followed by the presidential ones, and sandwiched between them, the PLO elections. Here, it is worth paying attention to the nature of the ongoing debate within the circles of the old guard regarding general elections, as well as the context of this debate.
Anxiety over the elections is natural and predictable as long as the preoccupation of the old guard remains the continuation of its control over the political landscape and its emerging requirements. This control is not guaranteed this time, owing to the potential heavy turnout that will sweep the ballot boxes and is expected to number in the millions.
A turnout of this scale and ambiguity regarding what it might lead to certainly warrants anxiety, as there are no guarantees for controlling either its course or its outcomes.
Driven by this anxiety, deliberations and debates are taking place between those calling for postponing the elections, which effectively means canceling them, and those calling for contesting them, even with relative and limited control over their results, as well as officials seeking alternatives to replicate their influence, which is already crumbling due to the erosion of the political ground on which they stand. Until a decision is reached on whether to hold the elections on time or postpone them through a formula that evades condemnation for their cancellation, the old guard will continue its logical anxiety over its role and influence, and the debate surrounding the elections and their alternatives will persist.
The easiest exit is simultaneously the most dangerous one: for the situation to remain as it is, characterized by the accelerating demise of the old formula and its guardians, away from establishing a firm path toward a new structure, without which there is no life for the people and their cause.
The dilemma of the old guard is that reality has forced upon it choices, the sweetest of which is bitter, yet a decision has to be made.
